Tremblay,
T.CJ.
[Translation]:—These
two
appeals
were
heard
on
common
evidence
in
the
city
of
Sherbrooke,
Québec.
1.
Point
at
Issue
According
to
the
notices
of
appeal
and
the
replies
to
the
notices
of
appeal,
the
issue
is
whether
the
appellants,
a
husband
and
wife
purchasing
a
farm
as
partners
in
1983,
were
right,
in
computing
their
income
for
that
year
to
deduct
expenses
pertaining
to
the
purchases
of
livestock
and
to
the
milk
quota
according
to
an
after-purchase
valuation
stating
that
the
livestock
was
worth
$87,400
and
the
milk
quota
$88,076.
The
respondent
argued
that
the
apportionment
stipulated
in
the
contract
must
be
used,
namely
$40,000
for
the
livestock
and
$30,000
for
the
milk
quota.
There
is
also
the
issue
of
a
tax
credit
for
the
year
1984.
Resolution
of
the
latter
point
depends
on
resolution
of
the
former.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
2
.01
The
appellants
have
the
burden
of
showing
that
the
respondent's
assessments
are
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
results
from
several
judicial
decisions,
including
a
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
judgment
rendered
in
Johnston
v.
M.N.R.,
[1948]
S.C.R.
486;
[1948]
C.T.C.
195;
3
D.T.C.
1182.
2
.02
In
this
same
judgment,
the
Court
decided
that
the
assumptions
of
fact
on
which
the
respondent
bases
the
assessments
or
reassessments
are
also
presumed
to
be
true
until
proven
otherwise.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
facts
presumed
by
the
respondent
are
described
in
subparagraphs
(a)
to
(1)
of
paragraph
7
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
of
the
respondent
with
respect
to
the
appellant
Gérald
Léonard.
This
paragraph
reads
as
follows:
In
assessing
the
appelant
for
the
taxation
years
1983
and
1984,
the
respondent
Minister
of
National
Revenue
based
himself
inter
alia
on
the
following
presumptions
of
fact:
(a)
Gérald
Léonard
and
his
wife,
Suzette
Léonard,
jointly
operate
a
farm
under
the
names
and
business
names
of
Ferme
Gérald
et
Suzette
Léonard
Enr.;
(b)
during
February
1983
the
appellant
and
his
wife
sold
their
farm,
located
in
Earlton,
Ontario;
(c)
during
July
1983
they
purchased
a
new
farm,
located
in
St-Valérien;
(d)
on
July
19,
1983,
the
appellant
and
his
wife
signed
a
notarized
deed
of
sale
for
the
purchase
of
the
said
farm;
(e)
pursuant
to
the
terms
of
the
said
notarized
contract,
the
appellant
and
his
wife
agreed
with
the
sellers,
on
page
9
of
the
notarized
contract,
on
the
following
apportionment
of
the
purchase
price:
Residence
|
$
75,000.00
|
Building
|
$
45,000.00
|
Equipment
|
$
28,000.00
|
Rolling
Stock
|
$
5,000.00
|
Livestock
|
$
40,000.00
|
Milk
quota
|
$
30,000.00
|
Plot
of
land
|
$227
,000.00
|
(f)
after
purchasing
the
farm
in
question,
the
appellant
and
his
wife
unilaterally
drew
up
a
new
apportionment
of
the
price,
without
considering
the
apportionment
provided
in
the
notarized
contract
on
which
they
had
agreed
with
the
sellers;
(g)
during
1983
the
appellant
and
his
wife
claimed
an
expense
for
the
purchase
of
livestock
in
the
amount
of
$87,400.00,
although
according
to
the
notarized
agreement
the
livestock
had
been
purchased
for
$40,000.00;
(h)
during
1983
the
appellant
and
his
wife
reported
the
profit
from
the
sale
of
the
milk
quota
of
the
farm
in
Ontario
in
the
amount
of
$21,348.00,
giving
the
cost
of
purchasing
the
milk
quota
as
$88,000.00
rather
than
the
$30,000.00
indicated
in
the
notarized
contract;
(i)
during
1983
the
appellant
and
his
wife
also
reported
a
capital
gain
on
the
disposal
of
a
plot
of
land
in
the
amount
of
$5,708.00,
pursuant
to
s.
