Beaubier,
T.C.C.J.:—
These
matters
were
heard
together
and
on
common
evidence
by
consent
of
the
parties
in
Toronto,
Ontario,
commencing
on
May
31,
1993
and
concluding
on
June
12,
1993.
They
are
appeals
pursuant
to
the
general
procedure
of
this
Court
concerning
both
appellants’
1983,
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
taxation
years.
The
appellants
are
husband
and
wife.
At
the
opening
of
trial
the
counsel
for
the
appellant
Thomas
M.G.
Schultz
abandoned
claim
25A,
leaving
the
following
claims
to
be
determined:
25.
B.
The
respondent
improperly
increased
the
appellant's
income
tax
payable
herein,
by
way
of
income
adjustments
made
by
the
respondent
by
way
of
reassessments;
C.
The
respondent
improperly
included
onto
the
appellant's
income,
income
earned
and
received
by
another
taxpayer;
D.
The
respondent
failed
to
exercise
his
statutory
duty
under
paragraph
165(3)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act");
E.
The
respondent
can
not
rely
on
subsection
245(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
herein,
because
it
is
unconstitutional;
F,
The
respondent
denied
or
infringed
upon
the
appellant's
rights
guaranteed
by
sections
7
and
12
and
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
The
appellant
Lois
Schultz
recited
the
following
claims
to
be
determined:
29.
A.
The
respondent
improperly
increased
the
appellant’s
income
tax
payable
herein,
by
way
of
income
adjustments
made
by
the
respondent
by
way
of
reassessments;
B.
The
respondent
improperly
included
onto
another
taxpayer's
income,
income
earned
and
received
by
the
appellant;
C.
The
respondent
failed
to
exercise
his
statutory
duty
under
paragraph
165(3)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
D.
The
respondent
can
not
rely
on
subsection
245(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
herein,
because
it
is
unconstitutional;
E.
The
respondent
denied
or
infringed
upon
the
appellant's
rights
guaranteed
by
sections
7
and
12
and
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
Thus,
the
two
appellants’
claims
are
identical.
The
following
witnesses
testified:
1.
For
the
appellant:
(a)
John
K.
Maguire,
owner
of
J.K.
Maguire
&
Associates
("JKM
&
A")
(b)
Dr.
Thomas
M.G.
Schultz,
appellant
(c)
Mrs.
Lois
Schultz,
appellant
(d)
Roderick
H.
Campbell
(e)
Mark
Davis
(f)
Robert
Benyi
2.
For
the
respondent:
(a)
Peter
McCrodan
(b)
Mark
Salutin,
CA
(c)
Richard
A.
Holt
The
notices
of
reassessment
respecting
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
dealt
with
them,
in
numbers
as
follows:
|
Dr.
Schultz
|
Mrs.
Schultz
|
1983:
|
Disallowed
business
loss
|
$
36,954.31
|
|
|
Adjusted
Child
Tax
Credit
|
|
-
$310.19
|
1984:
|
Disallowed
business
loss
|
$
40,161.74
|
$
31,391.21
|
1985:
|
Disallowed
business
loss
|
$
35,457.00
|
$133,346.92
|
1986:
|
Disallowed
business
loss
|
$
74,432.00
|
|
|
Disallowed
non-capital
loss
for
prior
|
|
|
years
|
|
Appeal
filed
|
1987:
|
Disallowed
business
loss
|
$126,662.00
|
|
|
Disallowed
non-capital
loss
carry
|
|
|
forward
|
|
$
25,303.34
|
The
assessments
relate
to
securities
transactions
in
dispute
respecting
investment
clubs
in
which
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
were
allegedly
involved
in
1983
and
hedging
transactions
they
conducted
in
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987.
These
occurred
after
the
Schultzes
met
with
John
K.
Maguire.
Mr.
Maguire
testified
that
he
first
met
the
appellants
in
1983
when
they
were
referred
to
him
by
his
client,
Dr.
Watts.
They
discussed
income
splitting
in
the
initial
interview.
In
1983
Mr.
Maguire
operated
a
total
of
68
brokerage
accounts
according
to
testimony
by
Mr.
Salutin,
an
auditor
employed
by
Revenue
Canada.
Mr.
Maguire
described
some
of
these
as
"investment
clubs”.
The
appellants
allegedly
participated
in
two
of
these
investment
clubs,
Dr.
