P.R.
Dussault
J.T.C.C.:
—
This
is
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
denying
the
appellant
a
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”)
for
his
1989
taxation
year.
The
deduction
claimed
by
the
appellant
was
for
the
amount
of
rent
paid
for
a
living
accommodation
during
the
year
when
he
was
employed
by
the
Christian
Service
Brigade
of
Canada
(“CSB”).
Paragraph
8(1)(c)
of
the
Act
provides
such
a
deduction
in
the
following
terms:
(c)
where
the
taxpayer
is
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
of
a
religious
order
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination,
and
is
in
charge
of,
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation,
or
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order
or
religious
denomination,
an
amount
equal
to
(i)
the
value
of
the
residence
or
other
living
accommodation
occupied
by
him
in
the
course
of
or
by
virtue
of
his
office
or
employment
as
such
member
or
minister
so
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation,
or
so
engaged
in
such
administrative
service,
to
the
extent
that
such
value
is
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year
by
virtue
of
section
6,
or
(ii)
rent
paid
by
him
for
a
residence
or
other
living
accommodation
rented
and
occupied
by
him,
or
the
fair
rental
value
of
a
residence
or
other
living
accommodation
owned
and
occupied
by
him,
during
the
year
but
not,
in
either
case,
exceeding
his
remuneration
from
his
office
or
employment
as
described
in
subparagraph
(i).
Counsel
for
the
parties
admitted
that
the
only
points
at
issue
consisted
in
determining
whether
the
appellant
was,
at
the
relevant
time,
a
“member
of
a
religious
order”
and
whether
he
was
“in
charge
of
a
congregation”.
These
two
conditions
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c),
the
one
relating
to
status,
the
other
to
duties,
are
cumulative
and
the
only
ones
likely
to
be
met
in
this
case.
The
appellant
claimed
that
these
two
conditions
were
met,
while
the
respondent
contended
that
they
were
not.
Preliminary
Question
Prior
to
the
hearing,
I
informed
counsel
for
the
parties
that,
in
my
view,
the
testimony
of
experts
did
not
seem
to
be
appropriate
for
the
purposes
of
interpreting
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
At
the
hearing,
counsel
for
the
appellant
insisted
on
qualifying
and
having
testify
Dr.
Robert
S.
Wilson
as
an
expert
on
the
ground
that
the
Trial
Division
of
the
Federal
Court
had
accepted
expert
testimony
in
a
case
in
order
to
help
interpret
a
certain
number
of
terms
used
in
that
same
provision.
That
case
was
Zylstra
Estate
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
J
Counsel
for
the
respondent,
who
had
initially
required
the
services
of
an
expert,
Daniel
Pourchot,
amended
her
position
at
the
hearing.
She
first
contended
that
the
Court
should
not
receive
the
testimony
of
the
expert
proposed
by
the
appellant
since
the
report
submitted
was
not
consistent
with
the
provisions
of
section
145
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Rules
(General
Procedure)
(the
“Rules”),
particularly
in
that
it
was
not
“accompanied
by
a
certificate
of
counsel
that
counsel
is
satisfied
that
it
represents
evidence
that
the
proposed
witness
is
prepared
to
give
in
the
matter”,
as
required
by
paragraph
145(
1
)(b)
of
the
Rules.
Then
referring
to
the
judgment
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
R.
v.
Mohan,
[1994]
2
S.C.R.
9,
114
D.L.R.
(4th)
419.
counsel
for
the
respondent
contended
that
the
nature
of
the
case
did
not
really
present
elements
making
it
possible
to
conclude
that
expert
testimony
was
relevant
and
necessary,
two
criteria
adopted
by
Sopinka
J.
in
that
case
in
order
to
rule
on
the
admission
of
such
evidence.
Counsel
claimed
that
the
instant
case
presents
no
technical
or
scientific
characteristic
and
that
it
is
not
the
role
of
an
expert,
but
rather
that
of
a
judge,
to
interpret
the
Act.
In
any
case,
she
contended
that
the
Act
must
be
construed
by
giving
the
terms
used
their
common
meaning
and
she
relied
on
this
point
on
the
remarks
by
Pigeon
J.
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Pfizer
Co.
v.
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(Customs
&
Excise),
[1977]
1
S.C.R.
456,
68
D.L.R.
(3d)
9.
With
respect
to
the
non-compliance
with
the
provisions
of
section
145
of
the
Rules,
counsel
for
the
appellant
was
able
to
provide
only
the
explanation
that,
in
his
view,
it
was
urgent
that
a
second
expert
be
found,
considering
the
refusal
or
withdrawal
of
a
first
with
whom
he
said
he
had
communicated.
He
also
invoked
section
9
of
the
Rules
enabling
the
Court
to
dispense
with
compliance
with
any
rule
in
the
interests
of
justice.
As
to
the
argument
of
counsel
for
the
respondent
on
the
relevance
and
necessity
of
expert
evidence,
counsel
for
the
appellant
emphasized
that
the
Protestant
churches
have
evolved
differently
from
the
Catholic
Church
and
that
the
opinion
of
experts
on
Church
history
is
essential
in
establishing
the
differences
for
the
purpose
of
interpreting
the
expression
“religious
order”.
I
will
add
that
counsel
for
the
appellant
wanted
to
file
at
the
hearing
an
additional
report
prepared
by
his
expert,
Dr.
Wilson.
I
did
not
allow
the
late
filing
of
this
report
since
the
requirements
respecting
the
filing
and
communication
of
that
report
as
stated
at
paragraph
145(2)(b)
of
the
Rules
were
clearly
ignored.
However,
I
allowed
the
expert
of
each
of
the
parties
to
be
qualified
and
testify,
while
reserving
my
decision
as
to
the
admissibility
of
that
testimony
in
light
of
the
arguments
submitted.
I
decided
to
reject
Dr.
Wilson’s
testimony
because
not
only
was
his
report
submitted
before
the
hearing
not
made
in
an
affidavit,
not
signed
and
not
accompanied
by
the
certificate
of
counsel
required
by
paragraph
145(l)(b)
of
the
Rules,
but
also,
and
this
element
is
more
important,
because
it
did
not
constitute
under
paragraph
145(2)(b)
of
the
Rules
“a
full
statement
of
the
proposed
evidence
in
chief”
that
the
expert
intended
to
establish.