44(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
giving
the
purchase
price
of
the
plot
of
land
as
$133,300.00
in
their
computation,
rather
than
the
$227,000.00
contained
in
the
notarized
contract;
(j)
the
respondent
disallowed
the
appellant's
share
of
expenses
pertaining
to
the
purchase
of
livestock
in
the
amount
of
$23,700.00/2,
based
on
the
apportionment
provided
in
the
notarized
contract
on
which
there
had
been
agreement
between
the
parties;
(k)
during
1983
the
respondent
included
in
its
computation
of
the
appellant's
income
the
latter's
share
of
the
sale
of
the
milk
quota
in
the
amount
of
$14,500.00
(50%
of
$29,000.00),
based
on
the
apportionment
provided
in
the
notarized
contract
listing
the
value
of
the
milk
quota
at
$30,000.00;
(I)
the
investment
tax
credit
deferred
to
1984
was
reduced
by
the
respondent
to
account
for
the
additional
tax
credit
deducted
in
the
appellant’s
computation
of
income
for
the
1983
taxation
year.
3.
Facts
3.01
At
the
start
of
the
trial
both
counsel
agreed
that
the
key
issue
was
apportioning
the
value
of
the
property
purchased,
as
everything
else
de-
scribed
in
the
pleadings
is
based
on
this
apportionment.
The
evidence
was
thus
concerned
exclusively
with
the
apportionment
of
the
property
and
its
consequences.
3.02
Most
of
the
material
facts
described
above
in
paragraph
7
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
and
showing
the
various
data,
computations
and
dates,
are
not
in
dispute.
3.03
The
appellant
filed
a
table
of
taxable
income
of
the
appellants
according
to
their
tax
returns
and
their
assessments
for
1983,
1984
and
1985
as
Exhibit
A-1.
It
reads
as
follows:
Suzette
Léonard
|
1983
|
1984
|
1985
|
Taxable
income
according
to
the
return
|
5,132
|
26,607
|
(18,708)
|
Taxable
income
according
to
the
|
|
assessment
|
41,520
|
26,607
|
(18,209)
|
Gérald
Léonard
|
|
|
1983
|
1984
|
1985
|
Taxable
income
according
to
the
return
|
6,962
|
26,106
|
(19,000)
|
Taxable
income
according
to
the
|
|
assessment
|
43,502
|
26,106
|
(18,502)
|
Ferme
G.
et
S,
Léonard
|
|
|
1983
|
1984
|
1985
|
Optional
inclusion
of
livestock
at
the
|
|
close
(for
the
company
as
a
whole)
|
76,700
|
76,700
|
0
|
Sale
of
the
quota
and
the
livestock
in
1985.
|
|
3.04
The
appellants
filed
the
offer
of
purchase
for
the
farm,
dated
March
11,
1983,
as
Exhibit
A-3,
and
the
notarized
contract
dated
July
19,
1983
as
Exhibit
A-4.
Accordingly,
a
price
of
$450,000
was
paid
for
this
162-acre
farm,
including
153
acres
under
cultivation,
located
in
the
parish
of
St-Valérien
de
Milton
in
the
province
of
Québec.
3.05
Section
4
of
the
contract
reads
as
follows:
4.
The
sellers
hereby
provide
a
valuation
of
the
farm
broken
down
by
livestock,
machinery,
equipment,
the
quota,
the
plot
of
land
and
the
buildings,
and
the
purchasers
accept
this
valuation,
which
shall
remain
annexed
to
this
agreement
after
being
acknowledged
as
authentic
and
signed
by
the
parties
with
and
in
the
presence
of
the
undersigned
notary.
The
apportionment
is
as
appears
above
in
paragraph
2.02.7(e).
3.06
A
valuation
report
dated
December
1,
1983,
prepared
by
Mr.
Lucien
Beaudry,
agronomist
and
certified
appraiser,
whose
competence
was
never
in
doubt,
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-2.
The
apportionment
of
the
property
valuation,
according
to
Mr.
Beaudry,
appears
below,
along
with
that
listed
in
the
notarized
contract
(Exhibit
A-4):
3.07
Mr.
