The
Associate
Chief
Justice:—This
matter,
dealing
with
the
interpretation
and
application
of
section
31
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
came
on
for
hearing
at
Toronto,
Ontario,
on
November
13,
1984
and
January
9
and
10,
1985.
While
this
matter
was
under
consideration,
a
strikingly
similar
problem
came
before
my
colleague,
Joyal,
J.
in
Hadley
v.
The
Queen,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
62;
85
D.T.C.
5058.
At
the
same
time,
the
precise
questions
were
before
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
The
Queen
v.
Graham,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
380;
85
D.T.C.
5256.
When
the
judgment
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Graham
was
filed,
I
felt
obliged
to
grant
counsel
in
the
present
case
the
opportunity
to
submit
written
argument,
which
was
received
a
short
time
ago.
Bearing
in
mind
that
these
issues
had
also
been
exhaustively
canvassed
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
and
dealt
with
in
a
most
comprehensive
fashion
by
Dickson,
J.
(as
he
then
was),
in
Moldowan
v.
The
Queen,
[1977]
C.T.C.
310;
77
D.T.C.
5213,
it
might
be
expected
that
the
problems
with
the
interpretation
of
section
31
could
have
been
resolved,
but
that
is
far
from
the
case.
I
alluded
to
some
of
them
in
Kasper
v.
The
Queen,
[1982]
C.T.C.
178
at
179;
82
D.T.C.
6148
at
6149:
The
courts
have
had
great
difficulty
in
the
interpretation
of
this
rather
convoluted
language.
The
leading
judgment
on
the
forerunner,
subsection
13(1),
is
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
decision
in
William
Moldowan
v.
The
Queen,
[1977]
C.T.C.
310;
77
D.T.C.
5213,
wherein
Dickson,
J.
described
it
as
an
“awkwardly
worded
and
intractable
section
and
the
source
of
much
debate”.
More
specifically,
the
section
appears
to
contain
a
contradiction
in
terms
since
it
requires
an
assessment
of
the
significance
of
the
taxpayer’s
farm
income
in
relation
to
other
sources,
yet
obviously
relates
only
to
years
in
which
there
have
been
losses
from
the
farming
operations.
Dickson,
J.
put
the
problem
as
follows:
The
next
thing
to
observe
with
respect
to
subsection
13(1)
is
that
it
comes
into
play
only
when
the
taxpayer
has
had
a
farming
loss
for
the
year.
That
being
so,
it
may
seem
strange
that
the
section
should
speak
of
farming
as
the
taxpayer’s
chief
source
of
income
for
the
taxation
year;
if
in
a
taxation
year
the
taxpayer
suffers
a
loss
on
his
farming
operations
it
is
manifest
that
farming
would
not
make
any
contribution
to
the
taxpayer’s
income
in
that
year.
On
a
literal
reading
of
the
section,
no
taxpayer
could
ever
claim
more
than
the
maximum
$5,000
deduction
which
the
section
contemplates;
the
only
way
in
which
the
section
can
have
meaning
is
to
place
emphasis
on
the
words
“source
of
income”.
The
full
text
of
section
31
is
as
follows:
31.
(1)
Where
a
taxpayer’s
chief
source
of
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
neither
farming
nor
a
combination
of
farming
and
some
other
source
of
income,
for
the
purposes
of
sections
3
and
111
his
loss,
if
any,
for
the
year
from
all
farming
businesses
carried
on
by
him
shall
be
deemed
to
be
the
lesser
of
(a)
the
amount
by
which
the
aggregate
of
his
losses
for
the
year
otherwise
determined
from
all
farming
businesses
carried
on
by
him
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
his
income
for
the
year
from
all
such
businesses,
and
(b)
$2,500
plus
the
lesser
of
(i)
/2
of
the
amount
by
which
the
amount
determined
under
paragraph
(a)
exceeds
$2,500,
and
(ii)
$2,500;
and
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
amount
determined
under
paragraph
(a)
exceeds
the
amount
determined
under
paragraph
(b)
is
the
taxpayer's
“restricted
farm
loss”
for
the
year.
(2)
For
the
purpose
of
this
section,
the
Minister
may
determine
that
a
taxpayer's
chief
source
of
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
neither
farming
nor
a
combination
of
farming
and
some
other
source
of
income.
