The
Chief
Justice:—This
is
an
appeal
under
section
60
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
from
a
decision
of
the
Tariff
Board
which
declared,
on
an
application
under
section
59
of
the
Act,
that
the
plastic
or
wooden
soft
drink
cases
and
plastic
hand
carriers
in
issue
in
the
proceedings
are
subject
to
and
not
exempt
from
the
sales
tax
imposed
by
section
27
of
the
Act.
There
are
three
points
involved
in
the
appeal:
first,
the
scope
of
the
appeal
itself,
having
regard
to
the
wording
of
the
order
giving
leave
to
appeal;
second,
whether
the
cases
and
carriers
are
exempt
under
subsection
29(1)
and
Schedule
III,
Part
XIII,
subparagraph
l(a)(i);
and,
third,
whether
they
fall
within
Schedule
III,
Part
I,
and
are
denied
exemption
by
the
concluding
words
of
section
1
of
that
Part.
The
point
as
to
the
scope
of
the
appeal
arises
on
subsection
60(1)
of
the
Act
and
the
terms
of
the
order
of
the
Court
giving
leave
to
appeal.
The
subsection
reads:
60.
(1)
Any
of
the
parties
to
proceedings
under
section
59,
namely,
(a)
the
person
who
applied
to
the
Tariff
Board
for
a
declaration,
(b)
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Customs
and
Excise,
or
(c)
any
person
who
entered
an
appearance
with
the
Secretary
of
the
Tariff
Board
in
accordance
with
subsection
59(2),
may,
upon
leave
being
obtained
from
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
or
a
judge
thereof,
upon
application
made
within
thirty
days
from
the
making
of
the
declaration
sought
to
be
appealed,
or
within
such
further
time
as
the
Court
or
judge
may
allow,
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
upon
any
question
that
in
the
opinion
of
the
Court
or
judge
is
a
question
of
law.
The
practice
under
this
provision,
and
under
a
similarly
worded
provision
that
was
in
the
Customs
Act
for
some
years
after
1951,
has
been
for
the
most
part,
though
by
no
means
invariably,
to
set
out
in
the
order
giving
leave
to
appeal
the
question
which
the
Court
or
judge
granting
leave
considered
to
be
a
question
of
law.
Thus,
in
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Customs
and
Excise
v
Parke,
Davis
&
Company
Limited,
[1954]
Ex
CR
1,
Thorson,
P,
in
dealing
with
an
appeal,
said:
It
was
my
opinion
that
section
49(3)
required
that
the
court
or
judge
in
granting
leave
to
appeal
should
specify
the
question
which
in
its
or
his
opinion
was
a
question
of
law
and
on
which
the
appeal
was
permitted.
Accordingly,
on
December
29,
1949,
I
gave
leave
to
the
appellant
to
appeal
to
this
Court
from
the
decision
of
the
Tariff
Board
on
what,
in
my
opinion,
was
a
question
of
law,
which
I
specified
as
follows:
Did
the
Tariff
Board
err
as
a
matter
of
law
in
deciding
that
Penicillin
S-R,
imported
under
Windsor
entries
numbers
16407-A,
June
23,
1949,
and
17043-A,
June
28,
1949,
is
exempt
from
duty
by
virtue
of
Customs
Tariff
item
2060?
Later
he
said:
This
is
the
first
appeal
to
this
Court
under
the
Customs
Act
and
certain
observations
of
a
general
nature
may
be
in
order.
The
right
of
appeal
conferred
by
the
Act
is
a
limited
one.
In
the
first
place,
leave
to
appeal
must
be
obtained
from
this
Court
or
a
judge
thereof.
Moreover,
the
appeal
for
which
leave
may
be
obtained
is
confined
to
“any
question
which
in
the
opinion
of
the
court
or
judge
is
a
question
of
law’’.
This
language
permits
possible
anomalous
results
since
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
to
entertain
an
appeal
is
made
to
depend
not
on
whether
a
question
is
actually
a
question
of
law
but
on
whether
in
the
opinion
of
the
court
or
judge
it
is
so.
That
being
the
case,
it
is
quite
possible,
through
an
erroneous
opinion
of
the
court
or
judge
that
a
particular
question
is
a
question
of
law,
that
the
Court
will
find
itself
vested
with
jurisdiction
to
entertain
an
appeal
on
what
is
actually
a
question
of
fact.
