Date: 19980805
Docket: 96-3882-IT-G
BETWEEN:
GESTION B. DUFRESNE LTÉE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Archambault, J.T.C.C.
[1] Gestion B. Dufresne Ltée (“Gestion
Dufresne”) is contesting a notice of assessment issued by
the Minister of National Revenue (“the Minister”) for
the 1991 taxation year. Under subsection 55(2) of the Income
Tax Act (“the Act”), the Minister treated
as a capital gain a dividend that Gestion Dufresne was deemed to
have received on a share redemption. The Minister argues that the
dividend was received as part of a series of transactions that
resulted in a significant increase in the interest held in a
corporation (Roger Grenier Inc. (“Grenier”)) by a
person (Gestion G. Hamel Ltée (“Gestion
Hamel”)) with whom the corporation that received the
dividend (Gestion Dufresne) was dealing at arm’s length.
Gestion Dufresne argues that it and Gestion Hamel were not
dealing with each other at arm’s length and that subsection
55(2) of the Act is not applicable.
[2] Gestion Dufresne also argues that the Minister could not
make a reassessment beyond the normal three-year period and that
it did not file a notice of waiver of the limitation period (the
notice it filed related solely to 1990). The Minister argues that
the notice of waiver actually related to 1991.
Facts
[3] The facts of this appeal are not really in dispute, and
most of them have been admitted by counsel for Gestion Dufresne.
At the close of its fiscal year ending on February 28, 1990,
Gestion Dufresne owned 466 class A common shares
(“466 shares”) in Grenier, which represented 70
percent of that class of shares. Bertrand Dufresne was
Gestion Dufresne’s sole shareholder. Gestion Hamel owned
the rest of the class A common shares in Grenier, or 30 percent
of that class of shares. Gaston Hamel was Gestion Hamel’s
sole shareholder. His spouse, Aline Desrochers, is the sister of
Madeleine Desrochers, Bertrand Dufresne’s spouse.
[4] During the 1989 and 1990 fiscal years, Grenier redeemed
common shares owned by Gestion Dufresne: $100,000 worth in 1989
and $380,000 worth in 1990. On March 2, 1990, during the 1991
fiscal year, Grenier redeemed the remaining 466 shares owned by
Gestion Dufresne for $450,000.
[5] Since the paid-up capital and the adjusted cost base
of the 466 shares were $1 each, Gestion Dufresne was deemed
(under paragraph 84(3)(b) of the Act) to have
received a dividend of $449,534 ($450,000 - $466) during the 1991
fiscal year.[1]
Under subsection 112(1) of the Act, that amount was
deductible in computing Gestion Dufresne’s taxable income.
For the purposes of calculating the capital gain, the proceeds of
disposition were deemed to be $466 under subparagraph
54(h)(i) of the Act, since the amount of the deemed
dividend had to be subtracted from the proceeds of disposition
otherwise determined. The amount of the capital gain was
therefore nil, as the proceeds of disposition would in that case
have been equal to the adjusted cost base.
[6] Since the income earned after 1971 that was attributable
to the 466 redeemed shares amounted to $364,942, one of the
results of the redemption was to effect a significant reduction
in the portion of the capital gain that Gestion Dufresne
would have realized on a disposition of the 466 shares at fair
market value immediately before the redemption and that could
reasonably be considered to be attributable to anything other
than income earned after 1971.
[7] Before making a reassessment for 1991, the
Minister’s auditor informed Gestion Dufresne’s
representatives that he was going to apply subsection 55(2) of
the Act and treat the dividend deemed to have been
received on redemption of the 466 shares as a capital gain. On
November 22, 1993, the representatives asked the auditor if they
could submit comments to the Minister’s head office in
Ottawa. Several months later, no decision had yet been made and
the normal reassessment period was about to expire (on June 21,
1994). The auditor therefore asked Gestion Dufresne’s agent
to file a notice of waiver of the limitation period.
[8] On May 25, 1994, Gestion Dufresne filed a Form T2029
(Waiver in Respect of the Normal Reassessment Period) signed by
Mr. Dufresne. It concerned “the application of section
55 to the transaction in which Roger Grenier Inc. redeemed
shares held by Gestion B. Dufresne Inc. for $450,000”.
