Heald
J:—I
have
concluded
that
the
appeal
should
be
allowed,
and
the
notice
sent
by
E
A
Chater,
Director,
Registration
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
acting
as
the
Minister’s
delegate
(pursuant
to
Income
Tax
Regulation
900(7)*,
dated
November
21,
1980,
should
be
set
aside
on
the
basis
that
there
was
a
duty
on
the
said
Director
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
natural
justice
or
to
accord
to
the
appellant
procedural
fairness
and
that
the
Director
failed
to
do
either
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
The
appellant
had
been
registered
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
as
a
Canadian
charitable
organization
since
1976.
Paragraph
168(1
)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
provides,
inter
alia:
NOTICE
OF
INTENTION
TO
REVOKE
REGISTRATION
168.
(1)
Where
a
registered
charity
.
.
.
(b)
ceases
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
this
Act
for
its
registration
as
such,
the
Minister
may,
by
registered
mail,
give
notice
to
the
registered
charity,
.
.
.
that
he
proposes
to
revoke
its
registration.
Subsection
168(2)
provides:
REVOCATION
OF
REGISTRATION
(2)
Where
the
Minister
gives
notice
under
subsection
(1)
to
a
registered
charity
or
to
a
registered
Canadian
amateur
athletic
association,
(a)
if
the
organization
or
association
has
applied
to
him
in
writing
for
the
revocation
of
its
registration,
the
Minister
shall,
forthwith
after
the
mailing
of
the
notice,
publish
a
copy
thereof
in
the
Canada
Gazette,
and
(b)
in
any
other
case,
the
Minister
may,
after
the
expiration
of
30
days
from
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice,
or
after
the
expiration
of
such
extended
period
from
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
as
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
or
a
judge
thereof,
upon
application
made
at
any
time
before
the
determination
of
any
appeal
pursuant
to
susection
172(3)
from
the
giving
of
the
notice,
may
fix
or
allow,
publish
a
copy
of
the
notice
in
the
Canada
Gazette,
and
upon
such
publication
of
a
copy
of
the
notice,
the
registration
of
the
organization
or
association
is
revoked.
The
relevant
portions
of
subsection
172(3)
reads
as
follows:
APPEAL
FROM
REFUSAL
TO
REGISTER,
REVOCATION
OF
REGISTRATION,
ETC.
(3)
Where
the
Minister
(a)
.
..
gives
notice
under
subsection
168(1)
to
such
charity
...
that
he
proposes
to
revoke
its
registration,
.
..
the
charity
.
.
.
in
a
case
described
in
paragraph
(a)
.
.
.
may
notwithstanding
section
24
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
appeal
from
.
.
.
the
giving
of
such
notice
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
The
relevant
portions
of
section
180
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
reads
as
follows:
APPEALS
TO
FEDERAL
COURT
OF
APPEAL
180.
(1)
An
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
pursuant
to
subsection
172(3)
may
be
instituted
by
filing
a
notice
of
appeal
in
the
Court
within
30
days
from
(b)
from
(sic)
the
mailing
of
notice
to
the
registered
charity
.
.
.
under
subsection
168(1),
.
.
.
or
within
such
further
time
as
the
Court
of
Appeal
or
a
judge
thereof
may,
either
before
or
after
the
expiry
of
those
30
days,
fix
or
allow.
NO
JURISDICTION
IN
TAX
REVIEW
BOARD
OR
FEDERAL
COURT
—
TRIAL
DIVISION
(2)
Neither
the
Tax
Review
Board
nor
the
Federal
Court
—
Trial
Division
has
jurisdiction
to
entertain
any
proceeding
in
respect
of
a
decision
of
the
Minister
from
which
an
appeal
may
be
instituted
under
this
section.
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
OF
APPEAL
(3)
An
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
instituted
under
this
section
shall
be
heard
and
determined
in
a
summary
way.
The
notice
of
intention
to
revoke
the
appellant’s
registration
as
a
registered
charity
was
sent
to
the
appellant
by
registered
letter
dated
November
21,
1980
(AB
p
85).
In
my
opinion,
the
Director
made
two
decisions
in
that
letter.
