Date: 19980710
Docket: 96-456-IT-G
BETWEEN:
RULAND REALTY LIMITED,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowie, J.T.C.C.
[1] The issue in this appeal is whether the Appellant, in
computing its income under the Income Tax Act (the
Act) for the 1990 taxation year, was entitled to deduct an
amount of $26,089,145 as a writedown of deposits on land for
development, including preliminary development costs expended in
connection therewith. The development costs consist primarily of
interest upon money borrowed for the purpose of making the
deposits.
[2] Counsel entered into a Partial Agreed Statement of Facts
in which they agree as to the history of events giving rise to
the appeal. It is lengthy, but I reproduce it here in full as it
conveniently sets out the majority of the relevant facts.
PARTIAL AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purposes of this appeal, the parties by their
respective solicitors hereby agree on the following facts. The
parties may adduce additional evidence which is not inconsistent
with the facts agreed upon below:
1. The Appellant was incorporated under the laws of the
Province of Ontario and the address of its principal place of
business is 4950 Yonge Street, Suite 1914, North York,
Ontario, M2N 6K1.
2. The Appellant’s year end was October 31st.
3. Rudolph Bratty (“Bratty”) has been the
President and a director of the Appellant since its incorporation
and has always owned 100% of the voting shares of the Appellant.
Non-voting shares of the Appellant are held by
Mr. Bratty’s children. Mr. Bratty was the person
ultimately in charge of the Appellant’s operations.
4. At all times material to the issue in this appeal, the
Appellant carried on the business of buying land for the purposes
of development and resale and was in the housebuilding
business.
5. Infinity was a corporation owned and controlled by Stan
Leibel (“Leibel”).
6. Infinity, like the Appellant, carried on the business of
buying land for the purposes of development and resale and was in
the housebuilding business.
7. During the period between 1987 to 1989, the Bratty and
Leibel families were jointly involved in numerous real estate
projects, including the six which pertain to this appeal. All
projects were undertaken on a joint basis and were jointly
financed in equal shares by the Bratty interests and the Leibel
interests.
8. Lorne Leibel (Leibel’s son) was authorized by Bratty
and Leibel to look for new projects and to negotiate and sign
agreements of purchase and sale on behalf of the Appellant and
Infinity. Lorne Leibel also had the construction and management
contracts for each project.
9. The practice was to incorporate a company for each property
transaction.
10. With respect to the six agreements of purchase and sale at
issue in this appeal, six corporations were set up with only
nominal capital in which Bratty and Leibel each held a 50%
interest.
Original Agreements of Purchase and Sale
11. Lorne Leibel, In Trust, (or in the case of Fort Myers
Construction Inc., Douglas Klassen as agent for [Lorne Leibel in
Trust]), entered into each agreement of purchase and sale on
behalf of the particular corporation. Details of the six
agreements of purchase and sale (the “Agreements”) at
issue in this appeal are as follows:
Date
|
Purchaser
|
Vendor
|
Land
|
Price
|
May 24, 1988
|
Del Cruz
Construction Inc.
|
Geminian Builders
Limited
|
61 lots-Town of
Vaughan
|
$11,305,000
|
March 17, 1989
|
Ft. Myers Construction Inc
|
Cambria Enterprises Inc.
|
277 lots - Town of Richmond Hill
|
$53,900,000
|
May 27, 1988
|
San Jose Construction Inc.
|
K.J. Beamish
Construction Co.,
Limited
|
91 lots - Town of
Richmond Hill
|
$11,232,000
|
June 8, 1988
|
Santa Barbara
Construction Inc.
|
Woodchester
Building Corporation
|
140 lots - Town of
Richmond Hill
|
$18,752,000
|
February 17, 1989
|
Steamboat
Springs
Construction Inc
|
Landgroup Holdings
Inc.
|
154 lots - Town of
Richmond Hill
|
$35,000,000
|
February 16, 1989
|
Winding River
Construction Inc.
|
Merbanco Group
Limited
|
133 lots - City of
Mississauga
|
$20,043,200
|
A copy of each of the above Agreements is found in the
parties’ Joint Book of Documents.