The relevant taxation year indicated in the waiver was that
ending on February 28, 1990. In his testimony, the
Minister’s auditor maintained that the notice of waiver
applied rather to the year ending on February 28, 1991. He could
not have accepted a notice of waiver for 1990, since the
limitation period for that year had already expired by that
time.
[9] On March 9, 1995, the Minister made a reassessment in
which he added $337,151 to Gestion Dufresne’s taxable
income, which amount represented the taxable portion of the
capital gain of $449,534 (that is, three-quarters of the capital
gain).
Analysis
Limitation
[10] Under subsection 152(4) of the Act, it is clear
that the notice of reassessment of March 9, 1995, was issued
after the normal reassessment period. However, the Act
sets out exceptions authorizing the Minister to make
reassessments in such circumstances. One such exception is where
a taxpayer has, within the normal reassessment period, filed a
notice of waiver of the limitation period.
[11] In this case, Gestion Dufresne gave the Minister within
the normal reassessment period a notice of waiver in which it
clearly stated that it was waiving the limitation period in
respect of the application of section 55 to the redemption of the
466 shares. However, counsel for Gestion Dufresne argued that the
notice of waiver is not valid since it refers to the 1990
taxation year. In his Notice of Appeal, counsel argued that a
strict interpretation should prevail since
Gestion Dufresne’s waiver was “solely for the
taxation year ending on February 28, 1990, and not for the
taxation year ending on February 28, 1991”. However,
Gestion Dufresne did not adduce any evidence to support this
allegation. In particular, Mr. Dufresne did not appear as a
witness to swear that he had no intention of waiving the
limitation period for 1991 when he signed the waiver of
May 25, 1994.
[12] Despite the arguments of counsel for Gestion Dufresne, I
am convinced by the evidence adduced by the respondent
establishing that Gestion Dufresne genuinely intended to waive
the normal reassessment period for 1991. To begin with, 1991 is
the only year in respect of which the Minister intended to apply
section 55 of the Act. No mention was made of 1990 in the
auditor’s discussions with Gestion Dufresne’s
representatives. Moreover, Gestion Dufresne could not have mixed
up 1990 and 1991, since the notice of waiver refers to a $450,000
share redemption. If Gestion Dufresne had really been
concerned only with 1990, as its counsel argued, it would have
stated that its waiver applied only to a $380,000 share
redemption. It seems obvious to me that the reference to 1990
rather than 1991 in the notice of waiver was a careless mistake.
I therefore conclude that the notice of waiver of May 25, 1994,
is applicable to the 1991 taxation year and that the assessment
was made within the time set out in the Act.
Subsection 55(2)
[13] The only problem raised by the application of subsection
55(2) of the Act relates to subparagraph
55(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. Were Gestion Dufresne and
Gestion Hamel dealing with each other at arm’s length? The
other conditions governing the application of this subparagraph
and of subsection 55(2) are not in dispute.
[14] Before setting out each party’s position, it would
be helpful to reproduce the relevant portions of section 55 of
the Act:
55(2) Where a corporation resident in Canada has after
April 21, 1980 received a taxable dividend in
respect of which it is entitled to a deduction under
subsection 112(1) or 138(6) as part of a transaction or event or
a series of transactions or events . . . (or, in
the case of a dividend under subsection 84(3), one of the results
of which) was to effect a significant reduction in the portion of
the capital gain that, but for the dividend, would have been
realized on a disposition at fair market value of any share of
capital stock immediately before the dividend and that could
reasonably be considered to be attributable to anything other
than income earned or realized by any corporation after 1971 and
before the transaction or event or the commencement of the series
of transactions or events referred to in
paragraph (3)(a), notwithstanding any other section
of this Act, the amount of the dividend . . .
(a) shall be deemed not to be a dividend
received by the corporation;
(b) where a corporation has disposed of the share,
shall be deemed to be proceeds of disposition of the share
except to the extent that it is otherwise included in computing
such proceeds; and
. . .
55(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to any dividend
received by a corporation,
(a) unless such dividend was received as part of
a transaction or event or a series of transactions or events that
resulted in
(i) a disposition of any property to a person with whom that
corporation was dealing at arm’s length, or
(ii) a significant increase in the interest in any
corporation of any person with whom the corporation that received
the dividend was dealing at arm’s length;
. . .
55(5) For the purposes of this section,
. . .