Beaudry
explained
that
his
valuation
was
based
on
a
statistical
analysis
of
the
results
of
public
auctions
held
in
Québec.
This
analysis
was
published
in
a
report
prepared
by
a
committee
consisting
of
representatives
of
the
Ministère
de
l'Agriculture,
the
Canadian
Farmers
Association,
the
Office
du
crédit
agricole
and
the
Faculty
of
Agriculture
and
Food
Science.
The
report
concerns
the
economic
aspects
of
agriculture
in
Québec.
|
Contract
|
Valuation
|
Difference
|
Residence
|
75,000
|
45,000
|
30,000
|
Building
|
45,000
|
55,900
|
(10,900)
|
Equipment
|
28,000
|
40,400
|
(
7,400)
|
Rolling
stock
|
5,000
|
|
Livestock
|
40,000
|
87
,400
|
(47,400)
|
Milk
quota
|
30,000
|
88,000
|
(58,000)
|
Plot
of
land
|
227,000
|
133,300
|
93,700
|
|
$450,000
|
$450,000
|
|
According
to
Mr.
Beaudry
the
1983
figures,
based
on
statistics,
were
confirmed
in
the
appellants'
1985
auction
of
their
farm.
Prices
had
apparently
not
fluctuated
since
1983.
Mr.
Beaudry
stated
that
he
was
commissioned
by
the
appellants
around
November
25,
1983
to
prepare
the
valuation
report.
3.08
The
appellant
Suzette
Léonard
testified
that,
at
the
time
of
the
initial
offer
to
purchase
dated
March
10,
1983,
an
apportionment
had
not
been
made.
Only
a
total
price
of
$450,000
and
the
terms
of
payment
were
in
question.
On
the
following
July
19
she
and
her
husband
arrived
at
the
notary's
office
at
2:30
p.m.
The
contract
still
had
not
been
read
by
4:30
p.m.
At
that
time
the
seller,
who
had
to
leave
to
take
care
of
his
cows,
signed
a
blank
contract.
The
appellants
remained
for
the
reading
of
the
contract
and
to
find
out
the
apportionment.
In
cross-examination,
the
witness
confirmed
the
substance
of
a
letter
signed
by
herself
and
her
husband
and
sent
to
the
respondent
at
the
same
time
as
the
report
of
the
appraiser
Beaudry,
Exhibit
1-1.
The
following
is
an
excerpt
from
that
letter:
Pursuant
to
the
offer
to
purchase
the
farm
of
Mr.
Flueler,
the
latter
wanted
to
provide
his
own
apportionment
of
the
selling
price
for
each
of
the
farm's
assets.
A
few
weeks
before
signing
the
contract,
we
asked
him
for
a
copy
of
this
apportionment,
but
did
not
succeed
in
obtaining
it.
The
day
that
the
contract
was
signed,
the
apportionment
was
presented
to
the
notary,
and
the
latter
entered
it
in
the
contract.
We
nonetheless
signed
the
contract,
having
only
a
very
limited
understanding
of
the
fiscal
consequences
of
doing
so
and
in
order
to
avoid
any
pointless
delays
in
acquiring
the
farm.
Several
consultations
with
experts
revealed
that
the
prices
included
in
the
contract
are
totally
out
of
line
with
reality
and,
as
the
seller
did
not
wish
to
come
to
an
agreement,
we
therefore
decided
to
assign
the
values
provided
by
the
certified
appraiser
on
the
financial
statements.
3.09
Mrs.
Suzette
Léonard
also
made
particular
mention
of
the
auction
sale
that
occurred
at
their
farm
on
January
17,
1985.
The
auction
brought
in
a
total
of
$105,290,
with
$89,325
for
the
cows
and
$11,000
for
the
embryos.
The
report
of
the
auction
has
been
filed
as
Exhibit
A-5.
The
witness
also
explained
that
in
1974
they
had
purchased
a
farm
located
in
Earlton,
in
northern
Ontario.
They
received
a
purchase
offer
on
February
14,
1983
and
sold
it
in
April
1983.
This
farm
had
more
land
than
the
one
in
St-
Valérien,
but
a
lower
value.