It
seems
obvious
to
me
that
Dr.
Wilson’s
testimony
at
the
hearing
went
beyond
what
was
contained
in
his
report.
Compliance
by
a
party
with
the
provisions
of
section
145
of
the
Rules
is
fundamental
in
order
to
avoid
the
effect
of
surprise
and
to
enable
the
other
party
to
prepare
adequately
for
the
cross-examination
of
the
expert
whose
report
is
adduced.
In
the
absence
of
serious
explanations
of
the
reasons
that
led
to
the
non-compliance
with
that
rule,
I
do
not
believe
that
dispensing
with
compliance
therewith
is
in
the
interests
of
justice.
As
to
the
arguments
submitted
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
I
believe
the
Court
must
accept
in
particular
the
argument
that
it
is
the
responsability
of
the
judge,
not
of
an
expert,
to
interpret
the
Act
and
to
give
the
words
that
are
used
therein
their
rightful
meaning.
For
their
part,
the
authors
Sopinka,
Lederman
and
Bryant
state
the
following
in
their
work,
The
Law
of
Evidence
in
Canada
(Toronto
and
Vancouver:
Butterworths
Canada
Ltd.,
1992),
pages
535
and
536
(the
footnotes
are
omitted):
Sometimes
it
is
debatable
whether
the
expert
testimony
would
be
of
value
or
not.
Rejection
of
expert
evidence
about
whether
a
common
English
word
used
in
the
ordinary
way
was
generic
and
what
that
word
meant
may
be
easily
justified
as
not
coming
within
a
subject
requiring
any
special
study
or
experience.
The
courts,
however,
have
allowed
expert
testimony
about
uncommon
words
or
common
words
used
in
an
unusual
manner
as,
for
example,
drug
slang.
[Emphasis
added.]
In
that
same
work,
the
authors,
referring
to
Century
21
Ramos,
supra,
state
at
page
545:
Questions
of
domestic
law
as
opposed
to
foreign
law
are
not
matters
upon
which
a
court
will
receive
opinion
evidence.
Furthermore,
in
Phipson
on
Evidence
(London:
Sweet
and
Maxwell,
1990,
14th
Edition),
the
following
comment
appears
at
paragraph
32-51,
at
page
841
(the
footnotes
are
omitted):
Questions
of
construction,
whether
of
domestic
or
foreign
documents,
being
matters
of
law
and
not
of
fact,
belong
exclusively
to
the
court,
and
the
opinions
of
experts
thereon
are
inadmissible,
e.g.
the
construction
of,
or
meaning
of
particular
terms
in
a
modern
statute;
the
construction
of
a
company
prospectus,
patent
specification,
covenant
in
restraint
of
trade,
or
statutory
plan.
Although
this
is
the
general
rule
where
ordinary
English
words
are
concerned,
expert
testimony
is
of
necessity
admitted
where
the
words
have
a
special
or
technical
meaning.
(The
emphasis
is
mine.)}}
The
expressions
“religious
order”
and
“congregation”
used
by
Parliament
in
the
Act
do
not,
in
my
view,
have
any
special
or
technical
meaning.
For
this
reason,
to
the
extent
that
this
is
above
all
a
question
of
interpretation,
and
thus
of
law,
I
have
decided
to
reject
the
reports
as
well
as
the
testimony
of
the
two
experts.
To
the
extent
that
questions
of
fact
affecting
CSB
were
addressed
in
those
reports,
I
will
add
that
the
necessity
and
relevance
of
the
expert
testimony
was
not
demonstrated
and
that
it
is
sufficient
that
I
rely
on
the
appellant’s
testimony
and
on
the
documents
that
he
filed
respecting
CSB.
Thus,
to
the
extent
that
the
heart
of
the
matter
truly
lies
in
the
meaning
to
be
given
to
the
expression
“member
of
a
religious
order”,
I
find
that
the
Court
must
adhere
to
the
fundamental
rule
stated
by
the
author
Driedger
and
accepted
on
numerous
occasions
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
in
particular
in
the
recent
Québec
(Communauté
urbaine)
v.
Corp.
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours,
[1994]
3
S.C.R.
3
(sub
nom.
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours
(Corp.)
v.
Québec
(Communauté
urbaine)),
[1995]
1
C.T.C.
241,
(sub
nom.
Corp.
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours
v.
Québec
(Communauté
urbaine)),
95
D.T.C.
5017.
According
to
the
translation
that
is
given
in
that
judgment,
this
rule
states:
the
words
of
an
Act
are
to
be
read
in
their
entire
context
and
in
their
grammatical
and
ordinary
sense
harmoniously
with
the
scheme
of
the
Act,
the
object
of
the
Act,
and
the
intention
of
Parliament.
(Corporation
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours,
supra,
page
5096.)
Summary
of
the
Facts
During
1989,
the
appellant
was
regional
director
of
CSB
for
Quebec
and
eastern
Ontario.
After
completing
three
years
of
study
and
obtaining
a
certificate
in
theology,
the
appellant
joined
CSB
in
1985
in
order
to
make
the
organization
known
to,
and
make
its
presence
felt
by,
mainly
the
various
Francophone
Protestant
churches
in
Quebec.
The
appellant
himself
described
CSB
as
an
inter-denominational
missionary
organization
working
with
young
boys
whose
activities,
such
as
excursions,
camping,
hockey
tournaments,
etc.,
which
resemble
those
of
the
scouting
movement,
place
greater
emphasis
on
the
spirituality
aspect.
Thus,
even
though
an
activity
has
an
intrinsic
value,
the
appellant
explained
that
the
emphasis
there
was
placed
on
its
relationship
to
the
word
of
God,
in
particular
through
references
to
Scripture
or
biblical
history.
The
appellant,
who
started
up
CSB’s
activities
in
Quebec
himself,
stated
that,
in
1989,
the
organization
included
12
groups
of
young
boys
established
in
three
age
groups
under
the
terms
of
agreements
with
nine
parish
or
congregational
churches
of
various
Protestant
denominations,
the
majority
Francophone,
including
the
Baptist,
Evangelical,
Pentecostal
and
other
churches.