(e) in determining whether two or more persons are
dealing with each other at arm’s length, persons shall be
deemed to be dealing with each other at arm’s length and
not to be related to each other if one is the brother or sister
of the other
. . . .
[Emphasis added.]
[15] Sections 251 and 252 of the Act set out the
general rules defining the circumstances in which persons are not
“dealing with each other at arm’s length” or
are “related persons”. The relevant provisions are as
follows:
251(1) For the purposes of this Act,
(a) related persons shall be deemed not to deal with
each other at arm’s length; and
(b) it is a question of fact whether persons not
related to each other were at a particular time dealing with each
other at arm’s length.
251(2) For the purpose of this Act “related
persons”, or persons related to each other, are
(a) individuals connected by blood relationship,
marriage or adoption;
. . .
(c) any two corporations
. . .
(ii) if each of the corporations is controlled by one person
and the person who controls one of the corporations is related
to the person who controls the other
corporation . . . .
251(6) For the purposes of this Act,
(a) persons are connected by blood relationship
if one is the child or other descendant of the other or
one is the brother or sister of the other;
(b) persons are connected by marriage if one is
married to the other or to a person who is so connected by blood
relationship to the other . . . .
252(2) In this Act, words referring to a parent of a
taxpayer include a person whose child the taxpayer is, in the
taxation year in respect of which the expression is being
employed, within the meaning of subsection (1) or whose child the
taxpayer had previously been within the meaning of paragraph
(1)(b), and
(a) “brother” includes
brother-in-law . . .
(d) “sister” includes
sister-in-law.[2]
[Emphasis added.]
For Gestion Hamel and Gestion Dufresne to be considered not to
be dealing with each other at arm’s length, they must be
related.[3] These
two corporations may be related if each of them is controlled by
a person who is related to the person who controls the other
corporation. In the case at bar, it must be determined whether
Mr. Dufresne, who controls Gestion Dufresne, is related to Mr.
Hamel, who controls Gestion Hamel.
Positions of the parties
[16] To determine whether Gestion Hamel and Gestion Dufresne
were not dealing with each other at arm’s length for the
purposes of section 55 of the Act, it is necessary to
apply not only the general rules set out in sections 251 and 252
but also the special rule set out in paragraph 55(5)(e) of
the Act, which deems two sisters not to be related to each
other. Both parties are agreed on this approach. The fundamental
difference between their respective positions lies in the scope
to be given this presumption. The respondent argued that if two
sisters are “deemed . . . not to be related to each
other”, this also means that they must, in a manner of
speaking, be treated as strangers; in more technical terms, it
means that they are deemed no longer to be “connected by
blood relationship”. Gestion Dufresne argued that the
presumption in paragraph 55(5)(e) of the Act is
limited strictly to the concept of “related persons”
and does not have the effect of deeming two sisters not to be
connected by blood relationship or, in other words, no longer to
be sisters. Let us see how these two interpretations apply to the
facts of this case.
[17] Counsel for Gestion Dufresne argued that determining
whether a non-arm’s-length relationship exists
is a three-step process. First, it must be determined whether the
persons concerned are connected by blood relationship or
marriage. Second, it must be determined whether those persons are
related. Third, it must be determined whether they are dealing
with each other at arm’s length. This interpretation is
based on the fact that the Act defines three quite
separate concepts: (i) persons connected by blood relationship or
marriage; (ii) related persons; and (iii) persons not dealing
with each other at arm’s length.
[18] Counsel for Gestion Dufresne took the following approach
in reaching the conclusion that Gestion Hamel and Gestion
Dufresne are not dealing with each other at arm’s length.
The first step is to determine whether Mr. Dufresne and Mr. Hamel
are connected by blood relationship or marriage. Since Mr. Hamel
is Mrs. Dufresne’s brother-in-law, he is deemed to be
her brother (paragraph 252(2)(a) of the Act).
Since they are deemed to be brother and sister, they are also
deemed to be connected by blood relationship (paragraph
251(6)(a) of the Act). Finally, since Mr. Dufresne
is married to Mrs. Dufresne, who is deemed to be connected to Mr.
Hamel by blood relationship, Mr. Dufresne is connected to Mr.
Hamel by marriage (paragraph 251(6)(b) of the Act).
Of course, the same analysis could be done from Mr. Hamel’s
standpoint, since he is married to Mrs. Hamel, who is deemed to
be Mr. Dufresne’s sister.
