Date: 20010710
Docket: 98-2256-IT-G
BETWEEN:
ARTHUR C. DWYER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
McArthur J.
[1]
The Appellant appeals the reassessments of the Minister of
National Revenue to include in income unreported interest earned
in excess of $750,000 and interest and penalties for gross
negligence for the taxation years 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. In
addition, the Minister reassessed the Appellant for the 1991
taxation year increasing the amount of income from $62,537 to
$126,677.
[2]
The Appellant was born in 1941. He has a grade eight education,
has lived most of his life in the Peterborough area and has been
married for 41 years to Ruth Dwyer. Over the years, he
worked in the logging business, at Johnson's Outboard Marine,
and in a brake shoe manufacturing plant. About 1984, he injured
his back lifting slabs of asbestos and received Worker's
Compensation benefits for several years. He and his wife live
very modestly. She has worked at Sears for over 32 years and they
use her salary to pay household expenses.
[3]
The Appellant has been investing in residential mortgages for
over 20 years. He did not declare the interest, bonus and
penalties received by him and his investment fund grew
exponentially. He never used an accountant until Revenue
Canada's audit in 1992. He used the services of a mortgage
broker and lawyers and demonstrated an expertise that belied his
counsel's position that "the Appellant is a very simple
and naive man who had an honest belief that interest earned in
respect of residential mortgages was not included in income for
tax purposes".[1] The Appellant stated that he had read in an article in
the newspaper years ago that interest from residential mortgages
was not taxable. Revenue Canada keeps a record of such newspaper
reports but could not find any such article. The Appellant could
not remember when and where he read it.
[4]
Commencing in 1976 through to 1991, the Appellant loaned money
through a mortgage broker for approximately 78 residential
mortgages. His position is that while income from commercial
mortgages is subject to income tax, the interest and profit from
residential mortgages is not taxable. The Appellant's
investments in commercial mortgages were limited to only two or
three. He did not declare interest in 1990 on one of these
mortgages stating that he was awaiting the builder (mortgagor) to
complete an entire project. This appears to be a reason without
logic and flies in the face of his reasoning to spread income
with his wife. The Appellant's primary position is that the
Minister violated sections 7 and 8 of the CanadianCharter of
Rights and Freedoms, which sections read as follows:
7
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
8
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure.
[5]
The Appellant did his banking through a Peterborough Community
Credit Union. He arranged two mortgage accounts, one for
principal and one for interest. He also set up two corresponding
accounts for principal and interest for his wife to whom he gave
a 50% interest in the mortgages. He divided the mortgages with
his wife to split the income for tax purposes although he did not
declare residential mortgage interest. The manager of the credit
union, Mr. Butterworth, testified that the Appellant was
meticulous in his bookkeeping and was scrupulously honest with
the credit union. He said that on occasion, the Appellant
corrected the credit union where it had credited one of his
accounts with too much interest.
[6]
In addition, the Appellant had bank accounts with the National
Trust, two for principal and two for interest, one of each in his
name and also that of his wife. He managed all four. By referring
to the amortization schedules for each mortgage he deposited
one-half of the principal and interest in each respective
account. He maintained the bank accounts at the Peterborough
Community Credit Union because it paid a better rate of
interest.
[7]
The Appellant's position is that he honestly believed that
income from residential mortgages was not taxable. The Appellant
declared income from one commercial mortgage but other commercial
mortgages were not declared. These were part of a group of
building mortgages with a single mortgagor. He stated that he
intended declaring the interest when all the mortgages with this
builder were cleaned up. He was open and straightforward with the
Revenue Canada investigators.
[8]
The Appellant was tried in the Ontario Court, Provincial Division
on four counts of failing to declare income contrary to paragraph
239(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. In finding him not
guilty, Collins J., in his Reasons for Judgment dated February
15, 1996, stated :
The difficulty in proving mens rea in a tax fraud case
is often high. The standard can be shown in the case of R. v.
DiPasquale, a decision of Mr. Justice Sheppard, rendered June
8, 1993. This court is bound by that decision.
To quote Mr. Justice Sheppard:
With respect to mens rea a charge of wilful evasion is
a specific intent offence. A court must find on the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to evade the payment of
income tax.
