Collier,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board.
The
presiding
member
upheld
assessments
by
the
Minister
for
the
plaintiff's
1970-74
taxation
years,
inclusive.
The
assessments
levied
increased
taxes
and
penalties.
For
the
taxation
years
set
out,
the
Minister
added
into
the
plaintiff's
taxable
income,
the
following
amounts.
|
1970
|
$4,293.97
|
|
1971
—
15,150.73
|
|
1972
—
14,459.56
|
|
1973
—
16,595.60
|
|
1974
—
5,999.29
|
|
56,499.15
|
These
amounts
were
said
by
the
Minister
to
be
suppressed
income
of
a
company
that
was
appropriated
to
the
plaintiff
as
a
shareholder
of
the
company.
The
question,
as
I
see
it,
is
essentially
one
of
fact.
The
plaintiff,
in
the
years
under
review,
was
married.
Her
husband's
name
was
Kenneth
J
Murphy.
They
had
three
sons.
In
1970,
they
were
13,
9
and
6
years
old.
The
plaintiff
and
her
husband
separated
in
1978.
They
have
since
been
divorced.
The
plaintiff
and
Kenneth
Murphy
were
the
major
shareholders
in
a
company
called
Murphy
Hotel
Enterprises
Limited
(“the
company"').
The
plaintiff
held
2,447
of
5,000
issued
and
outstanding
common
shares
of
the
company.
There
was
no
evidence
before
me
as
to
who
the
directors
of
the
company
were.
The
company
operated
the
Hotel
Quinte
in
Belleville.
During
the
latter
part
of
1972
and
thereafter,
the
company
operated,
as
well,
the
Dutch
Mill
Inn
in
Trenton.
The
plaintiff
was
the
secretary-treasurer
of
the
company.
She
had
authority
to
sign
company
cheques,
with
hers
as
a
sole
signature.
There
was
no
evidence
before
me
as
to
the
actual
position
of
Kenneth
Murphy.
He
ran
the
businesses.
He
also
had
signing
power
as
a
sole
signatory.
According
to
the
plaintiff's
evidence,
which
I
accept,
she
rarely
signed
cheques
on
behalf
of
the
company.
That
was
done
by
her
husband.
He
also
looked
after
the
company's
banking.
The
plaintiff,
during
the
periods
in
question,
worked
two
to
three
hours
a
day
for
the
company.
She
worked
at
the
Hotel
Quinte
supervising
housekeeping
and
some
dining-room
staff.
She
also
calculated
the
retail
tax
payable
on
the
sales
made
by
the
three
bars
in
the
hotel.
She
did
not
have
as
much
to
do
with
the
Dutch
Mill
Inn
operation,
but
did
do
some
calculations
of
revenue
when
the
auditor
was
absent.
She
did
some
daily
cash
sheets
during
the
years
under
review.
The
plaintiff
was
paid
a
salary
by
the
company.
The
amounts
were
as
follows:
1970
—
$1,000
1971
—
5,200
1972
—
5,200
1973
—
5,300
1974
—
5,200
She
set
out
these
amounts
on
her
income
tax
returns.
No
other
income,
or
sources,
were
declared
In
February
1974,
the
Revenue
Department
was
carrying
out
an
audit
of
the
company.
As
a
result
of
that
audit,
it
was
felt
there
had
been
suppression
of
income
by
the
company.
Further
investigations
were
made.
Criminal
charges
were
laid
against
the
company,
Kenneth
Murphy
and
the
plaintiff.
They
were
dismissed.
The
Minister,
in
1975,
issued
the
assessments
earlier
referred
to.
Assessments
were
also
made
against
the
company
and
Kenneth
Murphy.
The
assessments
against
the
company
asserted
suppressed
income
of
$112,998.30
over
the
five
years.
The
assessments
against
the
plaintiff
amounted
to
50
per
cent
of
that
figure.
A
similar
assessment
of
50
per
cent
was
issued
against
Kenneth
Murphy.
In
each
year,
the
amounts
are
described
as
“unreported
income
.
.
."
of
the
hotel
Quinte
or
the
Dutch
Mill
Inn,
or
both
“.
.
.
appropriated
from
Murphy
Hotel
Enterprises
Ltd".
For
the
year
1971
there
was,
in
addition,
an
amount
of
$840.31
described
as
Unreported
appropriation
re
work
done
at
180
William
Street,
Belleville
and
paid
by
Murphy
Hotel
Enterprises
Ltd
(50%
of
$1,680.62).
One
hundred
and
eighty
William
Street
was
the
family
home.
It
was
in
the
name
of
the
plaintiff
and
her
then
husband.
All
three
taxpayers,
the
company,
the
plaintiff
and
Kenneth
Murphy,
appealed
the
assessments
to
the
Tax
Review
Board.
The
appeals
were
heard
at
the
same
time
in
1980.
The
assessments
were,
in
each
case,
upheld.
All
three
taxpayers
then
appealed
to
this
court.
The
only
appeal
now
remaining
before
the
Court
is
the
present
one
by
the
plaintiff.
The
appeals
of
the
company
and
of
Kenneth
Murphy
were
dismissed
for
want
of
prosecution.