Schultz
in
Club
0352
and
Mrs.
Schultz
in
Club
0345.
These
investment
clubs
used
Nesbitt
Thomson
Bongard
Inc.
("Nesbitt")
as
their
broker.
The
numbers
are
the
last
four
digits
of
the
Nesbitt
account
numbers.
These
two
accounts
dealt
in
Government
of
Canada
bonds.
At
the
outset
Mrs.
Schultz
filed
her
once
in
a
lifetime
election
(Form
1123)
pursuant
to
subsection
39(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
order
to
treat
her
dealings
in
Canadian
securities
as
capital
in
nature.
She
also
elected
in
her
1984
income
tax
return
(Exhibit
IV
2)
to
have
a
business
year
which
began
December
30,
1983
and
ended
December
29,
1984.
The
organization
of
the
alleged
investment
clubs
was
described
by
Mr.
Maguire,
during
his
examination-in-chief,
in
the
following
words:
MR.
ZALDIN:
Q.
Did
the
Schultzs
join
any
groups
of
clients?
MR.
MAGUIRE:
A.
Yes,
they
did.
They
participated
in
a
bond
hedge
that
was
executed
through
Nesbitt
Thomson.
Q.
Tell
us
about
that.
A.
That
was
essentially
an
income
splitting
hedge
where
Dr.
Schultz
took
a
short
position
in
a
Government
of
Canada
bond
and
his
wife,
Lois,
took
a
long
position
in
a
similar
Government
of
Canada
bond.
I
believe
the
maturity
dates
were
within
12
months
of
one
another,
similar
coupons,
so
that
the
bonds
were
close
enough
in
terms
that
the
risk
was
minimized
in
terms
of
one
investment
losing
a
lot
more
money
than
another
might
be
making.
The
primary
purpose
by
having
Thomas
go
short,
he
would
incur
all
the
expenses
on
the
short
sale,
the
interest
expense,
the
borrowing
cost,
and
Lois,
being
long,
would
receive
the
income
from
her
bonds,
so
we
would
be
accomplishing
the
primary
goal
of
getting
income
into
Lois’
name
and
having
Thomas
incur
some
expenses.
Q.
Would
the
Schultzs
be
in
the
same
club
or
different
clubs?
A.
They
were
in
different
clubs
because
the
one
club
was
shorting
in
Government
of
Canada
bonds.
There
was
a
separate
club
that
was
going
long,
this
other
Government
of
Canada
bond.
Q.
Do
you
know
how
many
people
were
in.
.
.
A.
In
the
Schultzs'
club
I
believe
there
were
29
members.
Q.
That
would
be
in
each
club?
A.
I
believe
there
were
29
in
both
clubs,
yes.
Most
of
the
members
would
have
been
in
a
similar
situation,
low
income
spouses
in
the
long
club
and
high
income
spouses
in
the
short
club.
Q.
How
was
the
membership
determined?
A.
The
membership
was
determined
by
essentially
grouping
together
people
with
like
financial
needs.
As
I
said,
in
the
Schultzs’
cases
it
was
largely
having
high
income
individuals
on
the
short
side
of
the
market,
the
short
club,
and
the
low
income
spouses
on
the
long
side.
It
was
essentially
like
financial
situations,
like
tax
circumstances.
In
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
matters
proceeded
on
the
basis
of
individual
accounts
in
the
names
of
Dr.
Schultz
and
Mrs.
Schultz.
In
1984
and
1985
these
accounts
were
with
McLeod
Young
Weir
Ltd.
(”
McLeod").
In
1986
and
1987
the
accounts
were
with
Merrill
Lynch
Canada
Inc.
("Merrill").
Mr.
Maguire
described
the
operation
of
these
accounts,
during
his
examination-in-chief,
in
this
way:
MR.
ZALDIN:
Q.
Could
you
explain
that
in
a
little
bit
more
detail,
the
conversion
aspect,
and
what
it
does?
MR.
MAGUIRE:
A.
Yes,
quite
simply,
the
investment
club
was
more
designed
for
income
splitting
and
there
was
a
much
larger,
obviously,
tax
emphasis
on
income
splitting
than
investment
whereas
with
other
hedges
we
—
to
give
you
a
simple
example,
let's
say
there
is
a
stock
at
$50
and
there's
a
warrant
giving
you
the
right
to
buy
that
stock
for
$50
and
let's
say
that
warrant
trades
for
$3.