They
moved
to
Québec
on
June
26,
1983.
She
said
that
her
father
and
both
of
her
grandfathers
were
farmers.
4.
Act—Case
Law—Analysis
4.01
Act
The
key
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the"Act")
which
apply
to
these
appeals
are
sections
68
and
69.
They
read
as
follows:
68.
Amounts
in
part
consideration
for
disposition
of
property.—Where
an
amount
can
reasonably
be
regarded
as
being
in
part
the
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
any
property
of
a
taxpayer
and
as
being
in
part
consideration
for
something
else,
the
part
of
the
amount
that
can
reasonably
be
regarded
as
being
the
consideration
for
such
disposition
shall
be
deemed
to
be
proceeds
of
disposition
of
that
property
irrespective
of
the
form
or
legal
effect
of
the
contract
or
agreement;
and
the
person
to
whom
the
property
was
disposed
of
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
the
property
at
the
same
part
of
that
amount.
69.
(1)
Inadequate
considerations.—Except
as
expressly
otherwise
provided
in
this
Act,
(a)
where
a
taxpayer
has
acquired
anything
from
a
person
with
whom
he
was
not
dealing
at
arm’s
length
at
an
amount
in
excess
of
the
fair
market
value
thereof
at
the
time
he
so
acquired
it,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
it
at
that
fair
market
value;
(b)
where
a
taxpayer
has
disposed
of
anything
(i)
to
a
person
with
whom
he
was
not
dealing
at
arm's
length
for
no
proceeds
or
for
proceeds
less
than
the
fair
market
value
thereof
at
the
time
he
so
disposed
of
it,
or
(ii)
to
any
person
by
way
of
gift
inter
vivos,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
received
proceeds
of
disposition
therefor
equal
to
that
fair
market
value;
and
(c)
where
a
taxpayer
has
acquired
property
by
way
of
gift,
bequest
or
inheritance,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
this
property
at
its
fair
market
value
at
the
time
he
so
acquired
it.
4.02
Case
Law
The
parties
referred
the
Court
to
the
following
case
law:
1.
Canadian
Propane
Gaz
v.
M.N.R.,
[1972]
C.T.C.
566;
73
D.T.C.
5019;
2.
The
Queen
v.
Shok,
[1975]
C.T.C.
162;
75
D.T.C.
5109;
3.
D.
Bohun
v.
M.N.R.,
[1972]
C.T.C.
2325;
72
D.T.C.
1268;
4.
Robbins
v.
M.N.R.,
[1978]
C.T.C.
2928;
78
D.T.C.
1669;
5.
R.L.
Petersen
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
1
C.T.C.
2071;
88
D.T.C.
1040;
6.
Herb
Payne
Transport
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1964]
Ex.
C.R.
1;
[1963]
C.T.C.
116;
63
D.T.C.
1075;
7.
Georges
Golden
v.
M.N.R.,
7.1:
[1983]
2
F.C.
599;
[1983]
C.T.C.
112;
83
D.T.C.
5138;
7.2:
affd
[1986]
1
S.C.R.
209;
[1986]
1
C.T.C.
274;
86
D.T.C.
6138;
8.
H.
Baur
Investments
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
1
C.T.C.
2067;
88
D.T.C.
1024;
9.
Damon
Developments
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
1
C.T.C.
2266;
88
D.T.C.
1128;
10.
Emco
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1969]
1
Ex.
C.R.
241;
[1968]
C.T.C.
457;
68
D.T.C.
5310;
11.
Klondike
Helicopters
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1965]
C.T.C.
427;
65
D.T.C.
5253.
4.03
Analysis
4.03.1
The
appellants
contend
that,
in
order
to
determine
if
the
apportionment
of
the
purchase
price
in
a
contract
is
reasonable
within
the
meaning
of
section
68
of
the
Act,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
must
take
the
positions
of
both
parties
into
account.
Counsel
first
cited
paragraph
7
of
Interpretation
Bulletin
IT-220R:
7.
Although
section
68
might
be
interpreted
as
requiring
a
determination
only
in
respect
of
the
vendor
with
such
determination
applying
automatically
to
the
purchaser,
the
Department
normally
obtains
and
considers
the
options
and
representations
of
the
purchaser
before
a
final
determination
is
made.