Subparagraphs
31(1)(a)(i)
and
31
(1
)(b)(i)
were
amended
in
1979
(to
apply
to
taxation
years
ending
after
1977)
by
S.C.
1979,
c.
5
s.
9
to
read:
9.
(1)
Subparagraph
31(1)(a)(i)
of
the
said
Act
is
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor:
“(i)
the
amount
by
which
the
aggregate
of
his
losses
for
the
year,
determined
without
reference
to
this
section
and
before
making
any
deduction
under
section
37
or
37.1,
from
all
farming
businesses
carried
on
by
him
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
his
incomes
for
the
year,
so
determined
from
all
such
businesses,
and''
(2)
Subparagraph
31
(1
)(b)(i)
of
the
said
Act
is
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor:
“(i)
the
amount
that
would
be
determined
under
subparagraph
(a)(i)
if
it
were
read
as
though
the
words
“and
before
making
any
deduction
under
section
37
or
37.1"
were
deleted",
The
decision
of
the
majority
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Graham
is
now
binding
authority,
particularly
since
an
application
for
leave
to
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
was
dismissed
on
July
31,
1985
[62
N.R.
103].
Nevertheless,
the
problems
posed
by
the
section
were
the
subject
of
a
very
plausible
dissent
by
Marceau,
J.
I
refer
in
particular
to
the
following
at
394
(D.T.C.
5267):
The
case
at
bar
involves
a
man
whose
ability
and
dedication
as
a
farmer
is
special
and,
in
that
sense,
it
is
an
extraordinary
case,
but
nevertheless
it
presents
a
pattern
that
is
certainly
not
unique
and
the
question
it
poses
goes
beyond
its
particular
facts.
I
think
counsel
for
the
appellant
could
rightly
present
the
case
as
a
test
case.
The
general
question
raised
is
the
following.
Can
a
full-time
employee
who
starts
a
farming
operation
without
leaving
his
employment
be
regarded
as
having
made
farming
his
chief
source
of
income,
within
the
meaning
of
section
31
of
the
Act,
before
he
even
puts
himself
in
a
situation
where
he
can
develop
an
operation
that
can
yield
a
profit?
As
I
read
the
reasons
in
the
Moldowan
case
and
understand,
through
them,
the
intention
of
the
statute,
it
seems
to
me
that
the
answer
to
the
question
simply
cannot
be
otherwise
than
in
the
negative.
I
took
care
to
note
previously
that
the
determination
that
a
man
is
farming
not
only
as
a
hobby
but
as
a
business
ought
not
to
be
really
influenced
by
the
actual
profitability
of
his
farming
activities,
the
length
of
time
the
operation
he
is
building
up
may
require
to
reach
a
certain
maturity
and
the
remoteness
of
his
expectation
of
real
profit.
But
I
simply
fail
to
see
how
the
comparison
between
a
man’s
several
sources
of
income
for
the
purpose
of
determining
which
is
the
chief
one
amongst
them
could
leave
aside,
to
the
same
extent,
their
respective
actual
capacity
to
produce
profit.
Of
course,
the
expectations
of
the
man
are
involved
but
for
the
determination
to
have
a
certain
practical
meaning
only
expectations
real
and
actual
are
relevant
not
mere
plans
and
long-term
goals.
These
expectations
must
be
that
the
source
will
provide,
not
in
the
far
future
but
now,
at
least
part
of
the
income,
the
man
may
need
for
his
own
and
his
family’s
living
needs.
It
is
true
that
the
definition
given
by
Mr.
Justice
Dickson
of
a
first
class
farmer,
in
the
Moldowan
case,
supra,
would
readily
apply
to
a
man
for
whom
farming
is
“the
centre
of
work
routine”
—
regardless
of
the
income
he
may
expect
to
derive
therefrom.
Of
course,
the
definition
had
to
cover
the
case
of
a
man
who
is
dedicated
totally
to
farming,
it
being
his
only
source
of
income
or
his
sole
ongoing
income-earning
activity.
But
I
do
not
think
that
a
man
who
has
a
full-time
job
can
be
seen
as
having
nevertheless
farming
as
“the
centre
of
work
routine”
within
the
meaning
given
to
those
words
in
the
definition.