12. Under each Agreement, a deposit was payable by the
purchaser upon execution of the Agreement and further deposits
were required to be paid upon completion of various steps by the
vendor. The deposits were to be credited or applied to the
purchase price on closing or completion of the Agreement. The
deposits were to be held by the vendor pending completion or
other termination of the Agreement.
13. Each of the Agreements was subject to one or more of the
following conditions:
(i) the registration of a plan of subdivision satisfying the
Planning Act before a specified date;
(ii) zoning of lots for the construction of single family
dwellings;
(iii) the completion of permit servicing requirements before a
specified date;
(iv) the lots would not be materially changed in size and/or
location by the vendor, unless the purchaser accepted the
changes.
The Agreements provided that if certain of the aforementioned
conditions were not satisfied as required by the Agreements, then
the Agreements would be null and void and the vendor was required
to repay to the purchaser all deposit monies paid under the
Agreements.
14. Deposits paid under these Agreements were fully bank
financed. The financing was guaranteed or backed up by the
Appellant and Infinity jointly and severally. Cheques were made
out of a clearing account or accounts with the Toronto Dominion
Bank.
15. The Agreements were entered into with the intention of
proceeding with the development of the land by building houses on
subdivided lots and selling same.
Assignment of Agreements of Purchase and
Sale
16. In or about November or December, 1989, Bratty and Leibel
decided to divide up certain of their joint real estate projects
in order to separate their interests.
17. In order to effect this division or separation of
interests, the Appellant took certain agreements of purchase and
sale by assignment, including the six Agreements which are at
issue in this appeal, and a Leibel corporation took other
agreements of purchase and sale by assignment.
18. The Appellant entered into “Assignment
Agreements” dated December 20, 1989 with each of Del
Cruz Construction Inc., Ft. Myers Construction Inc.,
San Jose Construction Inc., Santa Barbara Construction Inc.,
Steamboat Springs Construction Inc. and Winding River
Construction Inc. (the “Assignors”). Pursuant to the
Assignment Agreements, the Assignors agreed to assign to the
Appellant their interests in the Agreements of Purchase and Sale,
including the right to and the benefits of the deposits, in
consideration of and the payment by the Appellant of the
“Assignment Price”.
19. The “Assignment Price” was defined as:
“the aggregate of
(i) the Deposits;
(ii) all development costs (the “Development
Costs”) paid by the Purchaser and/or the Assignor for the
Project, including, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, construction costs, marketing costs, surveying costs,
engineering fees and architect’s fees;
(iii) interest paid or owing by the Assignor to its bankers or
other lenders in respect of the financing of the items set forth
in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) hereof; all of the foregoing to be
settled and agreed to by the parties hereto on the Assignment
Date.”
The Assignment Price for each of the Agreements was to be
satisfied under each of the Assignment Agreements by-the
Appellant’s assumption of the indebtedness incurred by or
on behalf of the Assignor in respect of the financing of the
items set forth in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) hereof to the
extent that such indebtedness had been incurred by the
Assignor.
20. The “Assignment Date” was defined to be
“April 30, 1990 or such earlier or later date as might be
agreed upon by the parties hereto”.
21. At the time of the assignment of the Agreements, the
Appellant’s intention was to close the transactions,
whether renegotiated or otherwise, and to build houses on the
lots and sell them to produce income.
22. On April 30, 1990, the Appellant and each of the Assignors
entered into agreements pursuant to which they agreed to satisfy
their respective obligations under the Assignment Agreements (the
“Completion Agreements”).
23. Copies of the Assignment Agreements and Completion
Agreements are found in the parties’ Joint Book of
Documents.
