Garon,
T.C.C.J.:—
This
is
an
appeal
from
a
reassessment
for
the
1984
taxation
year,
the
year
in
which
Mr.
Napoléon
Bouchard
("Mr.
Bouchard”)
died.
In
that
assessment,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
included
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$76,905
in
computing
Mr.
Bouchard's
income
for
that
same
taxation
year
in
respect
of
the
transfer
of
certain
lands
located
in
Beauport,
in
the
suburbs
of
Québec
City,
to
his
children
at
the
time
of
his
death.
The
appellant
claims
that
no
taxable
capital
gain
was
realized
by
Mr.
Bouchard
under
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
in
respect
of
the
transfer
of
farm
property
to
a
child
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
a
taxpayer.
The
respondent,
for
his
part,
argues
in
his
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
that
of
the
total
area
of
these
lands
of
951,631
square
feet,
only
a
maximum
area
of
95,163
square
feet,
that
is
to
say
approximately
10
per
cent
of
those
lands,
could
reasonably
be
considered
as
property
that
was
used
immediately
before
Mr.
Bouchard's
death
in
the
business
of
farming.
In
assessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
relied
on
the
following
assumptions
of
fact
stated
at
subparagraphs
(a)
to
(n)
of
paragraph
10
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal:
(a)
Mr.
Napoléon
Bouchard
died
on
December
23,
1984
at
the
age
of
66;
(b)
among
the
property
which
he
held,
Mr.
Bouchard
had
lands
located
in
Beau-
port
which
formed
part
of
lots
384,
385
and
387
of
the
Beauport
cadastre.
The
area
of
the
lands
in
question
is
951,631
square
feet;
(c)
Mr.
Bouchard
purchased
these
lands
from
his
father
in
1945
and
operated
a
farm
there
until
1965;
(d)
in
1965,
the
barn
located
on
these
lands
burned
down
and
was
never
rebuilt.
Mr.
Bouchard
did
not
keep
animals
after
that
time;
(e)
in
the
last
years
before
his
death,
Mr.
Bouchard
did
some
market
gardening
on
a
small
parcel
of
land
and
sold
his
products
at
market;
(f)
the
parcel
of
land
on
which
Mr.
Bouchard
did
the
market
gardening
represented
at
most
10
per
cent
of
the
area
of
the
lands
which
the
latter
held
and
thus
did
not
exceed
95,193
square
feet.
The
rest
of
the
lands
lay
fallow
and
were
not
exploited;
(g)
of
all
the
lands
held
by
Mr.
Bouchard,
only
a
10
per
cent
area
was
therefore
used
immediately
before
Mr.
Bouchard’s
death
in
the
business
of
farming;
(h)
the
zoning
of
the
area
where
the
lands
in
question
are
located
has
permitted
all
uses
since
at
least
1971.
Furthermore,
residential
development
appears
to
represent
the
optimum
use
of
the
lands
in
the
area;
(i)
market
gardening
and
the
sale
of
products
at
market
was
mainly
a
hobby
for
Mr.
Bouchard,
whose
wife
died
in
1977.
In
this
way,
Mr.
Bouchard
went
to
meet
the
people
he
knew
at
the
St.
Roch
market
in
Québec
City.
He
went
there
only
on
Thursdays
and
Fridays;
(j)
the
equipment
which
Mr.
Bouchard
used
dated
from
the
1960s
and
earlier
and
was
of
virtually
no
value,
except
for
a
tractor
which
Mr.
Bouchard’s
brothers
had
kept
in
order
to
maintain
the
road
in
winter;
(k)
Mr.
Bouchard
is
deemed
to
have
disposed
of
all
the
property
belonging
to
him
immediately
before
his
death;
(l)
the
fair
market
value
at
December
23,
1984
of
all
the
lands
forming
part
of
lots
384,
385
and
387
of
the
Beauport
cadastre
was
not
greater
than
$228,000;
(m)
the
fair
market
value
at
December
31,
1971
of
all
the
lands
forming
part
of
lots
384,
385
and
387
of
the
Beauport
cadastre
was
not
greater
than
$57,100;
(n)
in
1984,
Mr.