Conversely,
if
the
court
or
judge
is
erroneously
of
the
opinion
that
the
question
in
issue
is
not
a
question
of
law,
the
Court
will
have
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
an
appeal,
although
the
question
is
actually
one
of
law.
Whether
such
eventualities
were
contemplated
when
the
legislation
was
enacted
may
be
the
subject
of
speculation
but
that
they
might
result
from
the
language
of
the
enactment
does
not
appear
to
admit
of
doubt.
Other
cases
in
which
the
question
was
specified
in
the
order
are
to
be
found
in
the
Exchequer
Court
Reports
for
the
year
1953
and
later
years.
The
need
to
specify
the
question
was
considered
to
arise
from
the
view
that
the
statute
required
that
the
court
or
judge
which
grants
leave
form
the
opinion
that
the
question
is
one
of
law.
That
interpretation
of
subsection
60(1)
may
be
open
to
question
but
I
do
not
think
it
is
necessary
to
review
it
in
the
present
case.
In
this
instance
the
order
granting
leave
reads
as
follows:
Leave
to
appeal
is
granted
on
the
question
of
whether
or
not
the
Tariff
Board
erred
in
deciding
that
the
goods
in
issue
were
subject
to
and
not
exempt
from
the
consumption
or
sales
tax
imposed
by
section
27
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
in
view
of
the
provisions
of
section
2(1
)(f)
of
the
said
Act.
It
will.
be
noted
that
the
form
of
the
question
does
not
differ
much
from
that
used
in
many
cases
save
for
the
words
“in
view
of
the
provisions
of
paragraph
2(1
)(f)
of
the
said
Act”.
These
words
raise
the
question
whether
what
was
considered
to
be
a
question
of
law,
on
which
leave
to
appeal
was
granted,
is
somehow
limited
to
the
effect
of
the
addition
to
subsection
2(1)
of
a
paragraph
(f)
which
includes
in
the
definition
of
“manufacturer
or
producer”
any
person
who,
by
himself
or
through
another
person
acting
for
him,
assembles,
blends,
mixes,
cuts
to
size,
dilutes,
bottles,
packages,
repackages
or
otherwise
prepares
goods
for
sale,
other
than
a
person
who
so
prepares
goods
in
a
retail
store
for
sale
in
that
store
exclusively
and
directly
to
consumers;
As
the
result
of
so
restricting
the
meaning
of
the
question
would
be
to
deny
to
the
appellant
most
of
his
submissions
and
as
no
objection
to
their
relevancy
was
raised
in
the
respondent’s
memorandum
of
argument,
the
Court
should,
I
think,
be
loath
to
so
restrict
the
issue
on
which
the
appellant
had
leave
to
appeal
by
reference
to
wording
which
in
the
context
of
the
rest
of
the
question
is
difficult
to
interpret.
In
the
circumstances,
I
do
not
think
the
wording
should
be
read
as
meaning
anything
more
than
as
an
indication
that
the
Court,
in
addition
to
the
question
or
questions
of
law
raised
by
the
rest
of
the
question,
was
of
the
opinion
that
there
was
an
arguable
question
of
law
on
the
effect
of
the
addition
of
paragraph
(f)
to
the
definition.
Accordingly,
I
would
hold
that
the
question
to
be
determined
and
the
appeal
are
not
limited
to
issues
as
to
the
effect
of
the
enactment
of
paragraph
2(1)(f).
The
second
issue
requiring
determination
is
whether
the
soft
drink
cases
and
carriers
in
question
are
exempt
from
sales
tax
under
subsection
29(1)
and
Schedule
III,
Part
XIII,
subparagraph
l(a)(i)
of
the
Act.
In
the
scheme
of
Part
V
of
the
Act
the
general
charging
provision
is
subsection
27(1)
which
imposes
tax
on
the
sale
price
of
all
goods
“produced
or
manufactured
in
Canada”
or
“imported
into
Canada”.
The
provisions
relied
on
for
the
exemption
are:
29.
(1)
The
tax
imposed
by
section
27
does
not
apply
to
the
sale
or
importation
of
the
goods
mentioned
in
Schedule
II,
.
.
.
.
*
*
*
SCHEDULE
III
PART
XIII
PRODUCTION
EQUIPMENT,
PROCESSING
MATERIALS
AND
PLANS
1.