Status of Agreements as of October 31, 1990
24. As of October 31, 1990, deposits paid under the Agreements
were as follows:
Del Cruz $1,045,250
Ft. Myers 7,500,000
San Jose 1,994,520
Santa Barbara 3,315,755
Steamboat Springs 5,000,000
Winding River 2,004,320
$20,859,845
Particulars are provided in summaries of each project found in
the parties’ Joint Book of Documents.
25. The Agreements had not been completed and the related
deposits had not been forfeited as of October 31, 1990.
26. As of October 31, 1990 the Appellant’s intention was
to renegotiate each of the six Agreements and it had not yet made
the decision to walk away from any of the six projects.
27. The fair market value of the lots at issue in this appeal
as of July 1, 1990 was as stated in the appraisal report of
Dennis J. Seward, which was Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 on the examination
for discovery of Rudolph Bratty. The fair market value of the
lots at issue in this appeal as of October 31, 1990 had not
increased from July 1, 1990. The fair market value of the
Agreements in respect of the lots at issue in this appeal as of
October 31, 1990 was nil.
28. In both the non-consolidated and the consolidated
financial statements for the Appellant’s fiscal year ended
October 31, 1990, the amount of $26,089,145 was reflected as a
writedown of deposits on land held for development and of
preliminary development costs and was charged to earnings in the
Statement of Earnings. Of this amount $20,859,845 represented
deposits which had been paid pursuant to the Agreements and
$5,229,300 related to preliminary development costs, namely
$5,195,463 of accrued interest on the outstanding indebtedness
arising from the bank financing of the deposits, and $33,837
consisting of advertising expenditures, architect’s fees,
commitment fees, legal and other sundry expenditures.
29. Both the non-consolidated and the consolidated
financial statements were prepared by KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne.
The consolidated financial statements were, in the opinion of
KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne, prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles.
30. Note 9 in the Consolidated Financial Statements reads as
follows:
“9. Writedown of deposits on land held for development
and preliminary developments costs:
In November, 1989, the Company entered into several agreements
to acquire land at market value from companies partially owned by
immediate family members of the shareholders. Subsequently, as a
result of a downturn in the real estate market, the lands to be
acquired were appraised at values below the acquisition prices if
the agreements were to close. As a result, the deposits on land
and the related preliminary development costs in excess of the
appraised values were charged to the statement of
earnings.”
The relevant part of note 10 reads as follows:
“10. Contingent Liabilities:
The Company is contingently liable as follows:
(i) As described in note 9, if the existing agreements were to
close without adjustments, the total land acquisitions would
aggregate $280,000,000. The market value at year end is
approximately $132,000,000 which would result in a potential
aggregate loss of $148,000,000. Cash deposits of $28,200,000
applicable to these agreements have been charged to the statement
of earnings. It is management’s intention to renegotiate
these agreements and, as a result, the likelihood of these
transactions closing and the magnitude of additional losses, if
any, is not determinable.”
Income Tax Treatment
31. In computing income from its business for the 1990
taxation year, the Appellant deducted the aforementioned amount
of $26,089,145 as a writedown of deposits on land held for
development and of preliminary development costs.
32. The Minister of National Revenue (the
“Minister”) reassessed the Appellant for its 1990
taxation year to disallow the deduction of the writedown of
$26,089,145.
33. The Appellant objected to the reassessment by Notice of
Objection dated October 31, 1994.
34. The Appellant instituted the appeal herein, more than 90
days having elapsed after service of the Notice of Objection
without the Minister having notified the Appellant that the
Minister had vacated or confirmed the reassessment or
reassessed.
Current Status of Agreements
35. The following is a summary of the current status of the
six projects at issue:
Del Cruz - deposit forfeited on November 4,
1991.
Ft. Myers - deposit forfeited on November 12,
1992.
San Jose and Santa Barbara - both
agreements closed in stages commencing in 1991.
The first building permits for construction on these projects
were issued in October, 1991.
Steamboat Springs - deposit forfeited in
1994.
