Muldoon,
J
[ORALLY]:—This
is
an
action
in
the
nature
of
an
appeal
from
a
decision
or
judgment
of
the
Tax
Review
Board,
registered
as
Number
80-320
signed
at
Ottawa
November
23,
1981.
The
plaintiff,
Carsons
Camps
Ltd,
is
a
corporation
incorporated
in
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan
and
at
all
times
material
to
this
claim
was
carrying
on
business
in
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan.
It
is,
today,
still
a
valid
and
subsisting
corporation.
The
plaintiff
appeals
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board,
which
I
have
mentioned.
The
objection
to
the
assessment
was
properly
taken,
the
plaintiff
was
assessed
on
the
basis
of
the
profits
earned
on
the
sale
of
its
hotel
at
Cumberland
House
Saskatchewan,
being
business
income
arising
from
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
a
trade.
The
plaintiff
takes
objection
to
the
assessment
on
that
basis,
asserting
that
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
were,
as
it
says,
capital
gains
and
not
income.
The
plaintiff
purchased
the
hotel
known
as
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
by
an
agreement
signed
on
May
14,
1973
for
a
price
of
$120,000
and
it
is
alleged
by
the
defendant,
an
adjusted
price
of
$123,624.08,
and
then
sold
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
on
April
5,
1974
for
proceeds
in
the
amount
of
$185,000.
In
the
plaintiffs
return
of
income
for
its
1975
taxation
year,
the
plaintiff
reported
a
capital
gain
in
the
amount
of
$83,375.92
on
that
sale
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
with
a
consequence
that
it
included
in
its
income
for
the
year,
the
taxable
capital
gain
in
the
amount
of
$41,687.96.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
by
way
of
an
assessment,
assessed
or
reassessed
the
appellant
in
this
case,
Carsons
Camps
Ltd,
on
the
basis
that
the
gain
realized
on
the
disposition
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
was
on
income
account
and
he
included
the
same
in
the
plaintiffs
income
for
its
1975
taxation
year.
In
so
assessing
the
plaintiff,
the
respondent
relied
upon
the
following
assumptions
of
fact,
among
others:
first,
a
motivating
reason
for
the
acquisition
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
was
the
expectation
that
it
could
be
sold
for
a
profit;
and
secondly,
the
sale
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
was
a
culmination
of
a
scheme
of
profit-making
conducted
by
the
appellant.
The
-decision
in
this
matter
must
be
based
on
objective
evidence
of
facts
as
well
as
an
appreciation
of
the
testimony
of
the
plaintiffs
witness
Mr
Irwin
Car-
son,
a
barrister
of
Prince
Albert,
Saskatchewan.
That
is
to
say,
Mr
Carson’s
testimony
as
to
the
plaintiffs
intention
in
buying
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
in
view
of
its
resale
about
eleven
months
later,
must
be
assessed
and
appreciated
in
relation
to
the
objective
facts.
I
draw
that
principle
from
the
case
of
Greenbranch
Investments
Limited
v
The
Queen,
[1980]
CTC
514;
80
DTC
6384,
a
decision
of
Mr
Justice
Grant
of
the
Trial
Division
in
the
Federal
Court.
The
evidence
given
by
Mr
Carson
is
that
prior
to
June,
1971,
and
indeed,
for
some
months
thereafter,
he
was
prosecuting
in
his
professional
capacity
for
the
Attorney
General
of
Saskatchewan.
He
testified
that
after
the
change
of
government
in
June,
1971,
he
and
his
partners
apprehended
a
loss
of
that
prosecuting
agency
with
concomitant
loss
of
professional
revenue.
Mr
Carson,
in
response
to
that
situation,
was
looking
for
a
revenue-generating
business.
After
failing
in
an
attempt
to
buy
the
Buffalo
Narrows
Hotel
in
October,
1972,
he
looked
at,
and
considered,
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
owned
by
two
lawyers,
Messrs
Wilson
and
Rendek
of
Regina.
Mr
Carson
was
familiar
with
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
because
he
had
attended
at
Cumberland
House
from
time
to
time,
on
at
least
three
occasions,
as
defence
counsel.
Mr
Carson,
then
quite
unsolicited,
approached
Messrs
Wilson
and
Rendek
of
Regina
and
he
told
them
of
his
interest
in
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge.