All
the
following:
(a)
machinery
and
apparatus
sold
to
or
imported
by
manufacturers
or
producers
for
use
by
them
directly
in
(1)
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods,
The
appellant
produces
and
sells
bottled
soft
drinks.
When
sold
by
the
appellant
the
bottled
soft
drinks
are
in
the
cases
and
hand
carriers
which
are
in
issue
in
the
appeal.
The
appellant
sells
the
product
by
the
case
rather
than
by
the
individual
bottle.
The
hand
carriers
are
made
of
plastic
material;
some
of
the
cases
are
of
plastic
material,
others
are
wooden.
Both
the
carriers
and
the
cases
are
so
designed
as
to
hold
a
particular
number
of
bottles
of
a
particular
size
or
sizes
and
to
protect
them
from
breakage.
The
bottling
operation
is
carried
out
on
production
line
equipment
capable
of
producing
some
300
filled
bottles
per
minute.
Some
parts
of
the
equipment
are
involved
in
the
mixing
of
the
concentrates
with
desired
proportions
of
water,
some
with
the
washing
of
the
bottles,
some
with
the
filling
and
capping
of
the
bottles,
and
some
with
the
moving
of
them
from
one
stage
of
the
procedure
to
another.
In
this
operation
empty
bottles
are
brought
in
the
cases
and
carriers
in
question
to
the
conveyor
where
the
machinery
removes
the
bottles
from
them.
The
bottles
then
go
in
one
direction
to
be
washed,
filled
and
capped,
the
cases
and
hand
carriers
in
another
direction
in
which
they
are
moved
along,
in
the
case
of
those
made
of
plastic
to
be
washed,
and
thence
in
all
cases
to
a
point
in
the
production
line
where
they
are
again
mechanically
filled,
this
time
with
filled
bottles,
and
thereupon
placed
on
pallets
for
removal
to
the
warehouse.
In
its
description
of
the
operation,
the
Board
said:
.
.
.
Mr
Warren
described
the
production
process
at
the
bottling
plant.
The
concentrates
are
delivered
to
the
plant
in
stainless
steel
containers
and
mixed
in
a
mixing
tank
where
water
and
sugar
are
added.
The
resulting
syrup
goes
through
stainless
steel
lines
to
the
production
area
where
the
syrup
and
water
are
proportioned
as
required
and
additional
water
is
added
to
reduce
the
mixture
to
a
finished
product.
The
product
is
then
ready
to
go
into
a
bottler
or
product
tank,
travelling
through
stainless
steel
lines
to
the
top
of
a
filler
bowl.
As
the
bowl
turns
the
bottles
come
on
to
be
filled.
As
the
bottles
leave
the
filler
the
closures
are
put
on
and
they
go
to
the
packer
to
be
placed
inside
the
plastic
or
wooden
cases.
In
some
instances
the
bottles
are
placed
directly
in
the
cases
without
being
put
inside
plastic
hand
carriers.
The
cases,
when
filled,
move
down
a
conveyor
to
a
pile-off
station
where
they
are
manually
loaded
onto
pallets
and
taken
to
the
warehouse
for
loading
onto
trucks
for
delivery
to
retail
stores.
The
hand
carriers
and
cases
remain
with
the
retailer
for
one
to
three
weeks
until
they
are
picked
up
to
be
placed
on
pallets
and
stored
in
the
applicant’s
warehouse.
They
are
returnable
and
have
a
normal
life
of
seven
years.
No
witnesses
were
called
for
the
respondent
but,
in
cross-examination
of
the
appellant’s
witness,
counsel
adduced
evidence
that
the
soft
drink
bottles
are
placed
in
the
hand
carriers
and
cases
after
the
drink
mix
is
prepared
and
injected
into
the
bottles
and
after
the
caps
are
date
coded
and
put
on.
The
witness
conceded
that
the
only
thing
done
to
the
bottles
after
they
are
placed
in
the
hand
carriers
and
cases
is
labelling
and
that
the
quality
of
the
drink
was
not
altered
thereafter.
The
witness
also
conceded
that
the
goods
in
issue
are
used
exclusively
for
holding
the
soft
drink
bottles
and
that
they
were
designed
for
repeated
use.
During
re-examination,
the
witness
asserted
that
the
applicant
was
not
merely
selling
bottles
of
soft
drink
but
was
selling
the
cases
as
entire
units.