If
we
buy
the
warrant
and
short
the
stock,
you
only
have
to
put
up
the
$3
of
capital
and
there's
going
to
be
$50
sitting
in
your
account
that’s
going
to
earn
interest.
That's
probably
going
to
recover
all
or
most
of
the
$3
over
the
life
of
the
hedge.
Q.
Is
there
a
margin
requirement
in
that
case?
A.
Yes,
the
$3.
So,
let's
say,
generally
speaking,
the
bulk
of
that
capital
would
be
returned
via
cash
flow,
if
not
all
of
it,
and
if
the
market
fell
a
great
deal
of
money
would
be
made
because
if
the
stock
went
from
$50
to
$40,
you
make
$10
on
the
short
side,
but
the
warrant
could
only
go
from
$3
to
zero,
so
you
can
only
lose
$3
on
the
long
side.
Essentially
the
brokers,
and
to
a
certain
extent
ourselves,
would
be
looking
for
investment
opportunities.
Hedging
is
basically
a
mathematical
type
of
vehicle
where
you
are
looking
for
aberrations
where
you
can
make
investments
with
very
little
capital
at
risk
and
an
opportunity
to
make
a
great
deal
of
money
generally
if
the
market
falls.
Q.
Mr.
Maguire,
you
are
finished
with
the
other
reference?
A.
I’m
finished
with
the
U.S.
dollar
reference,
yes.
I
just
wanted
to
clear
that
up
for
the
record.
To
come
back
to
the
tax
loss
selling
at
year
end,
yes,
I
would
have
cause
to
look
at
a
client's
position
and
where
there
was
losses
that
would
generate
tax
benefits,
would
generally
choose
to
realize
them
in
the
same
fashion
that
most
of
the
financial
papers
are
so
advising
at
that
time.
MR.
ZALDIN:
Q.
What
advice
did
you
give
in
this
instance?
A.
The
same.
The
warrants
were
sold
and
—
there's
other
reasons
as
well.
The
stock
had
not
at
this
point
in
time
fallen
precipitously
enough
that
it
looked
like
money
was
going
to
be
made,
so
you're
reserving
your
capital
as
well
by
liquidating,
but
there
was
both
a
tax
loss
and
there's
actually
profits
being
locked
in
on
this
particular
trade
so
that
there
is
a
real
economic
benefit
over
and
above
the
tax
savings
sought
to
be
realized.
So,
this
is
the
type
of
year
end
tax
selling
that
was
frequently
done.
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
testified
that
they
arranged
to
meet
Mr.
Maguire
in
about
October
of
1983.
During
examination-in-chief
Dr.
Schultz
testified
as
to
the
purpose
of
their
visit
in
the
following
words:
DR.
SCHULTZ:
A.
I
phoned
and
made
an
appointment
with
Mr.
Maguire.
Q.
Why
did
you
do
that?
What
were
your
concerns
which
led
you
to
telephone
for
an
appointment?
A.
I'd
been
working
for
ten
years
up
to
that
point
as
a
dentist
and
basically
had
only
professional
income
and
I
wasn't
into
any
other
types
of
income
producing
ventures.
A
dentist
works
with
his
hands,
and
if
you’re
not
in
the
office
you’re
not
producing.
I
thought
it
would
be
nice
to
have
something
that
wasn't
directly
related
to
my
profession
of
dentistry.
So
I
wanted
to
make
extra
income
not
related
to
dentistry.
I
wanted
some
good
tax
planning
advice.
I
also
wanted
to
do
some
income
splitting.
I
wanted
my
wife
to
also
have
an
independent
income
as
well.
Q.
What
do
you
mean
by
income
splitting?
What
does
that
mean
to
you?
A.
I'm
in
a
very
high
tax
bracket
and
if
1
could
shift
some
of
the
taxes
to
my
wife
in
a
legal
manner
I
was
perfectly
willing
to
do
so.
Q.
Tell
the
Court
what
you
understood
at
that
time.
A.
I
understood
at
that
time
that
the
investment
club
would
be
set
up
by
Mr.
Maguire
on
our
behalf
with
other
members
and
he
would
look
after
the
paperwork.
Q.
What
would
the
investment
club
do?
What
would
be
its
business
or
what
would
it
do?
A.
It
was
going
to
do
the
short
selling
of
bonds.
Q.
You
knew
it
was
bonds?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You
knew
it
was
short
selling.
