Hamlyn
T.C.J.:
By
Notice
of
Assessment
no.
09581
dated
July
19,
1995,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
assessed
the
Appellant
for
federal
income
tax
deducted
at
source
but
not
remitted
by
Multi-Ventures
Ltd.
(“Multi”).
In
so
assessing
the
Appellant,
the
Minister
relied
on
the
following
assumptions:
7.
...
(a)
the
Appellant
was,
at
all
material
times,
a
director
of
the
Corporation;
(b)
the
Corporation
failed
to
remit
to
the
Receiver
General
Federal
income
tax
withheld
from
the
wages
paid
to
its
employees
as
follows:
Date
Assessed
to
Corporation
|
Unremitted
Federal
Tax
|
Mar.
26/93
|
$37,971.61
|
May
20/93
|
3,144.60
|
May
20/93
|
5,739.50
|
May
27/93
|
10,176.61
|
June
8/93
|
8,062.88
|
July
16/93
|
13,227.01
|
July
20/93
|
12,761.83
|
July
30/93
|
13,625.07
|
Aug.
17/93
|
16,652.79
|
(c)
the
Corporation
failed
to
pay
penalties
and
interest
relating
to
the
unremitted
Federal
tax;
(d)
on
August
23,
1993
a
receiving
order
was
made
against
the
Corporation
under
the
Bankruptcy
Act
and
a
claim
for
the
amount
of
the
corporation’s
liability
for
Federal
income
tax,
penalties
and
interest
was
proved
within
six
months
after
the
date
of
the
receiving
order;
and
(e)
the
Appellant
did
not
exercise
the
degree
of
care,
diligence
and
skill
to
prevent
the
failure
to
remit
the
said
amount
by
the
Corporation
that
a
reasonably
prudent
person
would
have
exercised
in
comparable
circumstances.
A
Partial
Statement
of
Agreed
Facts
was
filed.
It
reads:
The
Appellant,
G.
Royal
MacDonald,
and
the
Respondent,
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
by
their
solicitors,
agree
to
the
following
facts
provided
that:
1)
such
admissions
are
made
for
the
purpose
of
these
proceedings
only;
and
2)
the
parties
are
permitted
to
adduce
additional
evidence
which
is
not
contrary
to
these
agreed
facts.
(a)
The
Appellant
is
G.
Royal
MacDonald
of
214
Willingdon
Street,
Fredericton,
New
Brunswick,
E3B
3A5.
(b)
The
subjection
Corporation,
Multi-Ventures
Limited
(the
“Corporation”)
was
incorporated
in
1969
and
began
operating
in
1974.
(c)
During
the
relevant
period
of
time
(1.e.
1992
and
1993),
the
directors
of
the
Corporation
were
the
Appellant,
Royal
MacDonald
and
Kevin
Phillips
who
each
held
50%
of
the
Corporation’s
shares.
(d)
The
Appellant
was,
at
all
material
times,
an
active
director
of
the
Corporation,
holding
the
position
of
president.
(e)
The
Appellant
was,
at
all
material
times,
actively
involved
in
managing
the
Corporation.
(f)
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
issued
the
Notice
of
Assessment
#09581
dated
July
19,
1995
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
assessments
to
the
Corporation
dated
March
26,
1993
to
August
17,
1993.
(g)
The
assessment
referenced
in
paragraph
(f)
above,
included
amounts
relating
to
wages
paid
to
employees
in
both
1992
and
1993.
(h)
In
early
1993
a
restructuring
plan
had
been
worked
out
with
the
Royal
Bank
of
Canada.
Revenue
Canada
was
aware
of
the
plan
and
had
agreed
to
participate
under
certain
terms
and
conditions.
(i)
The
Corporation
had
agreed
to
a
payment
schedule
to
extinguish
the
arrears
owed
to
Revenue
Canada
and
had
agreed
to
keep
remittances
to
Revenue
Canada
current.
(j)
Agreed
payments
to
Revenue
Canada
were
not
made
by
the
Corporation
and
current
remittances
were
not
all
made.
The
Corporation
did
not
maintain
its
end
of
the
agreement.
