Christie,
A.C.].T.C.:—The
period
in
respect
of
which
the
appellant's
liability
to
tax
is
in
dispute
is
1980.
In
that
year
he
resided
in
British
Columbia
and
had
employment
income
in
the
United
States
which,
when
converted
to
Canadian
currency,
amounted
to
$463,435
in
respect
of
which
he
paid
the
equivalent
of
$241,864
Cdn
in
tax
to
the
government
of
that
country.
Under
subsection
126(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"),
the
appellant
deducted
from
the
tax
otherwise
payable
by
him
for
1980
the
maximum
allowable
to
him
of
$144,481
and
claimed
a
tax
credit
of
$39,384
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
of
British
Columbia.
Together
this
is
$183,805
and
relates
to
the
$241,864
paid
to
the
United
States
government.
There
is
no
controversy
regarding
either
of
these
steps.
The
litigation
is
about
whether
in
computing
his
income
under
the
Act
he
may
also
deduct
the
balance
of
the
$241,864,
i.e.,
$57,999,
under
subsection
20(12)
of
the
Act.
At
the
time
relevant
to
this
appeal
it
provided:
20.
(12)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
such
amount
as
he
may
claim
not
exceeding
the
non-business
income
tax
paid
by
him
for
the
year
to
the
government
of
a
country
other
than
Canada
(within
the
meaning
assigned
by
paragraph
126(7)(c)
read
without
reference
to
subparagraph
(iii)
thereof)
other
than
any
such
tax,
or
part
thereof,
that
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
having
been
paid
by
a
corporation
in
respect
of
income
from
a
share
of
the
capital
stock
of
a
foreign
affiliate
of
the
corporation.
Paragraph
126(7)(c)
as
applicable
to
1980
provided:
126.(7)
In
this
section,
(c)
“non-business-income
tax"
paid
by
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
to
the
government
of
a
country
other
than
Canada
means
such
portion
of
any
income
or
profits
tax
paid
by
him
for
the
year
to
the
government
of
that
country,
or
to
the
government
of
a
state,
province
or
other
political
subdivision
of
that
country,
as
(i)
was
not
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer's
business-income
tax
for
the
year
in
respect
of
any
business
carried
on
by
him
in
any
country
other
than
Canada,
(ii)
was
not
deductible
by
virtue
of
subsection
20(11)
in
computing
the
taxpayer's
income
for
the
year,
and
(iii)
was
not
deducted
by
virtue
of
subsection
20(12)
in
computing
the
taxpayer's
income
for
the
year,
but
does
not
include
the
portion
of
any
tax
that
would
not
have
been
payable
had
the
taxpayer
not
been
a
citizen
of
that
country
and
that
cannot
reasonably
be
regarded
as
attributable
to
income
from
a
source
outside
Canada.
The
parties
agree
that
the
$241,864
paid
to
the
government
of
the
United
States
was
non-business
income
tax.
The
appellant
contends
that
he
is
entitled
to
the
claimed
deduction
under
subsection
20(12)
and
that
it
can
be
made
in
relation
to
all
sources
of
income.
His
counsel
informed
the
Court
that
these
words
set
out
the
nub
of
his
client's
case:
Subsection
8(2)
prohibits
any
non-section
8
deduction
when
computing
“income
from
employment".
Subsection
20(12)
permits
a
deduction
in
computing
"income".
The
deduction
under
subsection
20(12)
does
not
relate
to
any
particular
source
of
income
(e.g.,
business,
property,
employment)
but
is
a
deduction
from
“income”
generally.
Accordingly,
subsection
8(2)
has
no
application
to
subsection
20(12),
regardless
of
whether
the
non-business
income
tax
arose
in
whole
or
in
part
out
of
foreign
tax
paid
on
foreign
employment
income.
In
the
course
of
argument
a
deduction
allowed
under
subsection
20(12)
was
also
described
as
"a
non-source
specific
deduction”,
"a
global
deduction"
and
"a
deduction
attributable
to
all
sources
of
income".
It
was
made
clear
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
if
the
Court
concluded
that
the
deduction
allowed
under
subsection
20(12)
is
other
than
as
just
described,
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed.
This
is
because
if,
as
contended
by
the
respondent,
deductions
under
subsection
20(12)
can
only
be
made
for
the
purpose
of
computing
income
from
a
business
or
property,
referring
the
matter
back
for
reassessment
on
that
basis
would
be
of
no
benefit
to
the
appellant
because
of
the
particular
facts
pertaining
to
his
income
in
1980.
