The taxpayer, and a partnership of which it was a member, leased equipment. Sarchuk T.C.J. accepted evidence that upon execution of the leases the taxpayer or the partnership was treated for accounting purposes as having disposed of the assets to the lessees and that the accounting carrying value of the resulting amounts on its or the partnership's balance sheet represented financial assets (i.e., amounts receivable by it). Given that the whole of Part I.3 of the Act relied on balance sheets and GAAP in the determination of a corporation's taxable capital employed in Canada, Sarchuk T.C.J. found (at p. 64) that:
"It seems only reasonable to conclude that the technical terms referable to the balance sheet ought to be defined and characterized for the purposes of Part I.3 of the Act by reference to accounting terminology."
Therefore, because the amounts were not tangible property for accounting purposes, they were not tangible property for the purposes of s. 181.3(1).