Date: 19980514
Dockets: 97-648-IT-I; 97-2169-IT-I
BETWEEN:
PATRICIA M. COLLINS,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Rowe, D.J.T.C.C.
[1] The appellant appeals from assessments of income tax for
the 1993 (97-648(IT)I) and 1995 (97-2169(IT)I)
taxation years. The parties agreed the two appeals would be
heard together. In computing income for the 1993 and
1995 taxation years, the appellant claimed tuition fees in
the sums of $2,520 and $9,700, respectively, paid to Choice
Learning Centre for Exceptional Children Society (Choice) as a
medical expense eligible for a tax credit pursuant to the
provisions of section 118.2 of the Income Tax Act (the
"Act"). In each taxation year, the Minister of
National Revenue (the "Minister") disallowed the claim
for the tax credit on the basis the fees were not an allowable
medical expense pursuant to paragraph 118.2(2) of the
Act.
[2] Pursuant to a Request to Admit, the respondent responded
and admitted the following facts:
1. Nicholas Collins is the son of the appellant;
2. Joan Pinkus, Ph.D. and Dr. Gabrielle Weiss are
appropriately qualified persons within the meaning of paragraph
118.2(2)(e);
3. Nicholas Collins has been diagnosed as having severe
Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD);
[3] However, the respondent did not admit that Nicholas
Collins had been certified to be a person who, by reason of a
physical or mental handicap, requires the equipment, facilities
or personnel specially provided by Choice Learning Centre or
other institution or place for the care, or the care and
training, of individuals suffering from the handicap suffered by
Nicholas Collins. Further, the respondent did not admit that
Nicholas Collins has, and always had, Attention Deficit Disorder
(ADD) and Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD) and did not admit
that ADHD was a mental handicap or that it had been certified as
such.
[4] The following points are in issue in the appeals:
1. Does Nicholas Collins suffer from a mental handicap?
2. If he does, has he been properly certified by a qualified
person to be someone who should attend at Choice because of
having been diagnosed as a person suffering from ADHD.
3. Does Choice specially provide equipment, facilities or
personnel for the care or the care and training of individuals
suffering from ADHD.
[5] It is agreed that Choice is a school or institution within
the meaning of the relevant provision of the Act, even
though the Reply to Notice of Appeal filed with respect to each
appeal had relied, inter alia, on Choice not having been
an educational institution. Further, it is agreed the relevant
provisions of the Act are the same for both taxation
years.
[6] Patricia Collins testified she is employed as an Office
Manager and lives in North Vancouver, British Columbia. She is
the mother of Nicholas Collins, born on February 8, 1986. The
appellant identified her T1 General for the 1993 taxation year -
Exhibit A-1 - in which she reported employment income in the sum
of $28,261.50. She claimed medical expenses in the sum of $2,520,
representing tuition fees paid to enrol Nicholas for part of the
school year, at Choice, and sought the appropriate medical
expense credit. She explained that Nicholas had attended a home
day care beginning at age 16 months, and remained there until age
three. The operator of the day care had reported to the appellant
that Nicholas was not joining in with other children during play
and was argumentative, explosive emotionally and needed time
alone from the group. Between age three and four, he went to
North Shore Discovery House, a licensed day care facility, and
the teachers complained regularly to the appellant about the
conduct of Nicholas. According to the day care staff, he did not
follow instructions, was prone to lashing out physically at the
instructors and appeared to be fixated on building structures and
playing with blocks and when so occupied was displeased when
interrupted or prevented from continuing with his particular
project of the moment. The appellant took Nicholas to a Public
Health Nurse who undertook an assessment and recommended that
additional medical opinions be obtained. Following a six-month
wait, the appellant was able to take Nicholas - now aged four -
to Nancy Luce, Ph.D., a child psychologist, who advised that she
suspected Nicholas was suffering from ADHD. Dr. Luce saw Nicholas
on several occasions but no written report was prepared and Dr.
Luce has since left Vancouver. At age four and one half, Nicholas
attended North Shore Children's House - a private day care -
and, although previous difficulties re-appeared, the facility had
additional physical space, more staff and a flexible schedule
resulting in a better response by Nicholas to that environment.
The appellant stated that Nicholas, at age five, attended
Capilano Elementary - a public school - which offered a one-half
day kindergarten program and he continued to spend the other
one-half day at the North Shore day care. There were 18 children
in the kindergarten program and the appellant stated she received
numerous complaints from the teachers about the poor social
skills exhibited by Nicholas who did not function well in groups.
No advice was forthcoming from the teaching staff other than to
warn the appellant that "this behaviour would not be
tolerated in Grade One". At this point, the appellant was
still seeking help from Dr. Luce but was becoming increasingly
frustrated in her search for a solution to her son's
problems. Upon Nicholas reaching his sixth birthday, he
attended Capilano Elementary and was placed in a
Grade One/Two split class. Now, in a more controlled
environment, seated behind a desk with stricter scheduling,
Nicholas was bored, restless, and identified as having a
behavioural problem despite scoring well in mathematics and
reading. The appellant stated she spoke to the teachers who
suggested counselling and who then advised Nicholas had been
seeing - without her knowledge or permission - a school
counsellor for about two months but no notes of those sessions
appeared to have been made or, if made, were never produced to
her. The appellant, Collins, testified she realized her child had
serious problems. He was unpopular, disruptive and she had been
requested to withdraw him from an after-school care facility. In
the fall of 1992, at Capilano Elementary, she heard about Choice
from an individual who gave her the telephone number for the
school. The appellant called the number at Choice Learning Centre
and spoke with Hélène Giroux, the Director, and
learned of an Open House which was being held in December and
another in February. During the spring of 1993, the school year
was drawing to a close and the appellant decided Choice would be
helpful as she had learned that Choice featured small classes,
individualized programs and was staffed with teachers who were
specifically trained to deal with children identified as having
"special needs". However, the appellant was advised
that an academic assessment was required and a particular skill
level had to be attained in order for the admission process to
continue. As a result, the appellant consulted
Joan Pinkus, Ph.D. and they discussed the history of
Nicholas as it pertained to behavioural issues. Following
four separate sessions, including interviews with Nicholas,
Dr. Pinkus recommended Nicholas attend Choice. The appellant
stated she could not afford to pay for a written report and it
was not necessary for admission provided the results of the
assessment performed by Dr. Pinkus demonstrated the appropriate
intellectual level had been attained by Nicholas. Filed as
Exhibit A-2, was a summary dated January 19, 1996, issued by Dr.
Pinkus concerning the results of the assessment of Nicholas done
in March, 1993. The appellant, upon confirmation of the
intellectual ability of Nicholas and then receiving certain
advice and recommendations from Dr. Pinkus, decided to enrol
Nicholas at Choice beginning September 1, 1993 and paid the sum
of $2,520 in tuition fees for the period ending December 31,
1993. Nicholas, now aged 7, was in a class with Ms. Davey as his
primary teacher and was doing schoolwork mostly at a Grade 3
level. Notwithstanding his scholastic ability, Nicholas was still
restless, reluctant to follow instructions and appeared to be
frightened of school and was aware he did not fit in with the
rest of the students. The teachers at Choice devoted a lot of
time and attention in order to ensure Nicholas was provided with
work geared to his abilities. In September, 1994 Nicholas was in
a class under the supervision of Mrs. Clare Dhillon. By this
time, his behaviour had improved but he still had emotional
outbursts and problems relating to other students on a social
level. The appellant explained she met - on many occasions - with
the teachers and administrative staff at Choice and was aware the
teachers used a daily planner to keep Nicholas on track and paid
special attention to him by offering support, thereby improving
his self-esteem. At age 9, in September, 1995, Nicholas was in a
class under Ms. Pesch and he was trying to cope but there were
still physical manifestations of his emotional outbursts. Dr.
Nancy Luce, during one of the interviews with the appellant, had
recommended Nicholas be seen by Dr. Gabrielle Weiss, a
psychiatrist specializing in children. In the spring of 1995, Dr.
Weiss interviewed Nicholas together with the appellant and
suggested she should see him again after the new school year had
begun in the fall. Dr. Weiss saw Nicholas in September and in
October, 1995 prescribed the medication, Ritalin, in order
to treat the ongoing difficulties stemming from an inability to
accept instruction and his inadequate social skills. Dr. Weiss
provided a report - Exhibit A-4 - concerning Nicholas in which
she stated Nicholas was a child who had superior intelligence
with high level of creativity, severe ADHD and Oppositional
Defiant Disorder (ODD). In that letter, Dr. Weiss had stated it
was her opinion a school such as Choice was the only facility
available where Nicholas could be maintained properly even with
medication. The appellant stated she had requested the letter
from Dr. Weiss in order to provide it to Revenue Canada in
support of her position that the tuition fees paid to Choice
should be regarded as a qualifying medical expense. The appellant
also requested Dr. Weiss correspond with Ms. Bell, counsel
for the respondent, and Dr. Weiss complied by sending the letter
dated December 23, 1997 - Exhibit A-5 - in which she referred to
her diagnosis of ADHD Combined Type, referring to the presence of
ODD, and reported Nicholas functioned at a level indicating his
intelligence was superior to 99% of other children and explaining
the reasons for recommending Choice as a school specially set up
for gifted children. In September, 1996, Nicholas was
10 years old and Christopher Carroll was his main teacher.