The
first
decision
was
a
determination
that
the
appellant
had
ceased
to
comply
with
the
registration
requirements
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
second
decision
made
by
him
was
to
exercise
the
power
conferred
on
the
Minister
pursuant
to
subsection
168(1)
to
give
notice
to
the
appellant
that
he
proposed
to
revoke
appellant’s
charitable
registration
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
168(2).
In
my
view,
both
of
those
decisions
are,
in
all
likelihood,
quasi-judicial
decisions
notwithstanding
that
the
statutory
scheme
as
set
out
supra
does
not
specifically
provide
for
participation
by
the
party
affected
in
the
adjudicative
process.
This
view
is
strengthened
by
the
fact
that
the
statute
provides
for
an
appeal
to
this
Court,
an
appeal
similar
to
appeals
to
this
Court
from
the
Trial
Division.
A
perusal
of
sections
172
and
175
to
180
inclusive
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
makes
it
clear,
in
my
view,
that
whereas
the
so-called
“appeals”
from
an
assessment
directly
to
the
Trial
Division
or
from
the
Tax
Review
Board
to
the
Trial
Division
are
intended
to
be
trials
de
novo,
an
appeal
under
section
180
to
this
Court
is
an
appeal
in
the
normal
sense,
that
is,
an
appeal
in
which
the
question
is
whether
or
not
the
tribunal
below
was
right
on
the
basis
of
the
materials
which
it
had
before
it
when
it
made
its
decision.
The
evidence
is
clear
here
that
prior
to
making
the
two
decisions
referred
to
in
his
letter
of
November
21,
1980,
the
Director
failed
to
observe
the
requirements
of
natural
justice
and
of
procedural
fairness
in
that
he
reached
a
decision
adverse
to
the
rights
of
the
appellant
without
first
giving
the
appellant
prior
notice
of
the
case
against
it
and
an
opportunity
to
meet
that
case.*
The
evidence
is
that
in
February
of
1980,
the
Director’s
attention
was
directed
to
a
publication
in
the
Toronto
Globe
and
Mail
which
tended
to
case
some
doubt
on
the
right
of
the
appellant
to
have
continued
its
charitable
registration.
As
a
result,
he
asked
his
staff
to
further
investigate
the
matter.
This
investigation
was
carried
on
for
some
two
months,
then
seemingly
suspended
until
November
of
1980,
when,
after
receiving
a
further
publication
of
the
appellant’s
and
an
anonymous
newspaper
article
from
the
Toronto
Sun
and
after
several
discussions
with
his
staff
members,
the
Director
made
the
decisions
referred
to
supra
which
he
communicated
to
the
appellant
by
the
letter
of
November
21,
1980.
These
decisions
were
made
without
any
notice
being
given
to
the
appellant
of
the
investigations
preceding
the
decisions
nor
of
the
allegations
upon
which
the
Director
proposed
to
make
his
decisions
nor
was
the
appellant
given
any
opportunity
to
challenge
those
allegations
or
to
be
heard
by
the
Director
in
response
thereto.
It
is
said,
however,
by
the
respondent
that
since
the
Income
Tax
Act
itself
has
provided
the
appellant
and
others
in
a
similar
position
an
opportunity
to
be
heard
in
circumstances
where
the
rights
of
those
parties
are,
in
some
way,
adversely
affected,
the
legislation
should
not
be
supplemented
where,
as
here,
Parliament
has
addressed
itself
to
this
question.
In
the
respondent’s
view,
the
sending
of
the
notice
under
subsection
168(1)
is
not
a
final
determination
of
the
appellant’s
status
as
a
registered
charity.
It
is
merely
a
proposal
to
revoke
registration
and
thus
has
no
effect
until
the
Minister
or
his
delegate,
pursuant
to
subsection
168(2)
publishes
the
notice
in
the
Canada
Gazette,
which
publication
has
the
effect
of
revoking
the
charitable
registration.
I
do
not
subscribe
to
that
view
of
the
matter.
While
the
sending
of
the
subsection
168(1)
notice
is
not
a
final
determination
of
the
appellant’s
status
as
a
registered
charity,
it
most
certainly
adversely
affects
that
status
because,
firstly,
it
is
a
firm
and
unequivocal
decision
that
the
appellant
no
longer
fulfills
the
registration
requirements
and
is
therefore
no
longer
entitled
to
be
a
registered
charity
and,
secondly,
it
puts
the
appellant
on
notice
that
at
the
expiration
of
30
days
from
the
mailing
of
the
notice,
it
will
be
published
in
the
Canada
Gazette
which
publication,
prsuant
to
subsection
168(2),
revokes
the
appellant’s
registration.