Winding River - deposit treated as forfeited by
vendor on July 2, 1991 but disputed by purchaser.
[3] Paragraph 27 refers to the appraisal report of Dennis J.
Seward. Mr. Seward is a well-qualified real estate
appraiser. In 1990, he was instructed by the Appellant to
appraise the six properties which give rise to this appeal, and
certain others as well. His estimates of value of the properties
as of July 1, 1990 provided the basis for the writedown taken by
the Appellant in its financial statements for the year ended
October 31, 1990. He testified that in his opinion the six
properties should be considered to have the same values as of
October 31, 1990. As the decline in value between the purchase
prices specified in the Agreements of Purchase and Sale and the
October 31, 1990 valuation in each case exceeds the sum of the
deposits and the preliminary development costs, he opined that
the Agreements, as of October 31, 1990, had no value. This is
also the subject of specific agreement between the parties.[1]
[4] Mr. Rudolph Bratty is the person who directs the
Appellant’s business. He is very experienced in real estate
development, and has built the Appellant into a large and
successful integrated real estate operation.
[5] The Agreements that gave rise to this appeal were, in Mr.
Bratty’s words, a large failure. The reason for this, of
course, was the severe recession which adversely affected the
real estate market in the late 1980s. The lands which were the
subject of the Agreements were all bought from developers at the
draft plan of subdivision stage. The Agreements provided that the
buyer would make an initial deposit, to be followed by further
payments at specified stages of completion of the process of
development, with the final balance payable on closing after the
registration of a plan of subdivision. There also were provisions
requiring the vendors to meet certain milestones by specified
dates.
[6] The situation in the summer of 1990 was that the six
properties represented by these Agreements had declined so far in
value that they were worth less than the amounts remaining to be
paid to complete the purchases. The best that could be hoped for
was that the vendors would fail to meet the deadlines in their
respective Agreements, in which case the Appellant would be
relieved of the need to complete the transactions, and could sue
for return of the deposits. The worst prospect was that the
vendors would meet their obligations on time, and the Appellant
would then be faced with either closing the deals, which would
require it to pay on closing more than the land was worth, in
addition to the $26 million it had already paid, or else
defaulting on its obligation to close, and forfeiting the
deposits, with the prospect of being sued for damages as well.
Mr. Bratty’s evidence was that he expected that the vendors
on each of the six projects would perform according to the terms
of the contracts. Obviously, in view of the severe decline in
market values, it would be greatly to their financial advantage
to do so. In the result, although efforts were made to
renegotiate the contracts as to either the price or the time for
closing, the deposits on four of the six projects were forfeited
by the Appellant between 1991 and 1994. In one of these cases the
forfeiture was disputed, and remained unresolved at the time of
the trial. The other two projects, San Juan and San
Bernadino, closed on terms which had been renegotiated as to
the closing dates. The Appellant ultimately sustained losses on
both of these.
[7] In the summer of 1990, the Appellant’s accountant,
Mr. Goldstein of Peat Marwick Thorne (now KPMG), aware of the
severe drop in real estate values which had taken place, raised
with Mr. Bratty the question of the value of these six
properties, and the possible need to take a writedown in respect
of the deposits at year-end. It was as a result of this
discussion that Mr. Seward was retained to appraise the
underlying real estate. Mr. Goldstein testified that he
spent a considerable amount of time considering the question
whether the writedown was necessary in order to properly reflect
the Appellant’s financial situation in the 1990 statements.
He concluded that it was, and he so advised Mr. Bratty. Mr.
Goldstein was the author of notes 9 and 10 to the consolidated
financial statements.[2] He testified that Note 9 explained the reason for the
writedown; note 10 warned against the prospect of further losses
in the event that the Appellant were to close the transactions on
the existing terms.
[8] Mr. Van Weelden is an experienced chartered accountant.