[19] Counsel for Gestion Dufresne noted that the concept of
“related persons” as defined in subsection 251(2) of
the Act did not have to be relied on in order to reach
this conclusion. The presumption in paragraph 55(5)(e) of
the Act, pursuant to which Mrs. Hamel and Mrs. Dufresne
are deemed not to be related to each other, is therefore not
applicable to this case.
[20] Having determined that Mr. Dufresne and Mr. Hamel are
connected by marriage, the second step is to determine whether
they are related persons. Under paragraph 251(2)(a) of the
Act, individuals connected by marriage are related
persons. Mr. Dufresne and Mr. Hamel are therefore related
persons. The presumption in paragraph 55(5)(e) of the
Act is not applicable here, not because they are not
deemed to be brothers but rather because they are deemed to be
individuals connected by marriage.
[21] The third step is to determine whether Gestion Dufresne
and Gestion Hamel are dealing with each other at arm’s
length, which is easily done. Since the former is controlled by
Mr. Dufresne, who is related to Mr. Hamel, and since Mr. Hamel
controls Gestion Hamel, the two corporations are related under
subparagraph 251(2)(c)(ii) of the Act and are
therefore not dealing with each other at arm’s length under
paragraph 251(1)(a) of the Act.
Subsection 55(2) of the Act therefore does not apply
to the redemption of the 466 shares.
[22] In support of this strict interpretation he has adopted,
counsel for Gestion Dufresne argued that if Parliament had
intended that subsection 55(2) of the Act should apply in
circumstances such as those of this appeal, brothers and sisters
would have had to be deemed by paragraph 55(5)(e) of the
Act not to be connected by blood relationship. If that had
been the case, a connection by marriage could not have been
established between Mr. Dufresne and Mr. Hamel, since Mr.
Dufresne would not have been married “to a person
[Mrs. Dufresne] who is so connected by blood relationship to
the other [Mr. Hamel]” (paragraph 251(6)(b) of
the Act). Even if Mr. Hamel had been deemed to be Mrs.
Dufresne’s brother because he is her brother-in-law and the
term “brother” includes “brother-in-law”,
they would have been deemed by paragraph 55(5)(e) of the
Act not only not to be related persons but also not to be
connected by blood relationship.
[23] According to the analysis used by the respondent in
determining that Gestion Hamel and Gestion Dufresne were not
dealing with each other at arm’s length, a broader scope
must be given to the presumption in paragraph 55(5)(e) of
the Act. When two sisters are deemed not to be related to
each other, this means that they also cease to be connected by
blood relationship, and their respective spouses can therefore no
longer be connected by marriage. Mr. Hamel can no longer be
Mrs. Dufresne’s brother-in-law, as it were. Thus, Mr. Hamel
can no longer be married to “a person [Mrs. Hamel]
who is so connected by blood relationship to the other
[Mr. Dufresne]” (paragraph 251(6)(b) of the
Act). Accordingly, if Mr. Hamel and Mr. Dufresne cannot be
connected by marriage, they cannot be related to each other. This
means that their management companies cannot be related either
and must be dealing with each other at arm’s length.
The proper interpretation
[24] At first glance, I think that the positions put forward
by the parties in this case can be equally persuasive. I would
add that Gestion Dufresne’s position even struck me as more
persuasive at first. It is true that paragraph 55(5)(e) of
the Act contains two presumptions: first, the presumption
that persons are dealing with each other at arm’s length,
and second, the presumption that they are not related to each
other. There is no presumption that they are not “connected
by blood relationship”.
[25] When a statutory provision seeks to create a legal
fiction, it is important that the scope of the fiction be clearly
specified. There are many illustrations of this in the
Act. For example, in paragraph 55(5)(e) of the
Act, Parliament did not merely provide that two sisters
are deemed not to be related to each other; it also considered it
necessary to add that they are deemed to be dealing with each
other at arm’s length. The purpose of this was probably to
ensure that the following argument would not be made: even if two
sisters are deemed not to be related — which means that
they cannot be deemed to have a
non-arm’s-length relationship — it can
still be argued that in factual terms they are not dealing with
each other at arm’s length and that this affects the
determination of whether, for the purposes of subparagraph
55(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, the corporation that
received the dividend and the person whose interest in a
corporation was significantly increased were dealing with each
other at arm’s length.
