Hargrave
P.:
Reasons
for
Order
This
motion
for
an
extension
of
time
within
which
to
appeal
a
30
September
1993
order
was
heard
and
granted
9
December
1996.
At
that
time,
I
indicated
reasons
would
follow.
In
passing,
I
note
these
reasons
apply
to
seven
other
actions,
T-3406-90,
T-3408-90,
T-3409-90,
T-3410-90,
T-
3411-90,
T-3412-90
and
T-3413-90.
Background
This
action
and
seven
companion
actions,
all
commenced
in
December
of
1990,
appeals
of
an
assessment
under
former
section
172(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
were
initially
held
in
abeyance
but,
following
an
acquittal
on
tax
evasion
charges,
were
heard
by
the
Federal
Court
in
September
and
October
of
1993.
By
the
time
of
trial
the
Crown
had
dropped
all
but
one
of
the
penalties
claimed
under
section
163(2)
of
the
Tax
Act
against
the
Plaintiffs.
Rather,
at
issue,
was
the
reopening
of
four
statute
barred
taxation
years
under
section
152(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
To
reopen
the
statute
barred
years
the
Minister
had
the
onus
of
showing
misrepresentation
attributable
to
neglect,
carelessness
or
willful
default
in
the
filing
of
the
tax
returns.
Present
counsel,
who
acted
for
Mr.
Podavin
in
the
four
actions
in
which
he
is
plaintiff,
and
for
his
company,
Can-Am
Realty
Ltd.,
plaintiff
in
the
other
four
actions,
reasoned
that
since
the
common
law
onus
to
show
misrepresentation
was
on
the
Minister
,
the
Minister
ought
to
proceed
first
at
trial.
So
the
Plaintiffs’
position
would
catch
neither
the
Crown
nor
the
Court
by
surprise,
which
might
well
result
in
an
adjournment
and
a
waste
of
everyone’s
time,
counsel
filed
and
served
a
motion
which
makes
his
point
quite
clearly:
This
motion
is
for
an
Order
under
Rule
494(2)
that
by
reason
of
the
taxation
years
that
are
the
subject
matter
of
this
litigation
being
statute
barred
for
the
purposes
of
notices
of
reassessment
under
the
Income
Tax
under
subsection
152(4)
of
that
Act
the
onus
of
proof
is
on
the
Defendant
to
show
misrepresentation
and
therefore
the
Defendant
should
proceed
first
to
tender
evidence
necessary
to
meet
this
onus.
(Motion
filed
23
September
1995)
A
transcript
of
the
trial
indicates
the
motion
was
dealt
with
not
as
a
preliminary
matter,
but
rather
during
the
course
of
the
trial.
The
trial
judge
denied
the
motion
and
subsequently
produced
reasons.
Counsel
for
the
Plaintiffs
submits
that
the
trial
judge’s
reasons
deal
not
with
the
onus
on
the
Crown
in
order
to
reopen
taxation
years
after
time
had
run,
under
section
152(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
but
rather
with
the
assessment
of
penalties
under
section
163(3)
of
the
Act,
with
the
correctness
of
the
Minister’s
assessment
with
the
onus
on
the
Plaintiff
to
establish
that
the
assessment
was
wrong.
The
Plaintiffs
say
the
reasons
were
not
only
not
responsive,
but
also
wrong
at
law
in
requiring
that
the
Plaintiff
must
go
first.
Counsel,
knowing
that
a
trial
is
not
to
be
adjourned
so
an
evidentiary
point
might
be
taken
to
appeal,
and
being
aware
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
decision
in
Saint
John
Shipbuilding
&
Dry
Dock
Co.
v.
Kingsland
Maritime
Corp.,
[1979]
1
F.C.
523,
93
D.L.R.
(3d)
91
at
527
(D.L.R.
93-4)
that:
...
(The
Trial
Judge’s)
...
rulings
...
(during
the
course
of
a
trial)
...
whether
reduced
to
writing
and
signed
by
him
or
not,
cannot
form
the
subject
matter
for
appeals
until
he
has
pronounced
his
judgment
on
the
matters
put
in
issue
by
the
pleadings.
[Emphasis
added.]
did
not
immediately
appeal
the
ruling.
Moreover,
counsel
would
have
reasoned
that
if
his
clients
were
successful
on
the
main
issues,
an
evidentiary
procedural
point
would
be
moot.
Therefore,
he
waited
until
a
judgment
in
the
case
was
handed
down,
4
February
1994,
and
within
the
30-day
time
limit
appealed
the
judgment.