Napoléon
Bouchard
realized
a
capital
gain
of
$153,810,
hence
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$76,905:
Proceeds
of
disposition
|
|
Fair
market
value
at
date
of
death
(23/12/84)
|
|
$228
,000
|
Less:
|
|
Median
adjusted
cost
base:
|
|
Cost
|
—
|
|
Fair
market
value
|
$57,100
|
|
Disposition
|
$228,000
|
$57,100
|
Capital
gain
|
|
$170,900
|
Portion
exempted
as
a
result
of
a
rollover
(10
per
cent)
|
|
$17,090
|
Capital
gain
|
|
$153,810
|
Revised
taxable
capital
gain
(50
per
cent)
|
|
$76,905
|
|
[Translation.]
|
Summary
of
facts
The
lands
mentioned
above,
property
of
Mr.
Bouchard
at
the
time
of
his
death,
as
well
as
an
adjacent
land
of
the
same
dimensions
belonged
to
a
certain
Arthur
Bouchard
from
1920
until
1954.
In
1954,
the
latter
sold
the
east
half
of
all
this
land
to
his
son,
Mr.
Napoléon
Bouchard,
whose
estate
is
the
appellant
in
the
instant
case,
and
the
west
half
to
another
son,
Mr.
Edgar
Bouchard.
Mr.
Bouchard
thus
lived
on
this
land
throughout
his
life.
With
his
wife,
he
raised
his
five
children
there.
Following
Mr.
Bouchard's
death,
which
occurred
after
that
of
his
wife,
the
lands
were,
in
the
absence
of
a
will,
transferred
in
equal
parts
to
his
five
children.
During
her
testimony,
Mrs.
Louise
Duguay-Bouchard
described
the
activities
of
her
father,
Mr.
Bouchard,
with
respect
to
these
lands.
Prior
to
1960,
the
lands
in
question
were
used
mainly
by
Mr.
Bouchard
for
dairy
and
agricultural
production.
Around
1960,
Mr.
Bouchard
abandoned
dairy
operations
to
devote
himself
exclusively
to
market
gardening,
which
was
diversified.
The
evidence
clearly
shows
that
Mr.
Bouchard
engaged
in
cultivation
on
these
lands
until
his
death.
Cultivation
of
the
soil
was
his
main
activity.
He
worked
on
the
land
eight
hours
a
day,
six
days
a
week.
His
family
home
during
all
these
years
was
located
near
his
farm.
This
land
included
two
wooded
sections
which
were
estimated
by
Mrs.
Louise
Duguay-Bouchard
at
two-fifths
of
the
total
area
of
approximately
22
arpents,
and
the
rest
represented
the
arable
portion
of
that
property.
Included
in
the
two-fifths
wooded
section
is
a
smaller
part
that
is
a
bog.
She
also
testified
that
the
area
of
the
portion
farmed
by
her
father
in
the
year
of
his
death
was
11
arpents,
that
is
50
per
cent
of
the
area.
She
acknowledged,
however,
that
a
small
part
of
the
11
arpents
might
have
been
located
on
the
land
of
her
uncle,
Mr.
Edgar
Bouchard.
It
is
also
in
evidence
that,
before
fire
destroyed
the
barn
located
on
this
land,
Mr.
Bouchard
owned
all
the
farming
implements
necessary
to
the
exploitation
of
that
land.
Some
of
his
implements
were
damaged
in
the
fire
so
that,
after
that
event,
he
had
to
make
arrangements
with
his
neighbours
to
use
some
of
their
implements.
Mr.
Bouchard
was
also
careful
to
maintain
his
implements
and
machinery
properly.
Although
they
were
old,
these
implements
were
in
working
condition
at
the
time
of
his
death.
Mr.
Bouchard
could
rely
on
the
assistance
of
his
children
and
relatives
at
planting
time
and
harvest
time.