The appellant explained her son seemed to feel safer attending
school and he participated in daily discussions with
Mr. Carroll and, as a consequence of the extent of the
personal communication, his behaviour was mellowing. However, at
home, Nicholas was still a behaviour problem and exhibited the
kind of conduct which had been the constant source of complaint
by many teachers and/or caregivers over the years. The appellant
referred to a letter dated January 31, 1989 - Exhibit A-6 -
written by Dr. Joan Pinkus to Hélène
Giroux, Director at Choice, and stated she had submitted a copy
of it with her income tax return for 1993. She had been provided
- along with her tuition receipt - with a copy of the letter
dated April 15, 1994 sent by Dr. Joan Pinkus to Ms. Giroux. The
appellant identified her 1995 tax return - Exhibit A-8 - in which
she had reported employment income in the sum of $32,780 and had
claimed the sum of $9,700 - the amount of tuition paid to Choice
- as a medical expense. The appellant identified a receipt for
tuition - Exhibit A-9 - and explained the tuition was in the sum
of $3,430 if paid in two instalments or $6,270 if paid in one
sum. Her total payment also covered tuition until the end of the
school year in 1996. The appellant stated the school, Choice, was
located in Richmond, a 45-minute drive, each way, from her
residence and, in 1995, when Nicholas could not tolerate a full
day, she had to reduce her hours of work by 25% in order to pick
him up at Choice and then take him to a day care for supervision
during the remainder of her working day. The commuting was
extremely time-consuming and the appellant attempted to
re-locate Nicholas to a public school in the North Shore district
but was advised by the Head of Student Services that the
prognosis for an ADHD student finishing highschool was
"dismal". The appellant researched other schools, both
private and public, which accepted students who had special
needs. One of these institutions was Fraser Academy at Vancouver
but the yearly tuition was $13,000. Taking various factors into
account, including time and expense of commuting to Choice, the
appellant decided to send Nicholas to public school so he could
have the opportunity to develop friends. The appellant had
received a letter from Choice - dated September 4, 1996 - Exhibit
A-10 - containing therein material pertaining to students with
severe learning disabilities including information relating to
ADHD and the relationship of that disorder to exceptional
intellectual ability or, as it is sometimes referred, giftedness.
However, the appellant stated she was unable, despite her
efforts, to find a public school which would be suitable for her
son's education and, as a result, Nicholas continued to
attend Choice and is still a student there.
[7] In cross-examination, the appellant stated Dr. Nancy Luce
moved away from Vancouver in 1996. There had been a recognition
by Dr. Luce that Nicholas had problems which had to be dealt with
"on all fronts" referring to home, school and social
situations. The advice received from Dr. Luce was to forego
treatment by medication at such an early age and, in any event,
Dr. Luce was not a medical doctor able to prescribe drugs. It was
Dr. Weiss, in 1995, who prescribed Ritalin for Nicholas.
Ms. Collins explained that it was as a result of meeting a parent
at an after-school day care who had a child, attending Choice,
with many of the same problems as Nicholas, that she came to look
into the suitability of the school. The appellant stated she soon
became aware Choice was restricted to gifted children and that an
academic pre-requisite had to be satisfied prior to admission.
She had known that Nicholas had intellectual ability but was not
able to use it properly due to his emotional problems. At age 7,
Nicholas was saying, "I don't know why I was born -
nobody likes me - I might as well die". Even in Grade 1,
Nicholas stopped learning. The appellant took her son to see Dr.
Joan Pinkus and during the first visit Dr. Pinkus indicated
Choice might not be an appropriate school for Nicholas. However,
after several other interviews and discussions, she did recommend
Nicholas attend Choice. The appellant stated she did not attend
upon Dr. Pinkus seeking confirmation of the suspected disorder,
ADHD, but to determine his academic abilities or potential which
appeared to be very substantial. At Choice, the appellant
discovered the school had an Individual Education Plan (IEP)
tailored for each child, relating to academic ability and also to
behaviour. Unlike the situation at the public schools, the staff
and teachers were very accessible. Dr. Luce had spoken to Mrs.
Dhillon and Ms. Pesch about Nicholas, especially concerning his
behavioural problems and his need for extra space. The appellant
identified a letter dated April 17, 1996 - Exhibit R-1 - which
she had directed to Revenue Canada. In that correspondence, she
had attempted to explain the unavailability of schools within her
district to deal with the special needs of Nicholas. In addition,
the appellant explained that, due to overcrowding in other
districts, she had been unable to obtain permission to transfer
Nicholas to a school out of the North Vancouver district. After
starting to take the medication, Ritalin, Nicholas became
more agitated and hyperactive - which is normal during the
initial stages of the treatment - and Choice asked the appellant
to take Nicholas out of school until his behaviour became more
stable. Later, when the medication began to take effect, he
started to improve but still needed all the other aspects of
special care and attention in order to cope with his problems.
Nicholas saw Dr. Weiss, for the first time, in the spring of
1995. Prior to attending upon Dr. Weiss, the appellant had
been made aware of the opinion of Dr. Luce which was that
Nicholas was suffering from ADHD. During the summers - when
school was not in session - the appellant had to place Nicholas
in child-care programs and his behaviour led to expulsion from
those classes. His life deteriorated when not attending school
regularly. Because Nicholas was a large child, his angry
outbursts at other, smaller, children were a cause of concern for
persons in charge of any child-care facility.
[8] Christopher Carroll testified he resides in Langley,
British Columbia and is a teacher at Choice. He has obtained a
Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Education and a Master of Arts
in Philosophy of Education. In 1979, he also undertook studies in
alternative education. He has worked in organizations devoted to
dealing with troubled teenagers and, from 1986-1996, was a
teacher at schools within the North Vancouver School District. He
taught Grades 4-7 within the public system and was responsible
for teaching classes comprised, in part, of children with special
needs including ADHD, autism and young children with emotional
problems stemming from troubled family situations. Carroll stated
his own brother - during the 1950's - had exhibited symptoms
that are now known to be consistent with a diagnosis of ADHD.
During the course of professional development, Carroll explained
he had attended conferences where ADHD, and other learning
disorders, had been the topic of discussion and the subject of
lectures delivered by psychiatrists and psychologists
specializing in emotional and learning problems of children.
During his tenure at the North Vancouver School District, he
would receive, at the beginning of the school term, a class list
and thereafter an attempt would be made to assign particular
students with an identifiable problem of ADHD to the classroom of
a teacher with some specialized training in learning disorders or
behavioural difficulties. However, there was always a problem in
terms of large class size which was not conducive to dealing with
students having a learning disorder. At Choice, the child had an
individual educational plan which had been specially formulated
in order to meet the specific needs and problems of that student.
The policy of the school was not to exceed a teacher-student
ratio of 1:15. The teachers are non-union - without any
collective agreement - and there is flexibility to deal with
problems and to assign teachers to various duties whereas, in the
public system, the administrators are often restricted by the
collective agreement in terms of scheduling, assignment of duties
and the size and composition of classes. Carroll stated that,
within the public system, the average class would have 27
students of which 5 to 7 would have special needs. In order for a
student to attend Choice, he or she had to fall within the 95th
percentile on various psychological tests. Carroll stated he was
in his second year teaching Nicholas Collins. At first, he
noticed Nicholas was isolated socially, pursued his own agenda
and was tremendously creative but, unfortunately, often not in
relation to an assigned task. He explained it was difficult to
deal with a non-compliant student and attempted to discover ways
to allow Nicholas some flexibility. There were times when
Nicholas would face the wall and refuse to talk and, other times,
he was extremely argumentative concerning trivial matters. In
Carroll's view, many persons who are exceptionally gifted
with intellectual capacity are eccentric and Nicholas, as an
individual, was unique and the ADHD contributed to his
personality. By way of illustration, Carroll described the
ability Nicholas possessed to design cities or to create cut-away
drawings and lay-out of an underground sewer system. Yet,
Nicholas had difficulty working with other students. Carroll
stated he attempts to get to know a child and to identify any
special needs and then makes an effort to deal with immaturity
and to teach the reason behind compliance with societal rules. As
for Nicholas, Carroll remarked, "he will always march to his
own drummer". In Carroll's opinion, the only way to deal
with Nicholas is to allow him some space and to continue to work
on getting him to accept the rules which govern "the game of
life" While it is often possible to use standard techniques
to deal with ADHD children, some variations are necessary and,
with Nicholas, humour was used as a tool in order to instruct or
modify behaviour. At Choice, the complaint of a parent concerning
teaching methods would result in a meeting between the parent,
the teacher and Mrs. Ford, the Principal. Within the public
system, teachers generally have the right to teach a particular
class in accordance with a preferred method of instruction. In
1998, there are 114 students at Choice and, because of the
maximum 1:15 teacher-student ratio, a student has the ability to
be heard within the classroom and in that sense it becomes a
sanctuary for some troubled youth. Carroll explained he is the
parent of a child - now enrolled in Choice - who had previously
attended the public system in Langley.