In
due
course,
counsel
for
the
Appellants,
in
working
on
his
argument
and
in
going
through
the
Appeal
Books,
found
the
material
relating
to
the
procedural
point
and
the
resulting
reasons
of
the
trial
judge
were
missing.
The
Registry
apparently
advised
this
was
because
it
was
not
an
evidentiary
procedural
point
dealt
with
during
trial,
but
rather
an
interlocutory
motion
which
had
not
been
appealed.
In
effect,
counsel
for
the
Plaintiff,
who
had
tried
to
save
everyone
surprise,
time
and
expense
by
setting
out
his
concern
in
a
motion
to
be
dealt
with
in
the
course
of
trial
felt,
and
perhaps
properly
so,
that
he
was
being
penalized
in
a
way
which
would
not
have
happened
had
he
ambushed
the
Crown
with
the
procedural
point.
But,
undaunted,
he
brought
on
a
motion
in
writing
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
to
add
a
sixth
volume
to
the
Appeal
Book
to
contain
the
missing
material.
Mr.
Justice
Stone,
in
brief
reasons
in
Can-Am
Realty
Ltd.
v.
R.
(1996),
96
D.T.C.
6593
(F.C.A.),
held
that
because
the
motion
had
appealed
without
an
extension
of
time
and
that
with
no
appeal
pending
of
the
30
September
1993
order,
the
requested
material
could
not
be
added
to
the
Appeal
Book.
This
synopsis,
which
is
not
exhaustive,
but
which
summarizes
the
pertinent
events,
brings
us
to
the
present
motion
for
an
extension
of
time
within
which
to
appeal
the
30
September
1993
order.
Consideration
The
principles
to
be
applied
in
order
to
obtain
an
extension
of
time
within
which
to
appeal
are
not
at
issue.
They
have
been
set
out
many
times,
in
generally
similar
terms.
It
is
convenient
to
refer
to
the
phrasing
used
by
Madame
Justice
Reed
in
Noel
&
Lewis
Holdings
Ltd.
v.
Canada
(1986),
5
F.T.R.
166
(F.C.T.D.),
at
pages
168-69,
omitting
the
cases
referred
to
for
each
proposition:
(1)
each
case
depends
on
its
own
facts
(2)
an
important
factor
is
whether
or
not
there
would
be
undue
prejudice
to
the
opposing
party
(3)
special
circumstances
will
argue
in
favour
of
granting
an
extension
of
time
(4)
the
intention
of
the
plaintiff
during
the
whole
period
of
delay
is
a
relevant
factor...;
(5)
it
must
at
least
be
arguable
that
the
judgment
appealed
from
is
wrong
...;
(6)
the
court
has
discretion
to
extend
leave
when
the
interests
of
justice
so
require.
...
In
the
present
instance,
the
factual
background
and
circumstances
are
relevant
and
interesting.
Particularly
pertinent
is
the
forthright
manner
in
which
counsel
for
the
Plaintiff
raised
the
procedural
issue:
neither
he
nor
his
client
ought
to
be
prejudiced.
It
may
be
that,
in
future,
counsel
wishing
to
give
notice
of
a
procedural
point
to
be
raised
at
trial
so
as
not
to
be
accused
of
ambush,
will
be
advised
or
even
required
to
do
so
by
letter,
for
if
the
Saint
John
Shipbuilding
case
is
not
to
be
followed,
a
party
might
raise
a
procedural
point
during
trial
by
a
formal
motion,
and
then
appeal
the
outcome
before
the
conclusion
of
trial,
inevitably
prolonging
the
trial.
In
short,
without
the
rule
enunciated
in
the
Saint
John
Shipbuilding
case,
trials
would
never
end.
Counsel
for
the
Defendant
submits
an
extension
would
be
prejudicial
to
her
client
as
there
is
a
need
for
certainty
and
finality
to
the
4
February
1994
trial
judgment.
Were
the
appeal
on
a
procedural
point
to
be
successful,
counsel
for
the
Defendant
points
out
there
could
be
another
five
day
trial.
But
that
might
well
have
been
the
outcome
had
the
procedural
point
been
dealt
with
as
an
element
of
the
appeal
of
the
judgment
rather
than
as
a
pure
interlocutory
motion.
Further,
if
this
is
prejudicial
and
is
found
to
result
from
some
oversight
or
neglect
on
the
part
of
the
Plaintiffs,
the
Defendant
can
always
be
compensated
in
costs.
Counsel
for
the
Defendant
also
submits
that
the
outcome
of
a
new
trial,
even
with
the
order
of
precedence
reversed,
would
be
the
same.
This
is
perhaps
too
simplistic
an
approach
for
counsel
for
the
Plaintiffs
is
experienced:
he
felt
it
would
be
to
his
clients’
advantage
to
require
the
Crown
to
satisfy
the
onus
by
providing
evidence
first.