He
had
employees
only
very
occasionally.
Mr.
Bouchard
rented
a
stand
at
the
market
where
his
name
was
posted.
He
sold
his
products
himself
two
or
three
times
a
week.
Mr.
Bouchard's
activities
with
respect
to
the
sale
of
his
products
at
the
market
were
confirmed
by
an
independent
witness,
Mr.
Raymond
Alain,
a
market
gardener.
He
testified
that
the
rental
price
of
a
space
at
the
market
at
the
relevant
time
was
$6
a
day.
Mr.
Bouchard
sold,
gave
away
or
exchanged
products
with
his
neighbours.
Over
the
years
until
his
death,
Mr.
Bouchard
also
did
work
for
his
own
personal
purposes
in
the
wooded
area
located
on
these
lands.
He
rejuvenated
the
forest,
but
his
activities
in
this
area
were
not
part
of
the
operation
of
a
business.
He
was
also
a
member
in
good
standing
of
the
Union
des
Producteurs
Agricoles.
At
the
time
of
his
death,
he
held
a
registration
card
for
his
farm
issued
by
the
ministère
de
['Agriculture,
des
Pêcheries
et
de
I'Alimentation
of
the
Government
of
Quebec.
This
card
gave
him
access
to
the
various
technical
services
and
agricultural
programs
of
that
department.
Mr.
Yvon
Ouellet,
a
property
assessor
employed
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
provided
certain
information
for
the
respondent
on
the
subject
of
the
property
in
question
as
part
of
the
mandate
under
which
he
was
required
to
determine
the
fair
market
value
of
that
property
at
December
31,
1971
and
on
the
day
of
Mr.
Bouchard's
death,
December
23,
1984.
This
witness
visited
the
property
only
in
1991,
that
is
six
and
a
half
years
after
Mr.
Bouchard's
death.
In
particular,
he
consulted
the
zoning
by-laws
in
effect
at
the
relevant
times.
He
mentioned
that
a
portion
of
the
lands
purchased
by
Mr.
Bouchard
from
his
father
were
expropriated
in
1969
for
the
purposes
of
the
construction
of
a
highway.
With
the
aid
of
photographs,
he
estimated
that
the
portion
of
this
property
under
cultivation
was
not
more
than
16
per
cent
in
1984.
He
allowed
himself
a
margin
of
error
of
two
percentage
points.
In
cross-examination,
Mr.
Ouellet
acknowledged
that
it
was
possible
that
certain
other
parts
of
the
land
had
been
farmed
in
the
year
or
two
years
preceding
Mr.
Bouchard's
death
and
that
the
total
area
of
all
the
parts
under
cultivation
might
therefore
have
been
as
much
as
25
per
cent
to
30
per
cent
of
all
of
Mr.
Bouchard's
lands
which
are
in
issue
in
the
instant
case.
Furthermore,
according
to
this
witness,
the
use
of
this
property
as
a
farm
was
only
marginally
profitable
in
both
1971
and
1984.
He
also
provided
information
on
the
applicable
zoning
by-laws.
He
put
forward
his
conclusion
that
the
optimum
use
of
this
property
was
not
farming.
He
did
not
know
what
type
of
farming
Mr.
Bouchard
had
done
on
these
lands.
A
statement
prepared
by
Mr.
Ouellet
of
Mr.
Bouchard's
farming
income
was
filed
for
the
years
1975
to
1984.
This
statement
shows
very
small
net
incomes
for
each
of
those
years.
Mrs.
Lafleur,
an
auditor
with
Revenue
Canada,
also
testified.
She
had
not
visited
the
land
or
seen
the
farming
equipment.
Nor
had
she
communicated
with
the
neighbours
to
obtain
information
on
this
property
or
on
the
type
of
use
that
might
have
been
made
of
it
at
the
time
concerning
us.
Appellant's
claims
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argues
that
all
the
necessary
conditions
set
by
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act
applied
to
all
of
this
property
and,
in
particular,
that
these
lands
belonging
to
Mr.
