McGorman v. The Queen, 99 DTC 699, [1999] 3 CTC 2630 (TCC)

Bowman T.C.J.:

These appeals were heard together on common evidence and are part of a series of cases heard in the spring, summer and fall of 1998 relating to the deduction permitted under paragraph 8(1 )(c) of the Income Tax Act.

These two cases are concerned with the question whether the appellants, both missionaries, are members of a religious order and are either ministering to a congregation or are engaged exclusively in full-time administrative service by appointment of a religious order or religious denomination.

Since it was agreed that the expert evidence adduced by both parties would apply to all of the cases, I informed counsel that I would defer issuing judgment in all of the cases until they had all been heard.

As in every case under paragraph 8(1)(c) there are two questions: status and function.

Miss McGorman was employed by the Canadian Baptist Overseas Mission Board (“CBOMB”). We are concerned with the period in 1984 when she worked as a missionary in Bolivia (January to April) and with the latter part of the year when she was in Canada on leave. The two questions in her case are whether CBOMB is a religious order and whether, when she was in Bolivia, she was engaged exclusively in full-time administrative service. When she was in Canada she spent her time visiting local congregations and speaking to them. The issue relating to her function in Canada is whether she was ministering to a congregation.

The other appellant, John G. Miller, had been a minister of SIM Canada since 1963. He had served as a SIM missionary in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya from 1963 to 1989. Since 1991 he has served as a SIM Ethnic Focus Missionary to Somalis in Toronto.

The questions in Mr. Miller’s case are whether SIM Canada is a religious order and whether his work with the Somali community in Toronto in 1994 constituted ministering to a congregation.

I shall consider first the two missionary organizations:

CBOMB (L6/R4890/T0/BT0) test_marked_paragraph_end (3652) 1.055 1315_2743_2877

CBOMB was established in 1911 to undertake foreign mission work on behalf of the Foreign Mission Board of the Canadian Baptist Conventions. It has 84 missionaries serving in countries throughout the world. CBOMB missionaries make formal public vows of diligence, faithfulness and zealousness in dedicating their time and talents to God and to their missionary work.

I shall deal at greater length later in these reasons with the effect of the department’s administrative practice, but I note that CBOMB has been treated as a religious order by the Department of National Revenue in 1993 and 1996.

CBOMB has detailed and specific procedures for the admission of members. Full members are expected to make a lifetime commitment. When serving overseas they normally reside on the mission compound.

They do not take vows of perpetual poverty, celibacy and obedience. They do, however, give a full-time commitment to the work of the mission and the service of God.

SIM Canada (L2/R4560/T0/BT0) test_marked_paragraph_end (748) 1.008 1315_6851_6979

SIM Canada was established in 1893 as Sudan Interior Mission. Its present name is an acronym for Society of International Ministries. Worldwide, SIM has approximately 1,400 missionaries serving in 36 countries on five continents. SIM Canada has approximately 100 members in overseas missionary service.

It describes itself as an interdenominational and international religious order. It has established thousands of congregations throughout the world, including the Sudan Interior Church and The Word of Life Church (Ethiopia). It is affiliated with or supported by more than 50 denominations worldwide. In Canada, these include the Baptist and Pentecostal Assemblies, the Mennonite Christian Missionary Alliance, and the United Church of Canada.

Like CBOMB, members are not required to take vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Also, like CBOMB, they commit themselves to a life of self-deprivation, abstinence and dedication to the work of God.

Persons joining both SIM and CBOMB must accept the doctrinal statement of the respective organizations.

During the years relevant to the assessment in issue (1994) SIM, like (1984) CBOMB, was on the Department of National Revenue’s list of qualifying religious orders.

Miss McGorman has been a CBOMB missionary since 1960. Most of her time has been spent in Bolivia. She is a registered nurse. In 1984, she was the director of Project Reach in Bolivia, training Bolivians to deliver medical services and basic hygiene knowledge. Some of her time, apart from her work with Project Reach, has been devoted to traditional pastoral duties. In that period she lived in shared accommodation provided by the mission.