(k)
The
plan
referenced
in
paragraph
(h)
was
rejected
in
August
1993
when
Revenue
Canada
made
a
request
that
certain
real
property
be
pledged
as
security
for
the
Revenue
Canada
debt,
to
which
the
Royal
Bank
would
not
agree.
(l)
At
this
point
the
Royal
Bank
forced
Multi-Ventures
Limited
into
bankruptcy.
(m)
On
August
23
,
1993
a
receiving
order
was
made
against
the
Corporation
under
the
Bankruptcy
Act
and
on
September
28
,
1993
a
Proof
of
Claim
in
respect
of
Revenue
Canada’s
Unsecured
Claim
and
Property
Claim
were
filed.
(n)
Revenue
Canada
received
the
following
payments
on
account
of
unpaid
withholdings:
September
28,
1993
|
$317,836.66
|
October
7,
1993
|
2,174.51
|
November
2,
1993
|
102,918.03
|
The
amount
of
$2,174.51
was
a
garnishee
payment
from
Warren
Maritime
Limited
and
the
balance
was
a
garnishee
payment
from
Fundy
Contractors
Limited,
all
received
pursuant
to
requirements
to
pay.
(o)
Except
for
the
payments
noted
above
in
paragraph
(n),
all
payments
applied
against
the
corporation’s
account
with
Revenue
Canada
were
done
so
at
the
direction
of
the
Corporation,
or
with
the
agreement
of
the
Corporation.
(p)
The
Corporation
experienced
some
financial
difficulties
beginning
in
1991.
In
1992
and
1993
the
financial
difficulties
continued
and
its
financial
position
became
more
critical.
(q)
The
Corporation
was
assessed
for
failure
to
remit
source
deductions
for
certain
pay
periods,
beginning
at
least
in
1991
and
continuing
in
1992
and
1993.
(r)
Throughout
the
relevant
period,
the
Appellant
was
aware
of
both
the
Corporation’s
financial
difficulties
and
the
failure
to
remit.
(S)
All
accounts
receivable
or
cheques
received
and
made
payable
to
the
Corporation
were
deposited
with
the
Royal
Bank
of
Canada
and
deposited
to
the
general
account.
(t)
The
Corporation
did
not
remit
the
federal
income
tax
with
respect
to
wages
paid
to
its
employees
as
assessed
to
the
Corporation
on
the
following
dates:
March
26
,
1993
—
May
20
,
1993;
May
20
,
1993,
May
27
,
1993,
June
8
,
1993,
July
16
,
1993,
July
20
,
1993,
July
30
,
1993,
and
August
17
,
1993.
(u)
The
Corporation
did
not
pay
the
penalties
and
interest
related
to
the
unremitted
federal
tax.
The
Evidence
The
Appellant,
G.
Royal
MacDonald,
is
a
civil
engineer
and
for
the
period
in
question
was
a
director
of
Multi.
He
was
also
the
President
of
Multi.
Multi
was,
prior
to
its
bankruptcy,
in
the
road
construction
and
heavy
equipment
business.
Multi
was
incorporated
in
1969
and
commenced
business
in
1974.
For
17
years
the
business
was
successful
and
was
one
of
the
larger
companies
in
that
business.
The
industry
suffered
a
downturn
in
1989
and
Multi
was
directly
affected
by
a
highly
competitive
market,
low
prices
and
dropping
volumes.
Withholding
remittance
problems
for
Multi
began
in
1991.
In
1992,
the
Appellant,
facing
remittance
arrears,
caused
cheques
to
be
issued
to
the
Receiver
General.
Several
of
those
cheques
were
returned
by
the
bank
with
the
notation
“non
sufficient
funds”.
In
part,
to
rectify
the
remittance
problem,
the
Appellant
on
behalf
of
Multi
caused
Mr.
John
Feeney
to
be
hired
as
Chief
Financial
Officer.
Mr.
Feeney
was
a
chartered
accountant
who
had
an
extensive
employment
history
with
KPMG,
a
public
accounting
firm.
His
first
role
with
Multi
was
as
Vice-President
in
charge
of
Finance
and
that
was
followed
by
the
office
of
Controller.
