Date: 19980507
Dockets: 95-1134-IT-G; 96-2494-IT-G
BETWEEN:
DOUGLAS HENDERSON,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
P.R. Dussault J.T.C.C.
[1] These two cases combine appeals from assessments for the
appellant's 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 taxation
years.
[2] The only point at issue is whether the deduction of
farming losses sustained by the appellant in each of those years
is restricted under s. 31(1) of the Income Tax Act
("the Act"), as the Minister of National Revenue
("the Minister") found in making the assessments. That
provision states that the restriction is applicable "where a
taxpayer's chief source of income for a taxation year is
neither farming nor a combination of farming and some other
source of income".
[3] The substance of the various parts of the Reply to the
Notice of Appeal in file No. 95-1134(IT)G (1989, 1990
and 1991 taxation years) is repeated in the Reply to the Notice
of Appeal in file No. 96-2494(IT)G (1992 and 1993
taxation years). The facts assumed by the Minister in making the
assessments are set out in subparagraphs (a) to (q) of
paragraph 14 of the latter Reply to the Notice of Appeal.
Those subparagraphs read:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) The appellant received the following income from his
employment or his engineering profession and claimed the
following farm losses for his 1987 to 1993 taxation years
inclusive:
|
YEAR
|
ENGINEERING
INCOME
|
GROSS
FARM
INCOME
|
FARM
LOSSES
|
|
1987
|
$130,768
|
$ 3,866
|
($ 79,920)
|
|
1988
|
$197,207
|
$14,257
|
($ 70,445)
|
|
1989
|
$118,200
|
$ 3,887
|
($ 79,681)
|
|
1990
|
$162,872
|
$ 5,425
|
($100,849)
|
|
1991
|
$140,528
|
$24,700
|
($ 56,771)
|
|
1992
|
$100,000
|
$12,630
|
($ 82,187)
|
|
1993
|
$ 96,700
|
$18,059
|
($ 77,551)
|
(b) The farm income of $24,700 reported in 1991 was
essentially income from equipment rental.
(c) The appellant has worked as an engineer for over
20 years, primarily in the Canadian West and North,
installing pipelines and doing other civil engineering work.
(d) In 1992 the appellant was suffering back pains and after
undergoing surgery was relatively inactive from March to
August.
(e) Except for a few weeks spent on a farm during summer
vacation in his youth, the appellant had little experience of
farm work and cattle raising before 1986.
(f) There were no cattle on the farm before 1990 and the
appellant had no cattle at the end of 1971.[1]
(g) The appellant worked in the James Bay area for
six months in 1989; for the rest of the year he did work
relating to engineering bids.
(h) In the first 11 months of 1990 the appellant spent an
average of two days a week working on the farm; it was
during that year that a stabling barn was built and the land
cleared to create pasture.
(i) In 1991, from January to April, the appellant worked in
Cochrane, Ontario, several hundred kilometers from his farm.
(j) The income derived by the appellant from the practice of
his profession as an engineer was, and in the future probably
will remain, his chief source of income.
(k) In 1993 the appellant was involved in a two-year
project having to do with an incinerator in the Montréal
area and his wife worked at the Hôpital
Général de Montréal as a nurse.
(l) In 1992 the appellant acquired an interest in the Auberge
Estrimont in Magog, and he derives a further portion of his
income from investments in securities.
(m) Part of the expenses claimed by the appellant arose out of
land clearing which was actually a capital investment but which
may be deducted in full by farmers under s. 30 of the
Income Tax Act.
(n) The appellant's residence was built on the farm in
1985 at a cost of some $200,000 and the yard and walkway(s) were
paved in 1991 at a cost of $15,115.
(o) A stable was built in 1986, the value of which was
estimated by the appellant as some $60,000, and the appellant
bought several horses, though he no longer had them in the years
covered by the appeal.
(p) In 1985 and 1986 the appellant submitted a five-year
rezoning proposal to the Town of Cowansville.
(q) The facts prior to the assessments which are admitted or
alleged in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of
this reply. [sic]
[4] It was in 1983 that the appellant, a professional engineer
specializing in civil engineering, and in particular in the
installation of pipelines, decided to purchase a piece of land in
Cowansville, Quebec. The appellant said that he had moved over
45 times since his career began in 1971, mainly in the
Canadian West and North, and wanted to settle down permanently
and begin a viable farming operation. The land, with an area of
313 acres located on the western boundary of the Cowansville
urban area, had at that time been abandoned for some
20 years.