John Miller has been a member of SIM Canada since 1963. Most of his life since then has been devoted to missionary work in Somalia and Kenya. He was commissioned to his SIM missions by his home church, Mennonite Brethren in Saskatchewan. In the 1994 taxation year, he lived in a home provided by SIM. Since 1991, he has worked as a SIM Ethnic Focus Missionary to Somalis in Toronto. In that service he worked with the Somali community, which 1s traditionally Muslim, seeking to establish a Somali led church. He would lead religious services in homes and churches for religious activities.

The work of both SIM and CBOMB goes far beyond spreading the gospel or seeking to bring the Word of God to non-Christians, although that is obviously central to their motivation. It involves bringing a broad range of social, humanitarian, educational and medical services.

The question what constitutes a religious order was the subject of much learned discussion by the impressive group of experts called by the appellant and the respondent. I do not recall ever having been confronted with such an array of theological erudition.

The appellants called Dr. Tom Faulkner, Professor of Comparative Religion at Dalhousie University and Dr. Ralph Winter, Founder and General Director of the United States Center for World Mission and Chancellor of and a Professor at William Carey International University, Pasadena, California. The respondent called Professor Donald Wiebe, the Dean of the Faculty of Divinity, Trinity College in the University of Toronto and Rever- end Francis Morrisey, O.M.I., a Professor of Canon Law at St Paul University in Ottawa and a Judge in the (Ecclesiastical) Canadian Appeal Tribunal. I shall not list all of the degrees, academic honours, professorships and publications of these learned persons. Their curricula vitae form part of the record. Their expertise in matters of church history and comparative religion is not in question.

What may however warrant some initial consideration is the extent to which such expert opinions, however scholarly, can assist in the determination of the meaning of words in a statute, which is traditionally regarded as a question of law. In Oligny c. R. (1995), 96 D.T.C. 1744 (T.C.C.) Dussault J. held that expert opinions on the meaning of words in paragraph 8(1 )(c) were unnecessary, since the words were not used in a technical sense. I agree that ultimately the construction of words in a statute is a matter for the court. Nonetheless in a case of this type, where the construction of a provision of the Income Tax Act is based in part upon concepts that are fundamental to religious observances and practices that have developed over millennia, the court would be depriving itself of the assistance of a vast and potentially valuable body of scholarship if it were to turn a blind eye to the experience, wisdom and learning of persons such as the experts who were called in this case.

The seemingly narrow and specialized tax questions that must be determined by this court touch upon many fields of human endeavour — engineering, medicine, science, psychology and religion, to mention only a few. Our court operates in neither a vacuum nor an ivory tower. It functions within the reality of the workaday world of ordinary and sometimes not so ordinary people. We benefit as judges from the experience of other disciplines whose role impinges upon the operation of the taxing statutes. Here we are dealing with words used in a provision that deals, broadly speaking, with ecclesiastical concepts. It is, in determining the meaning to be assigned to such concepts in paragraph 8(1 )(c), at least informative to know how these concepts have developed historically and have been articulated within an ecclesiastical context provided, of course, that the court remains mindful of its ultimate responsibility of determining the meaning in law of the words used.[1]

It is significant that counsel for both the appellants and the respondent adduced expert testimony, evidently on the assumption that the questions upon which the experts were to testify were questions of fact.

The issues that arise in these cases are:

(a) Are SIM and CBOMB religious orders?

(b) Was Miss McGorman, when she was in Bolivia in 1984, engaged exclusively in full-time administrative service by appointment of a religious order?

(c) Was Miss McGorman, when she was in Canada in the latter part of 1984, ministering to a congregation?

(d) Was Mr. Miller in 1994 in charge of or ministering to a parish, diocese or congregation?

Religious Order

Professor Faulkner’s understanding of words such as religious order, congregation and regular minister is based upon a “functional” as opposed to a “substantive” approach. He explained the difference between these terms as follows:

A substantive category focusses upon the particular form that something takes, its appearance. A functional category focusses upon what something does, i.e. what its essence really is, not what it may appear to be.

I should not have used the word “substantive” in the sense in which he uses it. Words such as “formal”, “stereotypical”, “conventional” or “orthodox” might more accurately convey the concept that he seeks to express. Indeed, substantive, in the sense in which I understand it, connotes that which is essential or intrinsic as opposed to that which is purely formal. Used in that sense it is analogous to Professor Faulkner’s use of the word functional. The fourth meaning of “substantive” in The Oxford English Dictionary is “belonging to the real substance or essential nature of a thing; essential”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “substantive” as “belonging to the essence or intrinsic nature of the substance as distinguished from something that is accidental or qualifying; essential”.