Carelessness or recklessness without knowledge of the facts
constituting the offence is not sufficient.
...
The defence urges the court to find that the testimony of the
defendant might reasonably be true, even though the large sum of
money involved might lead one to conclude that such ignorance
would be very unlikely.
...
His business dealings were perceived by everyone, with three
exceptions, as being scrupulously honest. In contrast, the three
who disagreed with him, all had axes to grind and were not
dependable witnesses.
At the end of the day, following the analysis of
DiPasquale, as I must, it becomes apparent that, on the
issue of mens rea, there must be reasonable doubt -
no more, no less - and he must be acquitted. It was a very
close matter because I was bound by DiPasquale.
Most, if not all of the mortgages required high interest rates
of 15% to 20% per annum and many provided for initial bonus and
severe payout privileges. The legality of these mortgages is not
in question.
[9]
The Appellant's mortgages demonstrated an expertise and
aggressiveness of a shrewd businessman. He charged very high
interest rates often together with an up-front bonus and a
four-month interest prepayment penalty. He was well aware of the
importance of equity, covenants and guarantors. At the hearing of
the appeals, he demonstrated an extraordinary memory for detail
with respect to his mortgages. He was very assertive in enforcing
the mortgage conditions and this diligence led to a disgruntled
mortgagor who anonymously informed Revenue Canada that the
Appellant may not be declaring the income from his mortgage
lending business. Acting on this information, Revenue Canada
obtained search warrants for the Appellant's home, the law
offices of Roger Clark, his lawyer at the time, and for the
law offices of James Dunn, his previous lawyer. It is with the
procedure in the execution of these warrants that the Appellant
takes issue.
[10] In his
home, the investigators found documentation for current mortgages
in random locations including in the top drawer of his bedroom
dresser. He stated that he discarded all documentation with
respect to discharged mortgages. At the law offices of Roger
Clark, Mr. Clark initially claimed solicitor-client privilege. He
immediately called the Appellant who, without hesitation,
instructed him to waive the privilege and release all
documentation requested. He gave similar instructions upon a call
from his former solicitor, Mr. Dunn. Throughout the search and
seizure during the morning of March 31, 1992, the Appellant and
his wife were completely co-operative and all relevant records
were quickly turned over to Revenue Canada, without incident.
[11] The
Appellant is portrayed by his counsel as a naïve man. His
method with respect to managing his mortgages was very simple and
basic. He divided the mortgages between himself and his wife for
tax saving purposes. He had an amortization schedule for each
mortgage that required blended payments of principal and
interest. He set up separate accounts for the principal and the
interest.
[12] Mr. Eric
Fransky, of Revenue Canada Special Investigations Unit, was
assigned the Appellant's file. His dogged determination,
attention to detail and perseverance caused the Appellant and his
family extreme distress and anger. While Mr. Fransky may have
been aggressive, overall I find that he should be commended for
his handling of this matter over the years. His meticulous
analysis revealed that the Appellant's total assets in bank
accounts and mortgages increased from $460,483 on December
31, 1986 to $1,717,147 on December 31, 1990. This
growth was not unnoticed by the Appellant. Pursuant to
paragraphs 231.2(1)(a) and (b) of the
Income Tax Act, the manager of the credit union provided
Mr. Fransky with documentation maintained by the credit union
with respect to the Appellant's bank accounts. Though the
same process, he obtained documentation maintained by National
Trust in connection with the bank accounts of the Appellant and
his wife.
[13] On March
31, 1992, officials of Revenue Canada executed search warrants at
the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Dwyer and the law offices of Roger
Clark and Dunn & Dunn pursuant to section 487 of the
Criminal Code of Canada. Mr. Raymond Finkle was the
Revenue Canada officer who led the search of the Dwyer premises.
He read Mr. Dwyer his rights in the presence of Mrs. Dwyer in the
kitchen of their home. The Appellant's counsel forcefully
presents that Mrs. Dwyer was not read her rights separately
making the search and seizure illegal. I cannot accept this. She
was present with her husband and followed his lead. She had
little knowledge of his mortgage business, he having complete
control. Mr. and Mrs. Dwyer were cordial to Mr. Finkle and his
team and co-operated fully even directing the six or seven
searchers to where they could locate mortgage cheques, bonds and
other relevant documents. The investigators found current
mortgages in random locations in the house, primarily in the top
drawer of the Appellant's bedroom dresser. The Appellant
threw out the documentation with respect to mortgages that had
been discharged.