[5] After obtaining a permit from the Commission de Protection
du Territoire Agricole du Québec ("the CPTAQ"),
the appellant began building his residence in fall 1984. The
building was completed in spring 1985.
[6] The appellant stated that his objective with the farming
operation was to devote himself to raising registered purebred
cattle so he could create a job that would enable him to remain
at home full time and give up engineering. In connection with the
application he made to the CPTAQ in 1984 for the permit to build
his residence, the appellant described his objectives as follows
(at p. 2 of Exhibit A-1):
[TRANSLATION]
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
We have sufficient resources that will enable us to meet the
following schedule:
Short term: - preparing soil and sowing;
(0 - 2 years) - application of soil enhancers and
fertilizers;
- application of pesticides and herbicides;
- construction of fences.
Medium term: - improvement of surface and
underground
(0 - 5 years) drainage;
- purchase of tractors and tillage tools;
- purchase of cattle for fattening;
- construction of farm buildings.
Long term: - clearing and drainage to improve
productivity.
(0 - 10 years)
[7] The appellant admitted that he had done no other long-term
planning and that the time needed to get the land in good shape,
rebuild the fences and construct buildings was much longer than
initially expected. As well, although he thought in 1985 that he
would be able to earn a substantial income with 50 breeding
cows, he now says that because of a drop in market prices, for
one thing, he would now need 85.
[8] Although he had considerable expertise in the field of
planning and development, the appellant had almost no experience
in cattle raising as he had only worked on a farm on a few
occasions in the summer when he was a teenager.
[9] In 1984 the appellant, assisted only by his wife and
children, began the work of developing his land section by
section, whether into cultivated fields or pasture land. They had
to pick up stones, clear brush, remove old fences and build new
ones, sow, harvest and so on. Obviously, they also had to buy
heavy equipment and the tools needed to do these various rather
extensive jobs, which continued until 1990 and even in later
years. As the appellant pointed out, all this could not be done
overnight.
[10] The appellant built his first barn himself in 1990.
Measuring 90 by 160 feet, it could be used to feed
100 animals. The second one, to be used primarily for
storing forage, was begun in 1992 and completed in 1994. Between
1989 and 1991 the appellant harvested 6,000 to 7,000 bales
of hay a year.
[11] The appellant's intention of starting to raise beef
cattle took shape in 1989 for the first time, when he purchased
his first 20 Angus cattle.
[12] However, these animals had to be sent to a neighbour some
kilometers away to spend the winter since all the necessary
fences had not yet been installed. The neighbour, who had the
same breed of cattle, was apparently the first person to import
them from Western Canada into Quebec. Over the next summer, some
60 head of Red Angus and Black Angus cattle, including the
20 head owned by the appellant and the year's calves,
were brought onto his land. That was apparently when they decided
to divide them up, the appellant wishing to keep the Red Angus
breed and his neighbour preferring the Black Angus.
[13] In 1991 the herd consisted of 35 to 40 head,
including 25 breeding cows. In 1993 it consisted of 75 to
80 head. In 1993 or 1994 the appellant bought back
10 bred cows. The herd consisted of 125 head in 1995,
and of 157 in 1996, including 77 breeding cows and four
top-quality bulls. Some 26 head recognized as genetically
superior were for sale. In 1997 30 head were sold at a price
of $1,000 each.
[14] The animals were not penned inside but were put out to
pasture. The barn had a feed distribution system and automatic
heated waterers which provided a year-round water supply. In
fact, the appellant said he had installed the various equipment
so as to reduce the need for labour. When he was travelling for
extended periods, the appellant said, his wife and children did
what was needed.
[15] The appellant's farm has a large wooded area, and
during the years at issue the appellant's farm income was
mainly derived from selling logs or firewood and hay and, in
1991, from renting farm machinery.
[16] Naturally, the appellant is a member of the Union des
producteurs agricoles ("U.P.A.") and is registered with
the Ministère des Ressources naturelles of the Government
of Quebec as a timber producer. On October 30, 1996 he
joined the Syndicat de Gestion Agricole, Lac Champlain
("S.G.A.L.C."), an organization of producers the
purpose of which was to help them manage their operations better.
