Beaubier,
T.C.J.:—This
appeal
was
heard
at
the
City
of
Toronto,
Ontario,
on
May
2,
1991.
At
the
opening
of
trial,
parties
filed
an
agreed
statement
of
facts
which
reads
as
follows:
1.
Dr.
Tedmon
was
employed
as
a
scientist
and
subsequently
as
a
Research
and
Development
Manager
at
General
Electric
Company
(“GE”)
during
the
period
June,
1964
through
February,
1987.
All
of
Dr.
Tedmon's
employment
activities
during
this
period
were
exercised
in
the
United
States.
2.
GE
is
a
corporation
incorporated
in
the
United
States.
3.
Throughout
the
period
June,
1964
through
February,
1987,
Dr.
Tedmon
was
a
citizen
of
and
resident
in
the
United
States.
At
no
time
in
or
prior
to
this
period
was
Dr.
Tedmon
resident
in
or
employed
in
Canada.
4,
Under
the
terms
of
his
employment
by
GE,
Dr.
Tedmon
was
entitled
to
participate
in
the
GE
employee
Stock
Option
Plan
(the
"US
Stock
Plan”).
5.
Dr.
Tedmon
chose
to
terminate
his
employment
with
GE
in
February,
1987.
G.E.
agreed
that
Dr.
Tedmon
would
continue,
notwithstanding
his
termination,
to
be
able
to
exercise
the
options
granted
to
him
up
to
that
time.
6.
Dr.
Tedmon
did
not
receive
any
options
from
GE
after
February,
1987.
7.
In
March,
1987,
Dr.
Tedmon
began
working
for
Noranda
Inc.
in
Canada.
Nor-
anda
Inc.
is
a
Canadian
corporation
that
is
unrelated
to
GE.
8.
In
March,
1987,
Dr.
Tedmon
moved
to
and
became
resident
in
Canada,
and
was
resident
in
Canada
throughout
1988.
9.
In
1988
Dr.
Tedmon
exercised
certain
of
his
options
under
the
US
Stock
Plan
and
acquired
12,000
GE
shares.
10.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
assessed
Dr.
Tedmon's
1988
taxation
year
on
the
basis
that
his
US
Stock
Plan
options
resulted
in
a
benefit
that
was
employment
income
subject
to
tax
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
(Canada).
This
benefit
was
valued
by
the
Minister
on
the
basis
of
the
difference
between
the
value
of
the
GE
shares
on
the
date
that
they
were
acquired
and
the
exercise
price
under
the
US
Stock
Plan.,
11.
Dr.
Tedmon
filed
a
Notice
of
Objection
in
respect
of
his
1988
assessment
on
the
grounds,
inter
alia,
that
his
rights
under
the
US
Stock
Plan
accrued
while
he
was
a
U.S.
resident
employed
in
the
U.S.
by
a
U.S.
employer
and,
as
such,
any
benefit
derived
therefrom
was
not
subject
to
taxation
in
Canada.
12.
By
Notice
of
Reassessment
dated
July
12,
1990,
the
Minister
disallowed
Dr.
Tedmon's
objection.
There
was
no
other
evidence.
The
principal
argument
between
the
parties
centres
on
section
7
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
“Act’”)
which,
for
purposes
relevant
to
this
appeal,
reads:
7.
(1)
.
.
.where
a
corporation
has
agreed
to
sell
or
issue
shares
|
of
the
|
corporation
.
.
.
to
an
employee.
.
.
|
|
(a)
if
the
employee
has
acquired
shares
under
the
agreement,
a
benefit
equal
to
the
amount
by
which
the
value
of
the
shares
at
the
time
he
acquired
them
exceeds
the
amount
paid
by
him
shall
be
deemed
received
by
the
employee
in
the
taxation
year
in
which
he
acquired
the
shares.
Subsection
7(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
then
states,
in
essence:
.
.
.
where
a
person
.
.
.
has
ceased
to
be
an
employee
before
all
things
have
happened
that
would
make
the
provision
applicable,
subsection
(1)
shall
continue
to
apply
as
though
the
person
were
still
an
employee
and
as
though
the
employment
were
still
in
existence.
The
appellant
argues
this
does
not
apply
to
a
Canadian
resident
taxpayer
where
the
agreement
was
entered
into
by
him
while
he
was
a
non-resident
with
a
non-resident
employer
and
cites
Henry
Russell
Hewitt
v.
M.N.R.,
[1989]
2
C.T.C.
2278;
89
D.T.C.
451,
as
the
authority
for
this
proposition.
In
that
case,
Mogan,
T.C.J.
states
at
page
2279
(D.T.C.
452)
that
the
taxpayer,
Hewitt,
was
not
liable
in
respect
to
income
which
was
not
earned
or
did
not
accrue
when
the
appellant
was
a
resident
in
Canada.
In
fact
that
income
accrued
on
May
25,
1984,
while
Mr.
Hewitt
was
still
in
Libya
when:
”.
.
.
he
signed
all
the
documents
connected
with
the
amicable
termination
of
his
employment
by
Oasis
Oil
and
requested
a
single
cash
payment
out.
.
.”.
Thus,
Mr.