For some years he has been one of three professional practice
partners of the firm KPMG in the Greater Toronto Area. His
responsibilities as a professional practice partner include
advising the other partners in the firm with respect to
accounting and auditing issues. He gave opinion evidence for the
Appellant with respect to the application of generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) to the Appellant’s treatment
of these deposits in its accounts at the 1990 year-end. Counsel
for the Respondent quite properly questioned his objectivity in
doing so, given that he was called upon to testify as to the
appropriateness of advice given by one of his partners. However,
I am satisfied that Mr. Van Weelden is not only
well-qualified to express an opinion as to the application of
GAAP in the context of this case, but also that his evidence was
given objectively.
[9] Mr. Van Weelden’s opinion, as expressed in the
written statement of his evidence, is that:
... the writedown or expensing of Ruland’s accumulated
costs of $26,089,145 in respect of the Assigned Agreements in its
financial statements for the year ended October 31, 1990 was made
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.[3]
He arrived at this conclusion following a review of the
CICA Handbook, another publication of the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants entitled Audit of Real
Estate Operations, and the CIPREC Handbook, a set of
guidelines published by the Canadian Institute of Public Real
Estate Companies with a view to improving the quality of
financial reporting in the real estate industry. He concluded
from these sources that the Appellant could continue to carry the
deposits and development costs as an asset on its balance sheet
only if it could demonstrate the existence of a future economic
benefit to be derived from them. This it could not do, as the
unpaid balances on the Agreements substantially exceeded the
value of the lands underlying them.
Mr. Van Weelden’s evidence was not shaken on
cross-examination, and I accept it as an authoritative statement
of the application of GAAP to the matter at hand.
[10] I conclude that by the 1990 year-end the
Appellant’s rights under these Agreements of Purchase and
Sale were of no value to the Appellant, and that they exposed it
to very substantial contingent liabilities, as expressed in note
10 to the Financial Statements. Mr. Bratty had the intention of
attempting to renegotiate these Agreements, but he had no reason
to believe that he would be able to do so successfully. He had
little or no bargaining power with which to negotiate, and
subsequent events showed that he was, for the most part,
unsuccessful in the attempt. By the summer of 1990, he quite
reasonably, considered the amounts paid under the Agreements, and
the associated carrying costs, to be unrecoverable. In taking the
writedown, the Appellant acted on the advice of its accountants,
which advice was in accordance with GAAP.
[11] The position taken on behalf of the Minister of National
Revenue in assessing the Appellant was expressed by Revenue
Canada’s auditor in his audit report in the following
way:
... one could take the position that it would be appropriate
not to recognize the decline in value, but rather provide the
information in respect of the situation, to the reader, by way of
a note to the Financial Statements, a note similar to the one
included in Ruland’s Financial Statements for the
applicable years, which outline the particulars of the situation,
including the apparent decline in the market value of the land
involved in the various Agreements.
During his examination for discovery he explained that passage
in the following way:
Q. What were you trying to convey by making the particular
statement that I have just read to you?
A. I guess I was trying to convey that I was not convinced
that GAAP would require recognition of the writedown.
The positions of the parties
[12] Counsel for the Appellant put his case on two separate
bases, which he described as being two confluent paths leading to
the same conclusion. The first is that the Appellant, having
suffered a deterioration in the value of an asset acquired as
part of its current business operations, was required to take
that loss into account in computing its profit for the year in
which it, as a “businessman” recognized that the loss
has occurred. In support of this position he relies upon the
judgment of Jacket, P., as he then was, in the Associated
Investors[4]
case, and on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. v. M.N.R.[5] The second branch of
the Appellant’s argument is that the Agreements in question
are inventory in the hands of the Appellant, which it holds in
the normal course of its business, and that both common law
principles and section 10 of the Act require that they be
valued at the year-end, for the purpose of computing income, at
the lower of cost and fair market value.