Mr
Carson
was
quite
familiar
with
the
operations
of
Cumberland
House
Lodge
because
he
had
spoken
to
the
manager
and
had
been
there
on
one
or
two
occasions.
He
performed,
as
best
he
could,
given
his
inexperience
in
these
matters,
a
study,
and
assessed
in
his
own
mind,
the
risks,
and
not
unaware
that
the
purchase
was
to
be
made
one
hundred
per
cent
by
borrowed
money.
It
was,
however,
the
purchase
of
a
going
concern
and
not
vacant
property.
Mr
Carson
said
that
his
intention
was
that
he
would
find
a
revenue-generating
business,
preferably
a
hotel
or
outfitting
business
because
he
was
interested
in
that
sort
of
endeavor,
and
his
hope
was
that
the
business
would
run
itself
if
there
were
good
managers
and,
indeed,
he
was
inspired
by
the
fact
that
Messrs
Wilson
and
Rendek
practising
law
in
Regina,
seemed
to
be
able
to
cope
with
the
ownership
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
even
from
such
a
distance.
At
the
time
Messrs
Wilson
and
Rendek
owned
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
they
did
not
sell
hard
liquor
on
the
premises,
even
though
that
was
an
expectation,
if
not
a
requirement,
of
their
license.
To
this
point,
in
viewing
the
evidence,
Mr
Carson’s
testimony
of
the
purpose
for
the
purchase
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
by
the
corporation
of
which
he
was
the
principal,
if
not
the
sole
directing
mind,
that
is
to
say
Carsons
Camps
Ltd,
is
entirely
plausible.
On
the
evidence
I
find
that
he
had
no
other
intent
but
than
to
buy
a
going
concern,
a
revenue-generating
business.
As
time
went
on,
his
illusions
were
disappointed
and
some
of
his
expectations
turned
virtually
to
ashes.
The
manager
who
was
installed
in
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge,
and
operating
it
for
Messrs
Wilson
and
Rendek,
was
apparently
a
person
of
high
moral
integrity
in
so
far
as
the
business
is
concerned,
that
is
to
say
his
honesty
was
unquestioned,
and
his
ability
to
operate
the
business
was
excellent.
Mr
Car-
son
expected
that
that
manager,
Mr
Lloyd,
would
continue
on
for
some
years
and
that
he,
Mr
Carson,
would
have
to
devote
very
little
time
to
the
operation
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge.
Because
of
unhappy
marital
differences
between
Mr
Lloyd,
the
manager,
and
Mrs
Lloyd,
as
it
would
appear
from
Mr
Carson’s
testimony,
and
I
find
no
reason
to
disbelieve
him
on
that
score,
Mr
Lloyd
finally
left,
departed
from
his
business.
It
had
so
been
Mr
Carson’s
hope
to
retain
Mr
Lloyd
that
he
had
offered
him
various
incentives
to
stay,
in
terms
of
profit
sharing
or
partnership.
Obviously
Mr
Lloyd
was
also
looking
at
Mr
Carson
to
assess
whether
he
would
be
the
kind
of
owner
for
whom
he,
Mr
Lloyd,
would
be
prepared
to
carry
on
working.
From
the
evidence
I
have
heard,
I
cannot
but
conclude
that
it
was
not
because
of
unhappy
differences
between
Mr
Lloyd
and
Mr
Carson,
but
rather
unhappy
differences
between
Mr
Lloyd
and
Mrs
Lloyd,
that
Mr
Lloyd
departed.
Mr
Carson
sought
another
manager
who
turned
out
to
be
inept
in
the
management
of
the
hotel.
I
will
not
recite
all
the
evidence
because
it
is
entirely
fresh
in
my
mind,
having
heard
it
earlier
today,
but
Mr
Carson,
as
it
would
appear,
and
I
think
that
must
be
taken
as
uncontradicted,
had
to
devote
more
and
more
of
his
time
to
the
affairs
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge.
The
bright
expectat-
ons
he
had
were
disappointed
and
frustrated.
He
began
looking
for
a
partner.
After
the
departure
of
the
inept
manager,
he
found
Mr
and
Mrs
Thompson
as
a
couple
to
take
over
the
hotel
and
they
did
better
than
their
predecessors
but
not
so
well
as
Mr
Carson
anticipated.
