Date: 20010608
Docket: 2001-72-IT-I
BETWEEN:
FRANK YATES,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
For the
      Appellant:                      
      The Appellant himself
Counsel for the Respondent:       Kristy
      Foreman Gear
Reasons for Judgment
(delivered orally from the Bench on May 11, 2001, at
      Vancouver, British Columbia)
Campbell, J.
      [1]            
      This appeal is under the informal procedure with respect to the
      Appellant's 1999 taxation year.
      [2]            
      The Minister initially assessed the Appellant by Notice dated May
      18, 2000. By letter dated August 24, 2000, the Appellant objected
      that the Minister did not allow him a deduction for Class 3
      National Insurance contributions. By letter dated October 6,
      2000, the Appellant objected that the Minister did not allow him
      a deduction for the non-uprated portion of the United Kingdom
      ("U.K.") old age pension as a foreign tax. As a result,
      the Minister, by Notice dated October 13, 2000, confirmed
      that there was no provision under the Income Tax Act (the
      "Act") which allowed a deduction for Class 3
      National Insurance contributions made by the Appellant in the
      amount of $781.41.
      [3]            
      There is basically no dispute as to the facts in this case and
      both parties proceeded on the basis of presentation of legal
      argument. The Appellant resided in England until 1972 when he
      came to Canada to live. He is a dual citizen of both countries.
      From 1967 to 1972, the Appellant worked in England and
      contributed to a National Insurance plan. In 1991 or 1992, the
      Appellant was advised by a friend that he could apply for and pay
      a lump sum payment to permit him to qualify for 82% of a future
      U.K. pension. As a result, the Appellant paid the U.K. Inland
      Revenue Department a lump sum payment of 4,009.92 U.K.
      pounds sterling, in 1991 or 1992 for the period 1986 to 1992
      under Class 3 National Insurance contributions. The amount paid
      by the Appellant in the 1999 taxation year was 335.40 U.K. pounds
      sterling (as per Attachment I attached to the Notice of Appeal
      and being a statement from the U.K. Inland Revenue NI
      Contributions Office).
      [4]            
      The Appellant divided his Notice of Appeal and presentation into
      two parts. The first part dealt with the deductibility of
      "additional U.K. Class 3 National Insurance
      contributions" in computing Canadian income tax in the
      1999 taxation year. The second part dealt with the
      deductibility of the "non-uprated portion of the U.K. old
      age pension, withheld by the U.K. Government to U.K./Canadian
      citizens, resident in Canada. He argued that this was a tax and
      should be "deductible" or a "tax credit"
      given against the amount of foreign income reported or Canadian
      tax payable on the foreign source of income.
      [5]            
      In respect to Part 1, the Appellant paid Class 3 National
      Insurance contributions to the U.K. Inland Revenue Department
      towards a future state pension. He referred to a statement of the
      U.K. Inland Revenue NI Contributions Office, which referred to
      these payments as "voluntary" yearly Class 3
      contributions and I quote directly from that statement:
You applied to us to pay voluntary class 3.
He stated that he was informed these additional contributions
      made to increase his future U.K. old age pension were not
      deductible in computing Canadian income taxes.
      [6]            
      The Appellant referred to subsections 20(11), 20(12), 126(1) and
      126(7) of the Act. He argued that these Class 3
      contributions are a tax and therefore should be deductible or an
      allowable tax credit against the amount of foreign income
      reported, or Canadian tax payable on the foreign source of income
      in compliance with these subsections. He stated that the
      contributions meet the definition of "non-business income
      tax" in subsection 126(7), in that they are a tax, based on
      income paid to the U.K. At the very least, he states that the
      contributions should be an allowable deduction or credit against
      foreign income tax reported, or deductible against Canadian tax
      payable on the foreign source income. He states that when he pays
      the contributions, he does so with after-tax dollars and he is of
      the opinion that these amounts are taxed several times. He
      states:
I understand in my own particular situation that I do not have
      any income from a foreign source, but I believe in the interests
      of fairness and Natural Justice that CCRA should
      change their policy ...
He contends that all of this violates the Canada/U.K. Income
      Tax Convention. He further contends that the "disallowance
      of a deduction or use as a tax credit" for such Class 3 U.K.
      pension contribution violates the Canadian Charter of Rights
      and Freedoms by treating a Canadian citizen paying into a
      Canadian state pension differently than a Canadian citizen paying
      into a U.K. state pension. He believes the ground of
      discrimination to be the enumerated ground of national
      origin.