Besides,
in
the
second
part
of
his
definition,
Mr.
Justice
Dickson
emphasizes
that
the
farmer
referred
to
is
one
that
“looks
to
farming
for
his
livelihood”
and
I
fail
to
see
how
a
man
who,
while
holding
a
full-time
job,
starts
and
carries
on
a
farming
operation
can
reasonably
“look
to
farming
for
his
livelihood”
until
his
operation
is
at
least
capable
of
yielding
a
profit.
It
is
also
true
that
Mr.
Justice
Dickson
refers
to
a
“man's
major
preoccupation”
but
in
the
context
in
which
it
is
used
the
phrase
does
not
appear
to
me
to
refer
simply
to
physical
activities
(in
which
case,
in
any
event,
it
would
be
doubtful
that
a
man
can
be
said
to
have
a
major
preoccupation
other
than
his
full-time
job),
but
to
actual
income
earning
activities.
Otherwise,
it
would
simply
mean
a
return
to
the
old
abandoned
concept
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
that
of
the
“chief
occupation”.
Finally,
I
am
not
oblivious
of
Mr.
Justice
Dickson’s
last
observation
to
the
effect
that
a
man
should
not
be
disentitled
to
deduct
the
full
impact
of
start-up
costs.
But,
I
do
not
think
that
the
concept
of
start-up
expenses
can
be
extended
to
a
period
reaching
over
several
years
during
which
the
taxpayer
plans
to
build
up
slowly,
through
gradual
development,
expansion
and
acquisition,
an
operation
that
will
finally
yield
a
significant
profit.
The
limit
placed
by
section
31
on
the
deductibility
of
farming
losses
is
extremely
difficult
to
explain
as
it
is
obviously
meant
to
apply
not
only
to
“hobby
farmers”,
who
in
any
event
would
have
difficulty
in
establishing
that
farming
is
for
them
a
source
of
income,
but
also
and
even
primarily
to
some
serious
and
dedicated
farmers
engaged
in
farming
as
a
business.
Of
course
one
must
assume
that
the
goal
is
to
prevent
abuses
which
in
this
area
could
be
more
difficult
to
detect.
But
it
remains
that
no
such
limit
appears
to
have
been
placed
on
the
deductibility
of
any
other
type
of
business
losses.
The
view
I
take
of
the
nature
and
scope
of
the
limit
is
all
the
more
dissatisfying
to
me
and
I
wish
I
would
not
have
felt
bound
to
adopt
it.
Unfortunately,
my
understanding
of
the
meaning
of
the
words
used
in
the
section
does
not
allow
me
to
support
the
finding
of
the
trial
judge
that
the
provision
is
not
applicable
in
this
case.
Truly,
the
more
this
section
is
subjected
to
judicial
analysis,
the
more
its
weaknesses
are
confirmed
and
they
are
many
and
severe.
To
begin
with,
the
purpose
is
to
establish
eligibility
for
the
deduction
of
farming
losses
from
other
income.
Since
it
addresses
situations
in
which
farm
income
is
combined
with
other
income,
there
is
a
value
only
apparent
to
legislative
draftsmen
in
attacking
the
problem
from
precisely
the
opposite
direction:
“Where
a
taxpayer's
chief
source
of
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
neither
farming
nor
a
combination
of
farming
and
some
other
source
of
income,
Secondly,
since
section
31
deals
only
with
the
treatment
of
losses
from
farming
operation,
none
of
these
cases
(and
the
present
case
is
no
exception)
deal
with
the
farming
operation
as
an
actual
source
of
income.
Indeed,
the
very
purpose
of
the
section
is
to
deal
with
losses.
The
result
is
that
in
every
one
of
these
factual
situations,
the
courts
have
been
required
to
analyze
not
present
income,
but
investment
in
the
hope
of
a
source
of
income
in
the
future.
Assuming
that
this
comparative
assessment
is
unavoidable,
how
much
more
suitable
would
it
be
if
the
relative
assessments
were
between
comparable
values
—
if
investment
of
time
and
money
in
the
farming
operation
could
be
compared
with
the
same
kind
of
investment
in
the
taxpayer's
other
sources
of
income.