However,
in
order
to
spur
them
on
in
their
efforts
at
operating
the
hotel
so
that
Mr
Carson
would
be
able
to
devote
less
time
to
it,
he
offered
them
a
form
of
partnership.
They
were
unable
to
raise
the
money
necessary
to
buy
in,
that
is
to
say,
to
buy
shares
in
Carsons
Camps
Ltd,
the
plaintiff
in
this
action.
Mr
Carson
then
wrote,
(and
we
have
the
letter
on
file
as
an
exhibit),
his
friend
Mr
Polischuk
in
British
Columbia,
also
proposing
that
Mr
Polischuk
return
to
Saskatchewan
and
help
him
in
the
operations
of
Cumberland
House
Lodge.
I
am
not
unmindful
that
in
Mr
Carson’s
letter
to
Mr
Polischuk
he
made
reference
to
the
possibility
of
a
turnover
and
of
“peddling”,
to
use
Mr
Carson’s
own
words,
the
business,
within
a
year
or
two.
At
that
time,
that
is
to
say,
January,
1974,
it
is
apparent
on
the
evidence
that
Mr
Carson
was
devoting
more
of
his
time
to
the
hotel
and
enjoying
it
less,
and
that
he
had
no
fixed
expectation
that
the
management
would
be
satisfactorily
stabilized
for
the
next
five
to
ten
years.
That
is
not
to
say
that
the
hotel
was
in
dire
straits
at
that
time.
The
Thompsons
appeared
to
be
at
least
adequate.
But
when
I
review
the
testimony
of
Mr
Carson,
in
relation
to
the
fact
as
as
they
are
well
documented
in
this
case,
I
must
conclude
that
Mr
Carson,
like
many
of
us,
is
not
a
cold-blooded
computer
but
had
simply
lost
heart
with
his
venture.
I
am
unable
to
find,
among
the
objective
facts
and
on
the
documents
of
this
case,
and
in
the
testimony
of
Mr
Carson,
any
secondary
intent
in
buying
the
hotel.
That
does
not
mean
to
say
that
as
a
practising
barrister,
or
any
other
educated
person
who
knows
the
ways
of
the
world,
he
might
not
have
considered
at
some
time
that
the
property
might
be
sold.
Everyone
who
buys
such
a
venture,
if
I
may
say
so,
probably
considers
that
at
some
time;
but
I
think
that
was
not
a
significant
thing
in
Mr
Carson’s
intention
when
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
was
acquired.
His
intentions
changed
later
as
he
became
more
and
more
weary
and
disappointed
with
the
venture
as
he
was
unable
to
find
a
partner,
because
Mr
Polischuk
turned
him
down
too.
There
appears
to
be
no
contradiction,
either,
of
Mr
Carson’s
testimony
that
Mr
Jardine
of
Jardine
Holdings,
approached
Mr
Carson
without
any
solicitation
on
Mr
Carson’s
part,
although
there
is
some
suggestion
in
the
evidence
that
Mr
Carson’s
brother,
also
a
lawyer,
may
have
steered
Mr
Jardine
to
Mr
Irwin
Car-
son.
However,
Mr
Jardine
found
Mr
Carson,
it
is
clear
on
the
evidence
that
it
was
not
with
Mr
Carson’s
own
doing.
Indeed,
Mr
Jardine
approached
Mr
Car-
son,
just
as
Mr
Carson
had
approached
Messrs
Wilson
and
Rendek
the
previous
year,
unsolicited.
Upon
the
examination
of
the
operation,
financial
statements
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge,
a
bargain
was
arrived
at,
a
deal
struck
and
the
sale
price
of
$185,000
was
arrived
at.
Mr
Carson
was
not
in
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
or
trading
in
real
estate.
His
only
other
personal
real
estate
holdings
at
that
time,
were
his
house,
his
lake
cabin
at
McPhee
Lake
and
a
hangar
for
his
aeroplane.
According
to
the
certificate,
Exhibit
1
in
this
matter,
that
is
to
say,
the
certificate
of
authentication
issued
under
the
Business
Corporations
Act
of
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
Carsons
Camps
Ltd
is
indeed
restricted
in
the
nature
of
the
business
the
corporation
may
carry
on.
