Supreme Court of Canada
R. v. Gerencer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 403
Date: 1979-10-02
Her Majesty The
Queen Appellant;
and
Steve Gerencer Respondent.
1979: March 26; 1979: October 2.
Present: Ritchie, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz and
Estey JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
Expropriation—Compensation—Residential
property—Property including other buildings and benefits—Purposes of
residence—Special value to owner—“Home for a home” provision—Amenities to be
included in “residence”—Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 16, as
amended, ss. 23, 24.
Respondent’s property (21.02 acres) was
expropriated in connection with the proposed Toronto International Airport. The Notice of Confirmation was registered on January 30, 1973. On
the property was a bungalow built in 1967 with a living area of 1,400 square
feet. There was also an attached two-car garage, a barn of approx. 2,880 square
feet, an implement shed and a workshop, a pond, cultivated garden (approx.
15,000 square feet) and a tree nursery area (approx. 36,000 square feet).
Respondent and his family lived on the property. He worked as a carpenter for a
Toronto firm but had an
interest in farming, keeping some animals and poultry on the premises and
growing corn and alfalfa as feed for them. The produce was for the family’s own
use but he hoped to make a little money out of the sale of nursery stock and
livestock.
The appeal raises only one issue: is the
whole of the 21.02 acre holding comprised in the term “residence” in
s. 24(6) of the Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-16, so as to
entitle the respondent to compensation for the entire parcel under the “home
for a home” provision. The trial judge in awarding the respondent $200,000
found that the expropriated interest in its entirety was being used as a residence
in terms of the section and that accordingly the minimum amount sufficient
to enable him to relocate his residence in or on premises reasonably equivalent
would relate to the entire expropriated interest. The trial judge noted further
that there was no fundamental difference in principle between the facilities
which respondent had on his property, to pursue his interests, and such things
as a swimming
[Page 404]
pool, a putting green and a tennis court, any
or all of which can clearly be included as being for “purposes of residence”.
The judgment at trial was affirmed by the
Federal Court of Appeal.
Held: The
appeal should be dismissed.
The finding of fact by the trial judge that
the property was in its entirety a residence and that the additional amenities
thereon were ancillary to its use as a residence, as a swimming pool, a putting
green, or a tennis court might be, was made properly. There was no apparent
error in the application of any principle of law and the finding accords with a
common sense approach to the meaning of the term “residence” as it relates to
the evidence. While appellant urged as a subsidiary point that the trial judge
had erred in relying upon the evidence of replacement cost, this matter was
correctly disposed of by the Federal Court of Appeal. It could not be said that
the trial judge wrongly construed the evidence, or some of it, or failed to
take into account a crucial portion of it, or that there was no evidence upon
which he could have based his conclusions. The judge did not err in failing to
accept the evidence of appellant’s appraisers and in failing to weigh that of
respondent’s appraisers. It is implicit in his reasons that he found a
differential to exist between market value determined at the time of taking and
the cost of relocation at the time of relocation and therefore that an increase
in compensation was payable under subs. (6). A precise mathematical formula or
procedure need not be followed where as here it was obvious from the award that
there was complete compliance with the statute.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal
affirming the judgment of Sweet D.J. at trial in the matter of compensation for
expropriated lands and premises. Appeal dismissed.
Thomas Dunne, for the appellant.
Henry Pollit, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
ESTEY J.—This appeal is by the expropriating
authority in proceedings under the Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st
Supp.), c. 16, as amended,
[Page 405]
from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal
confirming the judgment of the Trial Division of the Federal Court wherein the
respondent was awarded $200,000 in compensation for the expropriated lands and
premises.
The property in question is described in the
judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal:
The property comprises 21.02 acres, the
whole of which was expropriated for the purpose of the proposed Toronto International Airport by Notice of Confirmation of
Intention to Expropriate duly registered on January 30, 1973. On the property is a
bungalow built in 1967, with an attached two-car garage, and having a living
area of about 1400 square feet. There is also a barn on the property
constructed of concrete block having an area of approximately 2880 square feet,
a metal clad implement shed and a workshop, a spring-fed pond, a cultivated
vegetable garden and strawberry patch together having an area of approximately
15,000 square feet and a tree nursery area having an area of about 36,000
square feet.
The Respondent is a carpenter by trade. He lives
on the property with his family. In 1973, and at the time of trial he was
employed in Toronto by a firm in the business of laying hardwood floors. He
returned home each night. He had been born and brought up on a farm and, as a
result, retained an interest in farming so that he kept some animals and
poultry on the premises, the feed for which he grew corn and alfalfa. The
produce from the vegetable garden was for the family’s own use but, he
testified, he hoped to make a little money out of the sale of nursery stock and
livestock. That he was correct in assuming he would make only a little money is
illustrated by the fact that his gross sales in 1975 amounted to approximately
$5,000 from which he derived a net profit of about $600.00.
