Jerome,
ACJ:—These
applications
for
orders
extending
the
time
fixed
by
section
172
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended,
institute
appeals
came
on
before
me
at
Vancouver,
on
Monday,
February
22,
1982.
I
ordered
that
these
two
application
be
heard
together
and
at
the
conclusion
of
argument,
I
dismissed
both
applications
and
indicated
that
these
reasons
would
follow.
Both
cases
were
heard
by
the
Tax
Review
Board
on
May
21,
1980,
in
Vancouver
and
both
were
dismissed
in
oral
Reasons
given
in
the
presence
of
both
applicants.
A
written
judgment
following
the
oral
Reasons
was
signed
at
Ottawa,
on
June
4,
1980
and
written
reasons
for
judgment
were
issued
at
Ottawa
on
September
24,
1980.
I
note
from
paragraph
3
of
the
affidavit
of
Vincent
Grant
Gough
an
acknowledgment
that
both
applicants
received
these
reasons
in
an
envelope
post-marked
October
16,
1980.
Counsel
for
the
applicants
conceded
that
there
were
no
extenuating
circumstances
which
he
could
bring
to
the
attention
of
the
Court
to
explain
or
justify
the
delay
of
some
sixteen
months
between
that
date
and
the
present.
The
affidavit
of
the
applicant
also
offers
no
reasonable
explanation
except
for
ignorance
of
the
rules,
which
is,
of
course,
no
excuse
and
therefore,
I
am
unable
to
find
in
evidence
or
argument
any
justification
for
an
order
extending
the
time
for
the
commencement
of
these
appeals.
Accordingly,
the
applications
must
be
dismissed.
Counsel
developed
an
interesting
argument
based
on
subsections
171(4)
and
172(1)
of
the
Act:
Sec
171.
Disposal
of
appeal
(4)
Copy
of
decision
to
Minister
and
appellant.
Upon
the
disposition
of
an
appeal,
the
Board
shall
forthwith
forward,
by
registered
mail,
a
copy
of
the
decision
and
any
written
reasons
given
therefor
to
the
Minister
and
the
appellant.
Sec
172.
Appeal
(1)
The
Minister
or
the
taxpayer
may,
within
120
days
from
the
day
on
whch
the
Registrar
of
Tax
Review
Board
mails
the
decision
on
an
appeal
under
section
169
to
the
Minister
and
the
taxpayer,
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada.
It
was
counsel’s
submission
that
when
read
together,
the
120-day
time
limit
in
subsection
172(1)
must
be
determined
to
commence
only
upon
strict
compliance
with
subsection
171(4)
so
that
in
the
absence
of
proof
by
the
Crown
that
the
Board
had
forwarded
by
registered
mail
a
copy
of
the
decision
to
the
Minister
personally,
the
Court
should
consider
the
appeal
period
still
open.
Counsel
conceded
that
he
was
in
some
difficulty
in
relating
this
submission
to
an
application
to
extend
the
time
since,
if
successful,
no
extension
of
time
would
be
necessary.
It
may
be
as
counsel
suggested
during
the
argument
that
this
position
can
only
be
properly
tested
in
defence
of
a
motion
to
strike
out
any
statement
of
claim
which
these
appellants
may
now
attempt
to
file.
I
leave
that
question
open
since
I
consider
the
submission
entirely
irrelevant
to
the
application
now
before
me
which
seek
only
an
order
for
an
extension
of
time.
Accordingly,
the
applications
are
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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