Bouchard
at
the
time
of
his
death
had
been
used
immediately
before
his
death
by
the
latter
in
the
business
of
farming.
Respondent's
claims
Counsel
for
the
respondent
acknowledged
that
Mr.
Bouchard
operated
a
farming
business,
but
she
argued
that
the
provisions
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act
apply
only
to
an
area
representing
approximately
16
per
cent
of
that
property
as
a
whole,
that
is
to
say
to
that
part
that
was
actually
used
for
the
purposes
of
his
farming
business.
The
other
part
was
used,
in
the
terminology
of
counsel
for
the
respondent,
for
"development"
[translation]
purposes.
Analysis
The
case
therefore
turns
on
the
question
whether
the
lands
that
form
the
subject
of
the
instant
case
may
be
considered
as
land
used,
in
accordance
with
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act,
immediately
before
the
death
of
Mr.
Bouchard
by
the
latter
in
the
business
of
farming
or
whether
the
portion
effectively
farmed
at
the
time
of
his
death
is
the
only
portion
concerned
by
this
subsection.
As
I
have
already
indicated,
it
was
admitted
by
the
respondent
in
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
that
Mr.
Bouchard
operated
a
farming
business
immediately
before
his
death.
This
conclusion
is
drawn,
in
particular,
from
subparagraph
10(g)
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
which
I
reproduce
again
for
reasons
of
convenience:
(g)
of
all
the
lands
held
by
Mr.
Bouchard,
only
a
10
per
cent
area
was
therefore
used
immediately
before
Mr.
Bouchard's
death
in
the
business
of
farming;
[Translation.]
Notwithstanding
certain
doubts
expressed
from
time
to
time
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
on
the
question
whether
the
operations
carried
out
by
Mr.
Bouchard
on
these
lands
indeed
constituted
a
business
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
the
additional
fact
that
the
farming
business
did
not
represent
the
optimum
use
of
the
property
in
question,
as
Mr.
Yvon
Ouellet,
the
assessor,
underscored
in
his
report
of
June
7,
1991,
it
appears
to
me
undeniable
that
it
must
be
accepted
at
the
outset
as
a
premise
that
Mr.
Bouchard
operated
a
farming
business
on
these
lands
or
on
a
part
thereof
immediately
before
his
death.
Furthermore,
it
should
be
noted
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue's
assumption,
appearing
at
subparagraph
10(f)
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
that
"the
parcel
of
land
on
which
Mr.
Bouchard
did
the
market
gardening
represented
at
most
10
per
cent
of
the
area
of
the
lands
which
the
latter
held
and
thus
did
not
exceed
95,163
square
feet"
is
not
supported
by
the
evidence.
The
respondent's
main
witness
estimated
the
percentage
of
these
lands
used
for
agricultural
purposes
at
approximately
16
per
cent.
His
assessment
of
the
usable
portion
was
based
on
aerial
photographs
taken
a
number
of
years
after
Mr.
Bouchard's
death.
He
has
not
seen
this
land
at
the
relevant
time.
I
have
some
doubts
about
this
estimate
of
the
portion
of
these
lands
under
cultivation.
At
all
events,
I
prefer
the
testimony
of
Mrs.
Louise
Bouchard-
Duguay,
who
was
raised
on
this
land
and
who
had
the
opportunity,
after
she
left
her
parents’
home,
to
return
there
many
times.
She
was,
without
any
doubt,
familiar
with
the
various
characteristics
of
this
property.
However,
she
had
some
difficulty
saying
exactly
what
part
of
this
land
was
farmed,
in
particular
because
her
father’s
lands
and
those
of
her
uncle,
Mr.
Edgar
Bouchard,
were
not
separated
by
a
fence
or
any
other
kind
of
partition.
It
was
determined
that
a
part
of
these
two
properties
was
used
for
market
gardening
in
the
years
preceding
Mr.
Bouchard's
death.
From
the
evidence
as
a
whole,
I
find
that
the
part
of
this
land
cultivated
by
Mr.