The
term
of
his
retention
was
from
March
1992
to
August
1993.
Mr.
Feeney’s
role
(April
1992)
was
to
restructure
or
refinance
Multi
by
securing
an
enhanced
line
of
credit
with
the
Royal
Bank
of
Canada
(the
“Royal
Bank”).
The
increased
security
to
be
given
to
the
bank
was
to
be
on
Multi’s
equipment.
The
restructuring
was
done
on
notice
to
Revenue
Canada.
Early
in
1992,
Mr.
Alfred
Lacey
was
retained
by
Multi
as
a
project
manager
to
attempt
to
settle
accounts
receivable.
His
prior
work
history
was
extensive,
including
a
period
of
time
as
a
district
sales
manager
for
General
Motors,
an
elected
official
and
former
Cabinet
Minister
of
the
province
of
New
Brunswick
and
a
term
as
Chairman
of
New
Brunswick
Power.
Between
his
retention
in
early
1992
and
September
1992,
the
financial
situation
of
Multi
further
deteriorated.
At
that
point,
at
the
insistence
of
the
Royal
Bank,
Mr.
Lacey
assumed
the
new
role
of
General
Manager
of
Multi.
Mr.
Lacey,
amongst
other
things,
sought
to
negotiate
with
the
Royal
Bank
further
new
funding
for
Multi
on
the
basis
of
collateral
security
to
be
given
to
the
bank
in
relation
to
other
real
property
owned
by
Multi.
This
restructuring
also
was
on
notice
to
Revenue
Canada.
The
view
of
Messrs.
MacDonald,
Feeney
and
Lacey
was
their
expectation
with
the
restructuring
and
with
the
assistance
of
the
bank
that
the
current
remittances
and
the
arrears
would
be
addressed.
In
the
Spring
of
1992
the
over-draft
position
with
the
bank
was
approximately
$800,000
whereas
at
the
point
of
bankruptcy
(August
1993)
the
over-draft
was
$1,800,000.
No
witness
was
called
from
the
Royal
Bank.
However,
the
evidence
of
Messrs.
MacDonald,
Feeney
and
Lacey
was
to
the
effect
for
the
remittance
payment
failures
the
bank
would
only
allow
certain
cheques
of
Multi
to
be
negotiated
and
the
bank
controlled
all
receipts.
The
bank
returned
certain
arrears
cheques
for
non
sufficient
funds
and
would
not
authorize
the
payment
of
gross
payrolls
including
withholdings.
The
bank
would
only
allow
cheques
to
be
issued
to
employees
for
net
wages.
The
problems
that
arose
late
in
1992
and
1993
included
Multi’s
failure
to
collect
all
receivables,
the
bank’s
refusal
to
allow
monies
to
be
paid
to
the
Receiver
General
and
latterly,
the
inability
of
Multi
to
secure
the
transfer
of
property
to
the
bank
as
collateral
security.
For
the
period
of
March
1992
to
August
1993,
while
Messrs.
MacDonald,
Lacey
and
Feeney
were
apparently
concerned
about
source
deductions,
it
was
obvious
the
bank
was
not
concerned
and
refused
to
authorize
the
payment
of
remittances
from
the
over-draft
borrowings
or
from
the
receipts
of
Multi.
Analysis
The
decision
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Soper
v.
R.
(1997),
97
D.T.C.
5407
(Fed.
C.A.)
,
as
has
been
stated
in
many
recent
decisions,
is
the
leading
case
on
directors’
tax
liability
for
both
the
Act
and
the
Excise
Tax
Act
The
Court
in
Soper
(supra)
set
out
the
following
general
principles:
•
it
is
the
corporation
and
not
the
director
who
is
the
trustee
of
the
government’s
money;
•
the
standard
of
care
for
a
director’s
tax
liability
is
partly
objective
and
partly
subjective;
•
the
director
does
not
have
to
give
constant
attention
to
corporate
affairs,
although
there
is
an
obligation
to
be
informed
about
the
financial
statements
and
records
of
the
company;
•
a
director
can
delegate
responsibility
for
ensuring
that
source
remittances
are
made,
provided
that
no
suspicious
circumstances
exist;
•
once
a
director
is
aware
or
should
be
aware
that
there
are
problems
with
remittances,
he
or
she
has
a
positive
duty
to
act;
and
•
an
inside
director
will
be
held
to
a
higher
standard
of
care
than
an
outside
director.
