Stone
J.A.:-In
our
opinion
this
application
for
judicial
review
must
fail.
As
a
second
application,
in
court
file
A-337-94,
raises
the
same
issue,
these
reasons
will
be
filed
in
that
matter
and
shall
become
the
reasons
for
judgment
of
the
Court
therein.
In
the
summer
of
1992,
the
applicant
decided
to
seek
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
an
extension
of
time
within
which
to
file
an
objection
against
an
assessment
of
income
to
tax.
The
mode
of
making
such
an
application
is
governed
by
subsections
166.2(1)
and
(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-
71-72,
c.
63)
(the
’’Act”),
which
read:
166.2(1)
A
taxpayer
who
has
made
an
application
under
subsection
166.1
may
apply
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
to
have
the
application
granted
after
either
(a)
the
Minister
has
refused
the
application,
or
(b)
90
days
have
elapsed
after
service
of
the
application
under
subsection
166.1(1)
and
the
Minister
has
not
notified
the
taxpayer
of
the
Minister’s
decision.
but
no
application
under
this
section
may
be
made
after
the
expiration
of
90
days
after
the
day
on
which
notification
of
the
decision
was
mailed
to
the
taxpayer.
(2)
An
application
under
subsection
(1)
shall
be
made
by
filing
in
the
Registry
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
or
by
sending
by
registered
mail
addressed
to
an
office
of
the
Registry,
three
copies
of
the
documents
referred
to
in
subsection
166.1(3)
and
three
copies
of
the
notification,
if
any,
referred
to
in
subsection
166.1(5).
In
this
case,
the
application
was
sent
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
through
a
courier
on
August
4,
1992.
Unfortunately
for
the
applicant,
it
was
never
received
by
the
Tax
Court.
The
application
to
the
Tax
Court
for
a
further
extension
of
time
failed.
In
our
view,
the
only
legal
methods
authorized
for
the
making
of
such
an
application
to
the
Tax
Court
are
those
provided
for
in
subsection
166.2(2)
of
the
statute.
The
method
adopted
by
the
applicant
is
not
one
that
was
authorized
by
the
statute,
both
of
whose
methods
of
making
such
an
application
are
mandatory.
This
Court
is
simply
not
able
to
ignore
the
clear
language
of
the
statute
by
sanctioning
the
method
which
failed.
Put
shortly,
that
method
was
not
one
that
the
statute
authorized
because
it
did
not
consist
of
either
filing
in
person
or
by
registered
mail,
both
of
which
methods
provide
the
certainty
that
any
unauthorized
method
does
not
provide.
Any
other
method
of
filing
as
is
not
already
authorized
can
only
be
one
that
Parliament
itself
may
decide
to
adopt.
Finally,
we
can
find
nothing
in
section
166.2
as
a
whole
which
would
allow
this
Court
to
disregard
the
plain
language
of
subsection
166.2(2)
in
the
circumstances
before
us.
The
application
will
be
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.
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