[9] In cross-examination, Carroll agreed small class size is a
benefit to any child if the teacher is willing to devote time to
needs of the students. In his opinion, ADHD is an ongoing problem
and his primary function is to educate children by teaching the
approved curriculum and assisting them in achieving personal
growth. When he was teaching in the public system - in 1995 - his
class had been assigned a full-time aide who worked with a child
suffering from a special type of autism and the administration
designed an individualized program for the student. However,
there is a complex formula for determining class size in
accordance with the collective agreement and there are certain
funding policies within school administration which can be
restrictive. In his view, there are problems dealing with
intellectually gifted students apart from any learning
disabilities or emotional problems.
[10] Lorraine Ford testified she has been the Principal at
Choice for the past four years and before that was a teacher
and Vice-Principal at the school. As Principal, she still teaches
approximately 20% of the time. She holds a Bachelor of Applied
Arts and a Bachelor of Education degree from the University of
British Columbia and is currently working towards her Master of
Education. She has also obtained 30 extra credits in behavioural
disorder, instructional language disabilities, special learning
disabilities and remedial reading. Each of these courses assist
in understanding ADHD. Currently, there are 113 students at
Choice, with 12 teachers, herself as Principal and one
administrative assistant. The classes range from kindergarten to
Grade 10. There are 8 classrooms together with a music and
activity room, computer room equipped with 15 personal computers,
science laboratory, library and, outside the building, a
playground and soccer field. Ford explained that, prior to
admission at Choice, a student has to be tested by a clinical
psychologist and the results of the examinations must be
submitted to Hélène Giroux, Director who is in
charge of admissions. She identified a document - Exhibit A-11 -
dated February 25, 1992, issued by the Inspector of Independent
Schools, employed by the Independent Schools Branch of the
Ministry of Education for the Province of British Columbia
certifying that Choice was entitled to operate as an independent
school for the period extending to June 30, 1996. Ford explained
the Ministry of Education undertakes a thorough audit of the
school and accreditation must be renewed every two years. Once an
independent school is approved, then it is eligible to receive
funding from the Ministry equal to 50% of the amount, per pupil,
paid to a public school and there is also a formula for obtaining
additional funding for children with special needs and, to that
end, she submits reports together with applications to the
Ministry for funding. Ford explained the policy of Choice is to
develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for each
student after she, as Principal, has held discussions with the
student, parent(s) and teachers with a view to meeting academic,
social and emotional needs in order to meet short-term and
long-term goals. Before being hired at Choice, the teachers are
subjected to a rigorous interview and must be seen as nurturing,
caring and compassionate and are subject to review every two
years. In addition, there is flexibility in environment at Choice
with emphasis on small class size and one-on-one
attention, as required. There is a policy of maintaining constant
rapport with parents and reports and notes are sent on a regular
basis concerning the student and the school. There is an
accelerated program for teaching the mandatory curriculum which
utilizes only 60% of the available time and leaves 40% to work on
emotional needs of a child. In her opinion, special attention is
required to be given to gifted children. Ford referred to the
Certificate of Incorporation - Exhibit A-12 - of Choice
Learning Center For Exceptional Children Society, dated April 30,
1985, issued pursuant to The Society Act of British
Columbia and referred to the constitution of Choice - Exhibit
A-13 - and one of the purposes - as set forth in paragraph 2 -
which was to enable children of exceptional intellectual ability
to obtain an education that allows them to develop to their
fullest capacity and to provide specialized programs for that
purpose. Ford pointed out that, even though a child has a
handicap or learning disorder, he or she cannot be admitted to
Choice unless the child possesses exceptional intellectual
ability. Currently, within the student population of 113, there
are five children suffering from ADHD and 28 others with
various forms of dyslexia. During the period from 1993 to 1995,
there were 7 students at Choice with ADHD. In order to be
employed as a teacher at Choice, a person must have, at least, a
Bachelor of Education and are requested to attend seminars and to
otherwise learn about ADHD at courses made available by
universities or school districts and also are encouraged to
receive instruction on the subject of teaching gifted children.
Although there is no union agreement, each teacher at Choice must
be a member of the British Columbia College of Teachers. Ford
referred to a Manual of Policies, Procedures and Guidelines -
Exhibit A-14 - issued by the Special Programs Branch of the
Ministry of Education, Skills and Training of the Province of
British Columbia and stated Choice must follow the policies set
forth therein in order to retain accreditation. In Exhibit A-14,
at Section E-1, there is reference to ADHD and other
conditions and syndromes which impact on the educational needs of
students. At page E-11 of the Manual, there is a definition of
Learning Disabilities which includes ADHD, referred to therein as
AD/HD, the Ministry's choice of an acronym for Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Ford stated that, as Principal of
Choice, she ensures all teachers are familiar with the
information contained in the Manual and copies are distributed
and various topics contained therein are the subject of staff
meetings. At such meetings, each student's file is reviewed
and most have a personal record which, in some cases, includes
material provided by a public school previously attended by that
child. Ford referred to the letter dated September 4, 1996 -
Exhibit A-10 - issued by Ms. Giroux, Founder and Executive
Director of Choice, and stated she agreed with the statements
contained therein and is satisfied Choice meets all the
requirements of the Ministry of Education. In 1993, she met with
Nicholas Collins and each year thereafter reviewed his file which
included observations concerning his social and emotional
behaviour and there was an ongoing attempt to match a teacher to
a particular classroom in which certain pupils had been placed.
For the first three or four months after Nicholas attended
Choice, he would not greet her in a warm fashion and appeared to
be angry and fearful. She tried different strategies to deal with
Nicholas and, after some "ups and downs", he began to
understand himself and she encouraged a policy of providing him
with additional space and the use of tactile diversions such as
working in clay. In her view, each child with ADHD is different.
Ford stated she knew Dr. Joan Pinkus in her capacity as a child
psychologist who administered tests of intellectual ability and
as a parent who had a child enrolled at Choice. She also had
spoken, by telephone, to Dr. Gabrielle Weiss about Nicholas and
the effect of ADHD on his education.
[11] In cross-examination, Lorraine Ford re-iterated that each
student with special needs must have an IEP in accordance with
policy established in 1985 and as required by the Ministry of
Education since 1994. At page A-6 of the Manual
- Exhibit A-14 - the purpose of the IEP is explained
and, in the case of Nicholas Collins, certain goals were set
and revisions undertaken after consultation with his mother and
teachers. Ford stated she was not certain whether Capilano
Elementary had forwarded, to Choice, his student record. Upon
being referred to Exhibit A-2 - the report of Dr. Pinkus - Ford
commented that it was in the usual format following the required
testing by a psychologist or psychiatrist and a report may, on
occasion, be accompanied by further notes if requested by the
parent or deemed necessary by the consulting professional. The
minimum requirement for admission to Choice is such that a
prospective student must score - in terms of intellectual ability
- in the 97th percentile. Prior to the admission of Nicholas to
Choice, Ford stated she had only seen page 1 of the Pinkus Report
- Exhibit A-2 - and the hand-written material - at page 2 - had
been added later. Initially, there had been nothing in the report
concerning the intellectual testing to indicate Nicholas had any
learning disorder. In 1995 the administration and teachers at
Choice learned Nicholas had received a diagnosis of ADHD but that
disorder had been suspected for some time by the teachers. Since
his admission to Choice, he had always been treated by teachers
and staff as though he had ADHD and his IEP had been designed on
that premise. Ms. Davey had special training in primary education
and learning disabilities and Mrs. Dhillon had received her
education in England and had been certified by the British
Columbia College of Teachers as someone qualified in secondary
education. Mrs. Dhillon had taught school in an area of London
where many students were emotionally troubled and underprivileged
but she did not have any special or formal training in ADHD. Ford
commented that all ADHD children are restless and, although a
computer stimulates them, at the same time, it has the effect of
focusing attention, thereby producing a calming effect. In
accordance with the philosophy for teaching gifted children, the
approved teacher-student ratio is set at a maximum of 1:15. There
had been no special application to the Ministry of Education for
additional funding for Nicholas. Ford identified a document
entitled Mission Statement - Exhibit R-2 - as it pertained to
Choice and stated the mission of the school has remained constant
since its foundation. The school was structured to accord with
the age and ability of a student in particular subjects not
unlike the program used in the Prairie Provinces during the era
of the one-room schoolhouse prior to the 1950's. An
informational package - Exhibit R-3 - had been produced by Choice
and Ford agreed it did not contain any reference to teaching
children with learning disorders.