Leaving aside such semantic cavils, I am persuaded by an approach that seeks to determine the essence or the inherent attributes of the office, function or institution to which reference is made in the statutory provision and is not dependent upon a mechanical application of conventional nomenclature and stereotypes.

In his report Professor Faulkner takes exception to a passage in the judgment of MacKay J. in Zylstra Estate v. Minister of National Revenue (1994), 94 D.T.C. 6687 (Fed. T.D.) where, in discussing the evidence of Professor Wiebe relating to the meaning of religious order he said at page

6693:

That phenomenon is marked by common characteristics, when a group of persons, distinct from within a larger religious community, live under a set of rules, bound by vows to observe not only the general precepts of their church, but also vows of chastity, poverty and obedience, including agreement to a communal life unless permitted to live otherwise.

I do not think that in that passage MacKay J. was adopting the testimony of Professor Wiebe as constituting a definition for all purposes of the word religious order or any other word in paragraph 8(1)(c). He was merely paraphrasing Professor Wiebe’s testimony. If MacKay J. was not merely doing that, and was expressing his own views, then I respectfully disagree with him. The expression“religious order” has a much broader meaning in this century, and encompasses far more than organizations established under the aegis of one particular Christian denomination.

Indeed, the Federal Court of Appeal, in its oral reasons dismissing an appeal from MacKay J.’s decision Zylstra Estate v. Minister of National Revenue (1997), 97 D.T.C. 5124 (Fed. C.A.) said at page 5125:

It is clear to us that the Trial Judge did not purport to lay down detailed definitions of the words and phrases in paragraph 8(1)(c) applicable in all cases.

Professor Winter has studied and analyzed Protestant missions for over 30 years and has written a number of articles on the subject. In his report he stated:

These articles discuss how Protestant mission organizations are the counterparts within Protestantism of Roman Catholic religious orders. Both are disciplined religious bodies undertaking focussed Christian ministry. The members of each make a second level religious commitment as adults beyond mere membership in the general church. In addition, both have a degree of autonomy in relation to the general church (which they continue to belong to). The general church in both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism represents one of the two basic structures of God’s redemptive mission. Protestant missions and Roman Catholic religious orders represent the other basic and complementary structure.

The evidence that I found particularly persuasive was that of Professor Winter. In his testimony he discussed an article written by him Protestant Mission Societies and The “Other Protestant Schism” and one written by Professor Thomas M. Gannon, S.J., Catholic Religious Orders in Sociological Perspective. Professor Winter’s point is that the 15 distinctive traits of Roman Catholic religious orders are substantially mirrored in Protestant missionary organizations. He summarized these traits as follows:

1. Voluntary, deeper commitment

2 . Response to a challenge

3 . Stress on both devotion and active involvement

4 . Task forces ready for good work

5 . An organizational esprit de corps

6. Both come-structures and go-structures

7 . Durability of purpose and existence

8. Stress on Christian basics

9 . A normative pattern of discipline, for example:

(a) community of members

(b) related to church but semi-autonomous

(c) a Structure of authority - quasi-familial

(d) common property

(e) celibate chastity, mono-sexual membership

(f) and (g) elite commitment beyond that of ordinary church members

Applying these traits of a religious order, as developed by Thomas Gannon, to the Protestant religious missions referred to my articles, it is my opinion that these missions are counterparts within Protestantism of Roman Catholic religious orders. The Protestant religious missions share most of the distinctive traits of a religious order noted above.

In addition, the commitment required by a Protestant religious mission of its members invariably involves the following:

• The acceptance of poverty as a lifestyle. This characterizes virtually every Protestant mission. Most have parity of support compensation arrangements, i.e. modest and similar allotments to meet basic needs in the location of the mission.

• Obedience to the word and will of God as set out in the Bible and, acceptance of the religious doctrine, creeds and other rules of the organization, including requirements of moral sexual purity, i.e. chastity within marriage.

