Hugessen,
J.A.:—
We
are
all
of
the
view
that
the
learned
trial
judge
committed
no
error
when
he
looked
at
all
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
making
of
the
agreement
between
the
appellant
and
his
wife
in
order
to
determine
that
the
payment
of
$45,000
and
the
three
further
payments
of
$50,000
each,
spread
over
a
little
more
than
two
years,
were
lump
sum
payments
and
not
“allowance
.
.
.
for
the
maintenance"
of
the
wife.
We
specifically
reject
the
appellant's
suggestion
that
paragraphs
56(1)(b)
and
60(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
are
designed
by
Parliament
to
give
an
absolute
right
to
separated
or
former
spouses
to
contract
into
or
out
of
taxation
by
their
characterization
of
payments
as
“maintenance”.
There
is
simply
no
warrant
in
the
wording
of
those
provisions
to
support
such
a
drastic
departure
from
the
general
scheme
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
We
also
reject
the
appellant's
attempt
to
invoke
the
parol
evidence
rule
to
object
to
evidence
of
the
circumstances
leading
up
to
the
making
of
the
agreement;
the
Minister,
not
being
a
party
to
that
agreement,
is
entitled
to
rely
on
any
available
evidence
to
support
his
characterization
of
the
payments
in
a
manner
different
from
that
employed
by
the
former
spouses
in
the
agreement
itself.
In
our
view
the
trial
judge
correctly
examined
the
agreement
and
all
its
surrounding
circumstances
and
applied
thereto
the
proper
criteria.
His
conclusion,
we
say
with
respect,
is
quite
simply
above
reproach.
The
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.
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