The Queen v. Armstrong, 96 D.T.C 6315 (FCA)

After noting that the decision in The Queen v. Bryce, [1982] 2 F.C. 581 (C.A.) was reversed under a consent judgment made in the Supreme Court of Canada that allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal decision and restored the judgment in the Trial Division (at 80 DTC 6304), Stone J.A. stated (at p. 6320):

"True, the Supreme Court of Canada upon a motion in chambers in turn reversed this Court's judgment but as its judgment was given on consent it has no precedential value. A consent judgment represents an agreement of the parties and although it is entered upon the record with the approval of a court and is therefore binding as between the parties it does not create a precedent by which an inferior court is bound."

Monthly mortgage payments made by the taxpayer for the benefit of his former wife did not qualify for deduction because they did not represent an allowance as defined in s. 56(12), i.e., the former wife had no discretion as to the use of the monies in question. If s. 60.1(1) were read as not being subject to the conditions set out in ss.60(b), (c) and (c.1), and decree, order, judgment or written agreement would theoretically fall within the descriptions, a result which could not have been intended.

S.60.1(2) had no application as the court order in question did not provide for the application of that provision.