[12] In re-examination, Ford stated Nicholas, and the IEP
prepared for him, had always been premised on the probability he
suffered from ADHD. She explained the Ministry of Education
allows additional funding for no more than two students - out of
the total population of 113 - and the application by Choice is
then reserved for the most extreme cases of special needs. Ford
stated Choice has not refused admission to any student with a
learning disability provided they meet the requirement of
extremely high intellectual ability. The application form - part
of Exhibit R-3 - provides space in which information can be
provided by a parent concerning: Special Needs or under the
category: Medical Information.
[13] Joan Pinkus testified she is a psychologist carrying on a
practice in Vancouver, British Columbia and is a member of the
College of Psychologists of British Columbia as well as the
British Columbia Psychological Association. She has a Ph.D. in
psychology from the University of Toronto and has been practising
as a psychologist for 23 years. Currently, she stated she sees
children, adolescents, families and adults in therapy and
performs assessments of children. She specializes in long-term
pyschodynamic psychotherapy with children. The assessments focus
on the cognitive and intellectual skills and abilities of
children and she stated she has experience with learning
disabilities. Dr. Pinkus stated Nicholas became a patient in
March, 1993 and Patricia Collins, his mother, had become
concerned due to academic and behavioural problems and she was
seeking an assessment. At that time, in view of the shortage of
time and the limited funds available, Dr. Pinkus administered her
standard battery of tests which included looking at his receptive
vocabulary skills in English and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test. She also administered the Raven's Progressive Matrices
which is a visual pattern problem-solving task. In addition, she
administered the full Wexler Intelligence Scale for Children,
Third Edition, referred to commonly as WISC-3, which is the
standard test of intelligence (IQ) used in North America for
testing children aged between 6 and 16. Certain academic measures
were also used and until the data was analyzed she was not in a
position to recommend Choice - or any other school - to the
appellant. However, Dr. Pinkus agreed she had mentioned to
Patricia Collins that Choice might be a suitable school for
Nicholas if he met the admission criteria. Even though one has to
look at the whole child and the needs of the child and what a
school could offer, when it came to admission to Choice, he or
she had to meet the initial requirements for admission. After
analzying the test results, Dr. Pinkus stated she recommended
Choice as a suitable school for Nicholas because he met the
intellectual requirement and he had emotional and social and
behavioural difficulties which could be addressed at Choice. She
explained Nicholas was a very angry child having difficulty
socializing with other children, did not control his temper, was
easily distracted with tasks that were not of a particular visual
nature and had trouble listening to directions. These facets of
his behaviour were obvious during his attendance at her office
and he was seen to be impulsive, distracted, agitated and anxious
to a point beyond that experienced by most children during an
assessment. Dr. Pinkus stated she had been made aware Nicholas
had been seeing Dr. Nancy Luce, a registered psychologist, and
was continuing with therapy but there was no need to consult with
Dr. Luce unless there had been a problem in arriving at a
diagnostic assessment. Dr. Pinkus explained the disorder, known
as ADHD, had been recognized for many years and children
exhibiting the usual symptoms had been previously referred to as
being affected by minimal brain dysfunction or as being
hyperkinetic. Dr. Pinkus stated she will undertake an assessment
of a child but if specific treatment is required thereafter for
ADHD she will refer the patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist
who would specialize in that disorder and any medication used for
treatment would have to be prescribed by a physician. However,
she added that many children visiting her in her office meet the
diagnostic criteria of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or ADHD
as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), often referred to by
professionals practising in that area as the "bible of
psychiatric/psychological disorders". The diagnostic
criteria for ADHD requires hyperactivity in the form of
impulsivity which must have persisted for at least six months to
a degree that is maladaptive and inconsistent with developmental
level and is in accordance with the symptoms of inattention as
set out in the extract from the DSM-IV as reproduced on a sheet
issued by the British Columbia Children's Hospital (Exhibit
A-15). A child suffering from ADHD will be fidgeting with feet,
have difficulty remaining seated, is easily distracted by
external stimuli, has difficulty awaiting turns in group or game
situations and will blurt out answers to questions before they
are completed. The child will also have difficulty sustaining
attention in tasks or play activity and will shift from one
uncompleted activity to another, often talks excessively and does
not play quietly. In addition, the child will often interrupt or
intrude on others and does not seem to listen to what is being
said to them, will lose items needed for tasks or activities and
will often engage in physically dangerous activities without
considering possible consequences as in the case of a child who
will run into the street and does not realize there is traffic. A
diagnosis of ADHD is dependent on a series of behaviours and it
is on a continuum. As a disorder, Dr. Pinkus stated ADHD has the
effect of making progress difficult and it creates a disadvantage
that makes it difficult to achieve success. There are a variety
of manuals outlining how to manage ADHD children and medication
is sometimes considered appropriate. Generally, the child needs a
small, structured environment and can benefit from doing tasks in
small "chunks" rather than long open-ended tasks so
everything has to be broken down into small tasks with lots of
individualized feedback with immediate consequences if the
behaviour is inappropriate. In her view, it is better to be as
proactive as possible - rather than reactive - to the behaviour
and to recognize that the child is not acting intentionally.
Parents should take courses in how to parent a child with ADHD
and teachers should be nurturing, caring, have understanding
about individual needs and be able to break down tasks for the
child so the ADHD student can obtain the maximum benefit from his
or her abilities. Children who meet the diagnostic criteria for
ADHD should be placed in small group settings. They will have
problems with an open-ended classroom where there are two or
three teachers teaching in a large space to different grades at
the same time. The ADHD children cannot focus and are out of
their seats most of the time not knowing to which teacher they
should be listening. Dr. Pinkus stated, to the best of her
knowledge, there are no schools in British Columbia - and
probably not in Canada - that exist exclusively to educate ADHD
children, although there are some in the United States. She
commented that, usually, when a child is brought to her for an
assessment there have been ongoing difficulties with several
different schools and, while there are several schools that can
deal with learning disorders, she is not aware of any school -
other than Choice - that is appropriate for the gifted child - in
the extremely high intellectual range - who is also suffering
from ADHD. Dr. Pinkus identified the first page of Exhibit A-2 as
being a document completed by her - in 1993 - and provided to
Patricia Collins and the second page was written - in 1996 -
summarizing the earlier interviews and testing performed together
with a comment that various school and emotional issues had been
discussed. Dr. Pinkus stated it was never her policy to recommend
only one school but preferred that the parent made a choice after
having made some visits to various schools and having held
meetings with the administration of a facility. A lengthy report
was not prepared for the appellant because she was short of
funds. Dr. Pinkus stated she was familiar with the policies and
programs at Choice, such as small class sizes, proper teacher-
student ratio and the opportunity for individual programming of
education which included structure and daily routine to reduce
distractions and impulsivity. Also, at Choice, children were
permitted to explore areas of particular interest and could
participate in a program called Passions which allowed the child
to work on something about which they had an intense interest. As
for Nicholas, Choice could provide a place for him to put some of
his energy and he could feel he was productive rather than merely
"spinning his wheels". Dr. Pinkus identified
Exhibit A-6 as a letter - dated January 31, 1989, - she wrote to
Ms. Giroux, Director at Choice. The letter had been requested by
Ms. Giroux because Dr. Pinkus was a psychologist who saw many
gifted children and while the letter does not refer specifically
to ADHD, it does refer to "special needs". Her letter -
Exhibit A-7 - dated April 15, 1994 to Ms.Giroux, was sent in
response to a request for a more recent opinion concerning gifted
children and it again made reference to "special
needs". Dr. Pinkus indicated she was familiar with
Fraser Academy, a private school in Vancouver, and she has
assessed children who were then admitted to that facility. Fraser
Academy had a teacher-student ratio of 1:4 but the tuition was
double that charged by Choice and Fraser Academy had been started
with somewhat of a "boot camp" mentality and, although
it has changed, would not have been appropriate for children who
were emotionally vulnerable. In order to be admitted to Fraser
Academy, a child must have been diagnosed with a learning
disability such as dyslexia, dysgraphia or other similar problem.
In order to meet the diagnostic criteria for ADHD, the symptoms
should have been present prior to age seven.