Dr. Wiebe’s disagreement with the experts called by the appellants can best be summarized in a passage from his report which reads:

For both Roman Catholics and Protestants, then, evangelism and missionary activity is part of the baptismal commitment of each member of the church. To be an evangelist or a missionary does not make one a clergy person or a member of a religious order. Nor can membership in or employment with a voluntary association dedicated to missionary activity be compared to being a member of a religious community. Members in a religious order have entered a vocation in order to realize a form of life together which will assist in living the fullness of the Gospel and they are clearly distinguishable from members of other associations dedicated to one or other aspect of the church’s work.

1 have given consideration as to whether the Statement of Faith, the Draft Policy on Religious Convictions of Employees, and the Signature Form of the Leprosy Mission of Canada are equivalent or comparable to the vows undertaken by members of religious orders. In my opinion, they are neither equivalent nor comparable. The Statement of Faith is that expected of every member of the evangelical churches from which they draw, or appear to draw, their staff: as the Statement puts it, the prospective employee affirms membership “in the body of Christ’’ which is the whole church. The Draft Policy does little more than list some of the objectives of the Mission which frame the tasks members of the Mission are expected to take up. Indeed, the Signature Form to be signed by employees indicates that the Statement of Faith is but an affirmation of being a Christian who is ready to take up the specific tasks of this voluntary organization.

The Statement of Faith of SIM Canada and its Policy on Lifestyle and Morality are similar to the documents of the Leprosy Mission discussed above. This Statement of Faith is also characteristic of the churches which one will find supporting the work of this organization and the Policy on Lifestyle and Morality is the behaviour those churches would expect of all of their members. For those who would work for SIM, such lifestyle and morality issues, as the Statement of Faith makes clear, are made a part of the employment contract. Neither these documents nor the Agreement Form distinguish the employees of SIM from others in the churches of which their employees are members.

The Statement of Faith of the International Teams of Canada are much the same as those of the Leprosy Mission and SIM and functions in the same way; it does not religiously differentiate the members of International Teams of Canada from that of other members of the church. Its Staff Conduct Policy, moreover, is meant to “endorse” the Christian commitment of its members and to encourage them in the general Christian activities of “prayer, Bible study, and sharing their faith and beliefs with others.” The “requirements” listed for members of ITC include regular attendance in “a church whose beliefs are consistent with ITC’s Statement of Faith”; and whose conduct is “consistent with the principles of the Bible.” The latter portion of the Staff Conduct Policy, furthermore, provides elements of a contract between ITC and its prospective employees. As in the case of the Leprosy Mission and SIM, ITC’s documents state specific conditions of employment which individuals must agree to uphold; they are not at all comparable to the evangelical counsels and the vows taken by members of religious orders. In no way do these documents religiously distinguish members of these associations from members of the supporting church communities.

Dr. Wiebe reserved most of his firepower to his rebuttal report in which, in discussing Professor Faulkner’s functional approach to the meaning of words such as minister, congregation and religious order, he uses such ex- pressions as “incoherent”, “lacks plausibility”, “contradictory”, “non se- quitur” and “ambiguous”.

I found this learned debate between Professors Faulkner and Wiebe instructive and, indeed, entertaining, but at its conclusion I was no wiser (albeit perhaps a little better informed) than at the beginning. I do however find Professor Faulkner’s and Dr. Winter’s approach realistic and in accord with modern developments in ecclesiastical organization as the extensive evidence reveals.

Father Morrisey’s evidence was very useful in describing the meaning of religious order under Roman Catholic canon law and generally within the Roman Catholic Church. I have no difficulty in accepting his evidence insofar as it pertains to usages and institutions within the Roman Catholic Church. Its relevance to this case, however, 1s helpful only if it is accepted that for an organization to be a religious order within the meaning of paragraph 8(1)(c) it is insufficient for it to be functionally equivalent to traditional Roman Catholic orders such as the Jesuits, Trappists and Franciscans; it must in fact be a Roman Catholic religious order. Counsel for the respondent urged me, with her usual skill and force, to avoid falling into the trap of functional equivalency.

I turn next to the Department’s administrative policy and interpretation. They “are not determinative but are entitled to weight and can be an important factor in case of doubt about the meaning of legislation: per de Grand- pré J. in Harel v. Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) (1977), [1978] I S.C.R. 851 (S.C.C.) at 859.” (Nowegijick v. R. (1983), 83 D.T.C. 5041 (S.C.C.) at 5044).