Article
III
of
CSB’s
by-laws
states
moreover
that
the
organization’s
objects
are
as
follows:
To
carry
on
as
a
Missionary
Organization
for
the
non-sectarian
Christian
education
of
youth
for
the
purpose
of
leading
all
those
to
whom
it
reaches
into
a
definite
acceptance
of
Jesus
Christ
both
as
Saviour
and
Lord
in
every
phase
of
their
lives
and
to
provide
training
for
Christian
Service.
Another
document
describes
the
organization’s
goals
(Declaration
of
Purpose)
proposes
a
profession
of
faith
(Statement
of
Faith)
to
which
the
members
must
adhere
and
establishes
rules
of
conduct
(Leadership
Standards)
with
which
the
adult
participants
in
the
organization,
including
obviously
the
appellant
himself,
must
comply.
That
document
reads
as
follows:
DECLARATION
OF
PURPOSE
The
mission
of
Christian
Service
Brigade
is
to
help
churches
disciple
boys
for
Jesus
Christ
through
Christian
men.
CSB
affirms
the
local
church
to
be
God’s
basic
instrument
for
evangelism,
instruction
and
fellowship
and
is
committed
to
serve
all
churches
in
the
U.S.A.
and
Canada
to
whom
the
CSB
Standard
of
Faith
is
acceptable.
CSB
views
the
Christian
man
as
the
essential
means
of
its
ministry.
Its
mission,
therefore,
involves
motivating
and
preparing
men
to
disciple
boys;
providing
men
with
programs
and
skills
for
ministering
to
boys;
and
offering
men
counsel,
assistance
and
encouragement
to
be
effective
in
their
leadership
roles.
CSB
focuses
on
boys
as
the
natural
means
of
mobilizing
manpower
for
Christ.
Thus
its
mission
includes
helping
boys
experience
personal
salvation
in
Christ;
directing
boys
to
the
Bible
as
their
guide
for
life;
providing
example,
instruction
and
opportunity
for
growth
into
Christian
manhood;
and
challenging
boys
to
be
good
witnesses
for
Christ
in
the
World.
STATEMENT
OF
FAITH
1.
We
believe
in
the
Scriptures
of
the
Old
and
New
Testament
as
verbally
inspired
by
God
and
inerrant
in
the
original
writing,
and
that
they
are
of
supreme
and
final
authority
in
faith
and
life.
2.
We
believe
in
one
God,
eternally
existing
in
three
persons:
Father,
Son
and
Holy
Spirit.
3.
We
believe
that
Jesus
Christ
was
begotten
by
the
Holy
Spirit,
born
of
the
Virgin
Mary,
and
is
true
God
and
true
man.
4.
We
believe
that
man
was
created
in
the
image
of
God;
that
he
sinned
and
thereby
incurred
not
only
physical
death,
but
also
that
spiritual
death
which
is
separation
from
God;
and
that
all
human
beings
are
born
with
a
sinful
nature,
and,
are
sinners.
5.
We
believe
that
the
Lord
Jesus
Christ
died
for
our
sins,
according
to
the
Scriptures,
as
a
representative
and
substitutionary
sacrifice’,
and
that
all
who
believe
in
Him
are
justified
on
the
ground
of
His
shed
blood.
6.
We
believe
in
the
resurrection
of
the
crucified
body
of
our
Lord,
in
His
ascension
into
Heaven,
and
in
His
present
life
there
for
us,
as
High
Priest
and
Advocate.
7.
We
believe
in
the
personal
and
imminent
return
of
our
Lord
and
Saviour,
Jesus
Christ.
8.
We
believe
that
all
who
receive
by
faith
the
Lord
Jesus
Christ
are
born
again
of
the
Holy
Spirit,
and
thereby
become
children
of
God.
9.
We
believe
in
the
bodily
resurrection
of
the
just
and
the
unjust,
the
everlasting
blessedness
of
the
saved,
and
the
everlasting
punishment
of
the
lost.
LEADERSHIP
STANDARDS
Maintaining
a
Christian
testimony
in
personal
conduct
is
essential
for
leaders.
The
following
paragraphs
clarify
the
position
of
Christian
Service
Brigade
in
this
important
matter.
The
leader’s
life
should
be
positive.
A
hesitant,
uncertain
Christian
testimony
will
greatly
weaken
the
effectiveness
of
the
Gospel
appeal
to
boys.
The
Christian
leader
should
be
certain
of
his
own
relation
to
Christ
and
happy
in
it.
The
leader’s
life
should
be
without
question.
A
Christian
leader
cannot
be
too
careful.
His
personal
habits
must
be
such
that
the
boys
who
listen
to
him
at
the
Brigade
meeting
on
Thursday
can
observe
him
on
Friday
without
losing
respect
for
his
testimony.
There
is
no
question
about
the
teaching
of
the
Scriptures
concerning
standards
for
honesty,
self-control,
humility,
and
cleanness
of
speech
and
thought.
However,
there
are
certain
practical
problems
of
conduct
which
sometimes
cause
confusion
and
disagreement
among
Christians.
Such
matters
cannot
be
settled
by
superimposing
commandments
that
go
beyond
the
Scriptures,
but
they
must
determined
by
the
individual's
own
communion
with
the
Lord
based
on
the
Word
of
God
and
the
witness
of
the
Holy
Spirit.
When
a
Christian
faces
squarely
the
matter
of
his
daily
personal
conduct,
he
has
an
obligation
to
obey
those
standards
which
he
believes
God
has
given
him.
All
who
are
sincerely
determined
to
live
according
to
God’s
standards
will
find
positive
guidance
from
Romans
12
&
13.
The
Christian
leader
has
the
additional
responsibility
of
maintaining
those
habits
of
conduct
which
young
fellows
can
safely
follow.
Boys
can
hardly
be
expected
to
achieve
a
higher
standard
of
Christian
conduct
than
their
leaders.
Christian
Service
Brigade
recommends
that
the
local
church
require
its
leader
to
take
a
decisive
stand
on
all
habit
forming
practices
generally
acknowledged
to
be
detrimental
such
as
the
use
of
tobacco,
liquor
and
narcotics.