      [7]            
      The second part of the Appellant's argument related to the
      future event of the taxability of his U.K. old age pension when
      he eventually reaches 65 years of age. The U.K. Government has a
      policy of "non-uprating" meaning "not annually
      increasing" the U.K. old age pension to persons living
      abroad as a resident of Canada. This policy has been in effect
      since 1955. He contends that a policy exists which
      "freezes" a portion of his pension. He submitted that
      as the non-uprated portion of the U.K. old age pension is a
      tax, based on income, the disallowance of a deduction or use of a
      tax credit for this non-rated portion violates Articles 17, 21,
      22 and 23 of the Canada/U.K. Convention. He recognizes that the
      receipt of his old age pension will be taxable as part of his
      worldwide income. He states that the U.K. Government will
      withhold the "frozen portion" from his pension and will
      use those monies for Government purposes. He contends that the
      "frozen portion" is a tax based on income which is
      taxable in Canada as part of the Canadian resident's
      worldwide income. He contends that all of this violates mobility
      rights in respect of section 6 of the Charter, legal
      rights in respect of section 7 of the Charter and equality
      rights in respect to section 15 of the Charter.
      [8]            
      And finally the Appellant argued that the U.K. old age pension is
      property and therefore the tax imposed by the U.K. Government is
      a tax on that property. The Appellant, as I understand it,
      contends that in disallowing a deduction or tax credit on the
      taxed portion of the U.K. pension which is property, it deprives
      property rights to Canadians whose national origin is the U.K.
      This therefore violates subsection 1(a) of the Canadian Bill
      of Rights according to the Appellant, in that it deprives
      property rights on the ground of national original.
      [9]            
      The Minister states that the Appellant applied to the U.K. Inland
      Revenue to pay the contributions, that these contributions are
      voluntary and that they are not an income or profit tax. The
      Minister states that the contributions do not qualify as a
      "non-business-income tax" and that for the 1999
      taxation year, the Appellant did not declare any income from
      foreign sources. The Minister then contends that the relief
      sought with respect to the "non-uprated portion" of the
      U.K. old age pension is not within the available relief that this
      Court may grant under section 171 of the Act, as the
      Appellant seeks relief in respect to a future event.
[10]           By letter
      from the Appellant dated April 2, 2001, he asserts that he has
      served all Attorneys General in compliance with section 57 of the
      Federal Court Act. Although this was not raised by either
      party during the hearing, it is the practice of this Court to
      hear argument on Charter issues where they are raised in
      the pleadings but section 57 notice requirements may not have
      been met. If there is merit to the Charter arguments, the
      matter would be adjourned to a further date for compliance with
      notice requirements. If there is no merit, the matter can be
      disposed of accordingly. I reviewed this practice at greater
      length in my decision in Whalen v. R., [2001] T.C.J. No.
      81.
Issues
[11]           There are
      four issues before me, which are as follows:
                       
      (1)              
      whether the U.K. Class 3 National Insurance contributions are
      non-business income;
                       
      (2)              
      whether the Appellant is entitled to a deduction or a foreign tax
      credit for the contributions in the 1999 taxation year;
                       
      (3)              
      whether the Court can provide any relief by way of deduction or
      tax credit with respect to the "non-uprated" portion of
      the U.K. old age pension; and
                       
      (4)              
      whether the denial of the deduction or foreign tax credit
      infringes rights and freedoms under the Charter and
      specifically a breach of sections 6, 7 and 15 and whether that
      breach can then be justified under section 1.
Analysis
[12]           The
      Appellant has objected to the non-deductibility of voluntary
      contributions he made to the U.K. Government to maintain his
      entitlement to a U.K. old age pension.
