Couture,
C.T.C.C.J.:—The
assessments
under
appeal
concern
the
1986
and
1987
taxation
years.
The
evidence
revealed
the
following
facts.
The
appellant
operated
its
business
until
1987,
when
its
shares
were
acquired
by
a
company
by
the
name
of
G.B.
Mécanique
Ltee
(G.B.),
and
its
activities
were
subsequently
continued
by
G.B.
According
to
the
witness
Bouchard,
who
was
the
appellants
vice-president
at
the
time,
its
operations
consisted
in
“fabricating”
(I
use
the
word
"fabricating"
which
the
witness
used,
without,
for
the
moment,
attaching
a
legal
meaning
to
it)
and
in
installing
industrial
pipes
and
fittings
in
paper
mills.
For
a
paper
machine
to
be
able
to
operate,
it
must
be
linked
to
a
source
of
the
components
that
contribute
to
the
manufacture
of
paper
by
a
network
of
pipes
and
fittings
which
supplies
it,
inter
alia,
for
example,
with
pulp,
steam
and
water,
etc.
A
machine
which
manufactures
paper
is
an
enormous
piece
of
machinery
which
may
measure
up
to
500
to
600
feet
in
length.
The
appellant
owned
a
workshop,
the
dimensions
of
which
were
50
feet
across
the
facade
by
150
feet
deep.
According
to
the
witness,
40
per
cent
of
the
work
related
to
the
carrying
out
of
contracts
was
done
in
the
workshop,
while
60
per
cent
was
done
on
the
site,
that
is
at
the
customer's
plant.
He
explained
that,
because
of
the
dimensions
of
a
system
of
pipes
and
fittings,
it
was
impossible
to
complete
it
in
the
workshop
since
it
eventually
had
to
be
transported
to
the
customer,
an
operation
that
was
done
in
small
sections.
The
workshop
was
equipped
with
tables,
winches
to
transport
the
material,
welding
machines,
torches
and
buffers,
in
fact
all
the
equipment
and
tools
necessary
to
enable
employees
to
execute
the
work.
The
appellant
employed
between
100
and
300
employees.
Those
at
the
workshop
were
what
the
witness
called
"pipefitters"
and
pipefitter-welders",
specialists
in
their
trade
who
had
to
be
members
of
the
Commission
de
construction
du
Quebec,
an
agency
which
has
replaced
the
Office
de
la
construction
du
Quebec.
They
were
governed
by
the
construction
order.
The
assembly
of
a
system
of
pipes
and
fittings
was
a
very
complex
operation,
according
to
the
witness.
The
operation
did
not
merely
entail
joining
lengths
of
pipe
end
to
end,
but
they
had
to
be
cut
and
had
to
be
joined
to
one
another
after
they
had
been
given
the
shape
required
by
the
specifications
provided
by
the
customer,
then
finally
joined
to
the
machine
itself.
This
kind
of
system
involved
an
enormous
quantity
of
pipes
joined
at
angles
that
varied
in
degrees
as
needs
dictated
and
were
then
routed
in
more
or
less
pronounced
curves
or
shapes.
When
the
appellant
obtained
a
contract,
it
purchased
the
pipes
necessary
for
its
execution
on
its
own.
Those
pipes
were
ail
20
feet
in
length,
but
their
diameters
could
be
different.
Its
task
was
then
to
produce
a
system
of
pipes
and
fittings
conforming
to
the
requirements
contained
in
the
specifications
provided
by
the
customer.
To
do
so,
it
had
to
handle
them
in
such
a
way
as
to
curve
them
as
needs
dictated
or
to
join
them
to
one
another
by
variously
angled
joints.
They
were
of
different
manufacture.
They
were
made
of
cast
iron,
stainless
steel
or
monel,
an
alloy
mainly
composed
of
copper
and
nickel
which
is
acid-resistant.
To
obtain
the
curves
and
angles
in
the
network
of
pipes,
there
was
no
question
of
bending
them
mechanically.
This
operation
entailed
a
series
of
cuts
at
very
specific
angles
and
lengths
accompanied
by
welding,
which
eventually
made
it
possible
to
achieve
the
required
curve
or
desired
angle.
According
to
the
witness,
this
effort
was
a
matter
of
teamwork,
which
meant
that,
in
order
to
prepare
a
pipe
either
at
the
shop
or
at
the
customer's
plant,
each
cut
required
the
contribution
of
three
men,
that
is
to
say
two
"pipefitters"
and
one
"pipefitter-welder".
It
was
precision
work,
which
took
an
enormous
number
of
hours
to
perform.