If
the
appellant
had
not
availed
itself
of
the
provisions
for
appeal
to
this
Court
or
if
that
appeal
were
unsuccessful,
the
publication
in
the
Canada
Gazette
and
the
resultant
revocation
of
registration
would
follow
in
due
course
and
without
any
further
possibility
of
recourse
or
participation
by
the
appellant.*
I
am,
accordingly,
persuaded
that
the
appellant’s
rights
are
seriously
and
adversely
affected
by
these
“decisions”
so
as
to
impose
upon
the
Director
the
duty
to
observe
the
requirements
of
natural
justice,
or
at
the
very
least,
the
duty
to
accord
procedural
fairness
to
the
appellant.
The
provision
for
an
appeal
to
this
Court
requires
that
appeal
to
be
an
appeal
in
the
strict
and
traditional
sense
since
it
is
not
an
appeal
by
way
of
a
rehearing
or
trial
de
novo.
Therefore,
the
appeal
should
be
on
a
proper
record
of
the
evidence
adduced
before
the
Director
which
persuaded
him
to
make
the
decisions
herein
impugned.
In
this
case,
the
record
of
the
material
before
the
Director
is
incomplete
since,
admittedly,
it
does
not
contain
all
of
the
material
that
was
before
the
Director.
Furthermore,
the
record
of
the
material
before
the
Director
has
an
even
more
serious
defect
—
that
is
—
it
is
a
unilateral
record
since
it
contained
no
imput
from
the
appellant.
Such
a
circumstance
fails,
in
my
view,
to
satisfy
either
the
requirements
of
natural
justice
or
the
duty
to
act
fairly.*
For
these
reasons,
I
would
allow
the
appeal
and
set
aside
the
notice
dated
November
21.
1980.
Pratte,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
pursuant
to
subsection
172(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
from
the
giving
by
the
respondent
to
the
appellant
of
a
notice
under
subsection
168(1)
to
the
effect
that
the
respondent
proposed
to
revoke
the
appellant’s
registration
as
a
registered
charity.
The
appellant
relies
on
two
grounds
of
appeal:
first,
that
the
respondent
followed
an
incorrect
procedure
in
making
his
decision
and,
second,
that
the
respondent
had
no
valid
reason
for
revoking
the
appellant’s
registration.
At
the
outset
of
the
hearing,
we
decided
that
we
would
first
hear
the
argument
of
both
counsel
on
the
first
ground
of
appeal.
This
has
now
been
done.
We
will
not
need
to
hear
counsel
any
further
because
we
have
reached
the
conclusion
that
the
appeal
should
be
allowed
for
the
reason
that
the
respondent,
before
sending
the
appellant
the
notice
pursuant
to
subsection
168(1),
did
not
give
it
any
opportunity
to
refute
the
allegations
that
were
made
against
it.
In
order
to
understand
the
issue,
it
is
necessary
to
have
in
mind
the
following
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act'.
168.
(1)
Where
a
registered
charity
or
a
registered
Canadian
amateur
athletic
association
(a)
applies
to
the
Minister
in
writing
for
revocation
of
its
registration,
(b)
ceases
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
this
Act
for
its
registration
as
such,
the
Minister
may,
by
registered
mail,
give
notice
to
the
registered
charity
or
registered
Canadian
amateur
athletic
association
that
he
proposes
to
revoke
its
registration.
(2)
Where
the
Minister
gives
notice
under
subsection
(1)
to
a
registered
charity
or
to
a
registered
Canadian
amateur
athletic
association,
(a)
if
the
organization
or
association
has
applied
to
him
in
writing
for
the
revocation
of
its
registration,
the
Minister
shall,
forthwith
after
the
mailing
of
the
notice,
publish
a
copy
thereof
in
the
Canada
Gazette,
and
(b)
in
any
other
case,
the
Minister
may,
after
the
expiration
of
30
days
from
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice,
or
after
the
expiration
of
such
extended
period
from
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
as
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
or
a
judge
thereof,
upon
application
made
at
any
time
before
the
determination
of
any
appeal
pursuant
to
subsection
172(3)
from
the
giving
of
the
notice,
may
fix
or
allow,
publish
a
copy
of
the
notice
in
the
Canada
Gazette,
and
upon
such
publication
of
a
copy
of
the
notice,
the
registration
of
the
organization
or
association
is
revoked.