[13]          
      Subsection 126(1) of the Act provides a formula for
      calculating a foreign tax deduction, where a taxpayer, who was
      resident in Canada at any time in a taxation year, paid
      non-business-income tax to a Government of a country other than
      Canada. The effect of the formula in subsection 126(1) is that a
      foreign tax credit cannot exceed the amount of Canadian tax that
      would have been payable on the foreign income had that income
      been earned in Canada. "Non-business-income tax" is
      defined in subsection 126(7) as follows:
"non-business-income tax" paid by a taxpayer for a
      taxation year to the government of a country other than Canada
      means, subject to subsections (4.1) and (4.2), the portion of any
      income or profits tax paid by the taxpayer for the year to the
      government of that country, or to the government of a state,
      province or other political subdivision of that country, that
(a) was not included in computing the taxpayer's
      business-income tax for the year in respect of any business
      carried on by the taxpayer in any country other than Canada,
(b) was not deductible by virtue of subsection 20(11)
      in computing the taxpayer's income for the year, and
(c) was not deducted by virtue of subsection 20(12) in
      computing the taxpayer's income for the year,
but does not include a tax, or the portion of a tax,
(c.1) that is in respect of an amount deducted because
      of subsection 104(22.3) in computing the taxpayer's
      business-income tax,
(d) that would not have been payable had the taxpayer
      not been a citizen of that country and that cannot reasonably be
      regarded as attributable to income from a source outside
      Canada,
(e) that may reasonably be regarded as relating to an
      amount that any other person or partnership has received or is
      entitled to receive from that government,
(f) that, where the taxpayer deducted an amount under
      subsection 122.3(1) from the taxpayer's tax otherwise
      payable under this Part for the year, may reasonably be regarded
      as attributable to the taxpayer's income from employment to
      the extent of the lesser of the amounts determined in respect
      thereof under paragraphs 122.3(1)(c) and (d) for
      the year,
(g) that can reasonably be attributed to a taxable
      capital gain or a portion thereof in respect of which the
      taxpayer or a spouse of the taxpayer has claimed a deduction
      under section 110.6,
(h) that may reasonably be regarded as attributable to
      any amount received or receivable by the taxpayer in respect of a
      loan for the period in the year during which it was an eligible
      loan (within the meaning assigned by subsection 33.1(1)), or
(i) that can reasonably be regarded as relating to an
      amount that was deductible under subparagraph 110(1)(f)(i)
      in computing the taxpayer's taxable income for the year;
[14]          
      Non-business-income tax does not include a tax or portion thereof
      that would not have been payable had the taxpayer not been a
      citizen of that county and that cannot be reasonably regarded as
      attributable to income from a source outside Canada.
[15]           The
      Respondent has submitted that these Class 3 insurance
      contributions are not a non-business-income tax under the
      Act as the contributions are not income or profits
      tax.
[16]           Are these
      contributions a tax? Judge Hamlyn of this Court in Kempe v.
      R. [2001] 1 C.T.C. 2060 had to determine whether a German
      state imposed church tax qualified for a deduction of foreign
      tax. In referring to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
      Lawson v. Interior Tree Fruit and Vegetable Committee of
      Direction, [1931] S.C.R. 357 Judge Hamlyn stated:
A tax is a levy, enforceable by law imposed under the
      authority of a legislature, imposed by a public body and levied
      for a public purpose.
[17]           The test
      for the essentials of a tax were confirmed in Attorney-General
      of Canada v. Registrar of Titles of Vancouver Land Registration
      District, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 764 as follows:
The tests are (1) it must be enforceable by law (2) imposed by
      a public body under legislative authority and for a public
      purpose. In addition "compulsion is an essential
      feature" (Halifax v. Nova Scotia Car Works (1914), 18
      D.L.R. 649, at p. 652).
[18]           These
      requirements have been confirmed in such later cases as M.N.R.
      v. The Shawinigan Water and Power Co., 53 DTC 1036.
[19]           In the
      case of Kempe, Judge Hamlyn found that the church tax was
      a compulsory obligation and that the ability of avoiding the tax
      by giving up citizenship or church membership did not make it any
      less a tax. In the present case, the Appellant became a resident
      of Canada and reported no foreign income from the U.K. The
      Appellant admitted that he chose voluntarily to continue making
      contributions towards the U.K. insurance plan. The exhibits which
      he presented, including the website information of the National
      Insurance Plan and the statements of the amount that was payable,
      refer to these Class 3 contributions as voluntary.
      According to the Appellant's evidence, when he worked in the
      U.K. he was required to make contributions on a weekly basis,
      which amounts were taken directly off his cheque and submitted.
      As pointed out by Respondent counsel, these payments were akin to
      CPP premiums in Canada, where the regime is structured so that
      payments are compulsory. When the Appellant left the U.K. for
      Canada in the 1970's he no longer made contributions to this
      plan and in fact made his first payment again only in 1993, after
      discussions with a friend prompted him to do so. The Appellant
      voluntarily applied to pay these contributions in order to
      maintain an old age pension in the U.K. The Appellant is clearly
      not obliged to pay these contributions. They are voluntary, not
      compulsory.
