Noel
J.A.:
This
is
an
application
for
judicial
review
from
a
decision
by
Judge
Bowman
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
confirming
that
the
applicant
had
received
a
benefit
from
his
employment
and
that
as
such
he
had
to
include
the
sums
of
$15,000
and
$50,000
in
his
income
for
1987
and
1988
taxation
years
respectively.
The
facts
mentioned
by
the
applicant
in
support
of
his
action
are
relatively
straightforward.
In
September
1986
he
successfully
applied
for
the
position
of
Clerk
of
the
Legislative
Assembly
of
the
province
of
Ontario.
Before
taking
this
position
he
had
been
Principal
Clerk
responsible
for
management
of
parliamentary
committees
and
private
legislation
at
the
House
of
Commons
in
Ottawa.
His
new
job
gave
him
a
significant
salary
increase
but
also
required
him
to
move
with
his
family
to
Toronto,
where
the
real
estate
market
was
more
costly.
The
applicant
mentioned
this
concern
after
the
position
was
offered
to
him
but
before
he
had
accepted
it.
His
employer
told
him
at
that
time
that
he
would
be
offered
financial
assistance,
but
gave
no
further
details.
Two
weeks
after
he
accepted
his
new
position
the
employer
told
the
applicant
that
he
would
be
paid
an
amount
calculated
by
reference
to
the
difference
between
the
selling
price
of
his
house
in
Aylmer
and
the
purchase
of
an
equivalent
house
in
Toronto.
The
taxpayer’s
house
was
put
up
for
sale
but
remained
on
the
market
for
several
months,
such
that
the
employer
was
forced
to
purchase
it
in
order
to
facilitate
the
move.
For
this
purpose
the
selling
price
was
set
at
$104,570,
in
accordance
with
the
fair
market
value
as
determined
by
independent
appraisers.
The
applicant
claimed
that
at
the
time
the
average
value
of
equivalent
houses
in
Toronto
was
about
$250,000.
The
applicant
said
that
as
he
was
desirous
of
minimizing
the
money
his
employer
had
undertaken
to
pay
on
his
behalf
he
in
April
1987
purchased
a
house
located
in
Oakville
which
he
considered
was
clearly
inferior
to
the
one
he
had
given
up.
In
his
submission,
this
house
was
inferior
in
that:
1.
it
was
located
45
km.
from
his
workplace,
whereas
the
other
was
only
9
km.
away;
2.
it
was
a
semi-detached
house,
whereas
the
other
was
detached;
3.
it
had
a
surface
area
of
1,700
sq.
ft.,
while
the
other
had
a
surface
area
of
2,400
sq.
ft.;
4.
it
had
three
bedrooms,
while
the
other
had
four.
The
house
in
question
was
purchased
for
$171,000.
The
applicant
moved
there
with
his
wife
and
three
children
in
April
1987.
Consistent
with
the
undertaking
it
had
given,
the
employer
paid
the
applicant
the
sums
of
$15,000
in
1987
and
$50,000
in
1988,
a
total
amount
almost
equal
to
the
difference
between
the
selling
price
of
the
old
house
and
the
cost
of
purchasing
the
new
one.
In
the
summer
of
1987
the
applicant
incurred
expenses
of
some
$22,000
in
order
to
renovate
his
new
house
and
create
the
living
space
needed
to
accommodate
the
members
of
his
family.
Despite
these
expenses
the
applicant
was
eventually
forced
to
conclude
that
the
house
was
still
inadequate
as
it
was
too
small.
The
decision
was
taken
to
dispose
of
it
and
at
the
end
of
1988
the
applicant
and
his
family
moved
to
a
new
house
which
we
may
assume
was
more
spacious.
In
light
of
these
facts
Judge
Bowman
concluded
that
the
sums
of
$15,000
and
$50,000
received
by
the
applicant
in
the
1987
and
1988
taxation
years
were
a
benefit
resulting
from
his
employment
and
that
as
such
these
amounts
were
taxable.