Instead,
we
are
asked
to
embark
upon
not
just
an
evaluation
of
investment
of
time
and
money,
but
the
conversion
of
it
from
the
start-up
loss
position
into
a
source
of
income
some
years
down
the
road.
As
if
that
were
not
a
difficult
enough
exercise,
a
comparison
is
required
to
determine
whether
this
imagined
source
of
income
combines
with
the
taxpayer's
other
sources
of
income
as
a
“chief
source
of
income".
Finally,
I
am
concerned
that
eligibility
for
the
loss
deduction
in
section
31
cannot
be
determined
in
relation
to
the
farm
operation,
but
will
depend
upon
the
extent
of
the
taxpayer's
activity
and
success
in
producing
income
from
entirely
unrelated
areas.
The
deductions
permitted
Mr.
Graham,
whose
other
source
of
income
was
as
a
Stationary
Engineer
with
Ontario
Hydro
might
not
have
been
available
to
Mr.
Poirier
in
the
years
that
he
was
enjoying
success
in
his
other
business
interests.
Even
more
graphically
in
the
present
case
at
the
time
that
Poirier
embarked
upon
the
farming
enterprise,
his
other
business
endeavours
were,
at
least
on
paper,
quite
successful.
Tragically,
they
began
to
decline
and
ultimately
were
lost
entirely
to
the
recession
period
between
1980
and
1981.
Is
it
not
fair
to
ask,
therefore,
whether
Mr.
Poirier’s
own
ability
to
escape
the
impact
of
section
31
would
vary
as
his
other
business
interests
dwindled
and
ultimately
disappeared
as
sources
of
income?
The
wisdom
or
the
necessity
of
the
special
tax
treatment
for
income
derived
from
farming
in
combination
with
other
income
is
not
my
concern.
I
take
it
as
axiomatic,
however,
that
tax
laws
should
be
written
so
that
the
taxpayer
can
not
only
understand
them,
but
can
plan
his
affairs
with
at
least
some
certainty
about
his
liability
for
tax.
If
section
31
leaves
the
courts
in
such
a
quandary
to
grapple
with
such
nebulous
concepts,
what
hope
was
there
for
any
of
these
taxpayers
to
predict
their
burden
of
tax
during
the
start-up
period
of
unbroken
losses
from
these
diverse
farming
operations?
Having
said
all
of
this,
I
hasten
to
indicate
that
I
have
no
difficulty
in
concluding
that
Mr.
Poirier
was
eligible
for
the
full
extent
of
the
loss
allowance.
Indeed,
I
would
reach
the
same
conclusion
were
I
to
follow
the
two-
step
approach
in
the
dissenting
judgment
of
Marceau,
J.
to
which
I
referred
earlier.
The
facts
satisfy
me
that
Poirier's
investment
of
time
and
money
was
of
such
a
magnitude
that
his
operation
was
stamped
from
the
start
as
a
business.
Furthermore,
a
business
not
only
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
in
the
near
future,
but
a
profit
that
would
compare
with
his
other
sources
of
income
so
as
to
be
“the
chief
source
of
income
for
a
taxation
year’.
Like
a
great
many
rural
Ontarians,
Mr.
Poirier
worked
for
many
of
his
younger
years
on
a
farm,
but
ultimately
was
drawn
to
the
more
lucrative
hourly
rated
work
as
a
truck
driver.
His
first
employment
was
with
B
&
M
Carriers
Limited
and
although
he
left
it
for
a
short
period,
he
returned
some
time
prior
to
1972,
as
a
driver
for
them
in
the
carriage
of
explosive
materials.
In
1972,
when
it
appeared
that
the
business
might
be
closed
down,
he
was
approached
by
one
of
the
major
suppliers
who
offered
to
loan
him
the
money
to
purchase
the
company.
At
the
same
time,
B
&
M
Explosives
Limited,
a
holding
company
owned
by
the
plaintiff
purchased
the
explosive
distributorship
business
from
B
&
M
Carriers.
B
&
M
Explosives
was
sold
in
1979.
In
1974,
the
plaintiff
formed
“Les
Entreprises
LGO”’
which
performed
trucking
activities
at
the
James
Bay
project
in
Quebec.