Secondly,
he
referred
to
Canadian
Propane
Gaz,
supra,
Shok,
supra,
Robbins,
supra,
Golden,
supra,
and
Peterson,
supra.
4.03.2
The
respondent's
general
position
is
that
no
apportionment
is
required
to
make
an
assessment
under
section
68.
If
there
is
an
apportionment
between
two
parties
dealing
at
arm's
length,
the
apportionment
used
in
the
contract
must
be
accepted.
The
position
of
the
respondent
is
based
primarily
on
Golden,
supra,
as
well
as
on
Baur,
supra,
and
Damon,
supra,
which
followed
Golden.
It
is,
in
fact,
the
latter
decision
rendered
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
1986
which
sets
out
the
current
state
of
the
case
law.
4.03.3
The
facts
in
Golden,
supra,
are
summarized
at
page
209
of
the
Supreme
Court
judgment:
Respondents
sold
in
an
arm's
length
transaction
a
plot
of
land
containing
apartment
buildings
for
$5,850,000.
The
Agreement
of
Purchase
and
Sale
expressly
provided
that
of
this
total
price
$5,100,000
was
allocated
to
land
and
$750,000
was
allocated
to
"equipment,
buildings,
roads,
sidewalks,
etc.”
Pursuant
to
s.
68
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
respondents'
allocation
of
proceeds
with
the
result
that
substantial
amounts
of
recaptured
capital
cost
allowances
were
added
to
their
incomes.
The
respondents
appealed
the
Minister’s
assessment
to
the
Federal
Court.
The
Trial
Division
dismissed
their
appeal
but
the
Court
of
Appeal
unanimously
set
aside
the
judgment
with
the
majority
holding
that
s.
68
had
no
application
to
this
transaction.
Case:
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
The
Court
ruled
on
two
points:
first,
on
the
meaning
of
“something
else”
which
appears
in
section
68.
A
majority
of
the
Supreme
Court
maintained
that
it
should
be
given
a
very
broad
meaning,
thereby
including
other
assets.
The
second
point
regards
the
apportionment.
On
this
issue,
a
majority
of
the
Supreme
Court
affirmed
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
ruling
that
the
apportionment
arrived
at
by
the
parties
was
a
reasonable
one.
4.03.4
At
116
(D.T.C.
5141;
F.C.
608-10)
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
referred
to
Herb
Payne,
supra,
where
Noël,
J.
set
out
the
following
rule:
Because
of
the
reciprocal
effect
on
purchaser
and
vendor
of
any
such
finding
here
I
am
prepared
to
accept,
as
suggested
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
that
the
matter
should
be
considered
from
the
viewpoint
of
the
purchaser
as
well
as
from
the
viewpoint
of
the
vendor.
There
is
also
no
question
that
if
the
purchaser
and
vendor
acting
at
arm's
length,
reach
a
mutual
decision
as
to
apportionment
of
price
against
various
assets
which
appear
to
be
reasonable
under
the
circumstances,
they
should
be
accepted
by
the
taxation
authority
as
accurate
and
should
be
binding
on
both
parties.
Somewhat
later,
referring
to
another
decision
by
Noël,
J.:
In
1968,
Mr
Justice
Noël
was
called
upon
to
again
make
a
determination
under
paragraph
20(6)(g)
in
the
case
of
Emco
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1968]
CTC
457;
68
DTC
5810.
Here
also,
in
making
the
necessary
determination,
the
learned
Justice
considered
the
evidence
as
to
the
bargaining
between
the
parties
and
the
evidence
as
to
the
meeting
of
minds
on
both
sides
in
the
relevant
transactions.
(4.02(10))
Section
20(6)(g)
of
the
old
Act
is
similar
to
the
current
section
68.
Still
on
the
same
point,
the
Court
of
Appeal
continued:
A
further
decision
of
the
Exchequer
Court
relevant
to
this
issue
is
the
decision
of
Thurlow,
J
(as
he
then
was)
in
the
case
of
Klondike
Helicopters
Limited
v
MNR,
[1965]
CTC
427;
65
DTC
5253.
