Mahoney,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
([1979]
CTC
2619;
79
DTC
540)
which
allowed
the
deduction
of
a
$139,500
business
loss
by
the
defendant
in
his
1971
taxation
year.
The
defendant
abondoned
his
counterclaim
at
trial.
The
defendant
was
a
licensed
securities
salesman
and
a
shareholder,
director
and
president
of
Malone
Lynch
Securities
Limited,
hereafter
“Malone
Lynch”,
a
licensed
securities
dealer
with
a
seat
on
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange,
hereafter
“the
TSE”.
Malone
Lynch
had
been
formed
by
amalgamation
in
1970.
There
is
no
material
distinction
to
be
made
between
it
and
the
amalgamating
entity
of
which
the
defendant
had
also
been
a
shareholder,
director
and
president
except
that,
as
president
of
the
larger
entity,
the
defendant
was
required
to
devote
more
time
to
administration
and
had
less
to
devote
to
selling
and,
so,
for
the
first
time,
was
paid
a
salary.
The
defendant’s
income
breakdown
for
the
years
1964
to
1971
follows:
Year
|
Salary/Bonus
|
Commission
|
Other
|
1964
|
—
|
$18,873
|
—
|
1965
|
—
|
16,227
|
—
|
1966
|
—
|
14,564
|
$
220
|
1967
|
$
478
|
21,680
|
(1,060)
|
1968
|
14,463
|
46,748
|
2,428
|
1969
|
71,443
|
18,000
|
(1,926)
|
1970
|
18,913
|
60,500
|
1,264
|
1971
|
43,801
|
10,500
|
1,581
|
Malone
Lynch
was
bankrupted
in
1971.
The
defendant
lost
$139,500
he
had
loaned
it.
The
loan
had
grown
over
the
years
as
the
TSE
required
the
principals
of
Malone
Lynch
to
improve
its
net
free
capital
position,
a
prescribed
level
of
working
capital
essential
to
the
maintenance
of
its
right
to
trade
on
the
TSE.
The
prescribed
level
would
ordinarily
increase
as
the
volume
of
business
increased.
That,
as
well
as
a
reduction
in
the
position
due,
for
example,
to
a
client’s
default,
led
to
routine
and
special
demands
for
shareholders’
advances
to
increase
or
restore
the
position.
As
required
by
the
TSE,
it
was
a
subordinated
loan.
It
bore
and
paid
interest
at
7%
per
annum,
about
the
prime
rate
of
the
day.
Other
shareholders
had
made
like
loans,
proportionate
to
their
shareholdings.
All
were
active
salesmen
for
Malone
Lynch.
It
is
said
that
the
loans
were
intended
to
be
short
term
although,
in
fact,
no
repayments
were
ever
made
and
I
do
not
see
that
they
could
have
been
repaid
in
the
short
term
in
view
of
Malone
Lynch’s
fiscal
policy
unless,
of
course,
business
volume
fell.
Commissions
on
TSE
transactions
were
earned
by
the
securities
dealer,
ie,
Malone
Lynch,
not
the
salesmen.
A
salesman
was
entitled
to
be
paid
a
portion
of
the
commissions
in
his
transactions
by
Malone
Lynch:
one-half,
if
a
shareholder,
or
one-third,
if
not.
Malone
Lynch
regularly
distributed
enough
of
its
earnings
as
bonuses
to
reduce
its
income
for
its
fiscal
year
to
a
level
that
would
attract
corporation
income
tax
at
the
low
rate.
The
bonuses
were
distributed
pro
rata
to
the
recipients’
equity
positions.
No
dividends
were
paid.
As
I
understand
exhibits
3,
4
and
5,
as
at
March
31,
1971,
Malone
Lynch’s
net
free
capital
stood
at
$447,227,
$43,723
more
than
its
prescribed
minimum,
whereof
$363,500
was
provided
by
subordinated
loans
from
its
shareholders.
The
defendant’s
loan,
at
March
31,
was
$117,000.
In
addition
to
the
loan,
the
defendant
had
invested
approximately
$60,000
in
common
shares
and
$80,000
in
preferred
shares
of
Malone
Lynch.
I
accept
that
the
defendant
was
in
the
business
of
stockbroking
for
his
own
account.
Malone
Lynch
was
the
vehicle
by
which
he
necessarily
carried
on
that
business.
Without
it,
he
would
have
required
to
be
associated
with
another
having
a
similar
license
and
seat
on
the
stock
exchange
and,
to
maximize
his
rate
of
commission,
he
would
have
had
to
be
a
shareholder.
Commissions,
his
income
from
his
business,
were
a
substantial
element
of
his
total
income.
The
defendant
was
also
an
employee
of
Malone
Lynch
and,
while
the
breakdown
as
between
salary
and
bonus
is
not
in
evidence,
I
accept
that
salary
ie,
income
from
an
employment
or
office,
was
not
an
important
element
of
his
total
income
in
1971,
or
at
all
prior
to
1970.
The
defendant
was
also
an
investor
in
Malone
Lynch.
The
nominal
interest
on
the
subordinated
loan
was
not
a
significant
element
of
his
total
income
nor,
in
my
view,
a
determining
factor
in
the
resolution
of
whether
or
not
the
loan
was
made
by
him
on
account
of
capital.
Bonuses
were
clearly
an
important
element
of
his
total
income;
the
more
so,
the
less
his
salary.
It
is
significant
that
the
bonuses
were
distributed
to
salesmen
pro
rata
to
their
equity
positions,
rather
than
their
sales
or
commissions.
Implicit
in
that
is
the
fact
that
the
same
sort
of
bonus,
if
any
at
all,
was
not
paid
to
salesmen
who
were
not
also
shareholders.
The
bonuses
were
not
simply
a
flow-
through
to
the
salesmen
of
commissions
they
had
earned,
net
of
expenses
incurred
by
the
company;
rather,
the
bonus
system
was
the
method
chosen
to
distribute
the
company’s
net
earnings
to
the
shareholders.
Disregarding
the
interest
on
the
loan,
the
defendant’s
position
that
Malone
Lynch
provided
only
a
necessary
vehicle
for
his
personal
business
as
a
stockbroker
is
untenable;
he,
in
fact,
realized
significant
income
qua
investor
as
well
as
qua
salesman.
Malone
Lynch’s
shareholders
chose
to
provide
its
necessary
capitalization
by
way
of
loans.
The
defendant’s
loan
was
capital
in
nature
and
its
loss
was
a
loss
of
capital,
the
deduction
of
which
from
income
was
prohibited
by
paragraph
12(1
)
(b)
of
the
Act*as
it
stood
in
1971.
The
appeal
is
allowed
with
costs.
The
Minister’s
assessment
will
be
restored.