172.
(3)
Where
the
Minister
(a)
refuses
to
register
an
applicant
for
registration
as
a
registered
charity
or
registered
Canadian
amateur
athletic
association,
or
gives
notice
under
subsection
168(1)
to
such
a
charity
or
association
that
he
proposes
to
revoke
its
registration,
the
applicant
or
the
charity
or
association,
as
the
case
may
be,
in
a
case
described
in
paragraph
(a),
..
.
may,
notwithstanding
section
2e
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
appeal
from
.
.
.
the
giving
of
such
notice
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
180.
(1)
An
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
pursuant
to
subsection
172(3)
may
be
instituted
by
filing
a
notice
of
appeal
in
the
Court
within
30
days
from
(a)
the
time
the
decision
of
the
Minister
to
refuse
the
application
for
registration
or
for
a
certificate
of
exemption
or
to
revoke
the
registration
of
the
profit
sharing
plan
was
served
by
the
Minister
by
registered
mail
on
the
party
instituting
the
appeal,
or
(b)
from
the
mailing
of
notice
to
the
registered
charity
or
registered
Canadian
amateur
athletic
association
under
subsection
168(1),
as
the
case
may
be,
or
within
such
further
time
as
the
Court
of
Appeal
or
a
judge
thereof
may,
either
before
or
after
the
expiry
of
those
30
days,
fix
or
allow.
(2)
Neither
the
Tax
Review
Board
nor
the
Federal
Court
—
Trial
Division
has
jurisdiction
to
entertain
any
proceeding
in
respect
of
a
decision
of
the
Minister
from
which
an
appeal
may
be
instituted
under
this
section.
(3)
An
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
instituted
under
this
section
shall
be
heard
and
determined
in
a
summary
way.
The
appellant
was
registered
as
a
charitable
organization
under
the
Act
when
it
received
a
notice,
dated
November
21,
1980,
that
had
been
sent
by
the
respondent
pursuant
to
subsection
168(1).
The
body
of
that
notice
reads
as
follows:
Re:
Revocation
of
Registration
of
a
Charity
You
are
hereby
notified
that
I
propose
to
revoke
the
registration
of
Renaissance
International
as
a
result
of
its
failure
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
registration
as
a
charity
inasmuch
as
it
has
devoted
resources
to
acitivities
that
are
not
charitable
activities
and,
after
30
days
from
the
mailing
of
this
notice,
the
following
will
be
published
in
the
Canada
Gazette.
DEPARTMENT
OF
NATIONAL
REVENUE,
TAXATION
Notice
is
hereby
given
pursuant
to
subsection
168(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
that
I
hereby
propose
to
revoke
the
registration
of
the
charity
set
forth
below
and
that
by
virtue
of
subsection
168(2)
thereof
the
revocation
of
the
registration
thereof
will
be
effective
on
the
date
of
publication
in
the
Canada
Gazette.
It
is
common
ground
that,
before
receiving
that
notice,
the
appellant
had
not
been
made
aware
either
of
the
allegations
retained
against
it
or
of
the
intention
of
the
respondent
to
revoke
its
registration.
It
is
for
that
reason
that,
in
support
of
its
appeal
under
subsection
172(3),
it
submitted
that
the
respondent
failed
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
procedural
fairness
or
natural
justice.
Name
and
Address
|
Registration
Number
|
Renaissance
International
|
0463356-47-14
|
Box
100
|
|
Milton,
Ontario
|
|
LOT
2Y3
|
|
Counsel
for
the
respondent
made
two
answers
to
that
submission:
first,
he
said
that
while
a
registered
charity
has
the
right
to
be
heard
before
its
registration
is
revoked,
the
statute
contemplates
that
the
charity
will
be
heard,
not
by
the
Minister,
but
by
this
Court
on
an
appeal
made
pursuant
to
subsection
172(3).
Second,
he
argued
that,
assuming
that
there
was
a
failure
by
the
respondent
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
procedural
fairness,
that
irregularity
is
cured
by
the
fact
that
the
appellant
will
have,
in
this
Court,
the
opportunity
that
was
denied
to
it
by
the
respondent
to
answer
the
allegations
made
against
it.