[14] In cross-examination, Dr. Pinkus stated she discussed,
with the appellant, what other public schools were available in
the district but there were none which could deal with the
particular problems encountered by Nicholas because there were no
programs available to deal with a child who was both gifted and
suffering from ADHD although there were some private schools
capable of doing so, one of which was Choice. She stated she had
been aware Nicholas was being treated by Dr. Luce and that he was
presenting behaviours which would be consistent with a diagnosis
of ADHD. Dr. Pinkus was referred to her letter of January 31,
1989 - Exhibit A-6 - written to Ms. Giroux - Director of Choice -
and was requested to review the second paragraph and the
reference to the "social and emotional difficulties"
often associated with the gifted child. She was asked whether any
of the behaviours exhibited by Nicholas would be similar to that
of any gifted child. Dr. Pinkus responded by explaining Nicholas
was exhibiting behaviours that one would see with individuals who
had been identified as gifted but he also had significant
behavioural problems. She added that not all gifted learners
exhibit such degree of emotional and social difficulties. Until
the appropriate battery of tests has been administered, it is not
possible to determine the IQ of a child and for admission to
Choice or to gifted programs in public schools a student must
score 125 or above on the standard IQ test in one of three
categories because there are children whose verbal skills are
very high but who have dysgraphia and fine motor difficulties
which impair performance in another category. An IQ of 125 and
above places one in the 95th percentile. Dr. Pinkus stated her
name is on many lists maintained by agencies and hospitals as a
professional specializing in assessing children and while any
registered psychologist would be entitled to administer tests or
conduct assessments most professionals, pursuant to a code of
ethical conduct, would not do so unless they were interpreting
assessments on a regular basis.
[15] Dr. Gabrielle Weiss testified she is a psychiatrist
practising in West Vancouver. She is a member of the College
of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia and is a Professor
of Psychiatry at the University of British Columbia. She works at
the ADHD Clinic in Children's Hospital, and at the
North Shore Health Clinic as well as conducting a private
practice. The ADHD Clinic performs assessments and consultations
but does not provide active treatment. The Clinic is composed of
multi-disciplinary personnel with an occupational therapist,
nurse, psychologist and psychiatrist. Dr. Weiss stated she has
seen at least 1,000 adults and children with ADHD during her
professional career and has written, since 1964, 130 papers on
the subject and two textbooks - one on adult ADHD. In 1995, as a
result of a referral from Dr. Nancy Luce, she saw Nicholas
Collins. She had spoken earlier to Nancy Luce about the
behavioural problems associated with Nicholas, including
inattentiveness, defiance and fighting. Dr. Weiss identified a
letter - Exhibit A-4 - as having been written by her concerning
Nicholas in which she stated he was a child who had a superior
intelligence with high level of creativity, severe ADHD, and
Oppositional Defiant Disorder. She went on to say that, "in
my opinion, a school such as Choice is the only facility
available where he could be maintained as well as learning as
well as possible". Dr. Weiss stated she used the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders, III, (DSM-3) in
order to diagnose Nicholas as having severe ADHD. Nicholas met 8
out of 8 criteria although only three have to be present in order
to justify a diagnosis. Dr. Weiss stated she thought optimal
schooling was required together with assisting the appellant in
coping in her role as parent because, if untreated, ADHD often
leads to criminal misconduct and incarceration. She noted ADHD
rarely requires special equipment in order to be treated but
special personnel are needed and facilities should have a high
ratio of qualified teachers to students within a small setting
which offers some options in curriculum. Within the public
system, a teaching aide is assigned only to severely learning
disabled children. Dr. Weiss stated Nicholas had already been
enrolled in Choice when she first met him but with his history
she would have recommended Choice had she been able to interview
him in 1992. The majority of children treated by her attend
public school so she is familiar with the programs available
within that system. Some of those schools severely discipline
children, some do not approve of students being placed on certain
medications and others have different policies and all of them
attempt to cope with a lack of funding. Dr. Weiss explained that
while one patient was able to cease taking medication after
attending Choice, with Nicholas the course of treatment was
"a thorny road" and, even with the medication, he was
nearly expelled due to his behaviour but was allowed to continue
attending on a half-time basis. Dr. Weiss stated ADHD can start
at age three or four and, by definition, certain symptoms must be
present at age 7 in order for there to be a proper diagnosis of
ADHD. She explained she rarely prescribed medication for
pre-schoolers and, in any event, Dr. Luce had been treating
Nicholas as though he were an ADHD child in the sense his
progress was impeded. She stated ADHD is usually linked to
another disorder. While approximately 4% of the population is
within the gifted category, in the course of her practice over
35 years, Dr.Weiss commented she had never seen a child,
with ADHD, as intellectually gifted as Nicholas. He was a
mathematical rarity in that 4% of the population is affected with
ADHD and - within that 4% - only another 4% would be gifted.
Nicholas is able to write, talk, and manipulate people to the
extent he is suited to a possible career as a politician. Dr.
Weiss stated she is not able to predict how Nicholas would
perform in a gifted program within the public school system.
[16] In cross-examination, Dr. Weiss stated the diagnosis of
ADHD is not an easy one to make and it was once believed children
merely outgrew the disorder but studies have shown only 50% did
so. Adolescence is the worst time and the cause of ADHD is not
known except it is a neurotransmitter disorder and
Ritalin, a stimulant, while enhancing the neurotransmitter
system reduces impulsivity which makes the child more reflective.
In situations where ADHD severely impairs function, she will
prescribe medication and Ritalin is most often given to
children between the ages of 10 and 12. Dr. Weiss stated ADHD IQ
scores are probably lower than those of the general population
but gifted ADHD children appear at the same frequency - 4%. Dr.
Weiss commented that "getting an education is a terribly
hard thing for these kids". Management of the disorder is
critical and, on average, the education level completed by ADHD
children is two years less than other children. Dr.Weiss stated
Ritalin is sometimes effective in improving ODD and 80% of
children with ODD also have ADHD. She noted that one of her
colleagues had completed a study in which it was found there were
no children - within the study group - who had only ODD and that
it was always coupled with another disorder. Nicholas Collins is
still a patient and Dr. Weiss stated she had referred him to a
psychologist as it may help to have a new person assist in his
treatment. Dr. Weiss explained she had heard of Choice after
moving, in 1993, to Vancouver from Montreal where she had been
Director of Psychiatry at the Montreal Children's Hospital.
She stated ADHD had received more attention from the lay press
than any other disorder and that ADHD is defined - within her
profession - as a mental disorder and a mental handicap.
[17] Counsel for the appellant pointed out the amounts paid by
the appellant to Choice for tuition were not in issue and that it
had been accepted Choice was a school. In addition, he stated the
wording of paragraph 118.2(2)(e) was the same for both
taxation years under appeal. Counsel submitted that a perusal of
subsection 118.2(2) and the following paragraphs and
subparagraphs indicated there are different standards which are
to be met in order for an expenditure to qualify as a medical
expense. He reviewed the development of the relevant provisions
of the Act since 1972 - when the legislation was changed
to expand the existing list of deductible medical expenses to
include payments to a school or other institution for the care
and training of mentally or physically disabled persons - noting
the section had remained virtually unchanged since 1974 except
that it was re-numbered as a result of tax reform, in 1987, which
introduced the system of tax credits in section 118.2. Counsel
stated paragraph 118.2(2)(e) requires the satisfaction of
a number of criteria, some of which have been admitted by the
respondent. Counsel submitted the evidence established that
Nicholas Collins was a person who had a mental handicap as a
result of suffering from the combined disorders ADHD and ODD and
had been certified as such by qualified persons, Dr. Weiss and
Dr. Pinkus, and that the Income Tax Act, since 1991,
did not require the certification to be in any prescribed form.
Counsel also submitted Choice was a school which specially
provided personnel for the care or care and training of persons
who suffered from the mental handicap affecting the
appellant's son. Counsel urged that a narrow construction of
the relevant provisions of the Act would defeat the
purpose of the section in light of the history of the legislation
and the wording of the applicable paragraph.
[18] Counsel for the respondent agreed it was no longer
necessary that a school be exclusively for students who were
mentally or physically handicapped and stated there was no longer
any need for a certification by a qualified professional to be in
any prescribed form. However, counsel submitted there had been
nothing done - in 1993 - by Dr. Pinkus which could be seen as a
certification that Nicholas Collins suffered from a mental
handicap as the evidence disclosed there had been no diagnosis,
at that time, of ADHD or any other disorder. In fact, counsel
pointed out, the ADHD diagnosis was not made until October, 1995,
by Dr. Weiss at which time the requisite certification was
complete as it applied to the 1995 taxation year. Counsel
submitted the evidence did not support a finding that Choice was
a school which specially provided care or care and training for
individuals who were certified as suffering from ADHD and/or ODD
even if these learning disorders could be regarded as
constituting a mental handicap as contemplated by the language of
the relevant provision.
[19] The revelant provision of the Act is paragraph
118.2(2)(e) which reads:
"(2) Medical expenses - For the purposes of
subsection (1), a medical expense of an individual is an amount
paid
...
(e) for the care, or the care and training, at a
school, institution or other place of the patient, who has been
certified by an appropriately qualified person to be a person
who, by reason of a physical or mental handicap, requires the
equipment, facilities or personnel specially provided by that
school, institution or other place for the care, or the care and
training, of individuals suffering from the handicap suffered by
the patient;"
[20] A reading of the above provision makes it clear there are
several criteria to be satisfied which are as follows:
1. The taxpayer must pay an amount for the care or care and
training at a school, institution or other place.