[20]          
      Black's Law Dictionary defines "tax" as
      follows:
A charge by the government on the income of an individual,
      corporation, or trust, as well as on the value of an estate or
      gift or property. The objective in assessing the tax is to
      generate revenue to be used for the needs of the public.
A pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property to
      support the government, and is a payment exacted by legislative
      authority. Essential characteristics of a tax are that it is not
      a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced contribution,
      exacted pursuant to legislative authority.
[21]           I agree
      with counsel for the Respondent that the case of Kempe can
      be distinguished from the present case as the church tax in
      Kempe was determined to be a tax due to its compulsory
      nature and that it was required by the laws of Germany. All
      evidence presented here however points to the payments being
      voluntary. The Class 3 contributions were not calculated as a
      percentage of income earned as no income was being earned in the
      U.K. All evidence of the Appellant referred to the entitlement of
      the U.K. citizens to apply to make contributions if they so
      wished or on a voluntary basis. The contributions were a
      minimum qualification amount rather than based on
      income earned. If a U.K. citizen wanted to make these
      contributions he had to meet a minimum requirement of working
      three years in the U.K. Thereafter these contributions could be
      made voluntarily in the expectation of receiving a benefit of old
      age pension. The Appellant had a choice of making these
      contributions. They were not compulsory in any sense of the word.
      In fact the Appellant in his evidence stated that if he ceased to
      make the yearly contributions referred to in these statements,
      nothing further happened. He simply would not receive future
      statements from the U.K.
[22]           The
      Appellant argued that his contributions were not voluntary
      because of the pressure and duress he felt surrounding the
      freezing of the non-uprated portions of the old age pension. He
      cited case law in support of this. However these cases are
      distinguishable. I agree with Respondent counsel when she stated
      that the issue, quite rightly here, is whether a certain type of
      payment is a tax. And for it to be a tax it must be compulsory.
      In any event, the Appellant had been advised his old age pension
      would be frozen at 65 and frozen at the amount of his first
      cheque. He was further advised that he could choose to make
      voluntary contributions and clearly indicated in his evidence
      that he chose to make these contributions to the U.K. plan rather
      than some other type of investment, as it was a guaranteed
      reliable state pension that was, to use his words, "a good
      investment". Although the Appellant argued they were made
      under pressure, I find no such duress in his decision to make
      those contributions.
[23]           As stated
      earlier for an amount to qualify as a non-business-income tax, it
      must reasonably be regarded as attributable to income from a
      source outside Canada. The Appellant's 1999 return (filed as
      Exhibit R-1) reports no foreign-source income and the
      Appellant's evidence was that he had not received any U.K.
      income. The contributions were paid from income from Canadian
      employment. As such the contributions cannot be attributable to
      income from a source outside Canada.
[24]           A final
      comment in respect to this issue comes from a reference to the
      tax period by Respondent counsel in her summation. The amount of
      4,009.92 U.K. pounds was paid in 1993 for the period 1986 to
      1992-93 as a lump sum catch-up amount. Respondent counsel
      submitted that only the amount paid in 1999 of 335.4 U.K.
      pounds would be allowable as a deduction as the amount paid in
      the year under appeal. I believe I understood Respondent counsel
      to make this argument should it be determined that these
      contributions are deductible or a tax credit. In any event, for
      the reasons given here, I find that the contributions do not meet
      the requirements of being a non-business-income tax.
[25]           I turn
      now to the second issue which is the Appellant's entitlement
      to a deduction or a foreign tax credit for a contribution in 1999
      taxation year. Respondent counsel cited several cases to support
      her submission that there is no provision in the Act for a
      deduction of contributions paid to a foreign insurance plan. In
      the case of Bransted v. M.N.R., [1992] T.C.J. No. 2, the
      Appellant there claimed a federal foreign tax deduction for tax
      paid on social security benefits to the U.S. The social security
      benefits were however tax exempt in the U.S. and at page 6 Judge
      Sobier stated:
Paragraph 4(a) of the Convention allows a deduction in respect
      of income tax paid or accrued to the United States in respect of
      profits, income or gains which arise in the United States. This
      income did arise in the United States, but because no tax was
      paid to or accrued to the United States in respect of these
      benefits, they cannot be included in a calculation of tax paid to
      the United States.
