Urie,
J.A.
(Heald
and
Hugessen,
JJ.A.
concurring):
—The
respondent
in
this
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
was
successful
both
in
that
Court
and
in
the
Tax
Review
Board("the
Board”)
on
his
appeal
from
an
assessment
for
income
tax
made
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("the
Minister”)
in
respect
of
his
1980
tax
year.
Both
the
learned
trial
judge
and
the
presiding
member
of
the
Board
found
that
the
respondent's
subscription
costs
for
certain
investment
publications
were
(a)
outlays
or
expenses
which
formed
part
of
the
adjusted
cost
base
of
his
investment
portfolio
or
(b)
were
outlays
or
expenses
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
disposing
of
component
parts
of
that
portfolio
both
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
40(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
"Act"):
(1)
Except
as
otherwise
expressly
provided
in
this
Part
(a)
a
taxpayer's
gain
for
a
taxation
year
from
the
disposition
of
any
property
is
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
(i)
if
the
property
was
disposed
of
in
the
year,
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
his
proceeds
of
disposition
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
the
adjusted
cost
base
to
him
of
the
property
immediately
before
the
disposition
and
any
outlays
and
expenses
to
the
extent
that
they
were
made
or
incurred
by
him
for
the
purpose
of
making
the
disposition,
or
(ii)
if
the
property
was
disposed
of
before
the
year,
the
amount,
if
any,
claimed
by
him
under
subparagraph
(iii)
in
computing
his
gain
for
the
immediately
preceding
year
from
the
disposition
of
the
property,
exceeds
(iii)
such
amount
as
he
may
claim,
not
exceeding
a
reasonable
amount
as
a
reserve
in
respect
of
such
of
the
proceeds
of
disposition
of
the
property
that
are
not
due
to
him
until
after
the
end
of
the
year
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
a
portion
of
the
amount
determined
under
subparagraph
(i)
in
respect
of
the
property;
and
(b)
a
taxpayer's
loss
for
a
taxation
year
from
the
disposition
of
any
property
is,
(i)
if
the
property
was
disposed
of
in
the
year,
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
aggregate
of
the
adjusted
cost
base
to
him
of
the
property
immediately
before
the
disposition
and
any
outlays
and
expenses
to
the
extent
that
they
were
made
or
incurred
by
him
for
the
purpose
of
making
the
disposition,
exceeds
his
proceeds
of
disposition
of
the
property,
and
(ii)
in
any
other
case,
nil.
As
a
result
of
the
decision
of
this
Court
in
The
Queen
v.
Geoffrey
Stirling,
[1985]
1
F.C.
342;
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
275,
which
was
rendered
after
the
judgment
here
under
appeal,
the
respondent
did
not
seek
to
support
the
judgment
on
the
basis
above
referred
to.
However,
the
respondent
took
the
position
that
there
remains
the
issue,
argued
below,
as
to
whether
the
outlays
for
the
subscriptions
for
the
publications
in
issue
are
deductible
as
current
expenses
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
income
from
a
business
or
property
in
accordance
with
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act
or
are
capital
outlays
the
deduction
of
which
is
prohibited
by
paragraph
18(1)(b)
of
the
Act.
Paragraphs
18(1)(a)
and
(b)
read
as
follows:
18(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
General
limitations.—an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property;
(b)
Capital
outlay
or
loss.—
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part.
That
issue
so
stated
puts
the
appellant
in
the
curious
position
of
now
seeking
to
uphold
the
judgment
from
which
she
is
appealing
because
of
the
Court's
favourable
ruling
on
the
non-deductibility
of
the
expenses
in
issue
under
paragraph
18(1)(a).
The
respondent,
who
was
initially
successful
now
has
to
contend
that
the
judgment
was
erroneous.
The
relevant
facts,
briefly
stated
are
these.
The
respondent,
a
retiree,
in
his
1980
tax
return
declared
as
income
from
investments
—dividends,
interest
and
taxable
capital
gains.
In
his
return
he
claimed
a
deduction
of
$477.50
from
income
for
subscription
expenses
in
the
acquisition
of
five
investment
publications
which
he
said
that
he
used
as
guides
in
deciding
whether
or
not
to
buy
or
sell
stocks
on
the
basis
of
their
expected
yields.
He
denied
that
he
was
a
trader
or
dealer
in
investments
and,
he
said,
that
he
did
not
acquire
the
publications
in
issue
to
add
to
his
level
of
knowledge
and
expertise
in
investing.
As
earlier
noted,
the
Minister
disallowed
the
subscription
expenses
on
the
basis
that
they
were
not
made
or
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act.
Rather,
they
were
outlays
or
payments
on
account
of
capital,
and
their
deduction
was
prohibited
by
paragraph
18(1)(b)
of
the
Act.