[13] The position of the Respondent is that the Agreements did
not constitute inventory in the hands of the Appellant at its
1990 year-end, but were simply Agreements under which it could
acquire the lands at some future time. The deposits paid by the
original purchasers under the Agreements are not an expenditure
by the Appellant to purchase inventory, as they do not become
part of the purchase price of the lands prior to closing; until
then they are simply security, which may become refundable to the
Appellant if the transactions are not completed through no fault
of the purchaser.
[14] As to both branches of the Appellant’s argument,
the Respondent takes the position that the realization principle
precludes recognition of any loss on the Agreements prior to
realization of that loss through a sale or other disposition. In
support of this position, counsel relies upon Edward Collins
& Sons, Ltd. v. C.I.R.[6], Dobieco Ltd. v. M.N.R.[7], and the dissenting judgment of
Iacobucci J. in Friesen v. The Queen[8].
[15] The Respondent’s position with respect to the
interest component of the acquisition cost of the Agreements is
that it must be viewed not as a cost of the Agreements, but as a
preacquisition cost of the land, and that subsection 18(2)
precludes its deduction in the computation of the
Appellant’s income. In written argument filed, counsel for
the Respondent says this with respect to the accrued interest
component of the Assignment Price:
The Appellant’s purpose was to acquire the lots as
inventory and the accrued interest liability which the Appellant
assumed was a preacquisition cost related to that property. For
both accounting and tax purposes, it would not be expensed when
incurred but first of all deferred until the land had been
acquired and then capitalized to the cost of land inventory.
Since the Appellant had not acquired the land as of the end of
its 1990 taxation year, it was not entitled to write down this
preacquisition cost under subsection 10(1).
[16] Soon after the hearing of this appeal the Supreme Court
of Canada delivered judgment in Canderel Ltd. v Canada,[9] and the two
related cases Toronto College Park Ltd. v. Canada[10] and Ikea Ltd. v.
Canada.[11] I
have now had the benefit of written submissions from counsel for
both parties as to the application of that trilogy to the case
before me.
The statutory provisions
[17] The relevant provisions of the Act are the
following:
9(1) Subject to this Part, a taxpayer’s income for a
taxation year from a business or property is his profit therefrom
for the year.
10(1) For the purpose of computing income from a business, the
property described in an inventory shall be valued at its cost to
the taxpayer or its fair market value, whichever is lower, or in
such other manner as may be permitted by regulation.
10(1.1)For the purpose of subsection (1), the cost to a
particular taxpayer of land that is described in the inventory of
a business carried on by him shall include all amounts described
in paragraph 18(2)(a) or (b) in respect of that
land for which no deduction is permitted to him or, by reason of
subsection 18(3), to another taxpayer in respect of whom the
particular taxpayer was a person, corporation or partnership
described in clause 18(3)(b)(ii)(A), (B) or (C), where the
amounts were not included in the cost to that other taxpayer of
property.
18(1) In computing the income of a taxpayer from a business or
property no deduction shall be made in respect of
(a) an outlay or expense except to the extent that it
was made or incurred by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining
or producing income from the business or property;
(b) an outlay, loss or replacement of capital, a
payment on account of capital or an allowance in respect of
depreciation, obsolescence or depletion except as expressly
permitted by this Part;
...
(e) an amount as, or on account of, a reserve, a
contingent liability or amount or a sinking fund except as
expressly permitted by this Part;
...
18(2) Notwithstanding paragraph 20(1)(c), in computing
the taxpayer’s income for a particular taxation year from a
business or property, no amount shall be deductible in respect of
any expense incurred by the taxpayer in the year as, on account
or in lieu of payment of, or in satisfaction of,
(a) interest on debt relating to the acquisition of
land, or
...
unless ... [the exceptions are not relevant].
18(3) In subsection (2),
...