As
an
example,
the
witness
mentioned
that
it
took
three
men
a
period
of
three
weeks
to
give
an
S-shape
to
a
pipe
24
inches
in
diameter.
Without
providing
a
more
technical
and
detailed
description
of
what
this
kind
of
work
entailed,
it
is
sufficient
to
mention
that
each
cut
required
an
isometric
drawing,
in
addition
to
a
pattern
shaped
by
one
of
the
team
members
to
identify
clearly
the
work
that
had
to
be
done.
The
witness
explained
that
it
was
possible
to
purchase
manufactured
90
degree
elbows,
which
were
standard
parts
supplied
by
pipe
manufacturers,
but
very
few
could
be
used
in
that
form
because
90
degree
angles
were
very
rare
in
a
system.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
the
respondent's
position,
as
expressed
in
his
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
according
to
which
the
appellant's
business
was
a
construction
business,
was
in
flagrant
contradiction
with
the
official
interpretation
he
states
in
his
Interpretation
Bulletin
IT-411,
dated
March
23,
1978,
in
effect
in
1986
and
1987
and
also
today.
He
cited
the
following
excerpt:
3.
As
a
general
rule,
the
on-site
fabrication,
installation
and
erection
of
machinery
and
equipment,
regardless
of
size,
is
not
considered
to
be
construction,
unless
it
constitutes
a
component
part
of
a
building
or
structure
(e.g.:
heating
system,
air-
conditioning
equipment,
sprinkler
system,
plumbing,
wiring,
etc.).
Machinery
or
equipment
which
will
form
an
integral
part
of
a
manufacturing
or
processing
activity
carried
on
inside
a
building
is
not
regarded
as
a
component
part
of
the
building,
even
though
it
may
be
firmly
attached
to
it
because
of
vibrations,
weight,
size,
etc.
In
some
cases,
where
the
installation
of
machinery
and
equipment
coincides
with
the
construction
and
erection
of
a
building
or
other
structure,
there
may
be
practical
difficulties
in
determining
what
activities
are
construction.
In
these
cases,
the
following
criteria
apply:
(a)
The
installation
and
erection
of
the
foundation,
walls,
floors,
roof
and
infrastructure
for
the
machinery
or
equipment
(i.e.:
pilings,
footings,
piers,
pillars,
pits,
etc.)
is
[sic]
regarded
as
construction.
(b)
The
fabrication,
installation
and
erection
of
the
machinery
and
equipment
inside
the
structure
(including
related
wiring,
plumbing,
ductwork,
etc.)
that
is
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
a
manufacturing
or
processing
activity
which
will
be
carried
on
inside
the
structure
is
not
regarded
as
construction.
He
also
cited
the
comments
of
Dickson,
J.
(as
he
was
at
the
time)
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Nowegijick
v.
The
Queen,
[1983]
1
S.C.R.
29,
[1983]
C.T.C.
20,
83
D.T.C.
5041,
at
page
37
(C.T.C.
24,
D.T.C.
5044),
where
he
States:
Administrative
policy
and
interpretation
are
not
determinative
but
are
entitled
to
weight
and
can
be
an
“important
factor”
in
case
of
doubt
about
the
meaning
of
legislation:
per
de
Grandpré,
J.,
Harel
v.
Deputy
Minister
of
Revenue
of
Quebec,
[1978]
1
1S.C.R.
851
at
page
859.
He
denied
the
respondent's
contention
in
his
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
that
the
appellant
was
a
service
business,
which
contention
is
made
in
paragraph
11
and
reads
as
follows:
11.
The
respondent
contends
that,
in
substance,
the
customers
of
the
appellant
retain
the
latter's
services
to
install
in
their
plants
industrial
pipes
and
fittings
which
they
have
themselves
acquired,
and,
furthermore,
concerning
the
material
acquired
by
the
appellant
on
behalf
of
its
customers
in
the
execution
of
contracts,
that
material
is
not
merchandise
manufactured
or
processed
by
the
appellant
to
be
"sold"
to
the
customer,
but
the
customer
becomes
owner
of
it
by
accession.
[Translation.]
He
challenged
this
contention
in
the
following
terms
(Transcript
vol.
2,
page
66):
What
the
customer
purchases
at
the
outset
is
material,
except
that,
given
that
this
is
an
extremely
particular
industry
and
involves
an
extremely
particular
method
of
fabrication,
it
may
indeed
be
considerable
labour
costs
involved
in
the
fabrication
of
a
part.
But
the
customer
never
becomes
owner
of
the
part
by
accession.
It
is
the
part
which
he
purchases.
[Translation.]
