[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Date: 19980716
Docket: 97-1921(IT)I
BETWEEN:
ESTHER TREMBLAY,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Lamarre Proulx, J.T.C.C.
[1] The appellant has appealed under
the informal procedure from reassessments of the Minister of
National Revenue (the "Minister") for the years 1991,
1992 and 1993.
[2] The issue is whether the
appellant's purchase and operation of a mini-excavator
were in the nature of a business enterprise.
[3] The facts on which the Minister
relied in making his reassessments are set out in paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 6(a) to (f) and 7 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal (the
"Reply").
[TRANSLATION]
3. In
computing her income, the appellant deducted $9,422 for the 1991
taxation year, $9,583 for the 1992 taxation year and $6,408 for
the 1993 taxation year as net business losses.
4. On or about
October 17, 1994, the appellant filed an amended return
for the 1993 taxation year seeking to have her business loss
adjusted to $7,908 and claiming a deduction of $1,669 for
carrying charges.
5. By notices
of reassessment dated May 18, 1995, for the 1991, 1992
and 1993 taxation years, the Minister of National Revenue
("the Minister") denied the appellant the said business
losses of $9,422 in 1991, $9,583 in 1992 and $7,908 in 1993 and
the deduction of $1,669 for carrying charges.
6.
In making these reassessments, the Minister made in particular
the following assumptions of fact:
a. in 1990,
the appellant started an alleged excavation business under the
firm name of "Mini Excavation B.M. Tremblay";
b. during the
years under appeal, the appellant had a job with her employer,
Paysage Claude;
c. during the
years under appeal, the appellant also received unemployment
insurance benefits;
d. the
business' highest gross income was only $1,610, which it
earned during the 1993 taxation year;
e. since 1990,
the appellant has claimed business losses each year;
f. the
appellant did not have much income compared with the expenses
incurred, and she has thus not shown that she had a business with
an expectation of profit;
. . .
7. At the
objection stage, the Minister noted that the appellant's
business loss for the 1992 and 1993 taxation years included a
rent expense of $1,800 for each of those two years, an expense
which could not exceed the appellant's income from the
business.
[4] Testimony was given by the
appellant and Michel Chapman, C.A. Mr. Chapman acted as
the appellant's agent at the hearing. He was the accountant
and financial advisor of the appellant and Paysage Claude, which
is referred to in subparagraph 6(b) of the Reply.
[5] The appellant and her husband
started the landscaping business operating as Paysage Claude in
1987. They each owned 20 percent of its shares. Their three sons
each had 20 percent of the shares as well. Their sons were born
in 1957, 1961 and 1963. According to the appellant, they each
worked for the business.
[6] Around 1990, Paysage Claude
acquired a nursery, which consisted of a piece of land where
trees, plants and gardening products were sold. The appellant
looked after the nursery. She also played an active role in
managing Paysage Claude's landscaping activities.
[7] In 1989, the appellant's
husband died and left her his shares.
[8] Mr. Chapman told the Court that he
was the one who had advised the appellant to buy the excavator
personally because of Paysage Claude's cash flow problems and
the problems the shareholders were having agreeing with one
another. The excavator was used exclusively by Paysage Claude,
which paid the appellant by giving her the fees it charged
clients to use the excavator for landscaping work. It thus gave
her $920, $1,157 and $1,610 for 1991, 1992 and 1993, as can be
seen from the financial statements for each of those years. The
appellant's tax returns and the financial statements were
filed as Exhibit I-1.
[9] The operating expenses for each
year were as follows:
[translation]
MINI EXCAVATION B.M. TREMBLAY ENR.
INCOME STATEMENT
FOR THE FISCAL PERIOD ENDING ON DECEMBER 31,
1991
1991
1990
INCOME
$920
$1,260
OPERATING EXPENSES
Professional
fees
500
500
Maintenance and
repairs
675
826
Bank
charges
149
384
Interest on long-term
liability
2,408
3,281
Depreciation - rolling stock
5,890
8,415
Depreciation -
equipment
720
900
(10,342)
(14,306)
NET
LOSS
$(
9,422)
$(13,406)
MINI EXCAVATION B.M. TREMBLAY ENR.