2. The patient must suffer from a mental handicap.
3. The school, institution or other place must specially
provide to the patient suffering from the handicap, equipment,
facilities or personnel for the care or the care and training of
other persons suffering from the same handicap.
4. An appropriately qualified person must certify the mental
or physical handicap is the reason the patient requires that the
school specially provide the equipment, facilities or personnel
for the care or the care and training of individuals suffering
from the same handicap.
[21] First, there is no dispute the tuition fees were paid in
the amount claimed by the appellant or that the payments were
made to Choice, a school, within the meaning of the
provision.
[22] Second, the question to be answered is this: does
Nicholas Collins have a mental handicap? There is no definition
in the Act or in any jurisprudence concerned with section
118.2 or the predecessor provision. Counsel for the parties
provided me with various dictionary definitions of
"handicap" including the following:
Webster's Third New International Dictionary :
"(b) - a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually
difficult".
The New Collins Concise Dictionary Of The English
Language:
"handicap:
1. something that hampers or hinders
2. a contest, esp. a race, in which competitors are given
advantages or
disadvantages of weight, distance, etc. in an attempt to
equalize their chances "
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary devoted 48 lines of type
to define the word - as noun and in verb form - as it pertained
to sporting events, mainly horseracing and was not particularly
helpful.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English:
"handicap - (fig., of circumstances) place (person) at
disadvantage; (in p.p.) suffering from physical or mental
disability."
The Merriam Webster Dictionary, New Edition:
"handicap: (2) a disadvantage that makes achievement
unusually difficult."
Stedman's Medical Dictionary - 25th Edition (Williams
& Wilkins) offers this definition:
"handicap - A physical, mental, or emotional condition
that interferes with an individual's normal functioning. See
also disability."
[23] Since the issue in the within appeal concerns the
eligibility for a medical expense tax credit, and the history of
the provision has been to expand deductibility for payments so
that it now covers expenditures made for the care,
transportation, purchase of equipment, devices or products,
travelling costs, board and lodging and the cost of purchasing
and caring for an animal specially trained to assist an impaired
patient, I prefer the definition from Stedman's Medical
Dictionary to those mainly concerned with the appropriate
etiquette as it relates to activities such as golf, horseracing
or lawn bowling.
[24] In the case of Speering v. North Bay (City)
7. M.P.L.R. (2d) 308, Bernstein, J. of the Ontario Court of
Justice (General Division) in a judgment dated October 21, 1991,
dealt with the question as to whether a saving provision in the
Limitations Act would apply to a person who, due to an
injury suffered from falling on an icy municipal sidewalk, was
able to proceed with her legal action notwithstanding she had not
served the requisite notice upon the City within the statutory
7-day period. While not finding any section of the Limitations
Act to be of assistance to the plaintiff, Bernstein J. found
the notice discriminated against persons who, because of their
mental or physical disability, were unable to give notice of
their injuries to the municipality and that section 15 of the
Charter had been breached. At p. 314 of the judgment,
Bernstein J. stated:
"At this stage of the proceedings, there is evidence
before me that the injured plaintiff was unable to provide notice
to the municipality because she was, at the relevant times,
physically disabled. As far as I am aware, the case law relating
to s. 15 has not defined the term "physical
disability." David Lepofsky, in his article "Equality
and Disabled Persons" (April 16, 1986), Department of
Education, The Law Society of Upper Canada, p. A-3,
characterizes a physically and mentally handicapped person as
someone "with any identifiable physical characteristic or
mental condition, however serious or minor, which can impair the
ability to undertake a particular task." On questions of
disability, human rights legislation has been construed to refer
to a wide range of permanent and temporary characteristics,
whether caused by congenital, accidental or disease-related
factors."
[25] It is worthwhile to point out that the within appeal is
not one involving the claim for a disability tax credit under
section 118.3 of the Income Tax Act because in those cases
the extremely high standard to be met arises out of the
restrictive wording of the section and the definitions contained
therein, none of which are particularly relevant in the within
appeal. In the case of Congo v. Canada [1996] T.C.J. No.
671, the Honourable Judge Taylor, Tax Court of Canada, although
dismissing the appeal, recognized that Attention Deficit
Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) was a handicap and stated at. p
2:
"...This lack of ability to concentrate, and remember
even basic requirements seriously interfered with his life, and
affected all around him, including family, friends, teachers, and
extended to relations with the general public."
[26] The evidence of Dr. Joan Pinkus and Dr. Gabrielle Weiss
confirmed Nicholas Collins was, at all times material, suffering
from ADHD and ODD. Counsel for the respondent was not convinced
that these disorders - in view of his extremely high intellectual
ability - could be seen as a mental handicap within the wording
of the section even though they created problems for the
appellant's son and were a disadvantage in relation to his
schooling. The New Collins Concise Dictionary of the English
Language (Collins) offers these definitions:
"mental: 1. of or involving the mind. 2. occurring only
in the mind
mental defiency: a condition of low intellectual development
requiring special education and employment. Also called: mental
handicap."
[27] The evidence of Dr. Gabrielle Weiss was very clear. In
her opinion, ADHD was a mental disorder and a mental handicap. It
was also normal for ODD to be coupled with another disorder and
Nicholas suffered from both. While its cause is not known, it is
accepted that it is a disorder involving neurotransmitters in the
brain. It is also apparent from the evidence of Dr. Pinkus and
Dr. Weiss that the ADHD/ODD disorders created a distinct
disadvantage in terms of Nicholas being able to obtain an
education. In view of the foregoing, I am satisfied Nicholas
Collins suffered from a mental handicap.
[28] Third, I must deal with the issue as to whether the
school, Choice, was a school that specially provided to Nicholas
- a person whom I have found to be suffering from a mental
handicap - equipment, facilities or personnel for
the care or care and training of persons suffering
from the same handicap.
[29] In the case of Ranelli v. M.N.R., 91 DTC 816,
Sobier, T.C.J. dealt with the issue of tuition fees paid to
Fraser Academy and whether they were properly deductible under
subparagraph 110(1)(c)(vi) of the Income Tax Act,
the provision then applicable. (The wording is identical to the
provision relevant to the within appeal.) In the Ranelli
case, the evidence was the child was suffering from dyslexia
which was a medical problem for which the only treatment - at
that time - was of the type provided by the Fraser Academy. At p.
817 of his judgment, Sobier, T.C.J. stated:
"At the Fraser Academy, the emphasis is on treating and
dealing with the whole child. The child's problem, while
having as a foundation a learning disability, may also included
severe low self-esteem, expectation of failure and in some
instances, suicidal tendencies."
[30] Further on page 817, Judge Sobier stated:
"There is a close and empathic relationship fostered
between the tutor and the child. The tutor is constantly with the
child endeavouring to instil this self-confidence as well as
overcoming the learning disability."
[31] Then, Judge Sobier proceeded with an analysis of one of
the requirements of the subparagraph as follows:
"[Analysis]
The Court is satisfied that all of the requirements, but one
set forth in subparagraph 110(1)(c)(vi), have been met.
The only area in issue is whether the payments to the school were
paid by the Appellant for the care, or the care and training of
the children, at the Fraser Academy.
The Respondent's position is that there must be either
care, or care and training, but not care or training. If it were
"care or training", there would be no issue since it
was conceded that training was provided.
The Minister's position on care is that care should be
read and interpreted by other uses of that word in section 110
which have a residential or custodial flavour such as
"full-time care in a nursing home", or full-time
attendant for a "cared-for-person".
At the outset, it must be remembered that each of the matters
set out in paragraph 110(1)(c) is a definition of a
medical expense which, if not for its inclusion, might not be
readily recognized as a medical expense; such as travel and
lodging expenses of an individual who is required to live away
from home because of attendance at a school where blind or deaf
persons are trained to handle dogs to assist them. Therefore,
each of the subparagraphs of paragraph 110(1)(c) must be
examined individually.
In the cases on this subparagraph and its predecessors such
as: Stewart v. M.N.R., 72 DTC 1092 (T.R.B.); Somers v.
M.N.R., 79 DTC 21 (T.R.B.) and Lawson v. M.N.R.,
71 DTC 572 (T.A.B.) the Board was struggling to give relief to
taxpayers under the former paragraph 27(1)(c) of the Act
whereby to qualify for the deduction the payment must have been
paid to a "licensed private hospital". Whereas, in the
cases above cited, the payments were made to schools which were
not themselves "licensed private hospitals" nor part of
a hospital and the effort was made to notionally convert them
into "licensed private hospitals". For the most part
the taxpayers were unsuccessful.
Yet, with the enactment of the present
subparagraph 110(1)(c)(vi), the concept of a school
has been introduced hopefully for the purpose of overcoming those
earlier decisions under paragraph 27(1)(c).
