Bonner,
T.C.J.:—Counsel
for
the
appellant
herein
has
made
a
preliminary
application
for
an
order
”.
.
.
allowing
the
Appellant's
appeal
on
the
ground
that
the
reassessments
and
assessments
referred
to
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal
are
nullities
having
been
issued
to
a
taxpayer
no
longer
in
existence".
In
the
alternative,
he
seeks
an
order
that
the
proceedings
be
stayed
to
permit
the
appellant
to
apply
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
for
a
writ
of
certiorari
quashing
the
decision
of
the
respondent
to
issue
the
assessments
and
reassessments.
The
respondent
has
applied
for
an
order
dismissing
the
appeals
on
the
ground
that
the
named
appellant,
a
corporation
which
was
dissolved,
has
no
capacity
to
conduct
them.
The
motions
were
heard
together.
It
is
common
ground
that
460354
Ontario
Inc.,
a
body
corporate
formed
under
the
Business
Corporations
Act
of
Ontario,
was
dissolved
pursuant
to
section
246
of
that
Act
by
articles
of
dissolution
effective
on
April
3,
1985.
The
appeals
are
brought
from
three
assessments
as
follows:
(a)
an
assessment
of
tax
under
Part
I
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
notice
of
which
is
dated
October
14,
1986;
(b)
an
assessment
of
tax
under
Part
III
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
notice
of
which
is
dated
September
11,
1987;
(c)
an
assessment
of
tax
under
Part
Il
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
notice
of
which
is
also
dated
September
11,
1987.
Thus
all
three
assessments
were
made
following
the
dissolution
of
the
taxpayer.
The
taxpayer
has
not
been
revived.
I
assume
that
no
attempt
to
do
so
has
been
made.
It
was
the
position
of
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
the
assessments
are
void
and
of
no
effect
because
there
is
no
taxpayer
in
existence
who
could
be
liable
to
pay
the
tax
and
to
whom
notices
of
the
assessments
could
be
sent.
He
made
submissions
with
regard
to
the
effect
of
subsections
241(1)
and
(2)of
the
Business
Corporations
Act.
They
read
as
follows:
241
(1)
Notwithstanding
the
dissolution
of
a
corporation
under
this
Act,
(a)
a
civil,
criminal
or
administrative
action
or
proceeding
commenced
by
or
against
the
corporation
before
its
dissolution
may
be
continued
as
if
the
corporation
had
not
been
dissolved;
(b)
a
civil,
criminal
or
administrative
action
or
proceeding
may
be
brought
against
the
corporation
within
five
years
after
its
dissolution
as
if
the
corporation
had
not
been
dissolved;
and
(c)
any
property
that
would
have
been
available
to
satisfy
any
judgment
or
order
if
the
corporation
had
not
been
dissolved
remains
available
for
such
purpose.
(2)
For
the
purposes
of
this
section,
the
service
of
any
process
on
a
corporation
after
its
dissolution
shall
be
deemed
to
be
sufficiently
made
if
it
is
made
upon
any
person
last
shown
on
the
records
of
the
Ministry
as
being
a
director
or
officer
of
the
corporation
before
the
dissolution.
Counsel
asserted
that
the
assessments
did
not
fall
within
the
words
of
paragraph
241(1)(b)
"a
civil,
criminal
or
administrative
action
or
proceeding
.
.
.”
with
the
consequence
that
the
Minister
was
unable
to
make
them.
He
said
that
it
was
impossible
to
serve
the
notices
of
the
assessments
notwithstanding
subsection
(2).
In
summary,
he
said,
a
valid
assessment
requires
that
a
taxpayer
exist,
be
properly
named
in
the
notice
of
assessment
and
be
liable
for
the
tax.
It
was
the
position
of
counsel
for
the
respondent
that
no
appellant
exists
and
there
is
no
manner
in
which
a
non-existent
entity
can
pursue
an
appeal.
In
consequence,
she
submitted,
the
appeals
must
be
quashed.
In
argument
she
referred,
inter
alia,
to
Spray
Construction
Company
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
2
Tax
A.B.C.
170;
50
D.T.C.
282
and
Lord
Elgin
Hotel
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1969]
C.T.C.
24;
69
D.T.C.
5059.
In
my
view
the
Court
cannot
consider
the
question
whether
assessments
are
valid
unless
it
is
first
able
to
find
that
appeals
from
those
assessments
have
been
properly
launched.
No
corporation
that
has
been
dissolved
exists
for
the
purpose
of
the
conduct
of
litigation
unless
the
proceeding
falls
within
the
ambit
of
provisions
similar
to
paragraph
241(1)(a)
or
(b)
of
the
Business
Corporations
Act.
The
present
appeals
purport
to
be
brought
by
and
not
against
the
above-named
appellant
and
were
commenced
following
its
dissolution.
Thus
neither
paragraph
(a)
nor
(b)
of
subsection
241(1)
applies
to
permit
the
conduct
of
this
litigation.
I
decline
to
follow
Mr.
Banwell’s
invitation
to
dismiss
the
appeals
on
the
ground
that
because
the
company
was
dissolved
prior
to
the
assessments,
the
assessments
must
be
treated
as
nullities
which
are
incapable
of
giving
rise
to
any
right
of
appeal.
To
consider
and
rule
on
the
validity
of
the
assessments
is
to
entertain
the
appeals.
This
Court
has
no
power
to
give
declaratory
relief.
It
may
dispose
of
income
tax
appeals
only
in
the
manner
laid
down
in
subsection
171(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
do
not
agree
with
the
submission
that
section
13
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act
in
any
way
authorizes
the
granting
of
declaratory
relief.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
referred
to
the
decision
of
the
Federal
Court
in
Burri
v.
The
Queen,
[1985]
2
C.T.C.
42;
85
D.T.C.
5287.
He
noted
that
the
style
of
cause
in
that
case
was
as
follows:
Eric
Burri
in
his
capacity
as
a
director
of
New
Park
Apartments
Limited
at
the
time
of
its
dissolution
(Plaintiff)
v.
Her
Majesty
The
Queen
(Defendant).
Nothing
in
the
reasons
for
judgment
in
that
case
indicate
that
the
Court
considered
or
decided
either
the
question
whether
a
company
which
had
been
dissolved
had
the
capacity
to
conduct
litigation
or
whether
a
former
director
had
the
right
to
conduct
litigation
on
behalf
of
a
dissolved
corporation.
It
seems
illogical
to
suggest
that
litigation
can
be
conducted
on
behalf
of
a
non-existent
entity.
I
have
already
dealt
with
the
question
whether
a
non-existent
entity
can
itself
conduct
litigation.
The
word
quashed
is
not
to
be
found
in
subsection
171(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Judgment
will
therefore
go
dismissing
the
appeals.
Finally,
I
will
note
that
the
dismissal
of
the
appeals
does
not
prevent
counsel
from
seeking
other
forms
of
relief
in
other
courts.
For
the
foregoing
reasons
the
appeals
will
be
dismissed
and
not
stayed.
Appeals
dismissed.