This
is
a
reasonable
approach.
I
have
already
touched
upon
the
special
circumstances
of
the
case,
notably
that
the
Plaintiffs
ought
not
to
be
prejudiced
either
by
their
counsel
be-
ing
upfront
in
raising
a
procedural
point
at
trial,
or
by
counsel
perhaps
mistakenly
relying
on
the
Court
of
Appeal
decision
in
the
Saint
John
Shipbuilding
case
(supra).
These
observations
lead
to
a
more
difficult
aspect
of
the
Plaintiffs’
motion.
As
Madame
Justice
Reed
pointed
out
in
Noel
&
Lewis
(supra)
the
intention
of
the
Plaintiff
during
the
whole
of
the
period
of
delay
is
a
relevant
factor.
The
Plaintiffs’
affidavit
material
is
sparse.
However,
I
accept
that
counsel,
once
judgment
was
handed
down
against
his
client,
intended
and
was
instructed
to
appeal
the
case
as
a
whole
which,
in
counsel’s
not
unreasonable
view,
included
the
procedural
issue
of
the
order
of
proceeding.
I
am
also
satisfied
that
if,
at
the
time
of
the
written
decision
on
the
procedural
point,
counsel
had
been
asked
whether
his
client
intended
to
appeal,
assuming
the
Plaintiffs
lost
their
case
at
trial,
a
reasonable
answer
would
have
been
that
certainly
the
Plaintiffs
intended
to
appeal,
of
the
written
decision
on
the
procedural
point,
counsel
had
been
asked
whether
his
client
intended
to
appeal,
assuming
the
Plaintiffs
lost
their
case
at
trial,
a
reasonable
answer
would
have
been
that
certainly
the
Plaintiffs
intended
to
appeal.
We
now
turn
to
the
issue
of
merit
and
whether
the
30
September
1993
reasons
of
the
trial
judge
are
at
least
arguably
wrong.
Put
another
way,
do
the
Plaintiffs
have
an
arguable
case?
To
me,
an
arguable
case
is
one
which
is
not
frivolous,
but
a
position
or
case
open
to
debate,
and
to
which
counsel
can
bring
a
reasoned
approach
drawing
from
a
foundation
of
knowledge
and
precedent
which
may
lead
to
establishing
a
desired
position.
Leaving
aside
counsel’s
position
that
the
trial
judge’s
reasons
dealing
with
who
should
go
first
were
not
responsive,
counsel
spent
some
time
in
explaining
his
position.
On
the
basis
of
the
cases
dealing
with
onus,
there
is
an
arguable
case.
More
specifically,
there
have
been
instances
in
which
the
Minister
has
proceeded
first.
I
have
in
mind,
as
an
example,
Minister
of
National
Revenue
v.
Taylor,
[1961]
C.T.C.
211,
61
D.T.C.
1139
(Ex.
Ct.).
In
the
Taylor
case,
the
Minister
sought
to
reopen
statute
barred
years
so
that
they
might
be
reassessed
by
showing
misrepresentation.
Mr.
Justice
Cameron
of
the
Exchequer
Court
pointed
out
that
while
it
was
for
the
taxpayer
to
go
first
when
it
was
merely
a
case
of
correctness
of
an
assessment,
where
the
case
involved
a
re-assessment
made
after
the
statutory
limitation
had
expired,
the
burden
of
proof
lay
on
the
Minister
to
first
establish,
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
Court,
that
the
taxpayer
had
made
a
misrepresentation
or
had
committed
a
fraud:
in
re-assessing
after
the
running
of
a
statutory
pe-
riod,
the
Minister
must
be
taken
to
have
alleged
misrepresentation
or
fraud
and
must
prove
it
(page
214
ff).
It
is
only
after
the
Minister
has
satisfied
the
statutory
requirement
that
there
arises
an
onus
on
the
taxpayer
to
deal
with
the
propriety
of
the
assessment
(page
216).
In
my
view,
counsel
for
the
Plaintiffs
has
a
reasonably
arguable
case.
Finally,
on
all
the
circumstances,
it
is
in
the
interests
of
justice,
not
only
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
Plaintiffs
but
also
to
settle,
in
the
face
of
apparently
conflicting
case
law
in
the
Court
on
reopening
statute
barred
taxation
years,
whether
it
flows
from
the
onus
on
the
Minister,
that
he
who
alleges
fraud
or
misrepresentation
must
prove
it,
that
the
Minister
must
proceed
first
at
trial.
I
thank
counsel
for
both
providing
good
and
interesting
argument.
Motion
granted.