Here we have a departmental policy and interpretation that completely supports the appellants’ position that SIM and CBOMB are religious orders. Paragraph 2 of IT-141 states:

The term“religious order” means a group of people bound by the same religious, moral and social regulations and disciplines, such as an order of monks.

In Revenue Canada Directive TIP 92-02 it is stated:

A religious order is defined as a group of people bound by the same religious, moral and social regulations and discipline. The most noted example of a religious order is a monastic society or fraternity, such as an order of monks or friars.

Whether or not an organization is a religious order is a question of fact adjudged for each situation. However, an essential prerequisite to being a religious order is the existence of vows or a specific religious discipline. This means that the organization’s primary purpose is to preach the gospel and its members are bound to certain religious, moral and social regulations and discipline, which would distinguish them from members of other organizations.

The Department of National Revenue in its TIP 92-02 listed a number of organizations which it determined were religious orders. These included CBOMB and SIM.

Although ultimately the status of such organizations is a matter that must be determined by the court, in my view the departmental administration and interpretation set out above is entirely correct and in accordance with the intent of the legislation. To effect so dramatic and radical a reversal of the Department’s position, apparently as the result of the McRae decision, is in my opinion without rational justification.

In brief, there is no basis for requiring vows of perpetual poverty, chastity and obedience. Such vows are not of the essence of a religious order. They represent one aspect of certain religious orders, particularly those created under the aegis of the Roman Catholic Church, but they are neither an invariable attribute nor a universal requirement. In the evidence there are a number of examples of orders that do not require such vows.

I am prepared to adopt the Department’s own words in a technical interpretation:

In the case of religious orders, there will be an ascertainable faith with tenets and principles. There will also be established religious, moral and social regulations and discipline and a requirement for their adherence.

While I do not intend these criteria to be inflexible, I should think that the following characteristics would be indicative of a religious order as that expression 1s used in paragraph 8(1 )(c) of the Income Tax Act:

(1) The purpose of the organization should be primarily religious. By this I do not imply that it can have no other objects within the overall context of that religious purpose such as education, the relief of poverty, or the alleviation of social ills and suffering. Indeed, to exclude religious organizations from the definition of religious order on the ground that they had objects that went beyond preaching the gospel and prayer and meditation and extended to works beneficial to humanity such as running hospitals, or helping the poor and homeless, is historically incorrect, scripturally wrong, at least in the context of Christian orders, (see James 2:20-26) and, as a practical matter, unreasonable and unworkable. The propagation of the gospel has traditionally been by example, good works and ministering to people’s needs, not by merely preaching to them.

(2) The members must agree to adhere to and in fact adhere to a strict moral and spiritual regime of self-sacrifice and dedication to the goals of the organization to the detriment of their own material well being.

(3) The commitment of the members should be full-time and of a longterm nature. In some cases it may be for life, but this is not essential. It is important that it not be short term, temporary or part-time.

(4) The spiritual and moral discipline and regime under which the members live must be markedly stricter than that to which the lay church members are expected to adhere.

(5) Admission to the order must be in accordance with strict standards of spiritual and personal suitability.

(6) There should generally be a sense of communality.

In formulating these criteria, I have endeavoured to draw upon the numerous authorities to which counsel referred me in an attempt to find a common thread that takes into account the varieties of religious institutions that have developed over the centuries and that is at the same time practical and workable within the statutory regime governed by paragraph 8(1 )(c). It goes without saying that any definition of religious order (or, for that matter any other words in paragraph 8(1)(c)) should not be premised upon the assumption of a legislative bias in favour of one particular denomination.

In Jeffrey v. Minister of National Revenue (July 31, 1992), Doc. 91- 929(IT) (T.C.C.), I said, in discussing the meaning of religious order:

It may well be that in this modern age and in the context of increasingly complex and novel forms of ecclesiastical organization it has a broader meaning than that traditionally associated with the term which would apply to such ancient orders as the Jesuits or the Franciscans.