That
was
also
a
paragraph
20(6)(g)
determination.
At
5254
of
the
report,
Thurlow,
J
said:
The
making
of
a
contract
or
agreement
in
the
form
in
which
it
exists
is,
however,
one
of
the
circumstances
to
be
taken
into
account
in
the
overall
enquiry
and
if
the
contract
purports
to
determine
what
amount
is
being
paid
for
the
depreciable
property
and
is
not
a
mere
sham
or
subterfuge
its
weight
may
well
be
decisive.
Thurlow,
C.J.
finally
drew
his
conclusion
on
this
point,
based
on
these
various
decisions:
It
is
my
opinion
that
the
correct
approach
to
a
section
68
determination
would
be,
as
suggested
by
the
above
authorities,
to
consider
the
matter
from
the
viewpoint
of
both
the
vendor
and
the
purchaser
and
to
consider
all
of
the
relevant
circumstances
surrounding
the
transaction.
Where,
as
in
this
case,
as
found
by
the
trial
judge,
the
transaction
is
at
arm's
length
and
is
not
a
mere
sham
or
subterfuge,
the
apportionment
made
by
the
parties
in
the
applicable
agreement
is
certainly
an
important
circumstance
and
one
which
is
entitled
to
considerable
weight.
Basing
his
decision
inter
alia
on
the
fact
that
the
trial
judge
had
held
that
the
price
of
$5,100,000
that
the
parties
had
assigned
to
the
land
in
the
contract
was
not
an
unreasonable
price
for
the
buyer
to
pay,
Thurlow,
C.J.
allowed
Mr.
Golden's
appeal.
4
.03.5
In
the
instant
cases
the
sellers
and
buyers
have
also
dealt
with
each
other
at
arm's
length,
as
in
Golden,
supra.
In
the
instant
cases,
both
parties
similarly
agreed
on
the
prices
to
be
allocated
to
various
items.
It
might
even
be
added
that
both
appellants
had
been
farmers
for
about
ten
years,
and
that
the
forebears
of
at
least
the
appellant
Suzette
Léonard
were
also
farmers
(paragraph
3).
Could
the
appellants
have
been
unaware
of
the
fiscal
implications
of
such
a
transaction,
after
having
just
sold
a
farm
in
Ontario?
On
the
other
hand,
can
we
ignore
the
circumstances
of
the
sale,
which
must
be
given
due
consideration
according
to
Thurlow,
C.J.
of
the
Court
of
Appeal,
supra
.
Although
the
appellants
should
have
been
informed
of
the
apportionment
of
the
value
of
the
assets
several
weeks
prior
to
signing
the
contract,
it
was
only
provided
to
them
at
the
last
minute
after
a
wait
of
more
than
two
hours.
It
cannot
be
said
in
the
instant
cases
that
there
were
serious
negotiations
between
the
parties.
Even
if
the
appellants
had
been
farmers
in
Ontario,
that
does
not
mean
the
prices
were
the
same.
Nonetheless,
can
it
be
said
that
the
apportionment
appears
reasonable
on
the
face
of
it?
The
basis
of
the
appraiser
Beaudry's
valuation
appears
reliable
to
me.
Prices
set
by
buyers
in
auction
sales
are
good
criteria
for
determining
true
market
prices.
I
am
ignoring
that
true
market
value,
which
is
the
applicable
criterion
for
section
69,
is
not
the
applicable
criterion
for
section
68,
which
is
that
of
reasonableness;
but
true
market
value
may
be
one
factor
in
determining
reasonableness.
With
respect
to
the
livestock,
the
difference
between
the
market
value
and
the
price
in
the
contract
is
$47,400
($87,400
—
$40,000),
or
120
per
cent.
As
for
the
milk
quota,
the
difference
is
$58,000
($88,000
—
$30,000),
or
193
per
cent.
Can
such
an
apportionment
be
seen
as
reasonable?
I
must
respond
in
the
negative.
Accordingly,
as
agreed
with
counsel
for
the
parties,
these
matters
are
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
review
so
that
a
reasonable
apportionment
can
be
arrived
at.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeals
are
allowed
and
the
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
Appeals
allowed.