In
Soper
(supra),
Robertson
J.A.
wrote
at
page
5416:
This
is
a
convenient
place
to
summarize
my
findings
in
respect
of
subsection
227.1(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
standard
of
care
laid
down
in
subsection
227.1(3)
of
the
Act
is
inherently
flexible.
Rather
than
treating
directors
as
a
homogeneous
group
of
professionals
whose
conduct
is
governed
by
a
single,
unchanging
standard,
that
provision
embraces
a
subjective
element
which
takes
into
account
the
personal
knowledge
and
background
of
the
director,
as
well
as
his
or
her
corporate
circumstances
in
the
form
of,
inter
alia,
the
company’s
organization,
resources,
customs
and
conduct.
Thus,
for
example,
more
is
expected
of
individuals
with
superior
qualifications
(e.g.
experienced
businesspersons).
The
standard
of
care
set
out
in
subsection
227.1(3)
of
the
Act
is,
therefore,
not
purely
objective.
Nor
is
it
purely
subjective.
It
is
not
enough
for
a
director
to
say
he
or
she
did
his
or
her
best,
for
that
is
an
invocation
of
the
purely
subjective
standard.
Equally
clear
is
that
honesty
is
not
enough.
However,
the
standard
is
not
a
professional
one.
Nor
is
it
the
negligence
law
standard
that
governs
these
cases.
Rather,
the
Act
contains
both
objective
elements
—
embodied
in
the
reasonable
person
language
—
and
subjective
elements
—
inherent
in
individual
considerations
like
“skill”
and
the
idea
of
“comparable
circumstances”.
Accordingly,
the
standard
can
be
properly
described
as
“objective
subjective”.
The
standard
combines
the
traditional
objective,
reasonable
test
with
subjective
elements
such
as
the
individual’s
intelligence,
experience
and
sophistication.
The
obligation
of
a
director
has
been
further
explored
in
Wheeliker
v.
R.,
[1999]
2
C.T.C.
395
(Fed.
C.A.),
where
Létourneau
J.
at
paragraph
49,
has
Stated:
[A]s
of
their
[the
directors]
learning
of
the
financial
difficulties
of
the
Corporation
or
its
failure
to
remit,
all
the
respondents
were
under
a
positive
duty
to
act
to
prevent
failure
to
make
current
and
future
remittances
and
not
simply
to
cure
default
after
the
fact.
And
further,
at
paragraph
57:
The
obligation
on
the
directors
is
to
prevent
a
failure,
not
to
condone
it
systematically,
as
the
respondents
did,
in
the
hope
of
eventually
correcting
it
because
there
would
be
enough
money
in
the
end
to
pay
all
the
creditors.
Some
other
jurisprudence
indicates
that
directors
should
not
be
held
liable
for
remittances
in
cases
where
they
do
not
have
control
over
the
financial
affairs
of
the
corporation.
In
Fancy
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1988),
88
D.T.C.
1641
(T.C.C.),
per
Couture
C.J.,
the
bank
of
the
company
in
question
had
begun
monitoring
all
cheques
issued
by
it
and
only
authorizing
certain
payments.
The
bank
refused
to
approve
remittance
payments
to
Revenue
Canada
and
the
Appellant-directors
informed
the
latter
of
this
fact.
It
was
held
that
the
directors
were
victims
of
circumstances
over
which
they
had
no
effective
control
and
therefore
they
were
exempt
from
liability
under
the
due
diligence
provisions.
In
Champeval
c.
Ministre
du
Revenu
national
(1990),
90
D.T.C.
1291
(T.C.C.),
per
Couture
C.J.,
and
Worrell
v,
R.
(1998),
98
D.T.C.