The
enslaving
tendencies
of
these
habits
are
clear
justification
for
this
stand.
Just
as
a
man
may
separate
and
condition
himself
for
a
particular
responsibility
or
occupation,
so
leadership
in
Christian
boys’
work
calls
for
total
abstinence
in
these
areas.
The
Lord’s
service
requires
clean
vessels,
and
He
has
promised
the
grace
necessary
to
be
such.
The
Saviour
calls
for
men
who
can
stand
before
boys
with
a
positive,
clear-cut
Christian
testimony
and
in
turn
have
the
joy
of
watching
young
men
follow
them
into
a
similar
life.
In
a
brochure
entitled
“Building
Christian
Men”,
it
is
explained,
on
the
one
hand,
how
CSB
conceives
its
relations
with
the
various
churches,
as
follows:
WORKING
TOGETHER
WITH
THE
CHURCH
Few
pastors
will
deny
that
active
Christian
men
are
essential
to
a
healthy,
vibrant
church.
Men
are
to
be
examples
of
Christian
maturity
in
their
homes
and
in
the
church.
Yet
many
churches
do
not
have
enough
involved
men,
and
women
are
called
upon
to
carry
more
than
their
share
of
responsibility.
CSB,
with
its
focus
on
reaching
boys
through
Christian
men,
is
an
excellent
means
by
which
churches
can
develop
man-power
—
to
help
men
be
more
effective
as
fathers,
leaders
of
boys
and
leaders
in
the
church.
Programs
for
boys
provide
a
context
for
men
to
develop
their
own
leadership
while
they
are
reaching
the
next
generation
and
preparing
them
for
Christian
manhood.
The
growth
of
a
church
will
be
enhanced
when
the
importance
of
equipping
men
is
recognized
and
when
programs,
such
as
CSB,
are
seen
as
tools
to
accomplish
this
purpose.
The
role
of
the
CSB
organization
is
to
support
and
assist
the
church
with
resources
and
personal
consultation
so
that
the
church’s
training
of
men
and
outreach
to
boys
will
be
most
effective.
For
this
to
occur,
a
relationship
must
exist
between
the
church
and
CSB.
Such
a
relationship
is
called
a
Working
Agreement
which
outlines
the
responsibilities
of
both
parties.
(In
Canada,
CSB
uses
an
Organizing
Notice,
followed
by
a
charter
to
the
church
when
the
program
is
functioning.)
CSB
commits
itself
to
provide
high
quality
program
literature
and
training
resources
together
with
personal
contact
and
involvement
by
its
field
representatives.
Experienced
in
program
leadership
and
able
to
provide
wise
counsel,
these
men
are
prepared
to
serve
the
local
church
at
all
levels.
They
can
help
the
Brigade
leaders
with
the
mechanics
of
a
program,
such
as
Stockade
or
Tree
Climbers.
They
can
help
Brigade
chairmen
organize
the
church’s
training
program
for
men.
They
can
also
support
the
pastor
in
developing
his
discipline
ministry
among
the
men
of
his
church.
There
is
also
a
financial
responsibility
involved
in
the
Working
Agreement.
As
a
non-profit
missionary
organization,
CSB
provides
its
resources
at
minimal
cost
to
the
church
and
serves
all
churches,
regardless
of
size.
Churches
with
Brigade
programs
are
urged
to
consider
supporting
CSB
and
its
representatives
through
contributions.
Gifts
of
this
kind
are
the
main
source
of
funds
to
support
the
CSB
organization
and
its
representatives.
On
the
other
hand,
the
brochure
provides
some
information
on
the
activities
of
the
various
groups
of
young
boys
within
CSB.
Thus,
among
other
things
,
the
following
is
indicated
concerning
the
“Tree
Climbers
(Grades
1-2
/
ages
6-7)”
group:
The
idea
behind
Tree
Climbers
is
simple.
Men
and
boys
play
a
few
games,
enjoy
a
constructive
project,
focus
on
a
Bible
verse
and
hear
a
story
with
a
Biblical
truth.
The
two
volumes
of
Tree
Climbers
Adventures
include
complete
weekly
meeting
plans
based
upon
nature
themes.
Boys
who
memorize
the
key
verse
each
week
receive
colourful
stickers
to
place
on
their
own
Tree
Climbers
poster.
Fathers
and
sons
can
also
enjoy
the
Adventures
book
at
home.
The
weekly
meeting
of
a
Tree
Climbers
group
is
led
by
a
program
coordinator,
usually
one
of
the
dads.
All
the
men
share
in
the
leadership
of
the
games,
projects
and
stories.
As
to
the
“Stockade
(Grades
3-6
I
ages
8-11)”
group,
the
following
is
mentioned:
Boys
work
through
a
graded
achievement
program
as
presented
in
the
boys’
handbooks.
Achievement
projects
may
include
everything
from
making
a
leaf
print
to
Scripture
memory.
They
will
expose
boys
to
growth
experiences
that
are
related
to
all
the
areas
of
his
life.
It
is
through
this
kind
of
interaction
that
men
can
build
friendships
with
boys
and
influence
them
toward
Christian
manhood.
Finally,
Stockade
boys
become
involved
in
camping,
service
projects
and
special
activities.
Action-packed
meetings
in
the
church,
outdoor
adventures,
and
a
great
magazine,
called
Venture,
add
up
to
a
dynamic
program
that
effectively
molds
the
lives
of
boys.
Lastly,
the
following
is
stated
concerning
the
“Battalion
(Grades
6-12
/
ages
12-18)”
group:
In
a
CSB
Battalion,
Christian
men
build
discipline
relationships
with
teenage
boys
and
train
them
to
be
effective,
dynamic
leaders.
Every
Battalion
unit
is
directed
by
a
leadership
team
made
up
of
Christian
men
and
teenage
leaders.
Each
teen
leader
is
responsible
for
a
small
group
of
boys
in
the
Battalion.
Serving
in
this
capacity,
a
teen
leader
has
a
unique
opportunity
to
disciple
other
boys
in
his
group.
Meeting
weekly,
Battalions
gather
in
churches
for
active
games,
group
achievement,
special
events,
and
Bible
related
discussions
and
talks.