Further
on,
he
says
at
page
70:
What
Tuyauterie
Saglac
fabricated
during
the
86-87
period
was
ultimately
the
missing
link,
the
part
that
was
missing
between
the
paper
machine
that
was
manufactured
by.
the
manufacturer
and,
ultimately,
the
supply,
all
the
energy
that
was
necessary,
the
energy
or
the
raw
materials
that
were
necessary
for
the
proper
operation
of
that
machinery.
It
was
ultimately
the
continuity
of
the
manufacturer's
machine
that
was
fabricated
by
Tuyauterie
Saglac
at
the
time.
At
issue,
once
again,
was
a
fabrication
that
was
specialized,
that
is
always
made
to
measure.
There
are
virtually
no
.
.
.
possible
standards,
except
a
notion
of
the
number
of
hours
required
to
do
certain
types
of
work,
but
no
two
paper
machines
are
the
same,
no
two
paper
machines
are
identical,
and
each
time
a
part
is
fabricated,
it
is
fabricated
to
measure.
[Translation;
emphasis
added.]
Counsel
based
his
argument
on
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
judgment
in
The
Queen
v.
York
Marble,
Tile
and
Terrazzo
Ltd.,
[1968]
C.T.C.
44,
68
D.T.C.
5001.
The
relevant
facts
were
summarized
as
follows:
The
respondent
company
installed
marble
walls,
floors,
etc.,
in
various
buildings
as
a
subcontractor.
The
marble
used
by
the
company
in
its
business
was
imported
by
it
from
Italy
in
large
slabs.
To
fill
its
contracts
the
company
selected
suitable
marble
slabs,
from
its
stock
and
subjected
them
to
various
processes
including
matching,
grouting,
roding,
gluing,
grinding,
rough
polishing,
cutting
and
edge
finishing.
When
assessed
to
sales
tax
on
the
basis
that
the
processed
marble
constituted
goods
produced
or
manufactured
in
Canada”
under
paragraph
30(1)
(a)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
the
company
paid
the
amount
demanded
under
protest
and
sought
a
refund
by
petition
of
right.
When
the
Exchequer
Court
([1966]
C.T.C.
355,
66
D.T.C.
5210)
allowed
the
petition,
the
Crown
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
The
Crown's
appeal
was
allowed,
and
the
passage
in
Spence,
J.'s
comments
to
which
counsel
drew
the
Court's
attention
appears
on
page
48
(D.T.C.
5003)
and
read
as
follows:
If
one
were
to
apply
the
latter
test
to
the
question
at
issue
in
this
appeal,
in
my
view,
the
finished
marble
slabs,
which
left
the
respondents
plant
had
by
work,
both
by
hand
and
machinery,
received
new
form,
new
quality
and
new
properties.
The
form
differed
in
that
what
had
arrived
were
great
slabs
of
raw
marble
sometimes
as
long
as
sixteen
feet
and
of
varying
widths,
and
what
left
were
exactly
shaped
pieces
of
polished
marble
much
smaller
in
size
cut
with
precision
to
fit
the
places
into
which
they
were
to
be
installed.
As
to
quality,
what
arrived
was
a
greyish,
nondescript
slab
of
stone
and
what
left
was
a
highly
polished
marble
facing
whether
it
was
to
be
installed
in
a
wall,
as
a
window
sill,
or
as
a
post.
As
to
properties,
what
arrived
was
in
many
cases
a
piece
of
unfilled
stone
and
sometimes
one
which
would
be
too
fragile
to
use
and
what
left
in
most
cases
was
a
piece
of
marble
in
which
the
rough
unevenness
had
been
filled
in
by
grouting
and
where
necessary
the
weakness
had
been
remedied
by
rodding.
In
my
view,
the
application
of
this
test
alone
would
be
sufficient
justification
to
find
that
the
marble
pieces
which
left
the
respondent's
plant
had
been
"produced"
or
"manufactured"
there
from
the
raw
material
of
the
rough
slabs
of
marble
which
had
arrived.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
contended
in
his
argument
that
Interpretation
Bulletin
IT-411
does
not
apply
in
the
appellant's
situation
because
its
operations
constituted
construction
and
not
manufacturing
or
processing.
If
I
have
correctly
understood
his
thesis,
he
suggested
that
the
respondent
interpret
this
Bulletin
as
applying
to
manufacturers
a
part
of
whose
operations
constituted
construction,
that
is
to
say,
on
the
one
hand,
the
fabrication
of
a
machine,
and,
on
the
other
hand,
its
installation.
In
his
view,
installation
is
purely
and
simply
construction.