Michel Boutet, an agronomist and management consultant for
the organization, was called to testify for the appellant. Mr
Boutet was consulted by the appellant in October 1996 for
assistance in making farming his main source of income and making
the operation viable, and he acknowledged the colossal amount of
work done by the appellant on his land and the exceptional
quality of the buildings and facilities, which reflected the
appellant's engineering experience. However, he admitted that
the business had to make certain structural adjustments to
increase the herd to meet the 1995 provincial standard, which was
85 breeding cows. In his submission, the buildings should
also have been expanded to accommodate more animals, and the
maintenance costs reduced by purchasing more up-to-date
machinery. As to the market situation, Mr. Boutet noted that
despite the drop in prices for slaughter animals in recent years,
a recovery could be expected and the Red Angus breed chosen by
the appellant, though not widespread, had a great future in
Quebec. Mr. Boutet said he had begun a three-year
program with the appellant to make the operation profitable and
achieve financial independence.
[17] Because the parties referred to several events which
occurred after the years at issue, with a view to providing a
more complete picture of the situation, it is worth including
some financial information to supplement the table set out in
subparagraph 14(a) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. In
1994 and 1995 the appellant's (net) employment and business
income from his profession as an engineer was $188,014 and
$138,187, respectively. In the same years, the gross farm income
was $21,669 and $29,676, resulting in a loss of $71,732 and
$110,842 for each of those years, respectively. In 1996 the (net)
income derived by the appellant from his profession came to a
total of $146,626 while the gross farming income was $48,934,
producing income of $5,575 after adjustments for inventory. In
actual fact, because the farm expenses amounted to $100,122 and
gross income to $48,934, there was an operating loss of $51,188
before the adjustments.
[18] Although the appellant mentioned work done on his farm in
1985, no financial information was supplied about that year or
about the 1986 taxation year.
[19] To complete the financial information, I should note that
the appellant had large investments, including residential and
apartment buildings and securities, which produced substantial
income. As indicated in subparagraph 14(l) of the Reply to
the Notice of Appeal, the appellant also purchased an interest in
the Auberge Estrimont in Magog, Quebec in 1992.
[20] Claude Charpentier, au auditor with Revenue Canada,
did an audit of the appellant's operations with the help of a
technical adviser, Réal Lamarche, who had some
20 years' experience. In February 1993, Mr. Charpentier
visited the appellant's farm for the purposes of his audit.
According to his testimony, his first reaction was astonishment
at the exceptional quality of the buildings, equipment and
facilities, the likes of which he had seldom seen. He was also
amazed to find that despite this quality the farm was generating
very little activity compared with other profitable operations.
At that time, he estimated that this made [TRANSLATION] "the
expectation of profit more problematic". The very slow
growth in the herd was also noted.
[21] Additionally, he said the appellant told him that he
expected to retire as an engineer in 1997, when he hoped to have
50 breeding cows which might produce 50 calves a year
for sale. According to the appellant’s own calculations, at
$1,000 a head he expected to have annual gross income of
$50,000.
[22] As noted earlier, the appellant admitted at the hearing
that he had to revise his forecasts of the number of breeding
cows needed to arrive at a certain level of profitability.
However, it was clear from his testimony that what he eventually
expected to receive from his operation was a net income of only
$30,000. I will return to this point later.
[23] Of course, at the meeting between Mr. Charpentier
and the appellant they discussed the time the appellant spent on
farm work as compared with the time he devoted to his
professional activities as an engineer. This is an important
point, and the last one I will discuss in the summary of the
facts.
[24] The appellant challenged the allegations of fact
contained in the Reply to the Notice of Appeal regarding the time
spent on his engineering work as compared with his work on the
farm. The appellant said he gave up his full-time job as an
engineer for Les constructions du Saint-Laurent in 1984. However,
because the company wished to continue to benefit from his
expertise in pipeline construction and did not want him to offer
his services to anyone else, he was promised a retainer of
between $50,000 and $100,000 annually, in addition to $1,000 a
week and profit-sharing when he worked on company projects. The
appellant said he kept a diary and he estimated the time spent on
engineering at between 25 and 30 percent, or an average of
100 days a year. He thus maintained that he had worked
seven days a week all year and spent an average of
two days a week on engineering and five days a week on
farm work.