[26]           In the
      case before me, as no tax was paid, the Appellant can have no
      entitlement to a deduction or a tax credit for an amount paid to
      a foreign country. The Appellant made the contributions with
      after tax dollars and accordingly he will be taxed on that income
      upon receipt of benefits. There is no breach of the U.K./Canada
      agreement. The contributions were not a tax so there can be no
      double taxation.
[27]           There is
      no provision in the Act to permit the deduction of the
      contributions paid to a foreign pension plan. In Ledwidg v.
      M.N.R., 71 DTC 188 the Court held, in discussing
      contributions to a French National Fund by a former citizen of
      France:
... the contribution ... is not a registered pension plan or a
      plan accepted by the respondent. The Income Tax Act denies
      the right to deduct such contributions from income earned in
      Canada.
... there is nothing in the Canadian Income Tax Act
      which permits the deduction of a tax in futuro.
      What is deductible is the tax paid during or for the taxation
      year involved. A contribution to a pension plan is not
      assimilated to a tax. It may or may not in the years to come,
      give rise to a levy because when the taxpayer receives the
      pension he contributed to, he receives an income which is
      taxable. Let's wait until then. For income tax purposes, the
      possibility of an event produces no relief.
[28]          
      Respondent counsel also quoted the case of Stelfox v.
      M.N.R., 85 DTC 100. The facts in Stelfox are
      almost identical to the facts before me. The Court found there
      was no provision for the deduction as the contributions were not
      an investment but were more akin to the payment of insurance
      premiums such as CPP or RSP which are deductible only when a
      specific provision is made in the Act for such a claim. In
      The Queen v. Hoffman, 85 DTC 5508, the Court there
      held:
If Parliament wanted to include, as a deduction against
      employment income, contributions made "to a similar plan of
      a country other than Canada", it would have done so. That
      Parliament expressly chose to include the phrase in respect of a
      provision concerned with the determination of maximum allowable
      deductibility limits of premium contributions, yet did not
      expressly do so in relation to paragraph 8(1)(l),
      indicates that contributions paid under social security are not
      allowable deductions within the meaning of paragraph
      8(1)(l).
[29]           The
      Act is clear, as is the case law. The Act contains
      no provision to allow a deduction of contributions paid to a
      foreign insurance plan.
[30]           With
      respect to the third issue, the Appellant's position as
      outlined in Part II of his Notice of Appeal is as follows:
I believe that when I receive my United Kingdom old age
      pension at the age of 65, the present policy of
      'freezing' (no annual uprating) at that time
      will result in a violation to the
      Canada-UK double Taxation Agreement. Also it should be
      noted that this also presently adversely affects existing
      Canadian pensioners resident in Canada in receipt of a United
      Kingdom old age pension.
It is acknowledged that upon receiving my old age pension at
      age 65, it will be taxable in Canada as part of my worldwide
      income.
When you reside in Canada as a United Kingdom pensioner, your
      old age pension is 'frozen'.
The United Kingdom government will withhold the 'frozen
      portion' of my old age pension 'at source' and
      those monies withheld by the Government are used for
      Government purposes such as payment towards social
      security or simply go into the United Kingdom Treasury.
...
The non-uprated portion of a UK old age pension withheld by
      the UK Government to a UK/Canadian citizen resident in Canada is
      in fact a TAX and should be 'deductible' or a 'tax
      credit' against the amount of foreign income reported, or
      Canadian tax payable on the foreign source income.
[31]           The
      problem the Appellant complains of is with respect to a future
      event but which does not relate to the Appellant's assessment
      for the 1999 taxation year. The jurisdiction of this Court stems
      from section 12 of the Tax Court of Canada Act. The
      available relief under the Income Tax Act for an
      appeal from an assessment is found in section 171.
      This Court may dispose of an appeal by dismissing it, allowing it
      and vacating the assessment, varying the assessment or referring
      the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and
      reassessment.
[32]           It would
      appear that the relief sought by the Appellant under Part II of
      his submissions is declaratory in nature. He did not report
      foreign source income in 1999 nor did he receive U.K. old age
      pension. This Court has no authority to provide the relief which
      the Appellant seeks. Although the Appellant produced documentary
      evidence expressing the Canadian Government's concerns over
      the unfairness of the U.K. policy and the attempts being made to
      convince the U.K. to remedy this by changing its policy, this
      Court can offer no assistance to the Appellant as there is no
      jurisdiction for it to do so.