Both
the
Tax
Review
Board
and
Collier,
J.
in
the
Trial
Division
agreed
with
the
Minister
on
this
aspect
of
the
appeal
from
the
assessment
although
the
latter
found
that
they
were
capital
outlays
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
40(1).
It
is
common
ground,
of
course,
that
that
finding
was
wrong
for
the
reason
earlier
noted.
Because
it
was
the
respondent's
contention
that
he
was
not
in
the
business
of
investments
but
was,
rather,
the
recipient
of
income
from
property,
he
had
to
satisfy
the
Court
that
his
outlays
for
the
purchase
of
subscriptions
to
the
five
publications
were
made
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
that
property
and
were
not
incurred
in
the
acquisition
of
capital
assets.
It
is
true,
as
counsel
for
the
respondent
pointed
out,
that
most
of
the
cases
enunciating
the
tests
to
be
applied
in
the
determination
of
whether
an
expense
is
on
income
or
capital
account
relate
to
those
expenses
incurred
in
a
business.
However,
the
general
principles
applicable
when
such
expense
relates
to
income
from
a
property
are
the
same.
There
are
numerous
phrases
and
guidelines
used
in
the
determination
of
whether
an
expense
is
capital
or
income
in
nature.
The
key
ingredient
in
the
determination,
derived
from
all
the
cases
is,
as
was
said
by
Lord
Pearce
in
the
B.P.Australia
case,
”
.
.
a
commonsense
appreciation
of
all
the
guiding
features
.
.
."
enunciated
in
those
cases.
They
have
been
referred
to
in
several
recent
decisions
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
and
of
this
Court
so
that
no
useful
purpose
would
be
served
in
repeating
them
here.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
a
review
of
the
evidence
makes
it
crystal
clear,
in
my
view,
that
what
the
respondent
was
doing
here
was
assembling
a
portfolio
of
equity
shares,
common
and
preferred,
of
a
variety
of
corporations,
some
for
capital
appreciation
and
some
for
their
dividend
yields
but
all
with
a
view
to
expanding
the
capital
base
by
reinvesting
the
earnings
however
derived.
Martland,
J.
in
Irrigation
Industries
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1962]
S.C.R.
346
at
352
had
this
to
say
about
such
investments:
Corporate
shares
are
in
a
different
position
[from
property
purchased
or
sold
in
the
course
of
trade]
because
they
constitute
something
the
purchase
of
which
is,
in
itself,
an
investment.
They
are
not,
in
themselves,
articles
of
commerce,
but
represent
an
interest
in
a
corporation
which
is
itself
created
for
the
purpose
of
doing
business.
Their
acquisition
is
a
well-recognized
method
of
investing
capital
in
a
business
enterprise.
That
quotation
is
very
apposite
in
the
appreciation
of
what
the
respondent
was
doing
when
he
purchased
the
publications,
the
costs
for
which
he
seeks
to
have
deducted
as
expenses
incurred
in
the
earning
of
money
from
property.
It
is
my
view
that
the
evidence
of
the
respondent
himself
overwhelmingly
demonstrates
that
he
was
assembling
a
portfolio
of
investments
in
shares
of
corporations
which
are
capital
assets.
As
an
incidence
of
ownership
of
such
a
portfolio
some
may
yield
dividends,
and
others
may
not,
depending
on
their
nature.
Some
were
purchased
for
their
capacity
to
produce
such
earnings.
Others
were
bought
for
their
potential
capital
appreciation.
Still
others
were
for
a
combination
of
each.
According
to
the
evidence,
the
publications
provided
information
on
the
ranges
of
stock
prices
for
given
periods,
their
yields
and
other
pertinent
information
relating
to
the
corporation's
financial
position.
But
most
importantly,
the
information
was
used
by
the
respondent
for
deciding
on
the
purchase
or
sale
of
investments,
managing
such
investments
and
generally
in
the
administration
of
an
expanding
portfolio
of
capital
assets.
That
being
so
the
expenses
were
clearly
not
made
for
the
purpose
of
earning
or
producing
income
from
property.
They
were,
thus,
not
deductible
pursuant
to
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act
and
being
capital
in
nature
were,
in
fact,
prohibited
from
deduction
by
paragraph
18(1)(b).
Contrary
to
what
was
argued
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
the
accounting
treatment
accorded
such
expenses
for
the
purpose
of
providing
financial
information
to
the
owner
is
irrelevant
in
the
context
of
their
treatment
for
tax
purposes.
Accordingly,
I
would
allow
the
appeal
and
direct
the
restoration
of
the
assessment
by
the
Minister.
The
respondent,
it
was
agreed,
would
be
entitled
to
his
costs
throughout
by
virtue
of
section
178(2)
of
the
Act,
irrespective
of
the
outcome
of
the
appeal
and
it
will
be
so
ordered.
Appeal
allowed.