Cases dealing with the interpretation of the new subparagraph
such as Johnston v. M.N.R., 88 DTC 1300 (T.C.C.) and
Avery v. M.N.R. (unreported) (T.R.B.) taxpayers'
appeals were also disallowed since payments were to ordinary
private schools and not to ones which provided equipment
facilities or personnel for the training of individuals with
handicaps. In the present instance, the Fraser Academy is a
school which qualifies in all respects if the "care and
training" hurdle can be overcome.
[Jurisprudence]
Recent developments in the interpretation of taxing statutes
such as Lor-Wes Contracting Ltd. v. The Queen, 85 DTC 5310
(F.C.A.) and The Queen v. McClurg, 91 DTC 5001 (S.C.C.)
emanated from Stubart v. The Queen [84 DTC 6305], [1984] 1
S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.). The Courts have made it clear that they were
"wedded neither to the rule of 'strict construction'
nor to an all encompassing test of 'independent business
purpose'". (Queen v. McClurg, supra, at
5010).
These cases also included the "object and spirit"
test of Estey, J. in Stubart at page 576 whereby he
said:
It seems more appropriate to turn an interpretation test which
would provide a means of applying the Act so as to affect only
the conduct of a taxpayer which has the designed effect of
defeating the expressed intention of Parliament. In short, the
tax statute, by this interpretation technique, is extended to
reach conduct of the taxpayer which clearly falls within the
"object and spirit" of the taxing provisions.
In McClurg, Dickson, C.J.C. went on to say at
page 5011:
Estey, J. expanded upon this test of "object and
spirit" in his majority judgment in The Queen v.
Golden, 86 DTC 6138, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 209:
...the law is not confined to a literal and virtually
meaningless interpretation of the Act where the words will
support on a broader construction a conclusion which is workable
and in harmony with the evident purposes of the Act in question.
Strict construction in the historic sense no longer finds a place
in the canons of interpretation applicable to taxation statutes
in an era such as the present (at pp. 214-15)...
More recently, in Bronfman Trust v. The Queen, 87 DTC
5059 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 32, I described the approach in terms of the
need to discern the commercial reality of a taxpayer's
transaction:
I acknowledge, however, that just as there has been a recent
trend away from strict construction of taxation statutes ... so
too has the recent trend in tax cases been towards attempting to
ascertain the true commercial and practical nature of the
taxpayer's transactions. There has been, in this country and
elsewhere, a movement away from tests based on the form of
transactions and towards tests based on ... a common sense
appreciation of all the guiding features of the events in
question ...
This is, I believe, a laudable trend provided it is consistent
with the text and purposes of the taxation statute.
In Lor-Wes, Macguigan, J. referred to Estey, J. in
Stubart in quoting him when he stated at page 5312:
Professor Willis accurately forecast the demise of the strict
interpretation rule for the construction of taxing statutes.
Gradually, the role of the tax statute in the community changed,
as we have seen, and the application of strict construction to it
receded. Courts today apply to this statute the plain meaning
rule, but in a substantive sense so that if a taxpayer is within
the spirit of the charge, he may be held liable ...
While not directing his observations exclusively to taxing
statutes, the learned author of "Construction of
Statutes", 2nd ed., (1983) at p. 87, E.A. Dreidger,
[sic] put the modern rule succinctly:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the
words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in
their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme
of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Parliament.
It seems clear from these cases that older authorities are no
longer to be absolutely relied upon. The only principle of
interpretation now recognized is a words-in-total-context
approach with a view to determining the object and spirit of the
taxing provisions.
Section 12 of the Interpretation Act R.S.C., c. I-23
states as follows:
Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such
fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best
ensures the attainment of its objects.
The enactment of subparagraph 110(1)(c)(vi) was
remedial in that it broadened the scope of medical deductions to
include payments to certain types of schools and institutions.
The evidence of Mr. Kuypers and Dr. Kline made it clear that
for the treatment to be successful, care, in its broadest sense,
was absolutely necessary. This care was not custodial but of a
nurturing or solicitous nature.
It is too narrow an interpretation of the word to limit it to
a structured type of care. Care in a custodial sense, or a
structured sense, is not the only meaning in which the word is
capable of having [sic]. Applying The Queen v.
Golden (supra) the word care "will support on a
broader construction a conclusion which is workable and in
harmony with the evident proposes [purposes] of the Act in
question."
Using the "words-in-a-total context" or "object
and spirit" approach an interpretation of "care"
in a solicitous, nurturing, sympathetic or empathic sense is not
out of the question but it is indeed the proper interpretation to
be applied. It is that type of care which the Fraser Academy
provides to its students.
[Decision]
Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, with costs, and the
matter referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and
reassessment on the basis that the Appellant was entitled to the
deductions for medical expenses in the 1986 and 1987 taxation
years under subparagraph 110(1)(c)(vi) of $23,780 in 1986
and $8,314.50 in 1987."
[32] In the case of G Anka v. The Queen [1996]
E.T.C. 7, Bonner T.C.J. dismissed the appeal of the taxpayer who
was claiming tuition fees paid to a nursery school and the cost
of ballet and swimming lessons for a child with severe language
and speech problems on the basis there was no evidence the child
received any "care or training." At p. 2 of his
judgment, Judge Bonner noted:
"Nothing in the evidence suggests that the child received
as a patient either at the nursery school or at elementary school
anything remotely resembling either care or care and training or
that any amount was paid for any such thing. What was paid to the
nursery school was tuition. What was received at all schools was
education, albeit education tailored to fit the child's
special needs."
[33] In the case of Somers v. M.N.R., 79 DTC 21,
Mr. Guy Tremblay (as he then was) of the Tax Review Board was not
able to find the behavioural problems of the taxpayer's child
constituted a mental handicap and also held the educational
institution was not one especially for the mentally or physically
handicapped students with behavioural problems.
[34] Counsel for the respondent conceded, as a result of the
decision of Judge McArthur, Tax Court of Canada, in Zack
v. The Queen, 97-495(IT)I issued October 15, 1997, it was not
necessary that Choice be a school that exclusively provided for
the care or care and training of persons suffering from the same
mental handicap as Nicholas Collins merely that - as a school of
mixed function - it was still capable of satisfying the
requirement of the subparagraph.
[35] In Johnston v. M.N.R.,88 DTC 1300, Judge Goetz,
Tax Court of Canada, dismissed the appeal of the taxpayer as it
related to tuition paid for his blind son at a private school. At
p. 1301, Judge Goetz stated:
"I accept Dr. Dickson's certification of David as
being blind and it would apply to all relevant times...
The relevant provisions of the Act refer to the words
"personnel specially provided by that school, institution or
other place". As I see it, there was considerable extra
effort, attention, care and consideration by the teachers shown
to David. He gained access to facilities at a time when other
students could not have them. In other words, the teachers did
everything they could to accommodate David's
handicap."
[36] In the within appeal, there is ample evidence from the
appellant, Lorraine Ford - the Principal of Choice -
Christopher Carroll, Dr. Joan Pinkus and Dr. Gabrielle Weiss that
Choice was a school that had personnel who were specially trained
and provided to deal with gifted students who were also suffering
from learning disorders sufficiently serious to constitute a
mental handicap. No special equipment is needed but the key is
small class size with a great deal of individualized attention in
accordance with the appropriate program designed for a particular
student. At Choice, the teachers and staff always treated
Nicholas Collins as though he were a child suffering from
ADHD, despite not having been advised of any official diagnosis
until October, 1995 when Dr. Weiss declared Nicholas to be
suffering from a combination of ADHD and ODD. Certainly, Dr.
Pinkus was well aware of the problems encountered by Nicholas in
his early schooling and recommended Choice on the basis the
physical structure of the small classes and the absence of
open-ended large classrooms provided an environment in which a
child, like Nicholas, could feel secure and could begin to
function at a higher level despite a severe handicap. The
evidence disclosed there was training given to Nicholas and to
other students in the school who were suffering from ADHD or
other learning disorders. In a student population of 113, 7
students had ADHD and 28 others had various forms of dyslexia, a
learning disorder. The Manual - Exhibit A-14 issued by the
Ministry of Education of the Province of British Columbia
recognized that ADHD children have a learning disability and must
receive special attention, an example of which is to provide an
educational plan which builds on their strengths while
compensating or alleviating their area of disability. The
teachers and administration at Choice were well-educated
and undertook additional training in the area of teaching
children with learning disorders and were familiar with the
difficulties posed by ADHD. It would be surprising for most
parents to discover that a school - whether public or private -
did not provide "care" for their children when in
attendance at a particular institution. Certainly, the school has
the care or is in charge of a student during the school day and
the legislation governing the operation of all schools places
certain responsibility on teachers and staff in recognition they
stand in loco parentis. In the ordinary sense of the word,
to provide "care" is to "care for",
"take charge of", "look after", or "have
regard for". These meanings are within ordinary, daily usage
in the English language. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on
Historical Principles Third Edition - has this definition:
"care: Charge; oversight with a view to protection,
preservation or guidance."