Boys
work
through
a
graded
achievement
system
both
individually
and
as
a
group.
The
achievement
program
provides
an
avenue
for
men
to
build
relationships
with
boys,
based
on
the
Word
of
God.
Scripture
is
integrated
throughout
the
system
and
relates
God’s
truth
to
all
areas
of
the
boys’s
life
and
interests.
Bible
memory
takes
on
new
significance
as
boys
understand
God’s
Word
to
have
meaning
for
them
personally.
Challenging
outdoor
adventures,
camping,
service
projects
and
informal
gatherings
are
also
a
part
of
the
Battalion
program.
These
are
the
dynamics
your
church
can
use
in
the
task
of
making
boys
into
Christian
men.
The
evidence
showed
that
the
appellant’s
work
as
regional
director
of
CSB
thus
consisted
in
making
the
organization
known
by
entering
into
communication
with
various
churches,
organizing
groups
of
young
people,
providing
training
for
the
fathers
or
men
interested
in
taking
part
in
the
activities,
while
also
securing
the
necessary
funding
for
those
activities.
The
appellant
placed
particular
emphasis
on
the
pastoral
aspect
of
his
role
in
CSB’s
activities,
on
which
moreover
he
had
to
report
regularly,
from
the
point
of
view
of
their
conduct
and
funding,
to
a
divisional
director
under
the
authority
of
a
director
general.
The
appellant
left
CSB
in
1992
as
a
result
of
a
decision
made
because
of
difficulties
during
the
recession
in
continuing
to
obtain
the
necessary
funds
to
pay
his
remuneration.
He
has
since
retained
no
title
or
status
whatever
within
the
organization.
Appellant's
Position
Counsel
for
the
appellant
contended
that
the
latter
was
a
“member
of
a
religious
order”
and
that
he
“was
in
charge
of
a
congregation”
within
the
meaning
that
must
be
given
to
those
terms
based
on
the
principles
stated
at
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
(the
“Charter”)
in
that
the
interpretation
must
not
favour
one
religion
or
religious
denomination
in
particular,
that
is
the
Roman
Catholic
religion.
Counsel
therefore
contended
that
the
interpretation
must
be
broad
and
liberal
so
as
to
take
into
account
the
evolution
of
religious
traditions,
in
particular
the
differences
between
Protestant
traditions
and
the
Roman
Catholic
tradition
with
respect
to
the
constitution
of
religious
orders.
Referring
to
common
dictionaries,
counsel
for
the
appellant
contended
that
the
expression
“religious
order”
was
likely
to
be
interpreted
fairly
broadly
and
to
include
an
organization
such
as
CSB
considering
its
vocation
and
the
presence
of
the
religious
aspect
in
its
activities.
As
to
the
expression
“to
be
in
charge
of
a
congregation”,
counsel
for
the
appellant
referred
to
the
decision
in
Attwell
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
67
D.T.C.
611
(T.A.B.),
and
that
in
Adam
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1974]
C.T.C.
2298,
74
D.T.C.
1220
(T.R.B.),
and
contended
that
the
responsibilities
assigned
to
the
appellant
in
respect
of
the
groups
of
young
boys
taking
part
in
CSB’s
activities
were
such
that
it
could
rightly
be
stated
that
he
was
thus
in
charge
of
a
congregation
constituted
of
those
groups.
Respondent's
Position
Counsel
for
the
respondent
referred
first
to
the
decision
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Symes,
supra,
and
contended
that,
since
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
contains
no
ambiguity,
invoking
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Charter
was
not
appropriate
in
the
circumstances.
In
that
decision,
Iacobucci
J.
gave
the
following
warning:
In
both
Hills
and
Slaight
Communications,
this
Court
was
confronted
with
statutory
language
which
was
ambiguous.
In
each
case,
the
values
of
the
Charter
were
consulted
to
resolve
the
ambiguity.
However,
each
case
recognizes
that
to
consult
the
Charter
in
the
absence
of
such
ambiguity
is
to
deprive
the
Charter
of
a
more
powerful
purpose,
namely,
the
determination
of
a
statute’s
constitutional
validity.
If
statutory
meanings
must
be
made
congruent
with
the
Charter
even
in
the
absence
of
ambiguity,
then
it
would
never
be
possible
to
apply,
rather
than
simply
consult,
the
values
of
the
Charter.
Furthermore,
it
would
never
be
possible
for
the
government
to
justify
infringements
as
reasonable
limits
under
section
1
of
the
Charter,
since
the
interpretive
process
would
preclude
one
from
finding
infringements
in
the
first
place.
(Symes,
supra,
page
752
(C.T.C.
67,
D.T.C.
6020)).
Counsel
for
the
respondent
then
argued
that
the
fundamental
rule
of
interpretation
is
that
stated
by
the
author
Dreidger
and
accepted
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
in
particular
in
Stubart,
supra.
As
employment
expenses
are
limited
by
subsection
8(2)
of
the
Act,
paragraph
8(1)(c)
must,
in
her
view,
be
construed
narrowly,
particularly
if
one
examines
the
origin
of
that
provision,
its
historical
context
and
the
fact
that
it
constitutes
an
exception
to
the
principle
that
personal
expenses
are
not
normally
deductible.
Referring
to
parliamentary
debates,
counsel
for
the
respondent
explained
that,
in
1949,
there
was
originally
a
wish
to
restrict
the
deduction
to
persons
such
as
religious
ministers
who
attended
to
religious
activities
on
a
full-time
basis.
In
Guthrie
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1995),
14
Tax.
A.B.C.
90,
55
D.T.C.
605,
the
Tax
Review
Board
decided
that
the
provision
contained
no
such
restriction
with
respect
to
duties
and
that
it
could
apply
to
a
member
of
the
clergy
engaged
as
a
full-time
teacher
of
theology.
In
1956,
a
new
provision
was
passed
in
order
to
add
the
requirement
respecting
duties,
that
is
that
the
individual
concerned
not
only
have
the
appropriate
status,
but
also
that
he
be
in
charge
of
or
minister
to
a
diocese
or
parish
or
congregation
or
be
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
on
appointment
of
a
religious
order
or
religious
denomination.