Hewitt
exercised
all
his
rights
and
entitlement
to
income
and
receipt
thereof
while
a
non-resident
of
Canada.
He
also
directed
where
the
cheque
was
to
go
at
that
time.
The
appellant's
second
argument
is
that
article
XV
of
the
Canada-United
States
Income
Tax
Convention,
1980
prohibits
Canada
from
taxing
any
deemed
benefit
arising
from
the
exercise
by
Dr.
Tedmon
of
his
options;
in
essence
the
appellant
says
that
paragraph
1
of
article
XV
provides
that
remuneration
derived
by
a
resident
of
the
United
States
in
respect
to
employment
shall
be
taxable
only
in
the
United
States
unless
the
employment
is
exercised
in
Canada.
"Derived"
in
the
sense
of
the
Convention
is
then
argued
to
mean
"accruing",
based
on
M.N.R.
v.
Hollinger
North
Shore
Exploration
Co.,
[1963]
S.C.R.
131;
[1963]
C.T.C.
51;
63
D.T.C.
1031
at
54
(D.T.C.
1033;
S.C.R.
134),
whereupon
the
appellant
argues
further
that
"derived"
refers
to
the
source
of
income,
rather
than
the
receipt
of
income:
Bessemer
Trust
Co.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1972]
C.T.C.
473;
72
D.T.C.
6404.
The
consequence
of
these
steps
is
the
proposal
by
the
appellant
that
article
XV
refers
to
the
residence
of
the
taxpayer
when
the
option
is
granted
(which
is
the
year
the
benefit
is
derived
or
accrued)
with
the
result
that
the
appellant
is
not
taxable
in
Canada.
A
third
(alternate)
argument
is
that
subsection
48(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
causes
a
value
of
the
option
to
be
taken
at
the
time
the
appellant
becomes
a
Canadian
resident
and
thus,
Dr.
Tedmon
should
only
be
taxed
on
the
increase
in
the
value
of
the
shares
which
occurred
while
he
was
a
resident
of
Canada.
In
reply,
counsel
for
the
respondent
refers
to
subsection
5(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
states:
5.(1)
Subject
to
this
Part,
a
taxpayer's
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment
is
the
salary,
wages
and
other
remuneration,
including
gratuities,
received
by
him
in
the
year.
Mr.
Justice
Dickson
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
said
of
this:
Subsection
5(1)
of
the
Act
is
worth
noting.
It
defines
the
taxpayer's
income
from
employment
as
the
salary,
wages
and
other
remuneration
received.
The
liability
is
at
the
point
of
receipt.
[Emphasis
added.]
Gene
A.
Nowegijick
v.
The
Queen,
[1983]
C.T.C.
20;
83
D.T.C.
5041
(S.C.C.)
at
23
(D.T.C.
5043).
Thus,
Mr.
Justice
Dickson
fixes
the
liability
under
subsection
5(1)
as
at
the
point
of
receipt.
It
is
to
be
noted
that
paragraph
7(1)(a)
refers
to
"the
taxation
year
in
which
ne
acquired
the
shares",
rather
than
the
taxation
year
in
which
he
acquired
the
agreement
or
option.
Dr.
Tedmon
acquired
the
shares
when
he
exercised
the
option
while
a
resident
of
Canada
in
1988.
The
counsel
for
the
respondent
deals
with
the
appellant's
second
argument
by
quoting
article
XV
as
to
the
following:
.
.
.
salaries,
wages
and
other
similar
remuneration
derived
by
a
resident
of
a
Contracting
State
in
respect
of
an
employment
shall
be
taxable
only
in
that
State
unless
the
employment
is
exercised
in
the
other
Contracting
State.
He
then
says
that
at
the
time
of
exercise
of
the
option
Dr.
Tedmon
was
a
resident
of
Canada,
was
not
employed
in
the
United
States,
and
is
taxable
pursuant
to
section
7
of
the
Act.
The
Court
accepts
the
respondent's
argument
on
this
point,
having
regard
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
7(1)
and
subsection
5(1)
and
to
the
determination
of
Mr.
Justice
Dickson
already
quoted.
The
appellant's
alternate
argument
that
the
option
was
capital
and
not
income
on
immigration
has
been
dealt
with
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
when
it
approved
the
Trial
Division's
statements
in
Vincent
N.
Hurd
v.
The
Queen,
[1981]
C.T.C.
209;
81
D.T.C.
5140
at
214
(D.T.C.
5143).
There,
the
majority
adopted
the
following
quotation:
.
.
.
plaintiffs
transaction
was
neither
a
sale
nor
an
exchange
of
capital
assets.
He
acquired
shares
at
a
price
previously
set
under
an
option
and
thus
benefited
from
their
increased
value,
a
benefit
taxable
under
this
Act
as
having
been
made
by
virtue
of
his
employment
in
Canada.
The
mere
fact
that
he
only
exercised
his
option
after
he
left
Canada
does
not
transform
the
taxable
benefit
into
something
else.
The
appellant
exercised
his
option
and
received
a
benefit
from
his
previous
employment
while
he
was
a
resident
in
Canada.
This
falls
within
the
ordinary
meaning
of
section
7
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
read
within
the
context
of
the
Act
and
the
Convention.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.