He
argued
as
follows:
"So
the
purpose
of
the
Bulletin
is
to
benefit
the
manufacturer
of
the
machine,
who
also
does
construction
work"
(transcript
volume
2,
page
85).
This
contention
is
difficult
to
accept
given
the
wording
of
paragraph
3
of
the
Bulletin.
I
see
nothing
in
that
paragraph
that
could
lead
to
such
a
conclusion.
As
praiseworthy
as
such
an
interpretation
may
be
in
favour
of
some
taxpayers,
it
cannot
be
accepted.
Paragraph
3
is
to
the
following
effect:
As
a
general
rule,
the
on-site
fabrication,
installation
and
erection
of
machinery
and
equipment,
regardless
of
size,
is
not
considered
to
be
construction,
unless
it
constitutes
a
component
part
of
a
building
or
structure
(e.g.
—
heating
system,
air-
conditioning
equipment,
sprinkler
system,
plumbing,
wiring,
etc.).
In
reading
this
paragraph,
I
cannot
concur
with
counsel
for
the
respondents
claim
that,
in
the
circumstances
described
in
the
evidence,
the
operation
carried
out
by
the
appellant
in
operating
its
business
could
constitute
construction.
This
wording
seems
to
me
clear
and
precise,
and
nothing
suggests,
as
counsel
for
the
respondent
contends,
that
it
applies
solely
when
the
manufacturer
of
the
machine
himself
erects
and
installs
it.
Whatever
Bulletin
IT-411
says,
and
notwithstanding
the
interpretation
given
it
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
it
is
up
to
me
to
determine
whether
the
operations
carried
out
by
the
appellant
constituted
or
not
manufacturing
or
processing
within
the
meaning
of
section
125.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
and
thus
enabled
him
to
claim
the
tax
reduction
provided
in
the
said
section.
The
relevant
provisions
of
section
125.1
read
as
follows:
There
may
be
deducted
from
the
tax
otherwise
payable
under
this
Part
by
a
corporation
for
a
taxation
year
an
amount
equal
to
the
aggregate
of
(a)
seven
per
cent
of
the
lesser
of
(i)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
corporation’s
Canadian
manufacturing
and
processing
profits
for
the
year
exceed
the
least
of
the
amounts
determined
under
paragraphs
125(1)(a)
to
(c)
in
respect
of
the
corporation
for
the
year,
and
(ii)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
corporation’s
taxable
income
for
the
year
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
(A)
(Repealed
by
1976-77,
c.
4,
subsection
50(1).)
(B)
the
least
of
the
amounts
determined
under
paragraphs
125(1)(a)
to
(c)
in
respect
of
the
corporation
for
the
year,
(C)
2
times
the
aggregate
of
amounts
deducted
under
subsection
126(2)
from
the
tax
for
the
year
otherwise
payable
under
this
Part
by
the
corporation,
and
(D)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
aggregate
of
the
corporation's
Canadian
investment
income
for
the
year
and
its
foreign
investment
income
for
the
year
(within
the
meanings
assigned
by
subsection
129(4))
exceeds
the
amount,
if
any,
deducted
under
paragraph
111(1)(b)
from
the
corporation’s
income
for
the
year;
and
(a)
five
per
cent
of
the
lesser
of
(i)
the
corporation's
Canadian
manufacturing
and
processing
profits
for
the
year,
and
(ii)
the
least
of
the
amounts
determined
under
paragraphs
125(1)(a)
to
(c)
in
respect
of
the
corporation
for
the
year.
(3)
Definitions.
In
this
section,
(a)
"Canadian
manufacturing
and
processing
profits”.—"
Canadian
manufacturing
and
processing
profits"
of
a
corporation
for
a
taxation
year
means
such
portion
of
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
the
income
of
the
corporation
for
the
year
from
an
active
business
carried
on
in
Canada
as
is
determined
under
rules
prescribed
for
that
purpose
by
regulation
made
on
the
recommendation
of
the
Minister
of
Finance
to
be
applicable
to
the
manufacturing
or
processing
in
Canada
of
goods
for
sale
or
lease;
and
(b)
"Manufacturing
or
processing”’.—"
manufacturing
or
processing”
does
not
include
(i)
farming
or
fishing,
(ii)
logging,
(iii)
construction,
(iv)
to
(x)
do
not
apply.
The
work
performed
by
the
appellant
to
install
a
system
of
pipes
and
to
link
a
paper
machine
to
energy
sources
to
permit
its
use
aid
not
consist
in
the
mere
joining
of
lengths
of
pipe
end
to
end,
but
in
a
series
of
operations,
cuts
and
welding
to
give
those
pipes
a
very
special
shape
in
order
to
incorporate
them
in
that
network.