[33]           The
      fourth and final issue I must deal with is whether the denial of
      a deduction of Class 3 contributions violates and infringes upon
      any rights and freedoms under the Charter, specifically
      sections 6, 7 and 15.
[34]           The
      Appellant states that as a result of the disallowance of the
      deductibility of his contributions, his mobility rights have been
      violated pursuant to section 6 of the Charter. Subsection
      6(1) states:
Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and
      leave Canada.
Subsection 6(2) states:
Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of
      a permanent resident of Canada has the right
      (a)            
      to move to and take up residence in any province; and
      (b)            
      to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.
[35]           In
      Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Pineview Poultry Products
      Ltd. and Frank Richardson operating as Northern Poultry,
      [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that a
      federal/provincial egg marketing scheme did not violate the
      Charter even though the Northwest Territories were not allocated
      a quota. Respecting Section 6, the Court held (at page 196):
... s. 6 responds to a concern to ensure one of the conditions
      for the preservation of the basic dignity of the person. The
      specific guarantee described in s. 6(2)(b) and s.
      6(3)(a) is mobility in the gaining of a livelihood subject
      to those laws which do not discriminate on the basis of
      residence. The mobility guarantee is defined and supported by the
      notion of equality of treatment, and absence of discrimination on
      the ground normally related to mobility in the pursuit of a
      livelihood.
[36]           The
      disallowance of a deduction or credit for the payment of
      voluntary National Insurance contributions paid to the U.K. in no
      way violates the Appellant's rights pursuant to this
      section.
[37]           I believe
      the Appellant's argument is that the freezing of the U.K. old
      age pension restricts his mobility since he feels pressured and
      under duress to relocate to the U.K. This however is not related
      in any way to a breach of his Canadian mobility rights. He is
      unrestricted in his mobility within this country and he is free
      to remain or return to the U.K. as he himself sees fit. The
      Appellant produced no evidence, other than correspondence of a
      lady who was not called as a witness, to show that he felt
      pressured to move back to the U.K. In fact the Appellant will
      eventually be the recipient of both the CPP pension and the U.K.
      pension. While many U.K. citizens, who have moved here without
      benefit of our CPP pension, are receiving only the non-uprated
      portion of the U.K. old age pension, that is not the case as
      presented before me in respect of this Appellant. The failure of
      the Act to include a deduction or tax credit for
      contributions to a foreign insurance plan in no way interferes
      with the Appellant's right to move within Canada, to leave or
      to pursue a livelihood here.
[38]           The
      Appellant then pleads that his rights under section 7 of the
      Charter have been infringed. Section 7 states:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
      person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
      accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
[39]           I will
      not restate them here but the three main stages of a
      section 7 analysis are stated by the Supreme Court of Canada
      in R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417.
[40]           The
      Appellant referred often in his submissions to the 144,000
      U.K./Canadian citizens resident in Canada that were affected by
      the failure of the Act to provide a deduction or a tax
      credit. On several occasions I reminded the Appellant, I had only
      his appeal before me and it was his circumstances that were the
      focus of the appeal. The Appellant seeks a foreign tax deduction
      or a foreign tax credit to reduce his tax liability in the 1999
      taxation year. This is an issue of economics not deprivation of
      life, liberty or security of person as the Appellant alleged.
      Respondent counsel quoted both Schaff v. The Queen, [1993]
      2 C.T.C. 2695 and Whitbread  &  Walley et al, (1988) 51
      D.L.R.(4th) 509 as standing for the proposition that
      section 7 does not protect economic interests nor does it
      guarantee a minimum income or standard of living or include a
      right to carry on a business or earn a livelihood. I agree with
      Respondent counsel's contention that if there is any
      interference or restriction with the Appellant's liberty it
      is caused by the U.K. Government policy in regard to freezing of
      the old age pension.
[41]           Even
      though I find no infringement of the Appellant's rights under
      this section, the Minister in any event is entitled to allow
      certain deductions while not allowing others. The Act by
      its very nature allows some taxpayers certain benefits while
      denying those very benefits to others.
[42]           Lastly,
      the Appellant complains of an infringement of section 15 of
      the Charter which provides:
      (1)            
      Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
      right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
      without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
      based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
      age or mental or physical disability.
      (2)            
      Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
      that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of
      disadvantaged individuals or grounds including those that are
      disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
      religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
[43]           One of
      the leading cases on the interpretation of section 15 is Law
      v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1999] 1
      S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) which sets out the three step analysis a
      court must undertake.
