Rothstein
J.A.:
The
issue
in
this
appeal
is
whether
membership
dues
paid
by
the
Appellant,
Alan
Montgomery,
to
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada,
for
the
taxation
year
1988,
were
deductible
in
computing
his
income
from
employment
for
that
year
under
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72
c.
63.
Mr.
Montgomery
was
employed
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
as
the
Chief
of
the
Real
Estate
Appraisal
Section
in
the
Hamilton,
Ontario
District
Office.
As
a
condition
of
employment
in
that
position,
he
was
required
to
hold
the
Accredited
Appraiser
designation
of
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
but
was
not
reimbursed,
and
was
not
entitled
to
be
reimbursed,
by
his
employer
for
the
payment
of
those
dues.
The
parties
are
agreed
that
real
estate
appraisers
are
members
of
a
profession
for
purposes
of
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(i).
In
1988,
there
was
no
statute
that
incorporated
or
regulated
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
as
a
self-governing
profession.
Rather,
on
April
11,
1960,
the
Institute
had
been
incorporated
as
a
corporation
without
share
capital
under
Part
II
of
the
Dominion
Companies
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
53.
The
Institute
has
by-laws
providing
for,
amongst
other
things,
designation
of
members
as
Accredited
Appraiser
Canadian
Institute
(AACI),
Professional
Appraiser
(P.
App.)
and
Canadian
Residential
Appraiser
(CRA),
education
and
discipline.
The
sole
issue
is
whether
a
real
estate
appraiser
in
Ontario
has
a
professional
status
“recognized
by
statute”
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
Bowman
T.C.J.
relied
on
reference
to
appraisals
being
conducted
by
persons
designated
AACI
by
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
in
the
British
Columbia
Expropriations
Act
and
Regulation.
As
a
result,
he
found
in
favour
of
Mr.
Montgomery
and
allowed
his
dues
to
the
Appraisal
Institute
as
a
deduction.
(See
Montgomery
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1996]
I
C.T.C.
2796
(T.C.C.)).
In
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
the
learned
Trial
Judge
came
to
the
opposite
conclusion.
See
Montgomery
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1997),
97
D.T.C.
5510
(Fed.
T.D.)
.
Citing
a
long
line
of
authority
which
she
followed
,
she
concluded:
In
my
opinion,
a
statutory
provision
requiring
the
preparation
of
an
appraisal
by
a
member
of
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
does
not
constitute
a
recognition
by
statute
of
the
professional
status
of
that
group;
it
merely
indicates
that
a
member
of
that
group
must
perform
the
appraisal
required
by
the
statutory
provision.
A
profession
only
possesses
“a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute”,
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
following
the
enactment
of
legislation
permitting
it
to
regulate
its
affairs
in
accordance
with
express
rights,
duties
and
powers.
In
1988,
there
was
no
legislation
anywhere
in
Canada
permitting
the
self-regulation
of
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
or
any
of
its
affiliated
groups
as
a
profession.
Subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
provides:
8.(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayers’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
as
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(i)
amounts
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as...
(i)
annual
or
professional
membership
dues
the
payment
of
which
was
necessary
to
maintain
a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute
to
the
extent
that
he
has
not
been
reimbursed,
and
is
not
entitled
to
be
reimbursed
in
respect
thereof;...
(emphasis
added)
The
term
“recognized”
is
not
further
defined.
Before
this
Court,
the
Appellants
cited
three
statutes
in
existence
in
1988
which,
they
argued,
recognized
the
professional
status
of
appraisers.
The
first
was
subsection
19(2)
of
the
Expropriation
Act,
S.B.C.,
1987,
c.
23
which
provides:
19.(2)
The
appraisal
report
shall
be
prepared
by
a
person
who
has
been
accredited
by
an
institute
or
body
prescribed
by
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council,
shall
be
reasonably
detailed
and
shall
include...
Section
8
of
the
Expropriation
Act
General
Regulation
451/87
provides:
For
the
purpose
of
section
19(2)
of
the
Act,
the
following
persons
may
prepare
appraisal
reports:
(a)
a
person
designated
A.A.C.I.
by
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
Next,
the
Appellants
cited
subsection
8(5)
of
the
Nursing
Homes
Act,
S.A.