The appeal raises only one issue: is the whole
of the 21.02 acre holding comprised in the term “residence” in s. 24(6) of
the Act so as to entitle the respondent to compensation for the entire parcel
under s. 24(6) of the Act, being the so-called ‘home for a home’ provision?
This issue involves an interpretation of the applicable provisions of the
statute, and in fact raises only the simple question as to whether all of the
respondent’s lands are to be taken into account in the application of
s. 24(6) or only the buildings and the two or three acres surrounding
them.
[Page 406]
This issue requires the interpretation of parts
of ss. 23 and 24 of the Act which provide as follows:
23. (1) Compensation shall be paid by the
Crown to each person who, immediately before the registration of a notice of
confirmation, was the owner of a right, estate or interest in the land to which
the notice relates, to the extent of his expropriated interest, the amount of
which compensation shall be equal to the aggregate of
(a) the value of the expropriated
interest at the time of its taking, and
…
24. (2) Subject to this section, the value
of an expropriated interest is the market value thereof, that is to say, the
amount that would have been paid for the interest if, at the time of its
taking, it had been sold in the open market by a willing seller to a willing
buyer.
…
(6) Where an expropriated interest was,
immediately before the registration of a notice of confirmation, being used by
the owner thereof for the purposes of his residence and the value of the
interest otherwise determined under this section is less than the minimum
amount sufficient to enable the owner, at the earlier of
(a) the time of payment to
him of any compensation in respect of the interest, otherwise than pursuant to
any offer made to him under section 14, or (b) the time when
the Crown became entitled to take physical possession or make use of the land
to the extent of the interest expropriated,
to relocate his residence in or on premises
reasonably equivalent to the premises expropriated, there shall be added to the
value of the interest otherwise determined under this section the amount
by which that minimum amount exceeds such value.
Counsel agreed at trial that the time of taking
under s. 23(1)(a) above was January 30, 1973; and that the
time when the Crown became entitled to possession under s. 24(6)(b)
was May 30, 1975. Counsel further agreed that the respondent-owner was
entitled, to the extent that s. 24(6) is found to apply to the taken
lands, to the greater of the amounts calculated under subss. (2) and (6) of
s. 24.
The learned trial judge stated:
[Page 407]
For the reasons I give below I find that
the expropriated interest in its entirety was, immediately before the
registration of the notice of confirmation, being used by the plaintiff for the
purposes of his residence within the meaning of section 24(6). Accordingly
the minimum amount sufficient to enable him to relocate his residence in or on
premises reasonably equivalent to the premises expropriated would relate to the
entire expropriated interest.
It is my view that of paragraphs (a)
and (b) in subsection (6) the one applicable here is
paragraph (b). Accordingly the time as of which the amount is to
be determined is, in this case, May 30, 1975.
The judgment returned to this aspect of the
matter later by stating in part:
In my opinion residence in the context of
subsection (6) is a place where one may indeed have those minimal benefits
but where one may also enjoy amenities of pleasant living according to one’s taste,
where one may find the companionship, solaces, comforts and joys of family and
where one may, if facilities and purse permit, pursue hobbies and leisure time
activities and do those things which he finds enjoyable but which are not
available to him in his vocation. I think this view finds support by the use of
the plural in “purposes” in the wording “purposes of his residence”.
If on this property there were a swimming
pool, a putting green, a tennis court or even all three it would be clear
enough that they would be included in residence. If a man’s inclination does
not run to swimming or tennis or golf but rather to doing a little farming in
the time which he has free from his job it would seem to me that there is no
fundamental difference in principle.
This finding of fact has been made in
circumstances which reveal no erroneous application of any principle of law and
indeed, if I may properly add, the finding accords with a common sense approach
to the meaning of the term “residence” as it relates to the evidence before the
Court. I therefore, with respect, agree with Urie J.A. when he stated:
The conclusion which the Trial Judge
reached, as he said, on the whole of the evidence, is supportable on that
evidence and since he did not proceed on a wrong principle we would not be
justified, in my opinion, in interfering with his decision on the ground argued
by counsel, namely that in finding that the whole of the property constituted
the Respondent’s residence he erred in the application of section 24(6).