(b) “interest on debt relating to the acquisition
of land” includes
(i) interest paid or payable in a year in respect of borrowed
money that cannot be identified with particular land but that may
nonetheless reasonably be considered (having regard to all the
circumstances) as interest on borrowed money used in respect of
or for the acquisition of land, and
(ii) interest paid or payable in the year by a taxpayer in
respect of borrowed money that may reasonably be considered
(having regard to all the circumstances to have been used to
assist, directly or indirectly,
(A) another person with whom the taxpayer does not deal at
arm’s length,
(B) a corporation of which the taxpayer is a specified
shareholder, or
(C) a partnership of which the taxpayer’s share of any
income or loss is 10% or more,
to acquire land to be used or held by that person, corporation
or partnership otherwise than as described in paragraph
18(2)(c) or (d), except where the assistance is in
the form of a loan to that person, corporation or partnership and
a reasonable rate of interest thereon is charged by the
taxpayer.
248(1) In this Act,
“inventory” means a description of property the
cost or value of which is relevant in computing a
taxpayer’s income from a business for a taxation year or
would have been so relevant if the income from the business had
not been computed in accordance with the cash method and, with
respect to a farming business, includes all of the livestock held
in the course of carrying on the business;
“property” means property of any kind whatever
whether real or personal or corporeal or incorporeal and, without
restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes:
(a) a right of any kind whatever, a share or a chose in
action,
...
Analysis
[18] For the reasons which follow, I have reached the
conclusion that the Appellant’s interests in the Agreements
of Purchase and Sale, described in the Assignment Agreements as
the "Assigned Interests", are inventory in its hands.
There is a statutory rule established by section 10 of the
Act which governs the way in which a decline in the value
of inventory is to be dealt with in the computation of income.
The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that where a
statutory rule exists to govern the treatment of a transaction
the courts must apply it.[12] In the present case, therefore, it is section
10 of the Act, rather than any business principle or
common law rule, which must be applied.
[19] My conclusion that the deposits[13] are inventory is derived from the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen.[14] In that case,
the Court considered the meaning of the statutory definition of
the word “inventory”, the relevant part of which is
“... a description of property the cost or value of which
is relevant in computing a taxpayer’s income from a
business for a taxation year ...”. The majority held that
in order to satisfy this definition an item of property need only
be relevant to the computation of income in a single year, and
not necessarily in the year under consideration. Major J., for
the majority, rejected the contention that an asset, in that case
a parcel of land, might be considered to be inventory only in the
year of disposition, saying:[15]
... If Parliament had intended to require that property must
be relevant to the computation of income in a particular year in
order to be inventory in that year, it would have added the
necessary phraseology to make that clear.
[20] The deposits in question are assets acquired by the
Appellant on current account. That is not in dispute. The
Appellant might have disposed of them in any of a number of ways.
In the case of the San Jose and the Santa Barbara
projects the Appellant obtained title to the lands by completing
the transactions of purchase and sale, at which point the
deposits became components of the new asset, the land, in much
the same way as parts become part of the inventory of finished
goods of a manufacturer. The Appellant incurred losses on the
sale of the houses in these projects, and the cost of the
deposits, as a component of the cost of the lots, was relevant in
computing those losses.
[21] In the case of the Del Cruz, Ft.
Myers and Steamboat Springs developments,
the deposits were forfeited between 1991 and 1994. It is not
denied by the Respondent that the Appellant could take these
losses into account upon the disposition of the deposits by way
of forfeiture. It follows that they are assets which come within
the meaning ascribed by Parliament to the word
“inventory”. Similarly, if any of the deposits had
been disposed of by way of a further assignment, or in any other
way, their original cost would have been relevant to the
computation of income in the year of disposition. On the
authority of the Supreme Court’s judgment in
Friesen, that is all that is required to establish them as
being inventory.
[22] Counsel for the Crown argued that the Appellant in this
case did not hold inventory until the transactions closed, and it
became the owner of the land. I do not accept that contention, as
it ignores the statutory language defining “property”
and “inventory”. It is true that, in the cases of
San Jose and Santa Barbara, the Appellant for the
first time held the land as inventory following completion of the
transactions of purchase and sale. Prior to completion it held a
different asset, a chose in action, which merged into the land
upon closing. Its cost became a component of the cost of the
land.