Each
piece
required
work
by
experts
in
the
trade
and,
because
of
its
complexity,
many
hours
were
required
in
order
to
execute
it.
The
final
product
no
longer
had
the
characteristics
of
shape
or
appearance
of
the
pipe
purchased
from
the
supplier,
but
was
a
well
identified
part
on
its
own
to
which
a
distinct
shape
had
been
given
in
accordance
with
very
particular
specifications.
The
evidence
shows
that,
apart
from
a
few
rare
exceptions,
these
pipes
could
not
be
purchased
in
manufactured
form
and
that
they
had
to
be
made
to
measure.
If
it
had
been
possible
to
purchase
them
in
the
form
and
dimensions
required
by
the
specifications,
that
is
to
say
ready
to
be
incorporated
in
a
network,
the
operation
involved
would
clearly
have
constituted
manufacturing
for
the
person
who
produced
them
in
that
state.
To
sum
up,
what
the
appellant
sold
his
customer
was
a
system
of
pipes
and
fittings
which
could
not
be
purchased
at
the
final
stage
of
production,
but
which
had
to
be
assembled
piece
by
piece,
each
being
prepared
according
to
particular
specifications.
To
assemble
such
a
system,
the
appellant
had
to
modify
the
pipes
which
it
purchased,
by
giving
them
a
different
shape,
which
enabled
them
to
be
incorporated
in
a
system.
In
their
final
form
for
the
purposes
of
a
contract,
they
in
no
way
resembled
the
pipes
purchased
from
suppliers.
I
cannot
understand
how
one
can
conclude
that
adding
some
kind
of
system
or
manufactured
parts
to
a
machine
which
is
the
product
of
manufacturing
constitutes
a
construction
activity.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
submitted
no
authority
to
the
Court
in
support
of
this
claim,
and,
in
the
absence
of
any
authority
to
that
effect,
I
am
not
prepared
to
allow
his
assertion
that
the
appellant's
operations,
as
described
in
the
evidence,
constituted
construction
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
125.1(3)(b).
In
my
opinion,
they
constituted
the
fabrication
of
a
system
of
pipes
and
fittings,
or
at
the
very
least
the
processing
of
pipes.
Furthermore,
counsel
for
the
respondent
submitted
a
certain
number
of
decisions
to
the
Court's
attention
concerning,
in
particular,
contracts
of
service
and
the
theory
of
accession.
From
those
cases
at
law,
however,
I
draw
the
principle
stated
by
Reed,
J.,
of
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division,
in
Halliburton
Services
Ltd.
v.
Canada,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
427,
90
D.T.C.
6320,
that,
if
an
appellant
is
in
fact
a
manufacturer
or
carries
out
processing,
he
thereby
benefits
from
the
application
of
section
125.1,
that
is
to
say
from
the
tax
reduction,
no
matter
the
nature
of
the
contracts
with
his
customers.
In
Canada
v.
Nowsco
Well
Service
Ltd,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
416,
90
D.T.C.
6313
a
decision
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
Urie,
J.
cites
the
comments
of
Reed,
J.
in
Hallibuton,
supra,
in
which
she
stated
at
pages
55-56
(D.T.C.
5338):
Secondly,
I
do
not
find
any
requirement
that
the
contract
which
gives
rise
to
the
taxpayer's
profit
must
be
of
a
particular
nature,
e.g.:
one
for
the
sale
of
goods
and
not
one
of
a
more
extensive
nature
involving
work
and
labour
as
well
as
the
goods
Or
material
supplied.
In
my
view
it
is
the
source
of
the
profit,
(arising
out
of
process)
that
is
important
for
the
purposes
of
section
125.1(3)(b),
not
the
nature
of
the
taxpayer’s
contract
with
its
customers.
[Emphasis
added.]
And
Urie,
J.
added
at
page
423
(D.T.C.
6319):
I
wholly
subscribe
to
what
the
learned
Judge
said
in
the
foregoing
passage
and
I
do
not
think
that
I
could
improve
on
it
by
a
prolonged
analysis
of
it.
Having
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
appellant
was
engaged
in
manufacturing
or,
at
the
very
least,
processing
operations,
I
am
led
by
the
application
of
Reed,
J.'s
comments
to
conclude
that
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
the
tax
credit
provided
under
section
125.1.
Given
this
conclusion,
the
respondent's
allegation
in
his
reply
that
the
appellant
operated
a
service
business
cannot
be
allowed.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
appeals
for
the
taxation
years
1986
and
1987
are
allowed,
and
the
assessments
are
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
party-and-party
costs.
Appeal
allowed.