[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
98-659(IT)I
98-1460(IT)I
BETWEEN:
FERNANDE CHAMPOUX,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on December 3, 1998, at
Québec, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge Alain Tardif
Appearances
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant herself
Counsel for the Respondent: Aziz
Saheb-Ettaba
JUDGMENT
The
appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act
for the 1995 and 1996 taxation years are dismissed in accordance
with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 9th day of December 1998.
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 10th day of July 2003.
Sophie Debbané, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Date: 19981209
Dockets: 98-659(IT)I
98-1460(IT)I
BETWEEN:
FERNANDE CHAMPOUX,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Tardif, J.T.C.C.
[1] These are two appeals for the 1995
and 1996 taxation years.
[2] In these two taxation years, the
appellant declared as income solely the amount of her support
payments: $11,962.08 in 1995 and $12,231.00 in 1996. She did not
make any calculations to determine the amount of income tax
payable and left it to the respondent to do so.
[3] The Department therefore made this
calculation and determined that the appellant owed money for each
of the taxation years at issue, a determination the appellant is
contesting.
[4] The appellant clearly invested a
great deal of time and energy in preparing her case and presented
her position clearly.
[5] After acknowledging that the
calculations in her case for the 1995 and 1996 taxation years
were accurate and admitting that they complied with the Income
Tax Act, (''the Act''), the appellant
vigorously argued that she was the victim of a great and serious
injustice.
[6] Comparing herself with taxpayers
receiving social assistance benefits, the appellant stated that
these persons had a number of advantages and privileges that were
not available to her. In particular, she referred to the fact
that social assistance beneficiaries were not obliged to cover
the costs of a wide range of special needs that were covered
directly by social assistance. In her opinion, coverage of those
costs constituted veiled income.
[7] In particular, the appellant
listed the costs of repairs to the electric system, plumbing,
heating system and refrigerator, as well as certain professional
fees. According to the appellant, all of these costs are covered
directly by the government and therefore are not included in the
monthly amount paid under the statutory program.
[8] The appellant argued that she was
very familiar with this situation because she herself had been
obliged to resort to social assistance when she was not receiving
support payments.
[9] The appellant therefore claimed
and argued before the Court that under these circumstances she,
too, should be able to exclude from her income the various
amounts she was obliged to pay out to meet the same essential
needs admitted and recognized by social assistance.
[10] The appellant's reasoning is
certainly legitimate, particularly since her low income
undoubtedly requires her to make painful sacrifices resulting in
stress that is hard to bear; she can rely only on herself to meet
all of her economic needs.
[11] While the appellant's two appeals
generate a great deal of sympathy, they cannot be allowed since
this Court is essentially authorized to rule, not in accordance
with what it believes to be fair, but in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. In this regard, I consider it
important to note that the appellant herself admitted and
acknowledged that the Department's calculations were accurate
and in keeping with the Act.
[12] In this instance, the appellant's
case for the two taxation years at issue was dealt with in full
compliance with the applicable legislation, and I therefore have
no choice but to dismiss the two appeals.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 9th day of December 1998.
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 10th day of July 2003.
Sophie Debbané, Revisor
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