[14] Prior to
the search and seizure of documents from each lawyer's
premises, the officers leading the search read a caution to the
lawyers and during a telephone conversation with his lawyers, Mr.
Dwyer consented to a complete disclosure of all his documents. He
stated he had nothing to hide and was magnanimous in his
invitation to Revenue Canada to take everything they needed for
their investigation.
[15] During
the ongoing criminal investigation, Mr. Finkle befriended the
Appellant and asked him for a personal mortgage loan which the
Appellant refused. Later, Mr. Finkle did not tell the truth about
this loan request to the Crown prosecutor but, he recanted his
lie within 20 minutes. There was no evidence of extortion by Mr.
Finkle. His behaviour was disgraceful but in no way was it an
abuse of process for which the assessments ought to be quashed.
During the investigation, prior to criminal charges being laid
against the Appellant, he paid Revenue Canada the amount of
$300,000 on account of taxes. There was no evidence, as suggested
by counsel for the Appellant, that this money was extracted from
the Appellant while holding the threat of criminal charges over
him. The Appellant raises the following issues, law and
argument:
55.
It is submitted that the clear and stunning facts of this case
make it a "first blush" case in flagrant violation of
s. 8 and 7 of the Charter by the Respondent's
officials which, on their own admission, constitute the breaches
for which all evidence ought to be declared inadmissible and/or a
stay entered on and/or the assessment quashed by this Court
pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.
Statutory and Constitutional Bar to Assessment
56.
In light of the fact that all evidence gathered for the
assessment stems from the evidence seized from the lawyer's
offices, and given that the empowering legislation for such
search and seizure, being s.488.1 of the Criminal Code of
Canada, was declared unconstitutional by the Appellate Courts
in Ontario, Alberta, and Newfoundland which unconstitutionality
of legislation is to be taken from the date of the enactment of
the Charter, the Respondent is barred from basing his
assessment on the evidence obtain from such seizure.
-
R. v. Fink, supra
-
Lavelle, supra, White supra
-
O'Neill Motors Ltd. v. Canada (1995), 96 DTC 1486;
affirmed C.A. 98 DTC 6424
57.
In O'Neill Motors both the Tax Court and Federal Court
of Appeal made it clear that evidence obtain on a search warrant,
which legislation was subsequently (subsequent to
execution of warrant) declared to be unconstitutional, could
not be used in the Tax Court on the civil assessment.
Execution of Search Warrant
58.
Regardless of this statutory bar, it is nonetheless
submitted that the record clearly indicates clear breaches
of:
(a)
the terms of the warrant itself;
(b)
the terms of s. 488.1 of the Code;
(c)
s. 7 of the Charter;
(d)
s. 8 of the Charter;
to render the search an illegal and warrantless one for an
illegal and improper execution of the warrant and evidence
gathered thereunder.
[16] The
Appellant seeks the following relief:
(a)
that the entire assessments be wholly quashed and/or stayed
pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter;
(b)
in the alternative to (a) above, that the assessment be set aside
or quashed only to the extent of the remaining claimed by the
Respondent Minister as to tax owing, penalties, and interest
thereon, and that the $300,000 already paid by the Appellant
remain paid on account to the Minister as full and final payment,
pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter,
(c)
in the alternative to (a) and (b) above, and in any event,
that the penalties and interest thereon be vacated, quashed or
set aside;
(d)
in the alternative to all of (a), (b) and (c) above, at a
minimum, given,
(i)
the declared unconstitutionality of s. 488.1 of the Criminal
Code;
(ii)
the abusive, extortive and questionably dirty hands of the
Respondent's officials;
(iii)
the clear and unequivocal ss. 7 and 8 Charter
breaches;
(iv) the
consistent criminal acquittals of Mr. Dwyer;
(v)
the complete disregard for the statutory and Charter
rights of Mrs. Dwyer; and
(vi) the
illegal and improper execution of the search warrant;
(vii) the
unsatisfactory and anaemic cogency and rationale of the
assessment and penalties imposed;
that this Honourable Court order a reassessment, by another
office, (preferably Toronto), other than the Belleville office or
its surroundings, of the taxation years in question;
(e)
costs of this appeal, to be assessed, and paid directly to the
solicitor for the Appellant; and
(f)
such further and other relief as the Court deems just.