1985,
c.
N-14.1.
It
provides:
(5)
If
the
Minister
grants
an
approval
referred
to
in
subsection
(1),
it
is
subject
to
the
conditions
prescribed
in
the
regulations.
Subsection
7(d)
of
the
Nursing
Homes
General
Regulation
232/85
provides:
7.
If
an
operator
of
a
non-district
nursing
home
applies
to
the
Minister
under
section
8(1)
of
the
Act
for
his
approval
of
a
sale
or
other
disposition
of
any
interest
in
the
land
and
buildings
used
for
his
nursing
home
to
a
district
board,
an
approval,
if
granted,
is
subject
to
the
condition
that
the
selling
or
disposition
price
for
land,
buildings,
and
any
other
property
used
for
the
nursing
home
shall
not
exceed
the
aggregate
of
the
fair
market
value
for
land,
buildings
and
any
other
property
determined
as
at
the
date
of
sale
or
disposition
on
an
appraisal
basis
under
which
(a)
the
district
board
shall
obtain
an
appraisal
of
them
from
an
appraiser
appointed
and
paid
by
it,
(d)
each
appraiser
shall
be
a
member
of
either
the
Alberta
Association
of
Professional
Appraisers
or
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
Finally,
the
Appellants
cited
subsections
5(2),
(3)
and
(4)
of
the
Government
Employee
Housing
Plan
Act,
R.S.Y.
1986,
c.
80
which
provide:
5.(2)
A
person
shall
not
be
appointed
as
an
appraiser
under
this
section
unless
he
is
able
to
demonstrate
that
he
is
experienced
in
the
making
of
appraisals
of
real
property
for
others,
for
other
purposes,
for
gain
or
reward.
(3)
A
person
shall
be
deemed
to
have
satisfied
the
requirements
of
subsection
(2)
if
(a)
he
is
the
holder
of
a
certificate
from
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
qualifying
him
to
appraise
the
housing
unit,
or
(4)
An
appraisal
under
this
section
shall
be
based
on
the
cost
approach
or
on
the
market
approach
as
recognized
by
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada.
The
question
is
whether
these
references
satisfy
the
words
“professional
status
recognized
by
statute”
in
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
For
purposes
of
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(i),
the
British
Columbia
and
Alberta
legislation
suffer
from
the
complication
that
the
references
to
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada,
or
the
AACI
designation,
are
found
in
regulations
and
not
in
the
statutes
themselves.
However,
the
Yukon
Government
Employees
Housing
Plan
Act
provides
that
an
appraiser
is
deemed
to
have
satisfied
the
requirement
that
he
be
experienced
in
the
making
of
appraisals
of
real
property,
if
he
is
the
holder
of
a
certificate
from
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
qualifying
him
to
appraise
the
housing
unit.
The
line
of
jurisprudence
upon
which
the
learned
Trial
Judge
relied
in
adopting
the
view
that
“recognized”
means
that
a
statute
must
provide
for
the
regulation
of
the
professional
organization,
was
based
on
cases
commencing
with
Minister
of
National
Revenue
v.
Montgomery,
supra.
However,
we
do
not
read
the
ratio
decidendi
in
Montgomery
to
deal
directly
with
the
question
of
what
“recognized”
means
in
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i),
which
is
the
question
before
us
in
this
appeal.
Indeed
in
Montgomery,
Kerr
J.
stated
at
page
120:
The
purpose
of
the
payment
of
wardroom
dues
is
not,
in
my
opinion,
to
maintain
a
professional
status.
The
status
of
a
navy
officer
does
not
call
for
membership
in
a
mess,
unlike
the
practice
of
medicine,
for
example,
which
calls
for
membership
in
a
medical
society
established
by
statute.
My
attention
was
not
drawn
to
any
specific
recognition
of
a
wardroom
mess
in
a
statute,
and
I
scarcely
think
that
the
status
of
membership
in
a
wardroom
mess
is
a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute.