In
1977,
he
purchased
the
shares
of
Armac
Drilling
&
Blasting
but
limited
his
involvement
in
that
business
to
negotiating
approximately
six
contracts
a
year
for
a
period
of
12
days.
Armac
was
a
customer
of
B
&
M
Explosives
and
the
purchase
was
designed
to
enhance
the
existing
core
business.
The
plan
was
to
eventually
sell
Armac
to
one
of
his
employees.
The
plaintiff
also
bought
a
third
interest
in
Por-Car
Leasing,
leasing
moving
equipment
for
use
in
quarries
and
moving
aggregate
once
it
had
been
blasted,
thereby
complementing
the
existing
business.
The
plaintiff
was
not
involved
in
the
day
to
day
management
of
Por-Car
Leasing.
In
1979,
the
plaintiff
bought
a
50
per
cent
interest
in
a
quarry,
Bertpor
Aggregates
Limited,
but
was
not
required
to
spend
significant
amounts
of
time
in
connection
with
the
business
activity
since
this
was
conducted
by
the
other
half-owner.
B
&
M
Carriers
also
purchased
Christie
Transport
whose
trucks
were
in
use
during
different
parts
of
the
year
than
those
of
B
&
M
Carriers,
enabling
him
to
keep
the
trucks
of
both
companies
in
use
throughout
the
year.
The
last
acquisition
made
by
the
plaintiff
was
that
of
Brundige
Construction
Company
Limited.
In
late
1978,
the
plaintiff
had
purchased
50
per
cent
of
the
Brundige
stock.
At
that
time,
Brundige
was
a
customer
of
Armac
and
was
indebted
to
Armac
in
the
amount
of
$250,000
and
was
on
the
verge
of
going
into
receivership.
The
plaintiff
purchased
the
balance
of
the
stock
in
order
to
protect
B
&
M
Holdings’
receivables.
On
August
31,
1979,
B
&
M
Explosives
Limited
sold
its
explosive
distributorship
and
related
assets
to
Powder
Company
Limited.
Against
this
background,
in
1976
the
plaintiff
became
interested
in
investing
in
purebred
cattle,
specifically
in
the
breeding
of
Charolais
cattle.
In
order
to
assess
the
viability
of
this
enterprise,
the
plaintiff
spoke
with
numerous
breeders
of
various
types
of
purebred
cattle
and
attended
several
fairs.
By
the
end
of
1976,
he
was
committed
to
breeding
Charolais
cattle
and
purchased
his
first
seven
head
of
cattle.
In
April
of
1977
he
hired
a
knowledgeable
assistant
to
aid
him
in
the
development
of
a
viable
farming
operation
and
additional
Charolais
were
purchased.
By
1978
the
plaintiff
had
established
a
breeding
program
that
would
ultimately
result
in
40
top
producing
female
Charolais,
and
by
the
end
of
that
year,
the
total
investment
in
cattle
inventory
was
$197,000.
Between
1978
and
1980
the
plaintiff's
herd
grew
to
a
peak
of
86
animals.
During
1976,
the
plaintiff
resided
in
a
house
situated
on
about
30
acres
of
land
owned
by
his
wife,
adjacent
to
a
larger
parcel
of
several
hundred
acres
owned
by
B
&
M
Carriers.
During
1976
and
1977
a
further
486
acres
were
acquired
for
additional
barn
facilities
and
for
pasture.
Ultimately,
the
plaintiff's
investment
in
land
for
farming
purposes
reached
$248,644,
in
farm
equipment,
$94,000
and
the
total
investment
in
the
farming
operation
was
in
excess
of
$600,000.
I
accept
Mr.
Poirier’s
evidence
that
several
aspects
of
the
farming
operation
required
his
personal
involvement,
including
investigating
what
cattle
to
buy
having
in
mind
the
build-up
of
the
herd
and
the
type
of
blood
lines
sought;
during
the
calving
season,
supervision
of
the
cows
and
providing
assistance
where
necessary;
breaking
new
calves
to
halter
in
preparation
for
shows;
the
feeding
and
cleaning
of
the
herd;
arranging
to
show
and
attending
with
his
cattle
at
local,
regional
and
national
shows
and
fairs;
attending
some
10
shows
per
year
for
the
purpose
of
showing
his
animals
and
promoting
his
operation;
meeting
with
breeders
and
potential
customers;
promoting
the
reputation
of
his
farm
by
advertising
in
trade
magazines.