The
company,
that
is
to
say,
the
plaintiff
in
this
case,
is
not
empowered
to
deal
in
real
estate
on
a
regular
basis
as
though
the
company
were
a
realtor.
The
purpose
for
Mr
Carson’s
purchase
of
the
Cumber
land
House
Lodge
is
a
plausible
one.
This
is
a
case
which
is
to
be
determined
on
a
balance
of
probabilities
and
not
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt.
On
a
balance
of
probabilities
I
conclude
that
Mr
Carson
bought
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
as
an
investment
and
not
for
resale
and
that
the
resale,
therefore,
of
the
Cumberland
House
Lodge
constituted
a
capital
gain
and
not
income
to
the
plaintiff,
Carsons
Camp
Ltd.
Accordingly,
I
shall
vacate
the
assessment
and
award
the
plaintiff
the
costs
of
this
action.
I
may
say
in
concluding
that
I
appreciated
very
much
the
helpful
services
of
both
counsel
in
this
case,
and
I
was
pleased
at
the
thoroughness
of
their
presentations,
not
only
of
the
evidence
and
argument,
but
their
research
on
the
authorities.
I
shall
finish
simply
by
noting
for
anyone
who
may
be
interested
still,
that
the
plaintiff
has
referred
to
me
the
following
cases:
Californian
Copper
Syndicate
v
Harris
(1904),
5
TC
159;
Anderson
Logging
Co
v
The
King,
[1925]
SCR
45;
[1917-27]
CTC
198;
Greenbranch
Investments
Ltd
v
The
Queen,
[1980]
CTC
514;
80
DTC
6384;
Hazeldean
Farm
Company
Limited
v
MNR,
[1966]
CTC
607;
66
DTC
5397;
Roy
M
Power
v
The
Queen,
[1975]
CTC
580;
75
DTC
5388;
Karmel
Apartments
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1975]
CTC
2130;
75
DTC
116;
Coronation
Holdings
Limited
v
MNR,
[1968]
Tax
ABC
513;
68
DTC
419;
Allan
Morrison
v
MNR,
[1917-27]
CTC
343;
1
DTC
113;
La
Cie
d’Immeubles
Courville
Ltée
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2834;
80
DTC
1719;
Robbie
Holdings
Ltd
v
The
Queen,
[1980]
CTC
422;
80
DTC
6336;
Hans
Reicher
v
The
Queen,
[1975]
CTC
659;
76
DTC
6001;
Regal
Heights
Limited
v
MNR,
[1960]
CTC
384;
60
DTC
1270;
and
Racine
v
The
Queen,
[1965]
CTC
150;
65
DTC
5098.
Defendant’s
counsel
has
referred
to
me
some
of
the
cases,
but
as
well,
MNR
v
James
N
Sissons,
[1969]
CTC
184;
69
DTC
5152;
J
Harold
Wood
v
MNR,
[1969]
CTC
57;
69
DTC
5073;
Coronation
Holdings
Limited
v
MNR,
[1968]
Tax
ABC
513;
68
DTC
419;
Arthur
Dansereau
v
MNR,
(1965)
37
Tax
ABC
425;
65
DTC
169;
Ulderico
Dolente
v
MNR,
37
Tax
ABC
404;
65
DTC
179;
and
MNR
v
Muzly
Lawee
and
Naima
E
Lawee,
[1972]
CTC
359;
72
DTC
6342.
I
have
considered
all
of
those
cases
in
the
short
time
between
the
end
of
argument
and
the
delivery
of
this
judgment
and
I
think
that
what
has
now
been
said
disposes
of
the
matter.
I
would
ask
Mr
Gaucher
to
draw
the
judgment
order
and
submit
it
for
signature.
If
possible
you
will
try
to
obtain
the
approval
as
to
form
on
that
judgment
order
which
you
will
be
submitting
for
signature,
from
Mr
Kennedy
or
another
member
of
the
Department
of
Justice.
If
there
be
any
difficulty
about
formulating
the
judgment
order,
I
shall
be
prepared
to
intervene
in
that
matter
to
settle
it.
Again,
thank
you
gentlemen
for
a
most
interesting
day.
Your
case
was
well
presented.