Urie,
J
(concurred
in
by
Pratte,
J
and
Sheppard,
DJ)
(judgment
delivered
from
the
Bench):—The
judgment
appealed
from
is
that
rendered
in
one
of
four
appeals
arising
from
reassessments
for
income
tax:
levied
by
the
respondent,
tried
together
in
the
Trial
Division.
and
argued
together
in
this
Court.
In
all
material
respects
the
facts
upon
which
the
learned
trial
judge
reached
his
decisions
in
each
case
were
identical
and
are
sufficiently
set
forth
in
his
reasons
for
judgment.
Put
briefly,
the
reassessments
added
to.
the
appellant’s
taxable
income
for
the
1969
taxation
year,
his
share
of
the
profit,
less
a
permissible
reserve,
derived
from
the
sale
in
that
year
of
160
acres
of
farm
land
situated
close
to
the
City
of
Edmonton,
which
he
and
his
three
fellow
appellants
had
purchased
in
1964
as
tenants
in
common,
along
with
another
individual
and
a
corporate
entity.
The
appellant
contended
that
his
sole
purpose
in
purchasing
the
property
was
for
a
long-term
investment
and
thus
the
gain
realized
on
the
sale
was
from
an
enhancement
in
the
value
of
a
capital
asset,
and
was
not
taxable
as
income
from
a
venture
in
the
nature
of
trade
as
contended
by
the
respondent.
Both
the
corporation
and
the
other
individual
participant
in
the
transaction
included
their
respective
shares
of
the
profit
derived
from
the
sale
in
their
taxable
income
for
the
year
in
question.
A
review
of
the
transcript
of
evidence
reveals
that
there
was
ample
evidence
upon
which
the
trial
judge
could
have
based
his
following
two
findings
of
fact.
Firstly,
that
the
appellant’s
sole
purpose
in
purchasing
a
share
of
the
property,
the.
profits
from
the
sale
of
which
have
been
assessed
for
tax
by
the
respondent,
was
to
realize
an
accretion
to
the
purchase
price
by
sale
at
a
time
when
the
increase
in
price
obtainable
made
it
expedient
to
sell.
secondly,
that
the
annual
income
produced
from
the
lands
was
so
negligible
as
to
be
immaterial
so
that
it
was
clear
that
the
property
was
not
purchased
as
an
investment
to
produce
income.
These
findings
of
fact,
in
our
opinion,
ought
not
to
be
disturbed
by
this
Court.
Having
so
found,
the
contention
of
the
appellant
that
his
interest
in
the
vacant
land
purchased
was
an
investment
and,
being
an
isolated
transaction
outside
the
ordinary
scope
of
his
profession,
the
profit
earned
on
its
resale
was
not
taxable,
is
in
our
view,
untenable.
Even
if
the
fact
is
accepted
that
the
sale
was
made
due
to
a
threat
of
expropriation,
it
was
nonetheless
a
premature
occurrence
of
the
appellant’s
ultimate
intention,
namely
to
sell
his
interest
in
the
land
at
a
profit.
Although
he
was
not
dealing
in
what
is
normally
considered
to
be
a
subject
of
commerce
such
as
commodities,
the
transaction
from
its
very
inception
was
purely
speculative
in
character
and
was,
in
our
opinion,
as
a
matter
of
law,
a
venture
in
the
nature
of
trade.
Moreover,
we
are
of
the
further
opinion
that
the
character
of
the
transaction
and
the
taxability
of
the
profit
arising
therefrom
is
in
no
way
changed
simply
because
the
appellant’s
intention
was
to
retain
his
interest
in
the
land
for
a
substantially
longer
period
of
time
than,
in
fact,
he
did.
Since
his
intention
from
the
beginning
was
to
sell
at
a
profit
from
then
on
its
characterization
as
a
venture
remained
and
thus
the
validity
of
the
taxation
of
his
gain
on
the
sale
also
remained.
The
learned
trial
judge
was
correct,
therefore,
in
his
conclusion
that
the
profit
arising
out
of
the
transaction
was
taxable
by
virtue
of
sections
3
and
4
and
paragraph
139(1)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
those
sections
read
in
the
taxation
year
under
review.
In
so
finding
we
rely
on
the
principles
enunciated
in
the
following
authorities:
Californian
Copper
Syndicate
v
Harris
(1904)
5
TC
159;
CIR
v
Livingston
et
al
(1926),
11
TC
538;
CIR
v
Fraser
(1940-42),
24
TC
498,
and
Regal
Heights
Limited
v
MNR,
[1960]
SCR
902;
[1960]
CTC
384;
60
DTC
1270.
The
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Email this Content