Subsequent
cases
appear
to
rely
on
the
obiter
comments
of
Kerr
J.
at
page
119:
I
feel
sure,
the
present
day
concept
of
organized
societies
and
associations
of
doctors,
dentists,
lawyers,
engineers,
chartered
accountants
and
other
professional
persons,
which
have
been
given
a
special
status
by
statute
and
have
the
power
to
make
regulations
governing
the
issue
of
certificates
and
licences
to
practise
the
profession,
examinations
of
candidates
for
membership
and
the
right
to
practise,
discipline
of
members,
and
a
variety
of
other
matters,
including
the
regulation
of
the
practice
and
the
professional
conduct
of
its
members.
(sic)
We
are
of
the
respectful
view
that
Montgomery,
and
the
cases
following
it,
read
into
the
Income
Tax
Act
Words
that
are
not
there.
In
this
respect,
we
must
be
guided
by
the
words
of
Iacobucci
J.
in
Canderel
Ltd.
v.
R.
(1998),
98
D.T.C.
6100
(S.C.C.),
at
6107
:
For
the
court
to
usurp
this
inherent
power
of
Parliament
is
rife
with
unnecessary
danger.
As
was
observed
in
Royal
Bank
of
Canada
v.
Sparrow
Electric
Corp.,
[1997]
1
S.C.R.
411,
at
p.
485:
All
that
is
needed
to
effect
the
desired
result
is
clear
language
of
that
kind.
In
the
absence
of
such
clear
language,
judicial
innovation
is
undesirable,
both
because
the
issue
is
policy
charged
and
because
a
legislative
mandate
is
apt
to
be
clearer
than
a
rule
whose
precise
bounds
will
become
fixed
only
as
a
result
of
expensive
and
lengthy
litigation.
The
law
of
income
tax
is
sufficiently
complicated
without
unhelpful
judicial
incursions
into
the
realm
of
lawmaking.
As
a
matter
of
policy,
and
out
of
respect
for
the
proper
role
of
the
legislature,
it
is
trite
to
say
that
the
promulgation
of
new
rules
of
tax
law
must
be
left
to
Parliament.
As
one
eminent
jurist
of
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
once
observed,
“we
are
a
Supreme
Court,
not
a
Supreme
Legislature.”
The
Respondent’s
approach
requires
us
to
supplement
the
word
“recognized”
in
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
with
words
such
as
“incorporating”
or
“providing
for
the
regulation
of’
the
profession
or
words
of
similar
import.
We
have
no
doubt
that
many,
and
perhaps
most,
professional
organizations
will
be
established
and
regulated
by
statute.
However,
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
not
concerned
with
the
incorporation
or
regulation
of
professional
societies
and
there
is
no
necessary
implication
that
the
word
“recognized”
in
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(i)
includes
such
requirements.
Subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
is
concerned
with
allowing,
as
a
deduction
from
income,
professional
dues
paid
in
order
to
maintain
a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute.
The
purpose
of
the
term
“recognized
by
statute”
is
only
to
establish
a
standard
against
which
the
validity
of
the
professional
status
in
question
is
measured.
The
dictionary
definition
of
“recognized”
is,
in
this
context,
“to
acknowledge
the
existence,
validity,
character
or
claims
of’.
See
Concise
Oxford
Dictionary,
8th
ed.
Had
Parliament
intended
to
restrict
the
meaning
of
“recognized”
to
include
the
requirement
of
being
“incorporated”,
“created”
or
“regulated”
by
statute,
it
was
open
to
it
to
use
words
to
that
effect.
It
did
not.
For
this
Court
to
do
so
would
be
contrary
to
the
approach
to
interpretation
mandated
by
Canderel.
There
is
statutory
acknowledgement
of
the
status
of
appraisers
which
status
is
associated
with
membership
in
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
and
which
the
parties
agreed
is
a
professional
status.
We
are
therefore
satisfied
in
this
case
that
there
is
statutory
recognition
of
the
professional
status
of
appraisers
for
purposes
of
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i).
The
appeal
will
be
allowed,
the
decision
of
the
Trial
Division
will
be
set
side
and
the
appeal
by
the
Respondent
against
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
will
be
dismissed,
the
whole
with
costs
to
the
Appellants,
in
this
Court
and
in
the
Trial
Division.
Appeal
allowed.