1783
(T.C.C.),
per
McArthur
J.,
the
Courts
held
that
in
certain
specific
fact
situations
where
the
bank,
and
not
the
directors,
had
the
ultimate
authority
to
decide
which
cheques
to
pay,
the
Appellants
had
no
freedom
of
choice
in
the
matter
and
could
not
be
held
liable
for
the
company’s
failure
to
remit.
In
terms
of
options
available
to
directors
of
corporations
involved
in
the
construction
industry
faced
with
remittance
problems,
Dussault
J.
of
this
Court
has
said
in
Bazinet
c.
R.
(1996),
97
D.T.C.
364
(T.C.C.),
at
page
373:
1
recognize
that
the
construction
industry
is
an
extremely
difficult
sector:
however,
that
does
not
mean
that
persons
working
in
it
are
exempt
from
the
application
of
the
law.
Dussault
J.
also
said,
at
page
373:
If
an
individual
cannot
himself
or
herself
terminate
the
operations
of
a
business
in
such
circumstances,
he
or
she
should
at
least
completely
dissociate
themselves
from
it
by
leaving
and
handing
in
a
resignation.
And
Mogan
J.
of
this
Court
has
commented
on
the
issue
of
involuntary
financing
by
way
of
unremitted
source
deductions
in
Charkowy
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1990),
91
D.T.C.
284
(T.C.C.),
at
page
287:
When
a
corporation
reaches
the
point
where
it
does
not
even
issue
the
remittance
cheque
on
June
15
for
fear
that
it
will
not
be
honoured,
it
is
time
to
lock
the
door
and
go
out
of
business.
Otherwise,
the
Receiver
General
becomes
the
involuntary
banker
of
the
corporation’s
failing
business.
Part
of
the
directors’
care,
diligence
and
skill
is
the
prudence
of
knowing
when
to
close
down
a
business
rather
than
prolong
the
agony
with
the
unlawful
use
of
funds
which
are
impressed
with
a
trust
under
subsection
227(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Continuing
to
operate
with
involuntary
financing
by
the
Receiver
General
with
respect
to
unremitted
source
deductions
was
neglectful
and
not
a
demonstration
of
care
or
diligence.
The
Failure
to
Remit
and
the
Actions
of
the
Appellant
In
1991,
the
corporation
failed
to
make
regular
payroll
remittances.
By
the
end
of
1991
the
corporation,
at
the
direction
of
the
Appellant,
substantially
addressed
the
remittance
problem
and
reduced
the
arrears
to
under
$13,000.
In
the
Spring
of
1992,
financial
problems
continued
and
once
again
remittances
were
not
made.
In
the
Fall,
at
the
insistence
of
the
bank,
Mr.
Lacey
was
appointed
as
General
Manager
and
he
had
the
direct
responsibility
of
dealing
with
the
bank
in
all
matters
and
with
Revenue
Canada
in
terms
of
remittances
and
arrears.
A
plan
was
structured
to
allow
for
the
payment
of
arrears
and
the
payment
of
current
remittances.
As
the
plan
was
never
followed,
the
plan
failed.
In
January
1993,
further
attempts
were
developed
involving
the
proposed
co-operation
of
a
major
supplier,
the
Royal
Bank
and
Revenue
Canada.
Ultimately,
this
proposal
was
not
followed
and
therefore
failed;
eventually
the
corporation
fell
into
bankruptcy.
Throughout
the
whole
process,
Revenue
Canada
was
informed,
advised
and
consulted.
The
major
problem
was
the
corporation
did
not
have
full
access
to
its
receivables
and
had
no
control
over
its
line
of
credit.
It
operated
throughout
beyond
its
line
of
credit
and
the
continued
operation
was
at
the
sufferance
of
the
Royal
Bank.
The
operating
cash
flow
life
line
of
the
corporation
was
at
the
discretion
of
the
Royal
Bank.
The
bank
held
a
registered
assignment
of
book
debts
of
the
corporation.
The
monies
from
accounts
receivable
such
as
contract
payments
could
only
be
obtained
with
difficulty
and
only
with
the
co-operation
of
the
Royal
Bank.