I
have
no
hesitation
in
rejecting
that
last
argument.
It
is
only
in
rare
cases,
in
my
view,
that
the
hearing
of
an
appeal
may
be
held
to
cure
the
failure
of
a
lower
tribunal
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
natural
justice
and
this
is
not
one
of
those
cases.
Normally,
it
seems
to
me,
an
appellant
has
the
right
to
be
treated
fairly
both
by
the
tribunal
of
first
instance
and
by
the
appellate
court.
I
find
much
more
merit
in
the
respondent’s
first
argument
that
the
various
provisions
of
the
Act
manifest
the
intention
of
Parliament
that
a
registered
charity
be
given,
before
the
sending
of
the
notice
provided
for
in
subsection
168(1),
an
opportunity
to
be
heard
by
this
Court
rather
than
by
the
Minister.
What
is
important,
it
seems
to
me,
is
not
that
the
registered
charity
be
heard
before
the
sending
of
the
notice
(which,
in
my
opinion,
does
not
affect
its
rights)
but
that
it
be
heard
before
the
revocation
of
its
registration.
For
that
reason,
I
would
have
no
hesitation
to
adopt
the
respondent’s
position
if
the
statute
provided
that,
after
the
sending
of
the
notice,
there
could
be
a
hearing
de
novo
to
determine
whether
the
circumstances
really
warranted
the
sending
of
the
notice.
However,
the
statute
does
not
provide
for
that
kind
of
a
hearing.
What
it
says
is
that
there
may
be
an
appeal
to
this
Court
after
the
notice
has
been
sent.
True,
the
word
“appeal”
is
rather
vague
and,
as
was
pointed
out
by
Jackett,
CJ
in
Srivastava
v
MMI,
[1973]
FC
138
at
148,
may,
depending
on
the
context
where
it
is
used,
refer
to
an
appeal
de
novo
or
to
an
appeal
normally
decided
on
a
record
created
in
the
inferior
Court.
However,
in
this
instance,
the
right
of
appeal
created
by
subsection
172(3)
is
a
right
of
appeal
to
a
Court
which,
it
is
well
known,
normally
decides
appeals
on
a
record
created
in
the
inferior
Court
and
accepts
to
receive
further
evidence
only
“on
special
grounds”
(see
Rule
1102(1)).
Moreover,
when
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
applicable
to
that
appeal
are
contrasted
with
those
of
section
175
governing
the
appeals
to
the
Trial
Division,
it
becomes
apparent
that
it
was
not
intended
that
the
appeal
to
this
Court
be
an
appeal
de
novo
like
the
appeal
in
the
Trial
Division.
I
therefore
conclude
that
the
appeal
created
by
subsection
172(3)
is
what
I
would
call
an
ordinary
appeal
which
the
Court
normally
decides
on
the
sole
basis
of
a
record
constituted
by
the
Tribunal
of
first
instance.
It
follows,
in
my
view,
that
the
decision
of
the
Minister
to
send
a
notice
of
revocation
under
subsection
168(1)
must
be
arrived
at
in
a
manner
enabling
the
Minister
to
create
a
record
sufficiently
complete
to
be
used
by
this
Court
in
deciding
the
appeal.
This
presupposes,
in
my
view,
that
the
Minister
must
follow
a
procedure
enabling
him
to
constitute
a
record
reflecting
not
only
his
point
of
view
but
also
that
of
the
organization
concerned.
For
those
reasons,
I
have
concluded
after
much
hesitation
that,
contrary
to
what
was
argued
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
do
not
impliedly
relieve
the
Minister
from
the
duty
to
comply
with
the
rules
of
natural
justice
and
procedural
fairness
before
sending
a
notice
pursuant
to
subsection
168(1).
On
the
contrary,
those
provisions,
as
I
read
them,
rather
suggest
that
the
Minister,
before
sending
the
notice,
must
first
give
to
the
person
or
persons
concerned
a
reasonable
opportunity
to
answer
the
allegations
made
against
them.
I
would,
for
those
reasons,
allow
the
appeal
and
set
aside
the
notice
given
by
the
respondent
to
the
appellant
on
November
21,
1980.