[26] As counsel for Gestion Dufresne noted, it can be shown
that persons are connected by marriage or blood relationship
under subsection 251(6) of the Act without there being any
need to refer to the concept of “related persons”.
For example, paragraph 251(6)(a) provides that persons are
connected by blood relationship if one is the brother or sister
of the other. Regardless of whether or not the Desrochers sisters
are deemed not to be related to each other for the purposes of
the Act, they are in fact still sisters. If Parliament
wanted to change that fact for the purposes of a statute and to
create a legal fiction, it was important that it be quite clear
as to the scope of the fiction. Gestion Dufresne argued that the
fact that persons are deemed not to be related does not
necessarily mean they are no longer connected by blood
relationship.
[27] The Minister’s position is just as persuasive. If
Parliament took the trouble to adopt a rule under which two
sisters are deemed not to be related to each other, that rule
must be given its full effect. In this spirit, the relationship
between Mr. Hamel and Mr. Dufresne must be determined on the
assumption that their spouses are strangers to each other. Based
on this assumption, the wives’ husbands can no longer be
brothers-in-law (in relation to the wives). From a more technical
point of view, the terms “related persons” and
“persons related to each other” are defined as
persons connected by blood relationship (see paragraph
251(2)(a) of the Act). When persons are deemed not
to be related to each other, this also means that they are deemed
not to be connected by blood relationship.
[28] Which interpretation should be accepted? In my opinion,
this depends on the answer to the following question: which of
the two interpretations is more consistent with
Parliament’s purpose in enacting subsections 55(2) et
seq. of the Act in 1981? This approach is the one
taken by Cartwright J. in Highway Sawmills Ltd. v. M.N.R.,
66 DTC 5116, in which he stated the following at
p. 5120:
The answer to the question what tax is payable in any given
circumstances depends, of course, upon the words of the
legislation imposing it. Where the meaning of those words is
difficult to ascertain it may be of assistance to consider which
of two constructions contended for brings about a result which
conforms to the apparent scheme of the legislation.
See also Cree Enterprises Ltd. v. M.N.R., 66 DTC 5158,
and Trans-Canada Investment Corp. Ltd. v. M.N.R., 53
DTC 1227, aff’d [1956] S.C.R. 49, 55 DTC 1191.
[29] It is clear from the wording of section 55 of the
Act, as it applies to the facts of this appeal, that
Parliament wanted to prevent a taxpayer from being
able — in a broad sense — to “indirectly
transfer” an interest in a corporation (“the
transferred corporation”) to third parties with whom the
taxpayer is dealing at arm’s length (“third
parties”) without realizing a taxable capital gain.
Subsection 55(2) of the Act ensures that the non-taxable
dividend the taxpayer receives instead of a capital gain is still
treated as a capital gain.
[30] On certain conditions, the transfer can be made
tax-free if it is in favour of certain persons with whom
the taxpayer is not dealing at arm’s length (“closely
related persons”). For example, if the taxpayer is a
corporation owned by a father and the interest in the transferred
corporation is transferred to his child, subsection 55(2) of the
Act does not apply. The result would be the same if, in
the scenario I have just outlined, the father were replaced with
a husband and the child with that husband’s wife.
Subsection 55(2) of the Act would likewise not apply to a
transfer within a group of corporations controlled by one
individual.
[31] It is clear by virtue of paragraph 55(5)(e) of the
Act that brothers and sisters, and by virtue of
subsection 252(2) of the Act that close
brothers-in-law and close sisters-in-law, are deemed not to be
related to each other. The effect of this rule is thus to include
such persons (who in the absence of
paragraph 55(5)(e) would have been related persons)
in the category of third parties, and to exclude them from the
category of closely related persons.
[32] It now remains to be determined in which of these two
categories distant brothers-in-law and distant
sisters-in-law should be placed. If the interpretation suggested
by Gestion Dufresne is accepted, distant brothers-in-law —
and distant sisters-in-law — would be related persons to
whom paragraph 55(5)(e) would not apply and they would
therefore fall into the category of closely related persons. Is
this outcome consistent with Parliament’s intent? I do not
think so. Why would subsection 55(2) of the Act apply to a
transfer to third parties, brothers and close brothers-in-law but
not to a transfer to distant brothers-in-law? Why would distant
brothers-in-law receive greater tax advantages than brothers or
close brothers-in-law? It makes no sense. The
relationship between distant brothers-in-law is
generally more like a relationship between third parties than
between closely related persons. I see no reason why distant
brothers-in-law should receive more advantageous treatment than
brothers in the application of subsection 55(2) of the
Act. The Minister’s interpretation is therefore more
consistent with the purpose of the Act, while Gestion
Dufresne’s interpretation leads, in my opinion, to absurd
results incompatible with that purpose.