[25] In his testimony, the appellant also commented on the
allegations of fact set out in subparagraphs 14(g) to (k) of
the Reply to the Notice of Appeal, which refers to some of his
activities as an engineer. In cross-examination the appellant
admitted that he had lived on his income as an engineer and his
investment income. He said he had always worked at least
two days a week as an engineer. He admitted that it was not
until 1991 that he received an annual retainer, regardless of the
number of days worked, in addition to a weekly salary and a
percentage of profits. He maintained that despite the fact that
there were no animals on the farm until 1990, he had always spent
75 percent of his time there since there was in any case
always something to do.
[26] Without going into detail, it appears to me that the
appellant's testimony regarding the time spent on his various
engineering projects and his work on the farm in the years at
issue is sometimes difficult to reconcile with the account given
to Claude Charpentier of Revenue Canada in 1993: one thing
the appellant told him, in reference to his activities as an
engineer for various companies from 1988 to 1992, was that he had
no diary for this. According to the appellant, however,
Mr. Charpentier did not ask him questions relating to
specific days spent on each activity and it was not until later,
with the help of his diaries, that he was able to establish in
greater detail how he used his time, and he now estimates that he
spent an average of two days a week on engineering and
five days a week on the farm.
[27] Counsel for the appellant cited a number of decisions,
and argued that despite certain weaknesses the situation in the
instant cases should be considered favourably in light of the
tests applied by the courts, in particular as regards the time
spent on farm activities and the energy the appellant put into
ensuring that his facilities were of exceptional quality. The
size and quality of the herd, the market price situation and the
fact that infrastructure expenditures are now decreasing steadily
were all, in his submission, factors going to show that the
break-even point is already a certainty. According to counsel for
the appellant, this is confirmed by Mr. Boutet's
testimony, which indicated that the approach taken by the
appellant to developing his farm during the years at issue was
fully justified. For example, the appellant could not be blamed
for not developing his operation quickly enough or for spending
too much money on it, because on the one hand, he had to start up
his operation on wasteland, and on the other, he had to manage to
operate a livestock farm with a superior breed of animals. In the
submission of counsel for the appellant, the quality of the
facilities was a sort of long-term guarantee that stemmed from a
business decision, even though some might think that certain
expenses were too high. Thus, according to counsel for the
appellant, what had been a source of losses in the past has now
quite certainly demonstrated that the appellant had a reasonable
expectation of profit, which according to the assessment made
will become his chief source of income when combined with his
other sources of income.
[28] Counsel for the appellant relied inter alia on the
decisions in the following cases: Moldowan v. The
Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 480, 77 DTC 5213, [1977]
C.T.C. 310 (S.C.C.); Monette v. M.N.R., 88 DTC
1459, [1988] 2 C.T.C. 2089 (T.C.C.); Ganci et al. v.
M.N.R., 90 DTC 1317, [1990] 1 C.T.C. 2354 (T.C.C.);
The Queen v. Wylie, 92 DTC 6294, [1992]
1 C.T.C. 236 (F.C.T.D.); Hover v. M.N.R.,
93 DTC 98, [1993] 1 C.T.C. 2585 (T.C.C.);
Mott-Trille v. The Queen, 94 DTC 1013,
[1994] 1 C.T.C. 2159 (T.C.C.); The Queen v. ICHI
Canada Limited, 95 DTC 5384, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 120
(F.C.T.D.); Phillips v. The Queen, 96 DTC 6581,
[1997] 1 C.T.C. 59 (F.C.T.D.); R & W Such
Holdings Limited v. The Queen, 96 DTC 6455, [1996]
1 C.T.C. 53 (F.C.T.D.).
[29] Counsel for the respondent, who also referred to a number
of judgments, including the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Moldowan, supra, first pointed out that
determining whether a source of income is a taxpayer's chief
source of income presupposes a test that is both a relative and
objective one, based on the reasonable expectation of income from
various sources and a taxpayer's habits and usual manner of
working. As well, it has been held that analysis of these factors
presupposes that the time spent, capital committed and present
and future profitability will be examined for each source.
Counsel for the respondent also pointed out that these tests must
be examined as a whole and not disjunctively, to determine
whether farming can be compared favourably with other sources of
income.
[30] Further, in the submission of counsel for the respondent,
concluding that farming is a taxpayer's primary concern or
his or her chief source of income depends on showing not only a
substantial commitment in time and money but also a reasonable
expectation of a large or significant profit.