[44]           The onus
      or burden of proof is on the Appellant who alleges a breach of
      section 15 of the Charter to show or prove that the
      legislation is discriminatory (the case of Thibaudeau at
      page 5274).
[45]           The
      Appellant's argument is based on national origin and the
      analogous ground that he is an immigrant. His status as an
      immigrant and nationality can be discussed together under the
      enumerated ground of "national origin". He argues that
      Canadian citizens paying into a Canadian state pension are
      treated differently than a Canadian citizen paying into a U.K.
      state pension.
[46]           The
      Appellant claimed a non-refundable tax credit in his 1999 tax
      return for CPP contributions. All employed Canadian citizens are
      required to make CPP contributions and are entitled to a
      corresponding deduction under the Act. According to his
      return it appeared that the Appellant was entitled to the
      non-refundable tax credit in this respect. Citizens of this
      country whether of U.K. national origin or Canadian national
      origin are not entitled to a like deduction for contributions
      made to a foreign insurance plan. There is no differential
      treatment as nationality does not come into play. The Act
      treats all Canadian citizens on the same footing regardless of
      nationality. The Appellant's argument in fact if allowed
      would give him preferential treatment based on national origin.
      The Act in allowing deductions, benefits and credits must
      do so by making distinctions. This does not necessarily make the
      provisions discriminatory. There is no differential treatment
      here and if it could be argued that there was, it is certainly
      not discriminatory.
[47]           In
      Triantis v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue -
      M.N.R.), [1992] T.C.J. No. 768, the Court stated in dealing
      with a claim that an old age security pension claw-back
      represented discrimination against those over 65 years of
      age:
It is quite clear that the impugned legislation creates a
      distinction between certain classes of taxpayers 65 years and
      older, but that distinction is based on a level of income as
      asserted by the Respondent. That distinction - which results in a
      refund of the amount by Mr. Triantis, and its possible retention
      by another recipient - has been accomplished by the use of the
      provisions of the Income Tax Act, and that does appear to be
      distasteful to Mr. Triantis. However nothing was brought forward
      at the hearing which would indicate there are any limits on the
      powers of Parliament to do just that - to make such a distinction
      and to make it under the Income Tax Act.
[48]           The
      Minister is vested with the authority to generate revenue for
      Canada and the further authority to make necessary distinctions
      within the provisions of the legislation in accomplishing this
      goal.
[49]           In
      conclusion, I find no breach of the Appellant's rights and
      freedoms under any of the sections 6, 7 or 15 of the
      Charter. Reference was also made to section 1 of the
      Charter. The only comment I make in light of my finding is
      that the Income Tax Act would be saved pursuant to
      section 1 even if I had found some breach. The Respondent
      cited the tests for the application of section 1 as found in
      the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Oakes,
      [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. She reviewed each of these tests as
      they might apply to the present case. I do not intend to embark
      upon an analysis under section 1 or a review of these tests,
      except to state that the provisions of the Act are within
      the reasonable limits prescribed by law with the aim of
      generating revenue within the country.
[50]           And
      finally the Appellant made reference to the Canadian Bill of
      Rights. I find no violation here. The policy of freezing old
      age pensions for U.K. citizens residing in Canada is a U.K.
      policy not a Canadian one. In fact according to evidence
      submitted by the Appellant, the Canadian government has spoken
      out against what appears on its face to be an unfair regime.
      However that may be, there is still no deprivation of the
      Appellant's rights under this Bill within this country.
[51]           Although
      I sympathize with the Appellant's problems which he has
      encountered with his U.K. pension, I must interpret the law as I
      find it.
[52]          
      Accordingly I must dismiss the appeal.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 8th day of June 2001.
"Diane Campbell"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
      NO.:                             
      2001-72(IT)I
STYLE OF
      CAUSE:                           
      Frank Yates and
                                                                 
      Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF
      HEARING:                      
      Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF
      HEARING:                        
      May 9, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:      The Honourable
      Judge Diane Campbell
DATE OF ORAL
      JUDGMENT:           May 11,
      2001
APPEARANCES:
For the
      Appellant:                      
      The Appellant himself
Counsel for the Respondent:       Kristy
      Foreman Gear
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant: 
      Name:                    
      Firm:            
                                                                 
For the
      Respondent:                  
      Morris Rosenberg
                                                       
      Deputy Attorney General of Canada
                                                                                                       
      Ottawa, Canada