According
to
counsel
for
the
respondent,
it
was
in
this
context
that
MacKay
J.
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division
precisely
analyzed
the
scope
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act
in
Zylstra
Estate,
supra.
Then
examining
the
definitions
of
“religious
order”
given
in
common
dictionaries,
counsel
for
the
respondent
first
noted
that
CSB
was
an
interdenominational
organization
and
that
the
appellant,
who
is
a
layman,
had
no
particular
status
therein
other
than
that
of
an
employee.
She
then
noted
that
the
normal
characteristics
of
the
concept
of
religious
order
are
that
the
members
live
as
a
community,
that
they
hold
their
property
in
common
and
that
they
commit
themselves
by
solemn
vows
of
poverty,
chastity
and
obedience.
Furthermore,
their
activities
must
be
exclusively
religious.
In
her
view,
CSB
possessed
none
of
these
characteristics.
The
appellant
had
to
adhere
to
the
statement
of
faith
and
accept
the
rules
of
conduct
proposed
by
CSB,
an
inter-denominational
organization
whose
objects
and
purposes
were
not
exclusively
religious,
in
order
to
meet
the
conditions
set
for
obtaining
his
employment.
According
to
counsel
for
the
respondent,
this
statement
of
faith
and
these
rules
accepted
by
participants
in
various
religious
denominations
were
very
general
and
could
not
be
likened
to
solemn
vows
made
by
the
members
of
a
religious
order.
In
support
of
her
arguments,
counsel
for
the
respondent
referred
in
particular
to
the
decision
rendered
by
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
in
Small
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
and
that
of
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division,
in
Wipf
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(sub
nom.
Tschetter
v.
R.),
[1973]
C.T.C.
761,
73
D.T.C.
5558,
reversed
[1975]
C.T.C.
79,
75
D.T.C.
5034,
affirmed
[1976]
C.T.C.
57,
76
D.T.C.
6059.
Furthermore,
in
her
view,
the
decisions
in
Adam,
supra,
and
Attwell,
supra,
to
which
counsel
for
the
appellant
had
referred,
were
not
applicable
in
this
case
since
the
appellants
in
both
cases
were
ordained
ministers
or
carried
on
religious
duties
in
respect
of
their
congregations.
As
to
the
question
whether
the
appellant
had
been
in
charge
of
a
congregation,
counsel
for
the
respondent
stated
that
the
expression
“congregation”
must
be
read
in
conjunction
with
those
of
“diocese”
and
“parish”
and
that
those
expressions
designated
an
assembly
established
either
on
a
geographical
basis
or
on
a
more
general
basis
in
the
sense
of
an
assembly
of
faithful
holding
the
same
belief.
In
this
sense,
she
said,
the
young
people
of
various
beliefs
or
denominations
could
not
constitute
a
congregation
within
the
meaning
that
must
be
given
to
that
expression.
If
I
properly
understood
the
argument
of
counsel
for
the
respondent,
she
contended
that
the
appellant
essentially
had
the
role
of
organizing
activities
for
various
groups
of
young
people.
As
such,
he
had
not
been
in
charge
of
an
assembly
or
group
of
faithful
for
religious
activities
as
part
of
a
belief
or
particular
denomination.
The
decisions
in
Zylstra
Estate,
supra,
Persaud
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Persaud
v.
Canada),
[1994]
1
C.T.C.
2832,
and
Bloom
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1964),
34
Tax
A.B.C.
206,
64
D.T.C.
39,
were
cited
on
this
point.
Analysis
I
have
already
addressed
the
application
of
the
fundamental
rule
of
interpretation
formulated
by
Dreidger,
supra,
and
accepted
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
a
number
of
decisions
including
that
in
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours,
supra.
It
is
my
view
that
the
teleological
approach
recommended
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
leads
in
the
instant
case
(upon
examination
of
the
parliamentary
debates,
of
the
historical
context
in
which
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
was
initially
passed
then
amended
and,
lastly,
of
its
exceptional
nature
relative
to
the
general
rule)
to
the
conclusion
that
it
must
be
interpreted
narrowly
rather
than
liberally.
This
was
the
approach
recommended
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
and
that
moreover
adopted
by
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
in
Zylstra
Estate,
supra.
I
also
agree
with
counsel
for
the
respondent’s
position
that
invoking
the
values
of
the
Charter
is
not
appropriate
in
circumstances
in
which,
in
accordance
with
the
test
stated
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
the
decisions
to
which
she
referred,
the
provision
to
be
construed
presents
no
ambiguity.
Furthermore,
in
my
view,
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act,
as
drafted,
neither
favours
nor
disfavours
any
religion
or
denomination
in
particular
through
the
use
of
the
expression
“member
of
a
religious
order”.
On
the
one
hand,
it
must
be
clearly
seen
that
this
is
not
the
only
standard
used
respecting
status.
The
expressions
“member
of
the
clergy”
and
“regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination”
are
also
present.
On
the
other
hand,
while
it
may
be
observed
that
it
is
in
the
Roman
Catholic
tradition
that
religious
orders
are
most
numerous,
it
is
nevertheless
common
knowledge
that
such
orders,
though
less
numerous,
exist
in
the
tradition
of
certain
Protestant
denominations,
in
particular
the
Anglican
Church
as
well
as
in
the
Christian
Orthodox
tradition.
I
will
add
that
certain
orien-
tal
religions
could
probably
lay
claim
to
their
existence
as
well.
It
is
clear
moreover
that
even
invoking
the
values
sanctioned
by
the
Charter
does
not
make
it
possible
to
consider
an
organization
or
movement
as
a
religious
order
when
it
does
not
possess
the
fundamental
characteristics
of
one.
Having
said
that,
I
see
no
reason
to
make
an
exception
to
the
fundamental
rule
of
construction
to
which
I
referred
above.
Le
Grand
Robert
de
la
Langue
Française,
Dictionnaire
Alphabétique
et
Analogique
de
la
Langue
Française
(Paris:
Dictionnaires
Le
Robert,
1989),
2e
Édition,
tome
VI,
volume
6,
p.
972,
defines
the
word
“order”
as
follows:
5.
Rel.