The
uncontradicted
evidence
also
shows
that
when
selling
its
product
the
appellant
charges
a
deposit
for
the
cases
and
carriers
and
that
in
the
normal
course
of
the
business
they
are
returned
to
the
appellant
in
a
few
weeks
filled
with
empty
bottles.
Thereafter
the
cases
and
carriers
are
used
again
to
carry
the
empty
bottles
to
and
on
the
conveyor
to
the
point
where
the
machinery
removes
the
bottles
from
them.
The
Board’s
reasons
for
denying
exemption
under
subparagraph
l(a)(i)
of
Part
XIII
appear
from
the
following
excerpt:
The
Board
finds
that
the
bottled
soft
drinks
are
fully
manufactured
at
the
time
they
are
placed
in
the
hand
carriers
and
cases.
They
are
not,
either
at
that
time
or
thereafter,
given
any
new
forms,
qualities
and
properties
or
combinations.
The
manufacture
or
production
of
the
soft
drink
must
therefore
be
regarded
as
having
been
completed
before
the
goods
in
issue
come
into
use.
They
do
not,
therefore,
fall
within
the
exemption
provided
by
section
1(a)
of
Part
XIII
of
the
Act.
The
appellant’s
first
submission
was
that
because
of
the
addition
of
paragraph
(f)
to
the
definition
of
“manufacturer
or
producer’’
in
subsection
2(1)
of
the
Act
the
meaning
of
the
expression
“manufacture
or
production”
in
other
sections
of
the
Act
must
be
taken
to
have
been
expanded
so
as
to
include
the
essentially
packaging
operations
referred
to
in
paragraph
(f).
With
respect
I
do
not
find
that
argument
persuasive.
It
appears
to
me
that
the
expressions
“manufacturer
or
producer”,
“manufactured
or
produced”
and
“manufacture
or
production”,
which
are
found
in
various
places
and
contexts
in
the
Act,
are
used
for
differing
purposes
and
that
is
wrong
to
try
to
interpret
one
by
reference
to
what
another
means
or
has
been
held
to
include
either
in
a
particular
context
or
in
general.
As
it
seems
to
me,
the
definition
of
“manufacturer
or
producer”
in
subsection
2(1)
is
intended
to
identify
a
person
who
will
be
liable
to
pay
the
tax
whether
or
not
he
manufactures
or
produces
anything
or
is
or
is
not
a
manufacturer
or
producer.
A
reference
to
paragraphs
(a)
to
(e)*
of
the
subsection
and
the
class
of
persons
described
in
them,
I
think,
makes
this
clear.
While
the
added
paragraph
(f),
unlike
the
preceding
paragraphs,
further
expands
the
definition
by
reference
to
functions
carried
out
in
connection
with
goods,
it
does
not,
in
my
opinion,
give
rise
to
an
inference
that
such
functions
necessarily
constitute
“manufacture
or
production”
or
“manufacturing
or
producing”
within
the
meaning
of
any
of
the
provisions
of
the
Act.
The
meaning
of
“manufactured
or
produced”
in
subsection
27(1),
which
has
been
considered
in
numerous
cases,
also
affords
no
sure
guide
to
what
is
meant
by
“manufacture
or
production”
in
any
other
provision,
including
subparagraph
1
(a)(i)
of
Part
XIII
of
Schedule
III.
The
expression
“manufactured
or
produced”
is
used
in
subsection
27(1)
adjectivally
to
prescribe
or
outline
the
scope
of
the
class
of
goods
on
the
sale
of
which
tax
is
imposed.
It
refers
to
goods
that
have
been
“manufactured
or
produced”,
not
goods
to
be
manufactured
or
produced.
Whether
goods
have
been
“manufactured
or
produced”
in
Canada
may
be
tested
by
what
has
happened
to
them
in
Canada.
But
the
expression
does
not
refer
to
and
is
not
concerned
with
the
means
by
which
the
goods
have
been
manufactured
or
produced.
Moreover,
decisions
that
turn
on
whether
particular
goods
have
been
“manufactured
or
produced”
in
operations
involving
them
or
whether
goods
fall
within
the
meaning
of
that
expression
in
the
Act
are
of
little
use
in
a
case
of
this
kind
in
which
there
is
no
issue
as
to
whether
the
appellant
is
a
“manufacturer
or
producer”,
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act,
of
the
bottled
soft
drink
or
as
to
the
product
of
its
operation
being
goods
“manufactured
or
produced”
in
Canada
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
27(1).