In
my
opinion
a
deduction
under
subsection
20(12)
is
limited
to
the
purposes
of
computing
income
from
a
business
or
property.
All
of
the
provisions
of
the
Act
that
are
relevant
to
this
appeal
are
to
be
found
in
Part
I.
The
headings
therein
are
of
some
significance.
Division
B
relates
to
computing
of
income-
basic
rules
and
subdivision
a
thereof
to
income
or
loss
from
an
office
or
employment—basic
rules.
Deductions
in
this
regard
are
dealt
with
under
section
8
of
the
Act.
Subdivision
b
pertains
to
income
or
loss
from
a
business
or
property—basic
rules
and
deductions
in
this
regard
are
dealt
with
in
sections
18
to
21.
Division
E
relates
to
computation
of
tax
and
it
has
subdivisions
a,
b
and
c
that
contain
rules
applicable
to
individuals,
corporations
and
all
taxpayers.
Section
126
is
in
subdivision
c.
Sections
13
and
14
of
the
Interpretation
Act
deal
with
preambles,
marginal
notes
and
reference
to
former
enactments.
They
read:
13.
The
preamble
of
an
enactment
shall
be
read
as
a
part
of
the
enactment
intended
to
assist
in
explaining
its
purport
and
object.
14.
Marginal
notes
and
references
to
former
enactments
that
appear
after
the
end
of
a
section
or
other
division
in
an
enactment
form
no
part
of
the
enactment,
but
are
inserted
for
convenience
of
reference
only.
Nothing
is
said
in
that
Act
about
headings.
They
can,
however,
be
of
significance
in
the
interpretation
of
a
statute.
In
E.
A.
Driedger's
Construction
of
Statutes
(1983)
2nd
Ed.
this
is
said
at
page
138:
Headings,
like
marginal
notes,
are
also
included
in
the
body
of
a
statute
but
are
not
a
grammatical
part
of
the
enacted
words.
However,
they
have
a
higher
status
than
marginal
notes.
Channel
B.
in
Eastern
Counties
Railway
v.
Marriage
(1861),
9
H.L.
Cas.
32,
at
p.
41
said:
These
various
headings
are
not
to
be
treated
as
if
they
were
marginal
notes,
or
were
introduced
into
the
Act
merely
for
the
purpose
of
classifying
the
enactments.
They
constitute
an
important
part
of
the
Act
itself.
They
may
be
read,
I
think,
not
only
as
explaining
the
sections
which
immediately
follow
them
as
a
preamble
to
a
statute
may
be
looked
to,
to
explain
its
enactments,
but
as
affording
as
it
appears
to
me,
a
better
key
to
the
construction
of
the
sections
which
follow
than
might
be
afforded
by
a
mere
preamble.
See
also
The
Interpretation
of
Legislation
in
Canada
by
Pierre
A.
Côté
at
page
44:
It
is
accepted
today
that
headings
are
part
of
a
statute
and
thus
relevant
to
its
construction.
Headings
may
help
to
situate
a
provision
within
the
general
structure
of
the
statute:
they
indicate
its
framework,
its
anatomy.
Headings
may
also
be
considered
as
preambles
to
the
provisions
they
introduce.
"The
heading
is
a
key
to
the
interpretation
of
the
sections
ranged
under
it":
Per
Rinfret
J.
in
Acme
Village
School
District
v.
Steele-Smith,
[1933]
S.C.R.
47
at
64.
Subsection
20(12)
does
not
identify
any
source.
It
simply
states:
"In
computing
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
..
.
.”.
Other
provisions
under
Division
B,
subdivision
b
regarding
deductions
use
different
approaches.
For
instance,
subsections
18(1)
and
(2)
and
20(1)specify
both
business
or
property.
Subsection
20(10)
refers
to
business
only
and
subsection
20(11)
to
property
other
than
real
property.
Subsection
19(1),
like
20(12)
does
not
identify
a
source.
Where,
as
with
these
two
subsections,
the
enactment
is
silent
in
respect
of
the
source
from
which
income
is
to
be
computed
under
Division
B,
subdivision
b,
and
assuming
there
is
a
well-
founded
doubt
in
this
regard,
it
can
be
resolved
by
having
reference
to
the
wording
of
these
headings
which
clearly
indicate
business
or
property.
I
say
assuming
there
is
a
well-founded
doubt
because
it
strikes
me
that
apart
from
the
headings
referred
to,
if
subsection
20(12)
is
considered
in
its
entire
context
the
clear
inference
to
be
drawn
is
that
the
deductions
permitted
by
it
relate
to
computing
income
from
a
business
or
property.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.