Association
of
persons
living
in
a
religious
state
after
taking
solemn
vows
(the
forms
of
religious
life
entailing
only
simple
vows
bear
the
name
Congregation).
Principal
religious
orders
(in
broad
sense).
Annonciade,
Augustine,
Barnabite,
Benedictine,
Servite,
...,
Charity
(Sisters
of
Charity),
...,
Ursuline,
Visitandine
...
and
also
Oblate,
brothers,
...
fathers,
sisters.
[Translation.]
and
the
word
“vow”
in
volume
9,
p.
787,
as
being:
2.
Promise
freely
made
to
a
divinity,
to
God;
religious
undertaking.
To
take
a
vow
to
belong
to
God
...
A
vow
of
chastity,
virginity,
celibacy.
...
[Translation.]
The
Grand
Dictionnaire
Encyclopédique
Larousse,
(Paris:
Librairie
Larousse,
1984)
defines
the
word
“order”
in
tome
7,
volume
7,
p.
7617,
as
follows:
Cath.
rel.
Religious
order,
society
of
persons
bound
by
solemn
vows
to
the
observance
of
a
rule.
(The
taking
of
solemn
vows
characterizes
a
religious
order
and
differentiates
it
from
a
congregation,
which
has
taken
simple
vows.)
...
[Translation.]
and
the
word
“rule”,
at
volume
8,
p.
8815,
as
follows:
Canon
law.
Set
of
principles,
regulations
and
recommendations
intended
to
help
the
religious
live
in
the
spirit
of
their
institution.
...
[Translation
]
In
English,
The
Oxford
English
Dictionary
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,
1989),
2nd
edition,
volume
X,
p.
903,
defines
the
word
“order”
as
follows:
7.
À
body
or
society
of
persons
living
by
common
consent
under
the
same
religious,
moral,
or
social
regulations
and
discipline;
especially,
a.
A
monastic
society
or
fraternity
:
as
an
order
of
monks
or
friars,
the
Benedictine
or
Franciscan
order.
Sometimes
applied
to
the
rule
or
distinguishing
constitution
of
such
a
fraternity,
or
to
monasticism
as
an
institution.
...
and
the
word
“regulation”
at
volume
XIII,
p.
525,
as
being:
2.
A
rule
prescribed
for
the
management
of
one
matter,
or
for
the
regulating
of
conduct;
a
governing
precept
or
direction;
a
standing
rule.
...
The
Random
House
Dictionary
of
the
English
Language,
Second
Edition
-
Unabridged
(New
York:
Random
House,
1987)
gives
us
the
same
definition
of
the
word
“order”
at
p.
1363:
23.
a
body
or
society
of
persons
living
by
common
consent
under
the
same
religious,
moral,
or
social
regulations.
25.
a
monastic
society
or
fraternity:
the
Franciscan
order.
It
appears
clear
from
these
definitions
that,
in
order
to
form
a
religious
order,
persons
must
submit
to
particular
rules
uniting
them,
rules
that
are
normally
more
compelling,
usually
vows,
than
those
generally
uniting
the
adherents
to
a
religion
or
particular
denomination.
In
Persaud,
supra,
after
examining
the
various
dictionary
definitions,
Judge
Kempo
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
concluded
that,
in
its
common
and
ordinary
parlance
“order”
contemplates
its
members
being
united
in
a
formal
way.
In
that
case,
Judge
Kempo
had
to
decide
whether
the
Hope
Mission
constituted
a
religious
order
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
As
an
administrator
of
the
Hope
Mission,
Mr.
Persaud
had
claimed
that
he
was
entitled
to
the
deduction
provided
by
subparagraph
8(1
)(c)(ii),
while
the
respondent
contended
that
he
could
not
be
entitled
to
it
on
the
ground
that
he
was
not
a
member
of
a
religious
order.
The
Hope
Mission
was
described
as
an
organization
whose
object
was
to
minister
to
the
needy
by
providing
them
with
food,
clothing,
shelter,
etc.,
the
whole
within
a
religious
environment
including,
among
other
things,
a
daily
gospel
mission
service.
Let
us
note
that
Hope
Mission’s
statement
of
faith,
to
which
Mr.
Persaud
had
adhered,
was
essentially
the
same
as
that
of
CBS
cited
above.
Judge
Kempo
ruled
that
the
Hope
Mission
was
not
a
religious
order
for
two
distinct
reasons,
that
is
because
its
activities
were
not
exclusively
religious
and
also
because
its
statement
of
faith
did
not
unite
the
members
in
a
formal
way.
Thus,
she
stated
the
following
at
pages
2839
and
2840:
Further,
while
the
mission’s
object
and
purpose
is
the
delivery
of
a
holistic
approach
of
which
religion
is
its
core
component,
its
activities
are
not
exclusively
religious
so
as
to
be
characterized
as
a
religious
order.
Although
there
is
a
statement
of
faith
of
the
mission,
simply
to
be
a
Christian
is
to
espouse
these
self-same
beliefs.
This
sharing
does
not
unite
Christians
in
a
formal
way
in
a
manner
of
a
vow.
In
my
view
this
threshold
has
not
been
met
by
the
mission
so
as
to
be
characterized
as
a
religious
“order”.
In
Zylstra
Estate,
supra,
one
of
the
points
at
issue
was
also
whether
the
Institute
for
Christian
Studies
(ICS)
and
the
Ontario
Bible
College
and
Ontario
Theological
Seminary
(OBC)
constituted
religious
orders
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
The
appellants
all
worked
for
one
of
these
organizations
and
argued
that
they
were
religious
orders
in
order
to
be
able
to
receive
the
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1
)(c).
MacKay
J.’s
remarks
in
Zylstra
Estate,
supra,
restate
in
a
different
way
the
elements
analyzed
by
Judge
Kempo
in
Persaud,
supra.
MacKay
J.
thus
based
her
conclusion
on
two
principal
considerations,
as
follows:
There
are
two
principal
considerations
which
lead
me
to
conclude
that
neither
OBC
nor
ICS
is
a
“religious
order”
within
the
intention
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c).