[33] Counsel for the Minister also argued that adopting
Gestion Dufresne’s interpretation could open the door to
some kinds of planning designed to avoid the application of
subsection 55(2) of the Act. For example, if a man
controlled one management company and his brother controlled
another, the brothers could transfer their shares to their
spouses (distant sisters-in-law in relation to each
other) and we would be in the same situation as in the case at
bar. Would such planning be covered by anti-avoidance
rules, such as section 245 of the Act? I do not have
to decide that question. However, it is an additional reason to
accept the Minister’s interpretation in the case at
bar.
[34] Even if I were wrong in accepting the Minister’s
interpretation of the scope of the presumption in paragraph
55(5)(e) of the Act, there is another reason why I
could find subsection 55(2) of the Act to be applicable.
As I pointed out in note 2 above, the word
“brother-in-law” can have two meanings: a narrow
meaning, which applies only to a close brother-in-law, and a
broad meaning, which also applies to a distant brother-in-law. If
the broad meaning of the word
“brother-in-law” were adopted, Mr. Hamel
and Mr. Dufresne would be considered brothers-in-law and would
thus be deemed to be brothers. As such, they would be deemed not
to be related persons, which would mean that the two management
companies could not have a non-arm’s length
relationship.[4]
[35] I should point out that this interpretation would be
contrary not only to that put forward by counsel for Gestion
Dufresne in his argument but also to the interpretation of
counsel for the Minister, who defended the position set out in
Interpretation Bulletin IT-419, dated July 10, 1978, in which the
Minister adopted the narrow meaning of the word
“brother-in-law”. Paragraph 5 of Bulletin
IT-419 read as follows:
5. Paragraph 252(2)(a) states that “brother”
includes “brother-in-law”, ie. the
brother of one’s spouse or the husband of one’s
sister. It does not include the husband of one’s
spouse’s sister. Similarly, paragraph 252(2)(d) states that
“sister” includes “sister-in-law”, ie.
the sister of one’s spouse or the wife of one’s
brother. It does not include the wife of one’s
spouse’s brother. Thus, if Mr. A and Mr. B are otherwise
unrelated, and they have each married one of a pair of sisters,
they are not related by blood pursuant to paragraph 251(6)(a).
Similarly, if Mr. A and Mrs. B are brother and sister Mrs. A and
Mr. B are not related by blood.
[36] Counsel for Gestion Dufresne cited a number of decisions
acknowledging that an interpretation bulletin can have some
persuasive force where there is an ambiguity in the application
of a statute. In Mattabi Mines Ltd. v. Ont. (Min. of
Revenue), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 175, Wilson J. stated the following
at p. 196:
. . . Interpretation Bulletins, however, do have some
persuasive force where there is an ambiguity in the
legislation.
In another decision by the Supreme Court of Canada,
Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, Dickson J.
stated the following at p. 37:
Administrative policy and interpretation are not determinative
but are entitled to weight and can be an “important
factor” in case of doubt about the meaning of
legislation . . . .
[37] In my view, if it were necessary to adopt the broad
meaning of the term “brother-in-law” in order to be
consistent with Parliament’s intent in subsection 55(2) and
paragraph 55(5)(e) of the Act, I would do so. I
consider this factor much more important than that of
administrative interpretation.
[38] I accordingly conclude that Mr. Dufresne and Mr. Hamel
are not related and that since Gestion Hamel and Gestion Dufresne
are therefore not related they were dealing with each other at
arm’s length. Subsection 55(2) of the Act applies to
the redemption of the 466 shares.
[39] For these reasons, Gestion Dufresne’s appeal is
dismissed and the notice of assessment is confirmed, the whole
with costs to the Minister.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 5th day of August 1998.
“Pierre Archambault”
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this day of September
1998.
Erich Klein, Revisor
Email this Content