[31] These rules follow from the following cases, inter
alia; The Queen v. Morrissey, 89 DTC 5080,
[1989] 1 C.T.C. 235 (F.C.A.); Mohl v. The Queen,
89 DTC 5236, [1989] 1 C.T.C. 425 (F.C.T.D.); The
Queen v. Roney, 91 DTC 5148, [1991] 1 C.T.C.
280 (F.C.A.); Connell v. The Queen, 92 DTC 6134,
[1992] 1 C.T.C. 182 (F.C.A.); The Queen v.
Poirier, 92 DTC 6335, [1992] 2 C.T.C. 9 (F.C.A.);
The Queen v. Timpson, 93 DTC 5281, [1993]
2 C.T.C. 55 (F.C.A.).
[32] Applying these rules to the facts of the instant case,
counsel for the respondent argued that consideration of the
various tests leads to the conclusion that farming cannot be
favourably compared with the appellant's other sources of
income. First, on the question of the time spent on farming as
compared with the time spent on his activities as an engineer,
she noted the stability of the appellant's income, which
remains stable despite his statements that he had extensive
professional activities which he had tried to cut back on during
the years at issue. Despite the fact that the appellant began
living on the farm in 1985, those activities have always
continued to produce substantial income, before, during and after
the years at issue, and there is no evidence to suggest that any
imminent change is likely in this regard. As well, noting that
there were no animals on the farm until 1990 and that the first
stable was built in that year, counsel for the respondent
considered that the time the appellant spent working on his land
was exaggerated. The limited activity was also observed by
Mr. Charpentier in 1993.
[33] With respect to the capital invested, counsel for the
respondent stressed the colossal amounts spent to construct what
were certainly the very top quality, but also very expensive,
facilities, which made it correspondingly less possible that the
operation would quickly become the appellant's chief source
of income.
[34] On the question of profitability, counsel for the
respondent stressed the fact that even now, after 13 years,
actual and potential profitability has not been established,
since even in 1996 there was a $50,000 operating loss before
adjustments for inventory. She also noted that the appellant
began his work on the farm without any real operating plan and
subsequently modified his projections several times in an attempt
to establish that his operation was profitable. She also noted
that the appellant delayed purchasing livestock and did not try
to increase their reproduction rate or to obtain financing which
would have made speedier progress possible.
[35] After the hearing, counsel for the parties had an
opportunity to make further submissions regarding the judgment
rendered by the Federal Court of Appeal on October 15, 1997
in Canada v. Donnelly, [1998] 1 F.C. 513,
97 DTC 5499 (F.C.A.). Counsel commented on that judgment and
distinguished it as required by the facts of the instant case,
and for the most part reiterated their respective positions as to
the application of s. 31 of the Act for the years at issue.
Counsel for the appellant added that the facts of the instant
case were even more favourable to the appellant than the facts in
The Queen v. Graham, 85 DTC 5256, [1985]
1 C.T.C. 380 (F.C.A.), to which the Federal Court of Appeal
referred and in which it found for the taxpayer.
[36] At the outset, I would say that applying well-defined
rules is likely to produce a more satisfactory conclusion than
simply comparing the appellant's situation with that of other
taxpayers, since it is always possible to find inconsistencies
which make comparisons awkward.
[37] In Donnelly, Robertson J.A., speaking for the
Federal Court of Appeal, succinctly summarized the analytical
principles developed in earlier cases and referred to by counsel
for the respondent. At pp. 520 and 521 of the Federal Court
of Canada Reports, he said the following:
A determination as to whether farming is a taxpayer's
chief source of income requires a favourable comparison of that
occupational endeavour with the taxpayer's other income
source in terms of capital committed, time spent and
profitability, actual or potential. The test is both a relative
and objective one. It is not a pure quantum measurement. All
three factors must be weighed with no one factor being decisive.
Yet there can be no doubt that the profitability factor poses
the greatest obstacle to taxpayers seeking to persuade the courts
that farming is their chief source of income. This is so because
the evidential burden is on taxpayers to establish that the net
income that could reasonably be expected to be earned from
farming is substantial in relation to their other income source:
invariably, employment or professional income. Were the law
otherwise there would be no basis on which the Tax Court could
make a comparison between the relative amounts expected to be
earned from farming and the other income source, as required by
section 31 of the Act. The extent to which the evidential
burden regarding the profitability factor or test differs from
the one governing the reasonable expectation of profit
requirement is a matter which I will address more fully
below.