The
first
is
that
there
is
no
expression
of
faith
or
of
religious
purpose
of
either
institution
apart
from
the
educational
purpose
of
each,
that
would
mark
the
institution,
and
its
members
as
distinct
from
the
churches
or
denominations
that
each
serves.
That
would
appear
to
me,
from
dictionary
definitions
and
from
the
testimony
particularly
of
Professor
Wiebe,
to
be
a
necessary
quality
of
a
“religious
order”.
If
it
were
otherwise
the
order
would
not
be
easily
distinguishable
from
other
institutions
serving
the
general
religious
purposes
of
the
churches
concerned.
The
second
consideration
is
that
both
OBC
and
ICS
have
their
primary
purposes
in
education.
That
is
offered
with
a
particular
religious
emphasis
and
to
serve
the
denominations
which
are
supportive
of
them
by
education
and
training
of
persons
from
those
denominations
in
spiritual
and
religious
life,
and
for
leadership
through
teaching
and
example.
Those
are
noble
and
important
purposes,
but
in
my
view
they
are
oriented,
quite
properly
for
each
institution,
to
education.
They
are
not
religious
purposes
in
the
sense
pursued
by
a
religious
order,
though
some
religious
orders
may
also
pursue
educational
purposes
as
subordinate
to
their
primarily
religious
purpose
of
service
to
their
God
through
worship,
prayer
and
devotion.
It
was
for
generally
similar
reasons
that
Urie
J.
determined
a
Hutterite
community
could
not
be
considered
a
religious
order
(i.e.
because
its
objects
and
purposes
were
not
exclusively
religious,
but
also
included
farming),
within
then
subsection
27(2)
of
the
Act
(now
subsection
110(2))
which
permits
a
member
of
a
religious
order
who
has
made
a
vow
of
perpetual
poverty
to
deduct
from
his
income
for
tax
purposes
the
amount
of
his
earned
income
if
it
was
paid
to
the
order.
(See:
Wipf
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1973]
C.T.C.
761,
73
D.T.C.
5558
at
page
5566
(F.C.T.D.);
reversed
on
other
grounds,
[1975]
C.T.C.
79,
75
D.T.C.
5034
(F.C.A).
See
Zylstra
Estate,
supra,
at
page
297
(D.T.C.
6693)).
From
the
definitions
of
the
common
dictionaries
and
the
decisions
cited
above,
the
conditions
that
appear
essential
for
an
organization
to
be
considered
as
a
religious
order
are,
in
my
view,
first
that
the
members
adhere
to
the
particular
rules
uniting
them
ina
a
formal
way
and
that
those
particular
rules
governing
them
be
more
compelling
than
those
that
consist
simply
in
ratifying
the
beliefs
established
by
the
religion
or
the
denomination
to
which
they
already
belong.
A
simple
inter-denominational
organization
such
as
CSB
offering
a
statement
of
faith
to
which
the
members
of
a
number
of
religious
denominations
adhere
and
rules
of
conduct
stated
in
very
general
terms
does
not
meet
this
condition.
It
also
appears
that
the
purposes
and
principal
activities
of
a
religious
order
must
be
exclusively,
or
at
the
very
least
mostly,
religious.
When
the
principal
purpose
of
an
organization
is
education,
assistance
to
needy
persons
or
personal
development
through
the
conduct
of
sports,
recreational
or
outdoor
activities,
as
in
the
instant
case,
it
cannot
be
characterized
as
a
religious
order,
even
if
the
religious
or
spiritual
aspect
of
the
activities
is
present
and
may
be
of
fairly
great
importance.
For
these
reasons,
CSB
does
not
constitute
a
religious
order
in
my
view.
It
follows
that
the
appellant
may
not
be
considered
as
a
member
of
a
religious
order.
This
conclusion
would
normally
excuse
me
from
having
to
decide
whether
the
appellant
“was
in
charge
of
a
congregation”.
However,
I
will
take
the
liberty
of
making
a
few
brief
comments.
According
to
Le
Grand
Robert
de
la
Langue
Française,
supra,
the
word
“congregation”
may
have
the
primary
meaning
of
a
company
of
priests
or
members
of
religious
orders
and
in
that
case
means
a
“community”
or
an
“order”.
In
another,
manifestly
broader
sense,
however,
it
also
means
a
Protestant
ecclesiastical
organization.
Although
the
Dictionnaire
historique
de
la
langue
française
gives
it
in
French
the
rarer
meaning
of
a
parish
or,
more
generally,
an
assembly
of
faithful
by
reference
to
Anglo-American
English,
it
is
this
broader
sense
that
MacKay
J.
adopted
in
Zylstra
Estatem,
supra,
based
on
the
English
version
of
the
Act.
Taking
care
to
analyze
the
expression
in
the
overall
context
of
paragraph
8(1)(c),
he
stated
the
following
at
page
302
(D.T.C.
6696)
of
his
judgment:
It
is
my
opinion
that
in
this
broader
context
of
the
words
used
to
describe
the
qualifications
for
a
deduction,
the
words
“diocese,
parish
or
congregation”
are
intended
to
describe
different
organizational
or
institutional
structures
determined
by
religious
denominations
for
the
ongoing
organized
activities
of
Le
Robert,
Paris,
1992,
volume
1,
page
473.
their
members
on
a
regular
basis.
Thus,
a
gathering
of
persons
may
well
be
a
congregation
for
some
purposes,
but
unless
it
is
a
gathering
for
shared
religious
purposes
recognized
by
a
religious
denomination
for
its
regular
organizational
religious
activities,
it
does
not
qualify
as
a
“congregation
within
the
meaning
of
that
word
in
paragraph
8(l)(c)
of
the
Act.
[Emphasis
added.
]
I
agree
with
these
remarks.
An
assembly
or
gathering
of
persons
of
different
religious
denominations
for
activities
that
are
not
strictly
regular
religious
activities
of
a
religion
or
particular
denomination
cannot
be
considered
as
a
congregation.
In
my
view,
the
appellant
was
not
in
charge
of
an
assembly
of
faithful
bearing
the
characteristics
of
a
congregation
within
the
meaning
that
must
be
given
to
that
expression
in
the
context
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
The
appeal
is
dismissed,
with
costs
to
the
respondent.
Appeal
dismissed.
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