Gibson
J.:—These
reasons
arise
out
of
two
applications
by
the
respondent,
Andre
Rouleau,
brought
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(8)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"),
to
review
two
authorizations,
commonly
known
as
jeopardy
collection
orders,
granted
by
Mr.
Justice
Dubé
on
May
31,
1994
and
June
3,
1994
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Subsections
225.2(2)
and
(8)
read
as
follows:
225.2(2)
Notwithstanding
section
225.1,
where
on
ex
parte
application
by
the
Minister,
a
judge
is
satisfied
that
there
are
reasonable
grounds
to
believe
that
the
collection
of
all
or
any
part
of
an
amount
assessed
in
respect
of
a
taxpayer
would
be
jeopardized
by
a
delay
in
the
collection
of
that
amount,
the
judge
shall,
on
such
terms
as
the
judge
considers
reasonable
in
the
circumstances,
authorize
the
Minister
to
take
forthwith
any
of
the
actions
described
in
paragraphs
225.(1
)(a)
to
(g)
with
respect
to
the
amount.
(8)
Where
a
judge
of
a
court
has
granted
an
authorization
under
this
section
in
respect
of
a
taxpayer,
the
taxpayer
may,
on
six
clear
days
notice
to
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada,
apply
to
a
judge
of
the
court
to
review
the
authorization.
The
dispositions
open
to
a
judge
on
a
motion
such
as
this
are
set
out
in
subsection
225.2(11)
which
reads
as
follows:
225.2(11)
On
an
application
under
subsection
(8),
the
judge
shall
determine
the
question
summarily
and
may
confirm,
set
aside,
or
vary
the
authorization
and
make
such
other
order
as
the
judge
considers
appropriate.
In
Canada
v.
Duncan,
[1992]
2
C.T.C.
360,
91
D.T.C.
5615
(F.C.T.D.),
Associate
Chief
Justice
Jerome
stated
at
page
366
(D.T.C.
5619):
In
Satellite
Earth,
MacKay
J.
reviewed
the
factors
to
be
considered
by
a
court
on
a
subsection
225.2(8)
review
of
a
jeopardy
collection
order.
After
considering
the
case
law
dealing
with
the
former
version
of
section
225.2
he
concluded
(at
page
296)
that
in
a
subsection
225.2(8)
application
the
Minister
has
the
ultimate
burden
of
justifying
the
decision
despite
the
fact
that
section
225.2
as
amended
no
longer
includes
the
former
paragraph
(5)
that
specifically
stated
that
"[O]n
the
hearing
of
an
application
under
paragraph
(2)(c)
the
burden
of
justifying
the
direction
is
on
the
Minister”.
However,
the
initial
burden
is
on
the
taxpayer
to
show
that
there
are
reasonable
grounds
to
doubt
that
the
test
has
been
met…
On
this
application,
the
applicant
failed
to
discharge
the
initial
burden
on
him.
The
applicant
is
retired.
He
was
born
in
September
1931
and
has
lived
in
various
locations
in
Canada
throughout
his
life.
He
is
single
and
without
children.
He
has
an
elderly
mother
and
five
surviving
sisters
and
two
surviving
brothers
which,
according
to
his
counsel,
implies
a
substantial
attachment
to
Canada.
From
the
age
of
17,
he
worked
steadily
for
some
38
years.
He
apparently
travels
little,
and
then
only
to
the
United
States.
On
May
30,
1994
he
was
reassessed
in
respect
of
the
1989,
1990
and
1991
taxation
years
in
amounts
totalling
$160,146.13.
A
few
days
later,
he
was
reassessed
in
respect
of
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years
in
amounts
totalling
$143,225.49.
These
reassessments
were
based
on
net
worth
statements
which
the
applicant
alleges
are
inaccurate.
The
net
worth
statements
were
in
part
developed
on
the
basis
of
information
garnered
through
search
warrants
obtained
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
on
May
3,
1994
and
a
later
date,
also
in
May,
1994.
In
the
execution
of
the
search
warrants,
it
was
discovered
that
the
applicant
had
$25,000
in
cash
at
his
apartment,
approximately
$92,000
in
cash
in
safety
deposit
boxes
and
over
$96,000
in
cash
in
a
cold
storage
depot
locker
maintained
by
the
applicant.
Counsel
for
the
applicant
argued
that
these
discoveries
alone,
disclosing
as
they
did
rather
unusual
practises
for
holding
and
preservation
of
assets,
did
not
provide
"reasonable
grounds
to
believe"
that
the
collection
of
all
or
any
part
of
amounts
assessed
against
the
applicant
would
be
jeopardized
by
a
delay
in
the
collection
of
those
amounts.
Further,
counsel
argued,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
was
under
a
duty
to
make
full
and
frank
disclosure
to
the
judge
considering
an
application
for
a
jeopardy
collection
order
and
failed
to
do
so
on
the
application
for
the
second
jeopardy
collection
order
when
the
Minister
failed
to
put
before
the
judge
the
net
worth
statements
developed
by
the
Minister’s
officials
on
which
the
reassessments
were
based.
As
I
indicated
earlier,
I
am
not
satisfied
that
the
applicant
discharged
the
initial
burden
on
him
to
show
that
there
are
reasonable
grounds
to
doubt
that
the
test
for
a
jeopardy
collection
order
has
been
met.
In
Laframboise
v.
The
Queen,
[1986]
2
C.T.C.
274,
86
D.T.C.
6396
(F.C.T.D.),
Mr.
Justice
Joyal
stated
at
page
278
(D.T.C.
6398):
I
find
that
the
nature
of
the
assessment
itself
raises
reasonable
apprehensions
that
the
taxpayer
had
not
been
conducting
his
affairs
in
what
might
be
called
an
orthodox
fashion.
There
is
reasonable
apprehension
that
in
placing
surplus
funds
for
investment
purposes
through
the
hands
of
a
third
party
instead
of
directly,
there
would
be
difficulty
in
retracing
these
funds
or
in
recovering
them.
I
find
the
foregoing
quotation
apt
to
the
circumstances
before
me.
Certainly,
the
nature
of
the
reassessments
against
the
applicant
indicate
a
range
of
income
to
the
applicant
quite
out
of
scale
with
the
incomes
disclosed
by
the
applicant
in
his
annual
returns
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
The
way
in
which
he
held
assets
certainly
disclosed
a
conducting
of
affairs
that
could
be
called
unorthodox.
It
also
disclosed
practises
that
would
have
made
it
very
simple
for
the
applicant
to
spirit
away
substantial
assets
if
he
had
been
so
inclined
so
that
there
conceivably
could
have
been
difficulty
in
retracing
the
assets
and
in
recovering
them.
Further,
I
find
no
support
for
the
position
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
failed
to
make
full
and
frank
disclosure,
which
I
am
satisfied
he
is
obliged
to
do,
on
the
second
ex
parte
application
to
Mr.
Justice
Dubé.
Full
and
frank
disclosure
does
not
require
the
disclosure
of
material
that
is
simply
irrelevant
to
the
test
for
issuance
of
an
ex
parte
jeopardy
collection
order.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
jeopardy
collection
orders
in
question
are
confirmed
and
in
all
other
respects
the
applicant’
s
applications
are
dismissed.
Applications
granted
in
part.
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