What
is
here
in
issue
is
a
different
question,
that
of
whether
the
cases
and
hand
carriers
are
sold
to
or
imported
by
the
appellant
for
use
by
it
“directly
in
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods”,
that
is
to
say,
its
bottled
soft
drinks.
These
words
must,
in
my
opinion,
be
given
their
ordinary
meaning
in
their
context
in
the
particular
subparagraph
l(a)(i)
of
Part
XIII
of
Schedule
III.
Accordingly,
I
would
reject
the
appellant’s
submission
based
on
paragraph
(f)
of
the
definition
of
“manufacturer
or
producer”
in
subsection
2(1).
The
second
branch
of
the
appellant’s
submission
was
twofold,
first
that
the
Board
erred
in
applying
the
test
of
The
Queen
v
York
Marble,
Tile
and
Terrazo
Ltd,
[1968]
SCR
140;
[1968]
CTC
44;
68
DTC
5001
and,
second,
that
the
Board
failed
to
consider
the
evidence
that
the
cases
and
carriers
are
used
at
the
beginning
of
the
production
process
to
introduce
onto
the
conveyor
and
carry
empty
bottles
along
on
it
to
the
point
where
the
machinery
removes
them
from
the
cases
and
carries
and
moves
them
to
the
washing
operation.
I
agree
with
both
branches
of
this
submission.
In
my
view
the
Board
erred
in
applying
to
the
question
whether
goods
which
fall
within
the
meaning
of
“machinery
or
apparatus”
are
for
use
in
the
“manufacture
or
production”
of
goods
a
test
which
narrowly
and
unduly
confines
such
machinery
or
apparatus
to
that
used
up
to
but
not
after
the
moment
when
a
usable
and
saleable
article
is
in
governor
in
council
of
any
province
of
Canada,
that
manufactures
or
produces
taxable
goods,
(d)
any
person
who
sells,
otherwise
than
in
a
retail
store
exclusively
and
directly
to
consumers,
cosmetics
that
were
not
manufactured
by
him
in
Canada,
other
than
a
person
who
sells
such
cosmetics
exclusively
and
directly
to
hairstylists,
cosmeticians
and
other
similar
users
for
use
in
the
provision
of
personal
grooming
services
and
not
for
resale,
(e)
any
person
who
sells
gasoline,
diesel
fuel
or
aviation
fuel,
other
than
a
person
who
sells
such
goods
exclusively
and
directly
to
consumers,
and
.
.
.
existence
without
regard
for
what
must
happen
immediately
thereafter
to
get
the
article
out
of
the
way
of
like
articles
on
the
production
line.
By
parallel
reasoning
one
would
hold
that
the
rollers
on
the
conveyor
which
come
into
play
after
the
filled
bottles
have
been
capped
are
not
machinery
or
apparatus
used
in
the
production
of
the
bottled
products
because
the
manufacture
or
production
of
the
bottled
product
has
been
completed
before
such
rollers
come
into
use.
Such
a
test,
in
my
opinion,
is
unreal.
In
an
operation
of
this
kind
means
for
removal
of
the
product
from
the
production
equipment
is
as
essential
as
any
other
part
of
the
machinery
or
apparatus
used
in
the
manufacture
or
production
of
the
product
and
is
used
as
directly
in
the
manufacture
or
production
of
the
product
as
any
of
the
other
parts.
The
cases
and
carriers
here
in
question
fall
easily
within
the
meaning
of
“apparatus”
and
are
used
in
the
production
process
at
a
time
when
the
distribution
and
warehousing
operations
have
not
yet
begun.
The
fact
that
the
cases
and
carriers
are
subsequently
used
in
the
warehousing
and
distribution
processes
is
not
relevant
to
the
question
under
discussion.*
Moreover,
the
cases
and
carriers
serve
a
further
function
in
the
“manufacture
and
production”
process
in
being
used
to
put
bottles
on
the
conveyor,
to
hold
them
while
being
conveyed
to
the
point
where
they
are
removed
and
to
hold
them
in
position
for
removal
by
the
apparatus
which
carries
out
that
function.
Again
these
cases
and
carriers
are
carrying
out
an
essential
function
of
the
manufacture
or
production
of
the
product
and
are
used
directly
in
it.
The
system
requires
a
supply
of
empty
bottles
to
be
brought
to
the
washing
apparatus.