[17] The
Minister is given the power in subsection 231.2(1) to demand
information or documents from any person as part of his
administration and enforcement of the Income Tax Act. This
does not infringe on sections 7 and 8 of the Charter even
when the information obtained is used for other than civil
purposes as stated by Létourneau J. in Bisaillon v.
Canada.[2]
[18] Counsel
for the Appellant referred to the stunning facts and flagrant
violation of sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. If any facts
are stunning, it is the outrageous behaviour of the Appellant in
not reporting huge sums of income while maintaining ignorance.
Special investigator, Eric Fransky, was given an investigation to
complete. The requirements he had served on the bankers, the
Appellant and his lawyers were made as part of his investigation
to determine if the Appellant had unreported income. I have no
doubt the evidence obtained is admissible and sections 7 and 8
have not been violated.
[19] Some of
the evidence was gathered from documents seized from the
lawyers' offices. The authority to seize the documents arises
from section 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The
procedure to be followed in carrying out the seizure was
contained in section 488.1 of the Code. The Ontario Court
of Appeal declared section 488.1 to be unconstitutional in R.
v. Fink,[3]
wherein Goudge J.A. stated:
... In serving the state interest in the investigation of
crime, s. 488.1 nonetheless mandates a procedure which more than
minimally impairs the solicitor-client privilege. The resulting
search and seizure is therefore unreasonable for the purposes of
s. 8 of the Charter and hence s. 488.1 infringes that
Charter right.
... In the result, in my view s. 488.1, must be held to
be unconstitutional.
The Appellant stated that the Minister is barred from having
his assessment on evidence from such seizure. He found support
for this in O'Neill Motors Limited v. The
Queen.[4] In that case, the Minister had admitted that
the search and seizure under section 231.3 of the Act was
in violation of the taxpayer's rights under section 8 of the
Charter and the evidence obtained was excluded. Sexton
J.A. in The Queen v. Jurchison[5] considered the impact of evidence in
violation of the taxpayer's Charter rights. He stated
that evidence might be inadmissible in a civil trial.[6] He added:
... Such determination would require an examination of
the impugned evidence and the method by which it was obtained, an
inquiry into the seriousness of any Charter breach and a
consideration of whether the evidence was already in possession
of the Crown or would have been discovered in any event. See
R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 at 664. ...
... The questions regarding the admissibility of evidence
and upon whom the onus rests with respect to the validity of the
assessments are to be left to the judge hearing the appeals of
the assessments.
[20] Briefly,
the wrongs alleged by the Appellant with respect to the search
and seizure include: no rights or caution was given to Mrs. Dwyer
by Mr. Finkle, who was the team leader, and solicitor-client
privilege was not respected. To review the facts, Mrs. Dwyer was
present when the caution was read to the Appellant. Mrs. Dwyer
knew little or nothing with respect to the mortgages since the
Appellant had complete control. Both the Appellant and Mrs. Dwyer
understood why Revenue Canada officers were in their home and Mr.
Dwyer directed them to relevant documents. He readily waived any
solicitor-client privilege and instructed his lawyers to
co-operate and give the investigators all they requested. If the
search and seizure under section 231.3 of the Act was a
violation of the Appellant's rights under sections 7 and 8 of
the Charter and the information was fundamental to the
making of the assessment, subsections 24(1) and (2) of the
Charter must be considered and they read as follows:
24(1) Anyone whose rights
or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.
24(2) Where, in
proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence
was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be
excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring
the administration of justice into disrepute.
I do not find the searches unreasonable given the
circumstances and have no difficulty concluding that admitting
the evidence would not bring the justice system into disrepute.
To the contrary, disallowing the evidence would no doubt bring
the justice system into disrepute.