Early
on
the
Royal
Bank
while
it
paid
net
payrolls
made
it
clear
it
had
no
intention
of
honouring
any
current
remittance
payments
out
of
the
line
of
credit.
The
Royal
Bank
made
all
the
day-to-day
decisions
as
to
what
cheques
could
be
issued
and
honoured
and
what
accounts
could
be
addressed.
In
the
face
of
this
position
Mr.
MacDonald
through
Messrs.
Feeney
and
Lacey
still
attempted
to
formulate
plans
to
pay
arrears
and
to
pay
current
remittances.
Conclusion
The
bank
financed
the
operation
of
the
corporation
for
the
period
in
question
to
the
point
of
bankruptcy.
The
Appellant
caused
an
experienced
chartered
accountant
to
be
retained
and
the
Appellant
followed
the
bank’s
direction
to
engage
a
General
Manager
that
the
bank
had
confidence
in.
Revenue
Canada
co-operated
throughout
the
various
attempts
but
did
insist
that
current
remittances
be
paid
and
payments
made
on
arrears.
While
plans
were
structured
to
pay
arrears
and
commitments
were
made
to
honour
current
remittances,
eventually
all
plans
failed.
The
corporation
did
not
maintain
its
end
of
the
agreements.
I
conclude
from
the
evidence
that
the
Appellant,
the
Controller
and
the
General
Manager
tried
to
appease
Revenue
Canada
by
undertaking
to
address
arrears
and
pay
present
remittances.
The
Royal
Bank
of
Canada
obviously,
from
its
decisions
and
actions,
would
not
cooperate.
During
this
time
of
continuing
economic
crisis,
the
on-site
consensus
of
Messrs.
MacDonald,
Feeney
and
Lacey
was
to
carry
on
business
and
not
pay
remittances
and
hope
the
future
receivables
and
future
business
would
eventually
solve
Multi’s
economic
woes.
The
failure
to
remit
was
not
a
short
run
event.
It
was
long
term
and
ongoing.
To
carry
on
in
this
mode
took
a
specific
decision
of
the
directors
and
was
taken
knowing
notwithstanding
their
plans
to
the
contrary
they
would
not
be
able
to
make
payments
to
extinguish
arrears
and
pay
current
remittances.
The
Appellant,
as
a
director
of
Multi,
was
a
highly
educated
civil
engineer
with
an
extensive
business
and
management
history
in
the
construction
industry.
When
remittance
problems
arose
the
second
time
in
1992
and
1993,
he
did
not
seek
independent
opinion
or
analysis
to
determine
if
Multi
was
a
viable
continuing
business.
He
relied
on
the
efforts
of
Messrs.
Feeney
and
Lacey
to
solve
the
problem
and
their
solution
was
to
not
positively
address
the
arrears
and
current
remittances
with
payments
but
rather
keep
negotiating
with
Revenue
Canada.
This
negotiation
was
done
in
the
face
of
the
Appellant’s
knowledge
that
the
Royal
Bank
would
not
pay
the
remittances
from
the
line
of
credit.
Further,
because
of
his
knowledge,
the
Appellant
did
not,
in
any
way,
direct
the
bank
or
specifically
cause
the
Controller
of
Multi
to
attempt
to
pay
remittances.
Thus,
the
Appellant’s
carry
on
course
of
action
was
a
decision
that
consciously
placed
remittances
continually
and
systematically
in
default.
The
Appellant,
by
allowing
Multi
to
continue
on
this
long
term
basis,
did
nothing
tangible
to
prevent
the
failure
to
remit.
The
negotiating
with
Revenue
Canada
with
accompanying
unproductive
proposals
when
the
director
had
full
knowledge
the
bank
would
not
pay
payroll
remittances
under
Multi’s
strained
line
of
credit
did
not
alleviate
the
positive
duty
on
a
director
to
prevent
failure
to
remit
current
and
future
remittances.
In
conclusion,
the
Appellant
did
not
exercise
the
degree
of
care,
diligence
and
skill
to
prevent
the
failure
to
remit
that
a
reasonably
prudent
director
of
his
capabilities
would
have
exercised
in
comparable
circumstances.
Decision
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
The
Respondent
is
awarded
her
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.