In
the
system
described
it
is
not
conceivable
that
the
procedure
could
be
carried
out
by
putting
or
dumping
individual
bottles
on
the
rollers
of
the
conveyor.
As
the
reasons
of
the
Board
do
not
mention
this
feature
of
the
use
of
the
cases
and
carriers
it
appears
to
me
that
the
Board
has
erroneously
failed
to
consider
the
effect
of
the
evidence
and
that
its
finding
is
unsupportable
and
should
not
be
allowed
to
stand.
In
my
opinion,
the
finding
is
erroneous
in
law
and
should
be
replaced
with
a
finding
that
the
cases
and
carriers
are
apparatus
for
use
in
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods
within
the
meaning
of
Schedule
III,
Part
XIII,
subparagraph
l(a)(i)
of
the
Act.
There
remains
the
question
whether
the
exemption
is
foreclosed
by
section
1
of
Part
I
of
Schedule
III.
That
provision
reads:
SCHEDULE
III
PART
I
COVERINGS
OR
CONTAINERS
1.
Usual
coverings
or
usual
containers
sold
to
or
imported
by
a
manufacturer
or
producer
for
use
by
him
exclusively
in
covering
or
containing
goods
of
his
manufacure
or
production
that
are
not
subject
to
the
consumption
or
sales
tax,
but
not
including
coverings
or
containers
designed
for
dispensing
goods
for
sale
or
designed
for
repeated
use.
The
Board’s
finding
on
this
point
was
expressed
in
the
following
paragraph
of
its
reasons:
The
Board
finds
that
the
product
that
the
applicant
sells
is
a
bottled
soft
drink,
not,
as
urged
by
its
representative
in
argument,
a
bottled
soft
drink
placed
inside
the
hand
carriers
and
cases.
The
hand
carriers
and
cases
are
for
use
by
it
in
covering
or
containing
goods
of
its
manufacture
or
production
and
therefore
would
be
exempt
under
section
I
of
Part
I
of
the
Schedule
were
it
not
for
the
exception
to
that
exemption
provided
by
the
words
“but
not
including
coverings
or
containers
.
.
.
designed
for
repeated
use”.
The
goods
in
issue,
being
returnable,
are
clearly
and
admittedly
designed
for
repeated
use
and
are
therefore
outside
the
exemption.
The
cases
and
carriers
in
question
are
undoubtedly
designed
for
repeated
use.
They
are
in
fact
used
over
and
over
again
and
last
up
to
seven
years.
But
containing
the
bottled
soft
drinks
of
the
appellant’s
manufacture
when
in
storage
after
they
have
been
produced
and
in
the
course
of
their
distribution
to
customers
is
but
one
of
the
uses
to
which
the
cases
and
carriers
are
put.
They
are
also
used
to
contain
and
return
empty
bottles
to
the
appellant
and
as
well
in
the
ways
already
mentioned
in
the
course
of
manufacture
or
production
of
the
bottled
soft
drinks.
The
cases
and
carriers
are
thus
not
used
“exclusively”
in
containing
goods
of
the
appellant’s
manufacture
or
production.
They
do
not
fall
within
Schedule
III,
Part
I,
section
I
and
are
thus
not
affected
by
its
exclusion
of
containers
designed
for
repeated
use.
Further,
even
if
it
could
be
said
that
these
cases
and
carriers
fell
within
section
1
of
Part
I
of
Schedule
III
and
are
not
exempted
because
of
the
exclusion,
the
result
is
simply
that
the
cases
and
carriers
are
not
exempted
by
that
provision.
They
are
not
on
that
account
rendered
ineligible
for
exemption
by
any
other
provision
of
the
Act
under
which
they
qualify
for
exemption.*
In
the
result
I
would
allow
the
appeal,
set
aside
the
declaration
of
the
Tariff
Board
and,
exercising
the
powers
of
the
Court
under
subsection
60(4)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act}
and
subparagraph
52(c)(i)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act},
declare
that
the
plastic
or
wooden
soft
drink
cases
and
plastic
hand
carriers
in
issue
are
apparatus
sold
to
or
imported
by
the
appellant
for
use
by
it
in
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
l(a)(i)
of
Part
XIII
of
Schedule
III
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
and
are
exempt
from
the
consumption
or
sales
tax
imposed
by
section
27
of
that
Act.