[21] In
Donovan v. The Queen,[7] the taxpayer argued that certain evidence
supporting the Minister's assessments had been obtained
through illegal seizures under section 231.3 of the Act
and his Charter rights were violated. The search in
Donovan was unconstitutional following the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Baron.[8] Linden J.A. in Donovan,
questioned whether the admission of evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. He stated at page
6343:
... The remaining question with respect to this search is
whether the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the
search would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
I agree with the Tax Court Judge[9] in her analysis of the factors and that this was
non-conscriptive evidence. The search was not done in bad faith,
the officials not being aware that the warrants they obtained and
executed were secured under a statutory provision that was
unconstitutional. It is hard to imagine, if this were all that
happened in this case, that the admission of this evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute, at least in a
civil case such as this.
He concluded that the evidence was admissible. He commented on
the remedy granted in O'Neill Motors, supra,
and stated at page 6344:
It was made clear in O'Neill Motors that vacating a
reassessment, though a possible remedy in certain circumstances,
was not an automatic one. The conduct must be "a flagrant
and egregious violation of the appellant's rights" (see
Collins, supra). Moreover, at least in the civil context,
O'Neill Motors suggests that a further remedy will be
appropriate only when limiting the remedy to the mere exclusion
of evidence would "render nugatory the very rights the
Charter guarantees." (O'Neill Motors,
supra, at 1493 T.C.C.). In other words, before a reassessment
can be vacated, it must be shown that the lesser remedy of the
exclusion of evidence was inadequate to vindicate the
Charter violation. In addition, for it to be
"appropriate and just" to vacate a reassessment, it
should be clear that the evidence illegally obtained was so
"fundamental" to the reassessments that they could not
be sustained without it (O'Neill Motors, supra, at
1493 T.C.C.). In short, this type of "extreme remedy",
as I wrote in O'Neill Motors, is reserved only for
"serious violations where other remedies are
insufficient".
Therefore, while the four wrongs committed by the officials in
this case, viewed cumulatively, were serious, I am of the view
that they were not so "flagrant and egregious" as to
support the extreme remedy of vacating these reassessments in
light of the minimal importance of the additional evidence
obtained by those violations. In this case, the legally obtained
evidence may well be sufficient to support the reassessments.
Hence, in this case it would not be unfair to the appellant to
force him to go to trial because the Crown has a reasonable
chance of proving the case entirely on the basis of the legally
obtained evidence.
[22] I find
the evidence obtained from the search of the law offices and the
Appellant's home would not bring justice into disrepute. The
searches were conducted in good faith and the officers were not
aware that the then section 231.1 was unconstitutional. The
Minister had strong reason to believe that the searches were
necessary in its audit process. The evidence was
non-conscriptive in that the Appellant was not compelled or
forced to give evidence such as a blood sample to be analyzed in
a criminal investigation.
[23] I believe
Revenue Canada was already in possession of much of the evidence
found in the searches and it was probably available through other
means such as searching the public records in the Land Registry
Offices after obtaining names and addresses of mortgagors. The
execution of the search warrants was not unreasonable and
conducted in good faith. The admission of the evidence obtained
would not bring the administration of justice in disrepute. In
fact, disallowing the evidence would bring the administration of
justice in disrepute.
[24] There
certainly is insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr.
Finkle's attempt to borrow money from the Appellant was an
attempt at extortion. It was bad judgment on his part but, the
evidence was that he did have substantial equity in his cottage
property to secure the loan he requested and was prepared to go
through the Appellant's mortgage broker and be subject to the
Appellant's usual credit checks and interest rates. When he
was refused by the Appellant, he obtained his required financing
through a regular lending institution. I believe he required
financing to pay for his children's college education.
[25] There
also was insufficient evidence that the Minister was attempting
to obtain a settlement and extract $300,000 from the Appellant.
Considering all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the
Appellant was made aware that he would owe in excess of $300,000
in tax and he paid that amount to prevent an accumulation of
interest. The Appellant was in a very difficult situation of his
own making. I am sure it had a detrimental affect on his and his
family's health but there was no abuse of process. Revenue
Canada was doing what it had to do to audit the Appellant's
mortgage business and assess tax, interest and penalty.