[37] I am satisfied on the evidence that Choice, through the
teachers and administration, provided a facility - in the form of
classrooms designed with small student population and with open
space - which was suitable for the student suffering from ADHD,
alone or in combination with ODD. In addition, there were
personnel specially trained, through a combination of formal
education and experience, capable of providing individualized
attention to Nicholas Collins and other students suffering from a
similar mental handicap. The care was evident in providing a safe
environment in which the ADHD child, albeit gifted, had to be
treated specially - not merely because of the giftedness - but
because that disorder, sufficient to constitute a mental
handicap, was intrexicably bound up with the rest of the
individual and it was necessary to care for and to provide
training to the whole child. The configuration within a
classroom, having a small number of students, can be seen as a
facility specially provided if it is done with the view to
allowing additional space or flexibility to a student who
otherwise has great difficulty in coping with ordinary
instructional techniques because of being affected by ADHD. If it
is not logical to demand a facility and its personnel be devoted,
exclusively, to the care or care and training of physically or
mentally handicapped individuals then it does not make sense for
the handicapped individual to be 100% - or nearly so -
handicapped in all aspects, almost all of the time, in order to
satisfy the criteria within the provision. To do so is to confuse
the issue in the within appeal with the egregiously restrictive
requirements to be met in order to qualify for a disability tax
credit under another provision of the Act. While all the
expenses covered by paragraph 118.2(2) relate - in some manner -
to treatment, care, therapy, services, products and so on, the
whole provision is so elaborate it would not be correct - in my
view - to rely too heavily on the medical connotation in the
usual, historical sense. The concept of a qualifying medical
expense has definitely grown since 1971 when it was restricted
only to amounts paid for the full-time care of a dependent person
in a nursing home provided, however, other criteria have been
satisfied. Part of the growth can be attributable to technology
but some of it is the result of a different attitude within the
general public, as reflected by amended legislation, public
policy and recent jurisprudence to recognize certain disorders,
syndromes and diseases as constituting a mental or physical
handicap. In one sense, it may seem inappropriate to regard
Nicholas Collins as a "patient" but he was in fact a
person who was "under medical care". At all times
material, either Dr. Nancy Luce, Dr. Joan Pinkus, or Dr.
Gabrielle Weiss - all qualified medical practitioners - were
providing treatment to Nicholas in relation to his ongoing
difficulties which, at all times, were suspected to have been
caused by ADHD. It must be kept in mind the ADHD diagnosis is
dependent on sufficient diagnostic criteria having been met when
the child is age seven. As Dr. Pinkus and Dr.Weiss indicated,
when a child is very young, the proper course is to deal with
behavioural problems day-by-day, in small "chunks" and
to only make the conclusive diagnosis once the child has attained
the proper age. It does not seem reasonable that a final
diagnosis of a particular physical or mental handicap must be
made in order to satisfy the language of the provision provided
the evidence establishes it was reasonable to have proceeded on
the basis the particular handicap was probably present and,
thereafter, it could be shown the probability had matured to the
degree of certainty recognized by that particular discipline
within the medical profession certifying the ultimate diagnosis.
Again, with children, especially at an early age, it must be
better to undertake remedial action on a reasonable basis rather
than wait for some definitive label to be affixed and then be
forced to scramble to discover a course of treatment. One has to
be practical and take into consideration the long waiting lists
to see child specialists. That was made clear by the evidence of
the appellant in relation to having Nicholas seen by
Dr. Luce and/or Dr. Weiss.
[38] I conclude that Choice was a school which specially
provided - to Nicholas Collins - both facilities and
personnel for the care or the care and training of persons
suffering from the same mental handicap - ADHD - although only
one or other is required to meet the language of the
provision.
[39] The last matter to be addressed is the issue of
"certification." There is no issue whether Dr. Pinkus
and Dr. Weiss are persons qualified to issue such a
certification. The question is: did they do so. As earlier noted,
there is no longer any special form of certification and there is
no requirement the certification - in whatever form - has to be
communicated to the Minister of National Revenue. Counsel
referred to various dictionaries and the definitions provided
included:
"Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary: certify -
to attest authoritatively
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: certify - Make (a
thing) certain; guarantee as certain; give certain information
of.
Black's Law Dictionary - Sixth Edition - certify - To
authenticate or vouch for a thing in writing. To attest as being
true or as represented."
[40] In 1993, prior to the admission of Nicholas to Choice,
Dr. Pinkus conducted an assessment which confirmed, inter
alia, his superior intelligence beyond that required to be
admitted to the school. In addition, she recognized Nicholas was
probably affected by ADHD and had been treated on that basis by
Dr. Luce. It was clear to the appellant her son was exhibiting
behaviour completely consistent with ADHD but she understood a
final diagnosis would have to be made at a later age, which was
done by Dr. Gabrielle Weiss in 1995. As far as the appellant was
concerned, Dr. Pinkus attested to her - authoritatively in the
sense she was an expert in the field of conducting assessments
and was a qualified psychologist specializing in children - that
Nicholas should be educated at a school which could provide
proper care or care and training for someone suffering from ADHD.
The position of counsel for the respondent, as it pertained to
the 1993 taxation year, was that certification, in some manner,
must be undertaken at the time the expense (payment of tuition)
was incurred or, at least, in that taxation year and that
Dr. Pinkus had not made any diagnosis of any mental handicap
at that time. It is clear on the evidence that Dr. Pinkus - while
reluctant to affix a label of ADHD to Nicholas pending
confirmation by a psychiatrist specializing in children - clearly
regarded him as having a mental handicap despite his impressive
IQ. In her expert opinion, Choice was an appropriate school to
assist in treating that disorder and otherwise dealing with the
mental handicap. It is not as though there was no reason
whatsoever to proceed on the basis Nicholas would probably be
officially diagnosed - at a later date - with ADHD, alone or in
combination with another learning disorder. There was a plethora
of evidence to suggest that such a diagnosis was almost
inevitable and the appellant, Dr. Luce, the teachers and staff at
Choice - at all times - treated Nicholas as a child suffering
from ADHD.
[41] In the case of Regina v . Lines, 27 C.C.C. (3d)
377, the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal considered the
meaning of the word "certify" as it appeared in the
Canada Evidence Act. At p. 380, Laycraft, C.J. N.W.T.
stated:
"Certify" has the connotation of "attestation
in an authoritative manner" though it is, of course, a word
of wide import which may also refer merely to a formal or legal
certificate.
[42] Clearly, if the Minister wanted to rely on a special
certificate in a prescribed form being provided at a particular
time or in conjuction with the tax return being filed then the
Minister should have taken steps to ensure the requirement for a
certificate in prescribed form was not taken out of the
Act during revision. In the case of Revusky v.
Canada a decision of Judge Bell, Tax Court of Canada, [1996]
T.C.J. No. 1754, held that a certification by a medical
practitioner that the taxpayer was incapable of travel without
the assistance of an attendant could also be made following the
completion of the patient's travel. Judge Bell noted at
page 6:
"The medical expenses provision must have rules, as it
does have. However, those rules must be interpreted to make sense
in situations which don't fit the norm and where relief is
intended."
[43] In the case of Kushnir et al v. M.N.R., 86
DTC 1381, Christie A.C.J.T.C. found that none of the
taxpayers' children had been properly "certified"
as required by the relevant provision of the Act,
subparagraph 110(1)(c)(vi) - the wording of which is
identical to the one in the within appeal - on the basis the
certificates were signed shortly before the hearing of the appeal
and also that the words used therein were incapable of
identifying the existence of a mental handicap.
[44] In my opinion, section 118.2 of the Act was not
drafted in a manner which would invite restrictive interpretation
despite the careful crafting of subparagraphs, clauses and
subclauses covering everything from vehicle mileage to dog food.
It was apparent from the submissions of counsel for the
respondent that the Minister is fearful every parent with a
gifted child - falling within that 4% segment of the general
population - will be seeking a deduction for private school
tuition. That is no concern of mine nor should it be. My duty is
to consider the evidence, review the submissions of counsel,
refer to relevant jurisprudence, undertake an analysis of the
facts and law and then arrive at a decision. Each case will still
have to be heard on its merits as ADHD symptoms fall within a
continuum and may not always constitute a mental handicap. In
each case - whether involving ADHD, ODD, or certain learning
disorders - the appellant will have the burden of proving the
requirements of the provision have been met and the evidence,
including that of the qualified professionals, will have to be
sufficient to carry the day.
[45] The appeals of the appellant for the 1993 and 1995
taxation years are allowed - with costs on the basis the appeals
were heard together - and the assessment for each taxation year
is referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and
reassessment on the basis the amounts paid to Choice in 1993 and
1995 are qualifying medical expenses within subsection 118.2(2)
of the Act.
Signed at Toronto, Ontario, this 14th day of May 1998.
"D.W. Rowe"
D.J.T.C.C.