The statement was obiter but it continues to be my view. That the concept of religious order is an evolving one is recognized in The Harper Collins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, in the chapter on“Religious Orders and Congregations”:

Some of the striking, if superficial, differences between orders have blurred in recent years with the move toward less institutional life-styles and the breakdown of rigid distinctions between contemplation and action. Since the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the recovery of a theology of one, common baptismal vocation and the rejection of a spirituality of separation from the world as the precondition of holiness have also blurred the distinction between religious life and the laity and clergy. New religious movements and groups are increas- ingly open to single and married people alike. In this context, the precise future of the traditional structures of religious orders has become more uncertain.

Numerous dictionary definitions were referred to by counsel. I shall mention only one, as the others are similar. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “order”, inter alia, as “a body or society of persons living by common consent under the same religious, moral, or social regulations and discipline.”

In my opinion both CBOMB and SIM are religious orders within the meaning of paragraph 8(1 )(c) and within the criteria that I have formulated above. It follows that Mr. Miller and Miss McGorman were members of a religious order.

I turn now to the second question, that of the function of Mr. Miller and Miss McGorman.

It is contended that Mr. Miller was ministering to a congregation. He was in 1994 a SIM Ethnic Focus Missionary serving the Somali community in Toronto.

Counsel summarized his work as follows:

• heads the SIM Somali pastoral team as “leader”:

° leads regular Somali language Sunday worship services (bi-weekly - weekly for a while) and midweek Bible studies. The Sunday worship services include prayer, singing, scripture readings and formal message. They are held in a small home church. Conducts other religious services (e.g. memorial service) as appropriate to the needs of his congregation;

° conducts one-on-one pastoral counselling and Bible study:

° does regular home visits;

° holds gatherings in his home to celebrate Christian holy days (Christmas, Easter, etc.) and to help introduce non-Christian Somalis to Christianity;

* is recognized by his congregation as a leader - Daahir-pur “anyone in

Toronto can find Daahir”:

• 1s called by members of his congregation in times of sickness, death, prison, hospitalization and other crises;

• has helped persons convert to Christianity, join the congregation and participate in its services;

¢ does other pastoral work as required by his unique congregation;

° makes himself visible to the Somali community by tutoring and interpreting for the Scarborough Board of Education - the income from which is turned over to SIM;

¢ worked with the First Alliance Church (CMA) to help it welcome members of Toronto’s Somali community into their church with a view to developing a distinct Somali congregation;

° speaks at the Chinese Gospel Church, First Alliance Church (and others);

• he has also been involved in preparing other SIM missionaries for overseas ministry (“minimal”). He also lectures on Islamics (culture, beliefs and practice) to college interns and to other missionaries (one hour per week).

I think that, on the evidence, this is a substantially accurate description of his work although it must be acknowledged that since 1991 his activities have broadened. Leaving aside for the moment the meaning of “congregation”, was he “ministering?”

His work encompassed everything that is traditionally done by a minister or priest who has one church. “To minister” means merely “to serve”, or “to attend to the needs of”. A physician or nurse ministers to the physical needs of a patient. A clergyman, minister, priest or spiritual counsellor ministers to the spiritual needs of a congregation, collectively or individually. Ministers are, however, called on to do much more than offer spiritual guidance. They provide psychological and marital counselling. They advise on family and career related matters. It is to the church that people turn when faced with the infinite variety of problems that arise in life. Ministering is a very broad concept, particularly in the context of the work of a person of the cloth. There is no question that Mr. Miller was ministering to the persons with whom he dealt.

Were they a congregation? “Congregation” has a variety of meanings, depending on the context. It can mean a body of people assembled to hear a sermon on a given day, irrespective of their religious beliefs or their reasons for being there. It is irrelevant whether they attend the particular church only once in their life, or whether they pay any attention to the sermon. They are, while they are there, a member of the congregation. “Congregation” can also mean the body of persons who regularly and customarily attend a particular church. If they happen to miss church on a particular day they do not cease to be a member of the congregation. I discuss at somewhat greater length the meaning of congregation in my reasons in the appeal of Reverend Vic Baker.