(Copies
of
these
advertisements,
of
acknowledgments
of
purchases
and
of
newspaper
articles
were
entered
in
evidence.)
Although
the
plaintiff’s
farm
finances
were
combined
with
those
of
his
non-farming
businesses
on
a
day
to
day
basis,
at
year
end
the
amounts
paid
out
in
relation
to
the
farm
were
charged
to
the
plaintiff
as
direct
salary
or
bonus.
Cheques
issued
for
farm
expenses
were
signed
by
the
plaintiff.
It
also
appears
that
although
Poirier
bore
the
ultimate
responsibility
for
each
of
these
companies,
each
division
was
managed
by
capable
managers
and
he
was
not
usually
involved
in
the
day
to
day
operation
of
them.
In
acquiring
each
of
these
companies,
the
plaintiff’s
aim
was
to
create
an
enhanced
business
package
which
he
would
ultimately
be
able
to
sell.
Since
both
the
farming
operation
and
the
non-farming
businesses
were
run
out
of
the
same
location
(an
office
located
on
the
farm)
the
plaintiff
was
able
to
commit
significant
time
to
the
development
of
his
farm
plan.
During
1980
and
1981,
the
plaintiff
encountered
financial
difficulties
caused
in
part
by
the
acquisition
of
Brundige,
the
economic
decline
and
the
rise
in
interest
rates.
The
Bank
to
which
the
plaintiff
was
indebted
had
required
cross-security
from
all
of
the
plaintiffs
companies
and
a
personal
guarantee
from
the
plaintiff.
Ultimately,
the
companies
were
not
able
to
meet
their
financial
obligations
and
the
plaintiff
Clarkson
Company
Limited
was
appointed
receiver.
Following
the
liquidation
of
his
assets,
the
plaintiff
was
forced
to
declare
personal
bankruptcy.
Income
tax
returns
prepared
by
the
plaintiff
and
filed
by
the
defendant
as
exhibit
D-2
indicate
that
for
the
1977
taxation
year,
the
plaintiffs
gross
income
from
farming
amounted
to
$129,438
with
a
loss
of
$50,619,
whereas
his
net
employment
earnings
were
$59,247.
In
1978,
gross
income
from
farming
was
$85,650
with
losses
of
$200,860,
and
net
employment
earnings
amounted
to
$181,151.
The
plaintiff
testified
that
non-farming
income
was
used
for
personal
living
expenses
and
the
operation
of
his
farm.
Between
1976
and
1980,
the
plaintiff
invested
$453,583
in
cash
and
$314,763
by
way
of
loans
in
the
farm.
It
is
not
disputed
that
the
plaintiff
had
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
from
his
farming
operation.
For
the
taxation
years
1975
and
1976,
the
plaintiff
filed
income
tax
returns
claiming
a
loss
from
his
farm
business
as
allowed
by
subsection
31(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
For
the
taxation
years
1977
and
1978,
however,
the
plaintiff
deducted
the
full
amount
of
his
farming
loss
in
computing
his
taxable
income.
By
notices
of
reassessment
dated
June
6,
1980,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
plaintiff
for
the
1977
and
1978
taxation
years
and
restricted
his
farm
losses
to
those
allowed
under
subsection
31(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
To
repeat,
the
evidence
satisfies
me
that
during
the
years
in
question,
Mr.
Poirier
embarked
upon
a
business
enterprise
in
the
raising
of
Charolais
cattle.
The
enterprise
was
conceived
in
the
hope
of
producing
a
source
of
income
and
the
commitment
of
time
and
money
was
of
such
a
magnitude
that
it,
in
my
opinion
would
reasonably
be
expected
to
be
a
source
of
income
combined
with
his
other
sources
of
income
to
form
his
chief
source
of
income
in
those
taxation
years.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed
and
Benoit
Poirier
is
entitled
to
deduct
the
full
amount
of
his
farming
loss
in
computing
his
taxable
income
for
the
taxation
years
1977
and
1978.
The
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
its
costs.
Appeal
allowed.