Bouchard
in
the
year
of
his
death
for
the
purposes
of
his
farming
business
was
not
less
than
40
per
cent
of
its
total
area
and
did
not
exceed
50
per
cent.
In
reaching
this
conclusion,
I
obviously
include
the
part
of
this
land
which,
let
us
say
in
the
year
1984,
was
in
a
period
of
fallow
because
the
evidence
is
clear
that,
in
this
type
of
farming,
there
must
be
a
rotation
among
the
arable
portions.
It
should
be
noted,
in
analyzing
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act,
that
the
legislator
is
not
here
concerned
with
the
part
of
the
land
that
was
used
immediately
before
the
taxpayer's
death
for
tillage
of
the
soil
or
other
operations
considered
as
farming
under
the
definition
of
that
term
at
section
248
of
the
Act,
but
rather
with
lands
that
were
used
in
the
business
of
farming
immediately
before
the
taxpayer's
death.
The
English
version
of
this
provision
is
also
drafted
in
general
terms.
Subsection
73(3),
which
is
the
counterpart
of
subsection
70(9),
in
that
it
also
provides,
in
certain
circumstances,
for
the
transfer
of
farming
property
without
tax
incidence
to
a
taxpayer's
children,
but
in
the
case
of
inter
vivos
transfer,
also
contains
terminology
entirely
similar
to
that
of
subsection
70(9).
The
legislator
acted
differently,
for
example,
when
it
defined
the
concept
of
"principal
residence"
at
paragraph
54(g)
of
the
Act.
The
legislator
there
stated
that
it
was
referring
to
such
portion
of
any
immediately
contiguous
land
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
contributing
to
the
taxpayer's
use
and
enjoyment
of
the
housing
unit
as
a
residence".
A
restrictive
interpretation
of
subsection
70(9)
[and
indeed
of
subsection
73(3)]
would
lead
in
many
instances
to
the
parcellation
or
splitting
of
agricultural
lands.
Consequently,
I
do
not
believe
that
in
interpreting
subsection
70(9)
one
must
consider
only
the
part
of
the
land
that
was
effectively
used
for
tillage
of
the
soil
or
other
agricultural
operations
immediately
before
the
taxpayer's
death.
In
my
view,
agricultural
land
must
not
be
segmented
so
that
the
wooded
portions,
groundwater
and
non-arable
or
arid
parts,
for
example,
would
necessarily
have
be
excluded
in
advance
in
order
to
determine
the
part
of
the
land
concerned
by
subsection
70(9).
Subsection
70(9)
shall
be
given,
in
my
opinion,
a
large
and
liberal
construction
and
interpretation,
as
the
legislator
orders
at
section
12
of
the
Interpretation
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
1-23.
In
particular,
the
use
of
this
property
as
a
whole
must
be
considered.
However,
it
must
also
be
noted
that,
in
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act,
the
legislator
is
not
concerned
with
agricultural
land
transferred
or
distributed
to
a
child,
but
with
land
that
"was,
immediately
before
his
[the
taxpayer's]
death,
used
by
him,
his
spouse
or
any
of
his
children
in
the
business
of
farming”.
The
use
of
the
word
"used"
places
a
considerable
restriction
on
the
otherwise
general
scope
of
this
provision.
In
applying
these
analytical
factors
to
the
situation
before
us,
I
am
of
the
view
that
it
is
not
important
for
the
purposes
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act
that,
at
the
time
of
the
death
and
probably
for
several
years
previous,
farming
did
not
represent
the
best
possible
use
of
this
land.
Having
regard
also
to
this
analysis
of
subsection
70(9),
I
believe
that
the
wooded
portions
of
the
property
under
study
are
too
large
to
be
considered
as
secondary
to
the
part
that
was
farmed.
A
large
portion
of
these
lands
was
therefore
actually
used
for
personal
purposes
rather
than
for
purposes
related
to
farming.
All
things
considered,
I
set
the
portion
of
the
lands
in
issue
that
was
used
by
Mr.