In the case of the Somali community to which Mr. Miller ministers we are dealing with a different phenomenon. Many are not Christians. The group is fluid and fluctuating. Meetings are frequently held in small groups and in people’s homes. Yet I can think of no word more apt to describe the group or groups to whose spiritual and other needs Mr. Miller ministers than “his congregation”. Jesus in His ministry travelled throughout the Holy Land preaching the Gospel, healing the sick and, on one recorded occasion, feeding His congregation. They came from all backgrounds and places. I do not think it could reasonably be said that He was not ministering to a congregation.

Whether one describes the group collectively as a“congregation”, or the several groups to whom he provided spiritual guidance and other assistance as “congregations” is irrelevant to the application of paragraph 8(1)(c). There 1s no reason, either as a matter of statutory interpretation or of common sense why one should lose the deduction simply because he or she is ministering to more than one congregation. I find support for this in the thorough analysis made by Garon J. in Vibe v. R. (1997), 98 D.T.C. 1684 (T.C.C.).

Miss McGorman’s work in Bolivia was that of director of Project Reach, training Bolivians in providing medical services and basic hygiene. That was her full-time responsibility. She had primary responsibility for the program and was described as Administrator, Director, or National Coordinator. She has a Masters degree in Public Health from Liverpool University and a Certificate of Management Organization in Management and Health Service.

Unquestionably, as with all missionary projects, there was an ingredient of evangelism. Her motivation in undertaking this arduous and sometimes dangerous assignment was love of God and her desire to bring the word of God to the villagers. Therefore she engaged as well in pastoral work - preaching, counselling, teaching, performing baptisms and funerals, assisting in communion services and at prayers, devotions and spiritual services.

There can be no question that her full-time work in administering, on behalf of and by appointment by CBOMB, the major social program in Bolivia, constituted in administrative service.

The respondent contends, however, that because as a devoted Baptist missionary she engaged in other spiritual activities in spreading the Word of God, her administrative service function, for the purpose of paragraph 8(1)(c), has become tainted, because of the words “exclusively” and “full- time”.

“Full-time” is used in contradistinction to “part-time” (see Minister of National Revenue v. Ritchie (1971), 71 D.T.C. 5503 (Fed. T.D.)). It cannot be said that her administrative work in directing the Reach program was part time. CBOMB appointed her to this assignment because of her qualifications and her dedication to the work of the mission. Both the words exclusively and full-time imply that the person not have some other form of employment, business or occupation that is in addition to, and impinges upon the administrative work performed for the church, congregation or order.

If we are to adopt a teleological approach to the interpretation of this provision we must ask “what is the telos at which the statute is aimed?” Clearly, it is not aimed at denying the deduction to a missionary such as Miss McGorman who has a full-time job administering an important social program on behalf of the mission in Bolivia but who also engages, as an incident of that assignment, in doing some pastoral or evangelical work. After all, what would one expect a Baptist missionary to do in the jungles of Bolivia?

I find that Miss McGorman was engaged exclusively in full-time administrative service in Bolivia by appointment of CBOMB.

When she came back to Canada she engaged in a very heavy schedule of preaching and travelling throughout Canada. She visited Canadian congregations and delivered her message from the pulpit on Sundays, evening services and mid-week services, as well as speaking to women’s, youth and children’s groups. It appears that in addition to preaching the gospel she also informed the congregation of the work of the mission in Bolivia.

When in Canada Miss McGorman lived in her mother’s house in New Brunswick. Accordingly, counsel informed me that it is only the value of the accommodation provided to her in Bolivia that is in issue. While I do not, therefore, need to make a final determination of her function in Canada in 1984, counsel raised the issue and I shall deal with it briefly. I think her activities clearly fall within the words “ministering to a congregation” in the sense in which I used them in the Miller appeal.

The point was not argued and I make no finding to this effect, but I should have thought it was arguable that her work in Canada was a necessary adjunct to the administrative work she was doing in Bolivia. It is customary for missionaries to take periodic home leave. At that time it is not uncommon for them to speak to their home congregations about their work with the foreign mission. Such activity could well be seen as a necessary incident of their work abroad. However, the point was not dealt with by counsel for either party and I raise it merely as a point that might be considered at another time.

These appeals are allowed and the assessments are referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that Mr. Miller and Miss McGorman are entitled to the deduction claimed under paragraph 8(1)(c).

I shall defer dealing with costs in all of these cases until I have received representations from counsel for all parties.

Appeals allowed.