[My emphasis.]
and further on, at 522:
Any doubt as to whether the taxpayer's chief source of
income is farming is resolved once consideration is given to the
element of profitability. There is a difference between the
type of evidence the taxpayer must adduce concerning
profitability under section 31 of the Act, as opposed to
that relevant to the reasonable expectation of profit test. In
the latter case the taxpayer need only show that there is or was
an expectation of profit, be it $1 or $1 million. It is well
recognized in tax law that a "reasonable expectation of
profit" is not synonymous with an "expectation of
reasonable profits". With respect to the section 31
profitability factor, however, quantum is relevant because it
provides a basis on which to compare potential farm income with
that actually received by the taxpayer from the competing
occupation. In other words, we are looking for evidence to
support a finding of reasonable expectation of
"substantial" profits from farming.
[My emphasis.]
[38] Of course, there is no question here as to whether the
appellant had a reasonable expectation of profit in 1989 to 1993,
as this point was conceded by the respondent at the outset
despite the significant losses incurred by the appellant not only
in those years but also in the years both before and after the
years at issue.
[39] Since what must actually be decided is whether farming
became the appellant's chief source of income in 1989 to 1993
pursuant to the tests applied by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Donnelly, supra, I consider the evidence submitted
to be entirely insufficient to support such a conclusion.
[40] The appellant, who in 1984 decided to establish a
permanent residence in the country, undoubtedly did make
considerable effort and, without a shadow of a doubt, spent a lot
of time setting up an operation which might be described as a
"model" one in various respects, especially as regards
the quality of the buildings and facilities. The extent of the
losses, which now exceed $900,000, also indicates the level of
the investment made over the years. However, two points are
unavoidable: first, the relative stability of the appellant's
income from his profession over the years, and second, the method
of calculating his use of his time, to establish the percentage
spent on farm work, which seems generous to say the least.
[41] I have to say that the appellant demonstrated exceptional
energy. However, the fact remains that, to take what is
admittedly an extreme situation, spending 187 days in a year
on engineering, which was the case in 1990, to my mind
corresponds to a percentage that is significantly greater than
50 percent of the time available. While it is understandable
that there is always something to do on a farm, it may also be
thought to be somewhat extreme to do the calculations based on a
365-day year. Accordingly, although the appellant said he
spent an average of two days a week on engineering alone in
the years at issue, in view of his frequent trips and often
prolonged absences it is difficult to conclude that he spent only
25 to 30 percent of his time on that and that he actually
spent an average of nearly 70 to 75 percent of the available
time on farm work.
[42] In any case, it is really on the crucial question of
potential profitability that, here again, as in many other cases,
the evidence is below the critical threshold. Bearing in mind the
amount of money invested by the appellant, which I repeat
exceeded $900,000, one cannot help being surprised to find that
in 1993 the appellant himself was hoping to get a gross annual
income of $50,000 from his operation when it reached maturity. At
the hearing, he said several times that his objective was an
annual net income of $30,000. This is where farming cannot be
favourably compared with the appellant's other sources of
income, in particular engineering, as his chief source of income.
Anticipating or hoping for a net income of $30,000 after
investing over $900,000 amounts to anticipating a return of less
than three percent on the capital invested, and this could
never be regarded as what was referred to as
"substantial" or even "reasonable" profits
from farming, contrary to what counsel for the appellant argued.
Moreover, this $30,000 net income was not even anticipated in
1993. Although Mr. Boutet's testimony was favourable to
the appellant, it must be noted that he did not suggest a figure
on the question of profitability. It should also be noted that he
was not consulted until 1996, for the specific purpose of helping
the appellant make raising livestock his chief source of income
and attempting to make the operation profitable. In any case,
this is not exactly what could be called relevant evidence in
establishing the situation in 1989 to 1993.
[43] In the circumstances, I cannot conclude that farming was
the appellant's chief source of income during the years at
issue in the sense that it became or could have become his
"living", as it is expressed in Moldowan,
supra. In my opinion, farming was actually a secondary
source which could at most have produced supplementary
income.
[44] The appeals are dismissed with costs to the
respondent.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, May 7, 1998.
“P.R. Dussault”
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 16th day of December
1998.
Kathryn Barnard, Revisor
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