[26] The
Appellant's counsel did not seriously contest the quantum of
the assessment except to state that it is based on a minute batch
of bank records unrelated to the totality and the assessment
should be returned for reassessment at a Revenue Canada office
other than Belleville. The Appellant produced no evidence
challenging the quantum of the assessments. His general
statements are insufficient. Mr. Fransky's detailed
explanation of how the amounts were arrived at was impressive and
I accept it.
[27] The last
question is with respect to the penalties imposed. The
Appellant's first submission is that mens rea is
required[10] and
that because the Appellant was twice acquitted of tax evasion and
fraud,[11]
arising out of the same allegations that he "knew or ought
to have known" that he had to report the income in question,
the issue of penalties is res judicata, as between the
parties and the Respondent thus is estopped, in law, from
attempting to impose them.[12] It is submitted, in the alternative, that the
Respondent has not discharged his onus of proving the
penalties.[13]
The onus of proving the penalties is on the Minister and the
Appellant had the onus of proving the assessments were too high
and he failed to do so. I agree with the reasoning in Hirex
Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, (1996)[14] wherein the Court stated:
... Although res judicata or issue estoppel may
apply in subsequent civil proceedings in the case of a conviction
from an offence, it will not apply in the case of an acquittal
and especially an acquittal grounded on lack of mens
rea.
[28] The trial
judge in the Appellant's criminal trial under paragraph
239(1)(d) of the Act appeared to be somewhat
reluctant to acquit the Appellant stating: "It was a very
close matter ...". At page 4 of his decision, Collins
J. stated:
The defendant has already been assessed the missing income tax
and will be subject to large penalties under the Income Tax
Act. The charges before the court then are in addition to
that and would be dealt with in the same manner as criminal fraud
cases.
Subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act reads in part
as follows:
163(2) Every person who, knowingly, or
under circumstances amounting to gross negligence in the carrying
out of any duty or obligation imposed by or under this
Act, has made ... a false statement or omission in a
return ... filed or made in respect of a taxation year as
required by or under this Act ... is liable to a
penalty of the greater of ...
[29] The
Appellant submitted that his case is indistinguishable from
Colangelo Estate v. M.N.R.[15]In that case, two
married taxpayers sold real property and failed to disclose
capital gains in tax returns. The taxpayers were unsophisticated
and relatively uneducated with limited understanding of business
and financial matters. Their tax returns were prepared by an
unsophisticated tax preparer and the taxpayers did not know they
had to report gains. The Minister assessed penalty, interest and
taxes owing on the gains. Bowie J. of this Court found that the
taxpayers were not grossly negligent. At page 2828, he
stated:
The statement which is generally accepted as defining gross
negligence, in the context of the Act, is that of Strayer
J., as he then was, who said in Venne v. R.:
"Gross negligence" must be taken to involve
greater neglect than simply a failure to use reasonable care. It
must involve a high degree of negligence tantamount to
intentional acting, an indifference as to whether the law is
complied with or not.
In Colangelo, Bowie J. was dealing with capital gains
and he believed the taxpayers' explanation. The present case
is with respect to the failure to include in income amounts which
clearly had an income character about them. This was not a single
transaction. The Appellant was no neophyte and he had been a
professional mortgage lender for years. He was wilfully blind and
grossly negligent. The penalties imposed are justified.
[30] The
appeals are dismissed, with costs to the Respondent.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of July, 2001.
"C.H. McArthur"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
98-2256(IT)G
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Arthur Dwyer and Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF
HEARING:
February 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Judge C.H. McArthur
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
July 10, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: Rocco Galati
Counsel for the
Respondent:
M. Judith Sheppard
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Rocco Galati
Firm:
Galati, Rodrigues, Azevedo & Associates
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
98-2256(IT)G
BETWEEN:
ARTHUR C. DWYER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on February 19, 20, 21, 22 and
23, 2001, at Toronto, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge C.H. McArthur
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Rocco Galati
Counsel for the
Respondent:
M. Judith Sheppard
JUDGMENT
The
appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years
are dismissed, with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of July, 2001.
J.T.C.C.
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