[Page 408]
As a subsidiary point, the appellant urges that
the trial judge was in error in relying upon the evidence of replacement cost
as given by the appraisers testifying on behalf of the respondent. It is
sufficient to say in disposing of this consideration that I am in complete
agreement with the Court of Appeal who, in referring to this aspect of the
judgment below, stated through Urie J.A.:
…it cannot be said that the Trial Judge
wrongly construed the evidence, or some of it, or failed to take into account a
crucial portion of it, or that there was no evidence upon which he could have
based his conclusions. In my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that he
erred in failing to accept the evidence of the Appellant’s appraisers and in
failing not to give any weight to evidence of the Respondent’s appraisers.
Consequently, I can find no merit in this branch of the Appellant’s appeal.
The evidence analysed by the learned trial judge
in this connection consisted of appraisal testimony by four expert appraisers,
two called by the Crown and two by the owner. A variety of approaches ranging
from a cost approach to a market data approach were employed by these witnesses
in determining both the market value at May 30, 1973 (being the date of
expropriation) and the cost of relocating the “residence” of the respondent in
May 1975 (being the date upon which the taker was entitled to possession). The
resulting quantities and values ranged from a low of $100,000 to a high of
$135,000 for the 1973 market value. With respect to the relocation expense
under ‘the home for a home’ provision in subs. (6), the amounts ranged from a
low of $100,000 to a high of $225,000 with much of the spread being accounted
for by the divergent views as to whether the term “residence” in subs. (6)
included all 21 acres of the respondent’s lands or only the two or three acres
immediately surrounding the residence and related buildings.
The learned trial judge, after a detailed
scrutiny of this expert evidence, concluded:
The amount of compensation (not including
interest) to be awarded in this case, in my opinion, is the minimum amount
sufficient to enable the plaintiff to relocate, as of May 30, 1975, the
entire expropriated prem-
[Page 409]
ises in or on premises reasonably
equivalent to the premises expropriated.
This was stated immediately after a discussion
of subs. (6):
The effect of subsection (6) under
such circumstances is to increase the amount of compensation which would have
been payable if subsection (6) were not in the Act to the minimum amount
required for the relocation contemplated by subsection (6). Once it is
established that such minimum amount does exceed a value otherwise determined
under section 24 there is no necessity for any mathematical exercise
involving addition to arrive at the amount of compensation and this
notwithstanding the wording “there shall be added” employed in the quoted
portion. The amount to be payable pursuant to subsection (6), that is the
amount of compensation to be awarded, would already have been determined.
It is implicit in his reasons that the learned
trial judge had found a differential to exist between market value determined
at the time of taking and the cost of relocation of the owner’s residence at
the time that the appellant was entitled to possession in favour of the latter,
and that therefore an increase in compensation payable to the owner was
required by reason of the application of subs. (6). The judgment at trial does
not include a finding of market value pursuant to subs. (2), nor a finding
precisely labelled as “the minimum amount sufficient to enable the owner… to
relocate his residence in or on premises reasonably equivalent to the premises
expropriated” pursuant to subs. (6), or in so many words, the difference, if
any, between these two quantities. In my view, a precise mathematical formula
or procedure need not be followed step by step by the compensation tribunal
where it is obvious from the award that compliance with the statute is
complete. What the learned trial judge clearly did was to find that the
“minimum amount sufficient to enable the owner… to relocate his residence”
exceeded the value determined under subs. (2), and accordingly awarded the
amount determined under subs. (6) as the proper compensation to the respondent-owner.
In this instance, the learned trial judge
concluded with reference to the actual compensation payable “as of May 30,
1975” that he did not “consid-
[Page 410]
er that the evidence of any of the appraisers is
such that it should be accepted in its entirety”. He thereupon fixed the
compensation “having regard to my interpretation of the statutory provisions…”
at $200,000. I find no error in principle anywhere in the process culminating
in the fixing of compensation and accordingly adopt the conclusion of Urie J.A.
already quoted with reference to the application of the expert testimony by the
learned trial judge.
In any case, error could only arise in such a
circumstance where the trial judge, in fixing the final amount of compensation,
failed to award the greater of the quantities determined under subss. (2) and
(6). Here the error would only arise if the market value under subs. (2)
exceeded the cost of relocation under subs. (6) thus entitling the
respondent-owner to a greater sum than here awarded under subs. (6). This would
only affect the respondent and he has not appealed.
I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs
throughout.
Appeal dismissed with costs throughout and in terms of
the order granting leave.
Solicitor for the appellant: R. Tassé,
Ottawa.
Solicitors for the respondent: Hyde,
Pollit, Arnold & Kirshin, Toronto.