Dubé,
J.:—This
action
turns
on
the
interpretation
of
subsection
227(9)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
reads
as
follows:
227.
(9)
Every
person
who
has
failed
to
remit
or
pay
(a)
an
amount
deducted
or
withheld
as
required
by
this
Act
or
a
regulation,
or
(b)
an
amount
of
tax
that
he
is,
by
section
116
or
by
a
regulation
made
under
subsection
215(4),
required
to
pay,
is
liable
to
a
penalty
of
10%
of
that
amount
or
$10,
whichever
is
the
greater,
in
addition
to
the
amount
itself,
together
with
interest
on
the
amount
at
the
rate
per
annum
prescribed
for
the
purposes
of
subsection
(8).
The
plaintiff
is
a
British
Columbia
corporation
carrying
on
the
business
of
an
electrical
contractor
in
the
City
of
Vernon,
B.C.
It
withheld
amounts
as
required
by
section
153
of
the
Act
from
wages
paid
to
its
employees
during
each
of
the
months
of
June
and
September
1981,
October
1982
and
January
1983
which
were
remitted
to
the
Receiver
General
of
Canada.
Subsequent
to
each
remittance
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
assessed
the
plaintiff,
pursuant
to
subsection
227(9)
aforementioned.
The
remittances
were
not
effected
within
the
time
prescribed
by
Regulation
108(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
which
prescribes
that
amounts
deducted
shall
be
remitted
to
the
Receiver
General
on
or
before
the
15th
day
of
the
month
next
following
the
deduction.
In
all
four
cases,
however,
the
remittances
were
effected
before
the
Minister
assessed
the
plaintiff
to
a
penalty
pursuant
to
the
above
subsection.
In
a
nutshell,
the
position
of
the
Minister
is
that
under
the
said
subsection
a
taxpayer
who
has
failed
to
remit
to
the
Receiver
General
the
amount
deducted
under
section
153
within
the
time
prescribed
by
Regulation
108(1)
is
liable
to
a
penalty
of
10
per
cent,
together
with
interest.
(In
this
instance,
however,
the
Minister
does
not
and
will
not
claim
interest
whatever
the
outcome
of
this
case.
By
consent,
there
will
be
an
order
to
that
effect.)
The
Tax
Court
of
Canada
confirmed
the
Minister's
assessments
and
dismissed
the
plaintiffs
appeal.
Rip,
T.C.J.,
conceded
that
subsection
227(9)
“could
have
been
drafted
with
greater
clarity”
but
concluded
that
it
“imposes
a
penalty
if
the
amounts
are
not
remitted
at
the
time
required
by
section
108
of
the
Regulations
to
the
Act”.
The
subsection
is
indeed
badly
written.
If
the
subsection
read
‘‘Every
person
who
has
failed
to
remit
or
pay
as
and
when
required
by
this
Act
or
a
Regulation”,
there
would
be
no
problem.
Other
penalty
sections
of
the
Act
are
so
written.
For
example,
“162.1
Every
person
who
has
failed
to
file
a
return
as
and
when
required
by”.
“235.
(1)
Every
person
who
has
failed
to
make
a
return
as
and
when
required
by.”
“238.
(1)
Every
person
who
has
failed
to
file
a
return
as
and
when
required
by”.
By
any
rules
of
construction
the
modifier
“as
required
by
this
Act
or
a
Regulation”
of
paragraph
227(9)(a)
modifies
only
that
paragraph
and
not
the
whole
subsection
227(9).
In
construing
a
penal
section
words
that
are
capable
of
an
interpretation
that
would
or
would
not
inflict
the
penalty
must
be
given
the
latter
interpretation.
(See
M.N.R.
v.
Donald
M.
Weeks,
[1972]
C.T.C.
60
at
62;
71
D.T.C.
6001
at
6002.)
In
other
words,
if
this
penal
provision
is
ambiguous,
the
taxpayer
must
be
given
the
benefit
of
the
doubt.
For
a
provision
to
be
ambiguous,
there
must
be
more
than
one
valid
interpretation.
The
interpretation
submitted
by
the
Minister,
as
already
mentioned,
is
that
failure
to
remit
or
pay
means
failure
to
remit
or
pay
on
time.
The
taxpayer’s
suggested
interpretation
is
that
failure
to
remit
or
pay
means
failure
to
remit
or
pay
at
all.
The
second
interpretation,
however,
must
imply
a
time
limit
to
have
any
meaning.
Otherwise
employers
could
delay
forever
without
penalty.
The
time
limit
submitted
by
the
plaintiff
is
the
time
of
the
assessment:
if
you
remit
before
the
assessment
you
are
not
subject
to
a
penalty.
I
have
found
no
provision
in
the
Act,
and
was
referred
to
none,
which
would
create
this
penalty
or
any
penalty
by
way
of
assessment.
In
my
view,
a
penalty
is
created
by
a
breach
of
the
Act,
not
by
the
issue
of
an
assessment.
It
is
now
well
established
(see
The
Queen
v.
Simard-Beaudry
Inc.,
[1971]
F.C.
396
at
403;
71
D.T.C.
5511
at
5515)
that
the
taxpayer's
debt
is
created
by
his
taxable
income
and
by
the
Act,
not
by
an
assessment.
In
principle,
the
debt
comes
into
existence
the
moment
the
income
is
earned.
Similarly,
a
penalty
comes
into
existence
the
moment
the
statute
is
breached.
In
this
instance
the
penalty
arose
on
the
16th
day
of
the
month
following
the
deduction.
The
assessment
which
followed
did
not
create
the
penalty,
it
merely
notified
the
taxpayer
to
pay
it.
Even
if
the
provision
is
not
as
clear
as
it
ought
to
be,
it
must
be
construed
within
the
general
framework
or
the
scheme
of
the
Act.
The
basic
section
on
withholding
is
section
153
which
stipulates
that
an
employer
shall
deduct
or
withhold
from
wages
and
shall
“‘at
such
time
as
may
be
prescribed,
remit
that
amount
to
the
Receiver
General".
Subsection
227(8)
imposes
a
penalty
of
10
per
cent
of
the
amount
not
deducted
or
withheld
when
an
employer
has
failed
to
deduct
or
withhold
as
required
by
section
153.
Similarly,
subsection
227(9)
imposes
a
penalty
of
10
per
cent
of
the
amount
not
remitted
when
an
employer
has
failed
to
remit
or
pay.
Subsection
108(1)
of
the
Regulations
provides
that
the
amounts
deducted
or
withheld
under
section
153
shall
be
remitted
to
the
Receiver
General
on
or
before
the
15th
day
of
the
following
month.
Viewed
in
that
context,
subsection
227(9)
is
capable
of
only
one
reasonable
interpretation,
namely,
that
it
imposes
a
penalty
on
the
employer
who
fails
to
remit
on
time.
The
action,
therefore,
is
dismissed
with
costs.
At
the
request
of
both
parties
it
is
also
adjudged
that
the
plaintiff
shall
not
be
assessed
interest
on
any
of
the
four
assessments.
Appeal
dismissed.