[23] This result is reinforced, in my view, by the conclusion
of the majority of the Court in Friesen that, for purposes
of the Act, all property is either inventory or capital
property. As Major J. put it:[16]
... The Act thus creates a simple system which
recognizes only two broad categories of property. The
characterization of an item of property as inventory or capital
property is based primarily on the type of income that the
property will produce.
[24] There can be no doubt that the deposits in this case are
not of a capital nature, and would produce income, not capital
gains, upon disposition. Mr. Bratty gave evidence that the
Appellant, in addition to being a builder, has in the past
subdivided property, bought and sold Agreements of Purchase and
Sale of the kind that are in issue in this appeal, and has bought
and sold building lots. If the Appellant had sold these deposits
by way of a further assignment it would have been a transaction
on income, not capital, account. I did not understand counsel for
the Respondent to dispute this.
[25] Counsel for the Respondent took the position in argument
that, even if the deposits were considered to be inventory, the
interest component of their cost cannot be subject to a writedown
by reason of the prohibition found in subsection 18(2) of
the Act. That subsection, subject to certain exceptions
which have no application here, prohibits the deduction of any
interest expense incurred by a taxpayer in relation to the
acquisition of land. Counsel takes the position that the part of
the “Assignment Price” paid by the Appellant which
represents accrued interest, and any interest accrued since the
assignments, falls within this prohibition, and must be
“... deferred and capitalized to the cost of land inventory
once acquired”. Subsection 10(1.1) makes specific provision
for the capitalization of interest, the deduction of which is
prohibited by subsection 18(2).
[26] Counsel for the Appellant argued that the interest
component of the Assignment Price is not interest, but is simply
part of the purchase price, computed with reference to an
obligation to pay interest which was incurred by the vendors
prior to the assignment. This argument, put in the way that it
is, would have more merit if the assignors and the Appellant
dealt with each other at arm’s length. Nor does it assist
the Appellant in relation to the interest accrued on the
Assignment Prices since the assignments took place. These amounts
are obligations to pay interest which the Appellant itself
incurred.
[27] The accounting treatment which the Appellant has accorded
to these amounts, both the pre-assignment interest obligations
which it assumed as part of the Assignment Prices, and the
post-assignment interest which it incurred itself directly, is to
capitalize them as costs of the deposits which it carried as
assets on its balance sheet. That this is the appropriate
treatment of them is implicit in the opinion of Mr. Van Weelden
that “... the writedown or expensing of Ruland’s
accumulated costs of $26,089,145 in respect of the Assignment
Agreements ... was made in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles”. Mr. Van Weelden was, of
course, aware that the amount of $26,089,145 included both the
pre-assignment and the post-assignment interest; he was not
cross-examined as to the appropriateness of capitalizing
that interest as part of the cost of the deposits.
[28] The argument of counsel for the Respondent is not that
the interest should not be capitalized, because clearly it should
be. It is simply that it should not be capitalized until the
acquisition of the land, because that, in her view, is when the
Appellant first had an inventory item to which the interest could
be capitalized. I have already concluded, however, that the
deposits were inventory, and it follows that they were properly
recorded at a cost which includes the interest component. It is
true that subsection 10(1.1) would not apply to permit
capitalization prior to the completion of the purchase
transactions and acquisition of land. However, the application of
generally accepted accounting principles brings about the same
result in respect of the capitalization of interest as a cost of
the deposits prior to completion of the transactions. There is no
statutory provision and no case law principle inconsistent with
this treatment of the interest component, and it is a reflection
of well-accepted business principles, as evidenced by the opinion
of Mr. Van Weelden, and therefore permissible.[17]
[29] The appeal is allowed, with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of July, 1998.
"E.A. Bowie"
J.T.C.C.