The
applicant,
who
represented
himself,
considered
that
he
had
not
received
a
benefit,
relying
essentially
on
the
fact
that
the
house
he
had
purchased
in
Oakville
was
in
every
respect
inferior
to
the
one
he
had
given
up
when
he
accepted
his
new
position.
He
claimed
that,
at
the
very
least,
the
expenses
incurred
to
renovate
the
house
in
Oakville
should
be
deducted
from
the
benefit
he
allegedly
received.
The
only
question
that
arises
is
as
to
whether,
in
paying
the
applicant
the
sum
of
$65,000
in
order
to
enable
him
to
acquire
a
residence
in
a
more
costly
real
estate
market
and
so
facilitate
his
coming
to
Toronto,
the
employer
conferred
a
benefit
on
him
within
the
meaning
of
s.
6(1)
(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
As
I
see
it,
the
question
answers
itself.
When
he
accepted
his
new
position
the
applicant
knew
he
had
to
move
to
Toronto.
The
fact
that
he
would
not
have
accepted
the
position
without
the
financial
benefit
he
was
promised
does
not
help
his
case,
nor
does
his
statement
that
the
house
purchased
in
Toronto
was
in
his
view
clearly
inferior
to
the
one
he
chose
to
give
up.
The
Revenue
Department
is
not
concerned
with
the
use,
whether
good
or
bad,
that
the
applicant
may
have
made
of
the
financial
assistance
he
received.
What
matters
is
the
existence
of
a
benefit
which
is
quantifiable
in
monetary
terms.
In
the
case
at
bar
the
employer
paid
his
employee
the
sum
of
$65,000
so
the
latter
could
purchase
a
personal
asset.
A
benefit
equal
to
the
amount
paid
by
the
employer
undoubtedly
results
from
this
transaction.
I
also
will
not
dwell
at
any
length
on
the
taxpayer’s
argument
that
the
property
purchased
with
this
benefit
had
a
fluctuating
value.!!
The
trial
judge
put
the
question
raised
by
the
taxpayer
as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
If
he
had
sold
it
after
residential
prices
fell
in
1989,
he
would
have
sustained
a
non-deductible
loss.
Where
is
the
benefit
he
was
supposed
to
have
enjoyed
and
in
respect
of
which
he
was
assessed?
As
I
mentioned,
the
benefit
resulted
from
the
amount
the
applicant
was
paid
in
order
to
enable
him
to
acquire
a
residence
in
a
more
costly
real
estate
market.
That
benefit
is
measured
at
the
time
it
was
conferred.
The
fact
that
the
residence
acquired
with
this
financial
aid
might
subsequently
increase
or
decrease
in
value
is
of
no
interest
to
the
Revenue
Department.
In
his
judgment
the
trial
judge
mentioned
the
legal
uncertainty
resulting
from
recent
decisions
by
this
Court
in
Phillips^
and
Hoefele
and
added
that
in
the
circumstances
it
is
easy
to
see
why
the
applicant
regarded
the
benefit
which
was
being
taxed
in
his
hands
as
[TRANSLATION]
“illusory”
or
“imaginary”.
Judge
Bowman
invited
the
applicant
to
appeal
his
judgment,
suggesting
that
this
Court
use
the
opportunity
to
clarify
the
state
of
the
law.
I
do
not
feel
there
is
any
need
here
to
say
more
than
is
necessary
to
dispose
of
the
action
at
bar.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
on
the
facts
on
issue
here,
there
is
nothing
illusory
or
imaginary
in
the
benefit
conferred
on
the
applicant
or
the
value
of
that
benefit
at
the
time
it
was
conferred.
The
application
for
judicial
review
should
be
dismissed.
As
the
respondent
did
not
claim
any
costs,
no
order
should
be
made
in
this
regard.
Application
dismissed.