Bouchard
immediately
before
his
death
in
the
business
of
farming
at
50
per
cent.
I
was
not
referred
to
any
judicial
decision
that
might
have
dealt
with
a
case
concerning
the
splitting
of
land
for
the
purposes
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act.
For
the
respondent,
reference
was
first
made
to
Roy
v.
M.N.R.,
[1984]
C.T.C.
2982,
84
D.T.C.
1901
(T.C.C.).
In
that
case,
the
issue
was
the
deductibility
of
certain
losses
incurred
by
the
taxpayer,
who
had
purchased
a
farm
of
125
arpents,
the
cultivated
portion
of
which
was
approximately
80
per
cent
during
the
years
in
issue.
Judge
Cardin
disallowed
the
deduction
of
those
losses
on
the
ground
that
the
taxpayer's
farming
operations
did
not
constitute
a
business,
particularly
since
he
had
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
This
judgment
is
of
no
interest
for
the
purposes
of
the
instant
case
since
quite
another
matter
is
here
at
issue,
the
respondent
having
acknowledged
that
Mr.
Bouchard
operated
a
farming
business.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
also
brought
Gale
Estate
v.
M.N.R.,
[1984]
C.T.C.
3043,
85
D.T.C.
28
(T.C.C.),
to
my
attention.
In
that
case,
Mrs.
Gale
bequeathed
her
farming
property
to
her
grandson
who
lived
on
the
farm
with
his
mother
and
his
mother's
husband.
The
point
for
determination
was
whether
the
land
in
question
was
used
immediately
before
Mrs.
Gale’s
death
by
her
or
one
of
her
children
in
the
business
of
farming.
Judge
Kempo
of
this
Court
dismissed
the
appeal
on
the
ground
that
the
farming
business
had
not
been
operated
immediately
before
the
death
of
Mrs.
Gale
either
by
the
latter
or
by
one
of
her
children
or
grandchildren,
but
by
the
husband
of
Mrs.
Gale’s
daughter.
The
point
at
issue
is
different
from
the
one
concerning
us
in
the
instant
case.
This
judgment
was
cited
because
it
contained
interesting
observations
on
the
scope
of
the
word
used"
which
qualifies
the
land
in
the
context
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act.
The
following
passage
from
that
judgment,
at
page
29,
was
relied
on:
Further,
with
reference
to
the
meaning
of
the
word
"used"
when
read
in
its
ordinary
and
grammatical
sense
within
the
context
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act,
I
would
accept
the
submission
of
Counsel
for
the
respondent
in
this
respect
that
used"
means
the
physical
employment
of
the
farmland
and
that
such
use
must
be
“by”
at
least
one
of
the
qualifying
individuals
“in
the
business
of"
farming.
Put
another
way,
the
physical
employment
(use)
of
the
farmland
is
to
be
in
farming
and
that
the
farming
must
also
be
such
that
it
is
a
business.
Relying
on
this
passage,
counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
there
had
been
no
physical
employment
of
a
substantial
part
of
this
land
for
market
gardening.
This
was
not,
however,
a
case
in
which
the
Court
limited
application
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Act
to
the
part
of
the
land
that
was
cultivated
at
the
time
of
death.
For
the
respondent,
two
other
judgments
were
also
briefly
cited:
Finless
v.
M.N.R.
(1970),
Tax
A.B.C.
1263,
71
D.T.C.
16
(T.A.B.)
and
Wong
v.
M.N.R.,
[1990]
2
C.T.C.
2123,
90
D.T.C.
1710
(T.C.C.).
These
latter
judgments
were
of
no
assistance
in
resolving
the
instant
dispute.
I
therefore
find
that
50
per
cent
of
the
lands
in
question
was
used
by
Mr.
Bouchard
immediately
before
his
death
in
the
business
of
farming
for
the
purposes
of
subsection
70(9)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
assessment
must
thus
be
amended
accordingly.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed.
There
is
no
award
of
costs.
Appeal
allowed.