The
plaintiff
neither
attended,
nor
gave
evidence,
at
the
Tax
Review
Board
hearing.
Kenneth
Murphy
did.
At
the
hearing
of
this
appeal,
the
plaintiff
was
the
only
witness
on
her
behalf.
She
testified,
in
chief,
as
to
what
services
she
performed
for
the
company.
I
have
already
briefly
outlined
that
evidence.
She
said
she
never
handled,
in
the
course
of
her
duties,
any
cash.
Nor
did
she
at
any
time
have
possession
of
cash.
There
was
a
safety
deposit
box
in
the
name
of
her
husband
and
herself.
She
testified
she
never
entered
the
safety
deposit
box.
She
was
corroborated
in
this
by
evidence
from
one
of
the
defendant's
witnesses.
It
was
admitted,
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiff
and
for
the
purposes
of
this
action
only,
that
the
company
suppressed,
or
failed
to
include
in
its
tax
returns,
income
of
$112,998.30.
She
said
she
never
took
or
received
anything
from
the
company,
cash
or
otherwise,
other
than
her
reported
earnings;
nor
did
the
company
give
her
anything
other
than
those
earnings.
She
further
testified
she
received
no
benefit
or
advantage,
cash
or
otherwise,
from
the
company
through
Kenneth
Murphy.
The
plaintiff
was
not,
in
my
opinion,
shaken
in
cross-examination.
I
found
her
to
be
an
honest
and
credible
witness.
As
one
illustration,
I
refer
to
her
candid
and
forthright
explanation
as
to
why
she
did
not
attend
the
Tax
Review
Board
hearing.
She
was
careful
in
her
answers,
both
in
chief
and
in
cross-examination.
That
was
understandable.
These
matters
occurred
as
long
as
15
years
ago.
The
issues
raised
amounted,
in
effect,
to
fraud
on
her
part.
I
found
no
reason
to
disbelieve
her
statements.
I
accept
her
evidence.
In
cross-examination,
a
number
of
documents
prepared
by
the
plaintiff
were
put
to
her,
as
well
as
other
documents
where
her
handwriting
appeared.
For
the
defendant,
it
was
submitted
this
evidence,
and
other
circumstantial
evidence,
must
militate
against
the
plaintiff
and
her
credibility;
that
she
had
not
met
the
“onus”
of
showing
the
assessments
and
the
assumptions
on
which
it
was
made
were
wrong.
I
have
found
the
plaintiff
to
be
a
credible
witness.
The
documents
I
have
referred
to
did
not,
to
my
mind,
indicate
she
should
be
disbelieved,
or
that
her
evidence
she
neither
received
nor
took
cash,
or
anything,
from
the
company,
should
not
be
accepted.
The
basis
of
the
assessment
according
to
Mr
Carson,
who
was
responsible
for
it,
was:
the
company
had
suppressed
income
of
over
$112,000;
Kenneth
Murphy
and
the
plaintiff
had
control
of
the
company,
because
between
them
they
owned
approximately
all
the
shares;
the
company
income
appropriated
was,
in
the
view
of
the
Revenue
Department,
in
cash
(as
distinguished
from
cheques);
it
ended
up
in
the
hands
of
the
Murphys;
because
of
their
equal
share
holdings,
5!
per
cent
of
the
appropriations
were
apportioned
to
each.
It
may
well
be
that
income
of
the
company
may
have
been
appropriated
to
Kenneth
Murphy.
That
was
not
an
issue
before
me.
I
find
the
plaintiff
has
met
the
“onus”,
stated
by
her
counsel,
to
demolish
the
Minister’s
assumptions
and
the
correctness
of
the
assessments.
The
assessments
for
the
years
1970,
1972,
1973
and
1974
are
vacated.
I
turn
now
to
the
assessment
for
the
year
1971.
In
that
year
some
work,
amounting
to
$1,680.62,
was
done
on
the
family
residence.
A
company
cheque
was
paid
to
the
contractor
who
did
the
work.
This
amount
later
found
its
way
into
the
asset
side
of
the
company’s
books.
Again,
I
accept
the
plaintiff’s
testimony
on
this
matter.
She
recalls
the
contractor
being
at
the
house
and
doing
work.
She
did
not
order
the
work
to
be
done.
Nor
did
she
personally
pay
anything
to
him.
She
did
not
even
know
if
he
was
paid,
or
by
whom.
Apparently,
according
to
Mr
Carson,
a
company
cheque
was
signed
by
Kenneth
Murphy.
Technically,
the
charging
of
half
the
amount
to
the
plaintiff
is,
in
my
opinion,
correct.
The
property
was
jointly
owned.
That
part
of
the
assessment
will
remain.
The
appropriation
of
$15,150.73
into
income
will
be
deleted.
The
penalty
of
$1,450.35
will
also
be
vacated.
There
was,
in
my
view,
no
gross
negligence
on
the
part
of
the
plaintiff
in
not
including
that
amount
in
her
1971
return.
She
had
no
knowledge
of
the
matter,
nor
any
means
of
knowledge.
The
plaintiff
has
substantially
succeeded.
She
is
entitled
to
the
costs
of
this
action.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.