Hugessen
J.A.:—This
section
28
application
seeks
to
review
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
which
upheld
the
Minister’s
decision
not
to
allow
the
applicant
to
deduct
the
sum
of
$18,200
paid
in
1988
by
the
applicant
to
his
separated
spouse.
That
amount
is
mentioned
in
minutes
of
settlement
signed
by
the
spouses
with
advice
of
counsel
(not
the
same
as
on
this
application)
on
May
9,
1989.
Clause
14
of
those
minutes
of
settlement
reads:
14.
The
petitioner
acknowledges
that
the
respondent
has
paid
to
the
petitioner,
as
and
by
way
of
maintenance
during
the
calendar
year
1988,
the
sum
of
$18,200.
The
only
provision
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
which
allows
maintenance
paid
prior
to
a
separation
agreement
to
be
treated
as
though
it
were
paid
pursuant
thereto
is
subsection
60.1(3)
which
at
the
relevant
time
read:
60.1(3)
Prior
payments
-For
the
purposes
of
this
section
and
section
60,
where
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
a
written
agreement
made
at
any
time
in
a
taxation
year
provides
that
an
amount
paid
before
that
time
and
in
the
year
or
the
immediately
preceding
taxation
year
is
to
be
considered
as
having
been
paid
and
received
pursuant
thereto,
the
following
rules
apply:
(a)
the
amount
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
paid
pursuant
thereto;
and
(b)
the
person
who
made
the
payment
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
separated
pursuant
to
a
divorce,
judicial
separation
or
written
separation
agreement
from
his
spouse
or
former
spouse
at
the
time
the
payment
was
made
and
throughout
the
remainder
of
the
year.
We
are
all
of
the
view
that
the
plain
meaning
of
this
text
requires
that
the
agreement,
unlike
clause
14
(above),
must
provide
that
prior
payments
shall
be
considered
as
having
been
paid
and
received
pursuant
thereto.
That
is
neither
a
strict
nor
a
liberal
interpretation
of
the
Act:
it
is
simply
the
only
meaning
the
words
can
bear.
We
do
not
read
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Québec
(Communauté
urbaine)
et
autres
v.
Corporation
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours
(1994),
171
N.R.
161
as
giving
warrant
to
courts
to
disregard
the
wording
of
the
statute
in
tax
cases;
on
the
contrary,
the
Court
was
careful
to
state
(at
page
180)
that
"the
ordinary
rules
of
interpretation
should
apply".
We
can
see
no
error
in
the
Tax
Court
judge’s
reading
of
the
minutes
of
settlement
and
his
interpretation
of
subsection
60.1(3)
is
unexceptionable.
The
application
will
be
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.