INCOME STATEMENT
FOR THE FISCAL PERIOD ENDING ON DECEMBER 31,
1992
1992
1991
INCOME
$1,157
$920
OPERATING EXPENSES
Rent
1,800
0
Maintenance and repair of premises
1,366
675
Travel
expenses
622
0
Professional
fees
500
500
Interest and bank
charges
218
149
Interest on long-term
liability
1,534
2,408
Depreciation - rolling stock
4,124
5,890
Depreciation - equipment
576
720
$(10,740)
$(10,342)
NET
PROFIT
$(
9,583)
$( 9,422)
MINI EXCAVATION B.M. TREMBLAY ENR.
INCOME STATEMENT
FOR THE FISCAL PERIOD ENDING ON DECEMBER 31,
1993
1993
INCOME
$1,610
OPERATING EXPENSES
Rent
$1,800
Maintenance and repair of premises
926
Travel
expenses
617
Professional
fees
500
Interest and bank
charges
181
Interest on long-term
liability
647
Depreciation - rolling
stock
2,886
Depreciation - equipment
461
$( 8,018)
NET
LOSS
$( 6,408)
[10] It can be seen that the losses for each
of the years at issue were very high.
Conclusion
[11] In circumstances in which the excavator
was available solely to Paysage Claude, it is difficult to
believe that the appellant purchased it personally merely because
she wanted to ensure that she had full control over it rather
than sharing control with her sons, which she would have had to
do had it been purchased by Paysage Claude.
[12] Moreover, when a taxpayer claims that
an activity of his is a business, the taxpayer must demonstrate
its business structure. A normal business structure for a rental
business or an excavator operation business would have required
that a prior agreement in principle be entered into with the sole
user of the excavator. That agreement would have provided for
rental fees that were high enough to cover the operating expenses
and allow for a profit margin. In actual fact, the use of the
excavator was subject to the contracts Paysage Claude obtained
and the entries it was willing to make concerning the fees
charged for use of the excavator. Those were the fees handed over
to the appellant.
[13] The conclusion is obvious: there was
nothing commercial about the agreement with Paysage Claude.
Moreover, it should be noted that, when the depreciation on the
excavator decreased, the appellant added the cost of renting an
office, the usefulness of which one cannot help but doubt given
that the excavator was available exclusively to a single
user.
[14] I must not examine activities carried
on by Paysage Claude jointly with those carried on by the
appellant and conclude that the appellant's activities,
through the excavator she owned, were useful to the operation of
Paysage Claude. I must consider each taxpayer's activities
and determine whether they constituted a business enterprise. In
the case of the appellant, the activities did not constitute a
business enterprise for the foregoing reasons.
[15] The appellant and the accountant,
Mr. Chapman, argued that an excavator cannot be purchased
for personal reasons. It is accepted in tax law that expenses may
have a purpose other than a personal purpose, but that does not
make them expenses incurred to earn business income. Only
expenses that are genuinely incurred for the purpose of gaining
business income may be deducted in computing the income from the
business.
[16] In light of the evidence, it is my view
that the appellant decided to purchase the excavator personally
for reasons other than the commercial reason of operating an
excavator rental business. The decision might have been made to
reduce the amount the appellant earned through her salary and
unemployment insurance benefits or to benefit Paysage
Claude's business, but its purpose was not to make
profits.
[17] Mr. Chapman said that the appellant had
genuinely incurred expenses and that, if those expenses were not
business expenses, they should be considered business investment
losses. As counsel for the respondent pointed out, this is a
significant change of position concerning the computation of what
is allowable. That must be argued in the Notice of Appeal or,
better still, at the notice of objection stage so that there can
be a legal debate during the hearing. Since there has been no
legal debate on the issue, I cannot rule on it.
[18] Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 16th day of July 1998.
J.T.C.C.