A.
Yes.
Q.
What
was
your
understanding
at
that
time
about
the
concept
of
short
selling,
Mr.
Schultz?
A.
My
understanding
of
the
short
selling
concept
was
that
if
the
bonds
went
up,
you'd
actually
lose
money.
If
bonds
went
down,
you’d
make
a
profit
to
a
certain
extent.
Q.
Who
would?
A.
The
short
seller
would.
Q.
You
indicated
that
you
had
an
intention
to
go
ahead
with
this
investment
club
deal;
correct?
A.
Correct.
Q.
What
was
your
purpose
or
motivation?
Why
did
you
do
that?
Why
did
you
want
to?
A.
Basically
to
income
split.
At
the
opening
of
cross-examination
Mrs.
Schultz
confirmed
that
in
respect
to
both
the
investment
club
and
the
convertible
hedges
the
purpose
was
that
she
would
get
the
gains
and
Dr.
Schultz
would
get
the
losses.
She
stated:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF
MRS.
LOIS
SCHULTZ
BY
MR.
OLSSON:
Q.
You
have
described
how
you
met
Mr.
Maguire
and
had
an
initial
consultation
with
him,
Mrs.
Schultz,
and
your
husband
has
explained
that
as
well.
I
gather
both
of
you
understood
the
basic
concept
of
trying
to
take
offsetting
positions
where
you
would
get
the
gains
and
your
husband
would
get
the
losses.
A.
Yes.
Q.
That
is
what
was
referred
to
as
income
splitting
and
the
advantage
was
that
your
tax
rates
were
lower,
so
that
if
you
could
end
up
more
or
less
with
gains
and
losses
that
substantially
offset
each
other
there
would
be
a
tax
advantage
because
your
husband
has
a
high
income
and
you
have
a
relatively
low
income.
A.
Yes.
Q.
That
concept
applied
both
to
the
investment
club
strategy
and
to
the
later
convertible
hedge
strategy.
A.
Yes.
Q.
You
understood
that,
too.
A.
Yes.
The
Schultzes
stated
that
they
agreed
to
go
into
separate
investment
clubs
to
deal
in
Government
of
Canada
bonds
during
a
meeting
with
Mr.
Maguire
in
his
office
in
1983.
All
of
the
investment
activities
in
these
clubs
were
conducted
by
Mr.
Maguire.
Mrs.
Schultz
testified
that
the
Schultzes
did
not
know
of
any
of
the
activities
of
the
clubs
until
April
of
1984
when
they
received
the
reports
attached
to
their
income
tax
returns.
Moreover,
the
Court
saw
and
heard
evidence
from
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
and
it
is
clear
that
neither
of
them
ever
understood
any
of
the
stock
or
bond
transactions
done
by
Mr.
Maguire
at
any
time.
Mrs.
Schultz
testified
that
when
they
met
with
Mr.
Maguire
and
he
explained
these
things
to
them
it
was
clear
to
her
at
the
time,
but
when
they
left,
they
lost
any
comprehension
of
what
was
going
on.
She
also
said
that
while
Dr.
Schultz
was
sometimes
apprehensive,
she
was
not.
Mr.
Salutin
testified
that
Dr.
&
Mrs.
Schultz's
names
were
discovered
at
the
end
of
Revenue
Canada's
investigation
of
these
investment
clubs.
Some
statements
filed
by
other
taxpayers
showed
a
Mr.
and
Mrs.
Harvey
named
instead
of
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz.
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
and
Mr.
Maguire
testified
that
the
Schultzes
signed
a
Nesbitt
form
investment
club
account”
or
something
similar
for
the
purposes
of
the
1983
clubs.
Mrs.
Schultz
recalled
the
form
she
signed
was
completed
in
some
part
at
the
top.
She
testified
that
she
mailed
the
signed
forms
to
JKM
&
A
sometime
between
October
and
Christmas
1983.
A
sample
(Exhibit
A-1)
of
the
Nesbitt
form
was
filed.
However
Mr.
McCrodan
testified
that
no
signed
"investment
club
account”
form
was
ever
received
by
Nesbitt
on
account
of
any
of
the
alleged
clubs.
The
Schultzes
state
that
they
never
kept
a
copy.
Mr.
Maguire
implied
that
the
1983
forms
were
sent
by
JKM
&
A
to
Revenue
Canada
and
never
returned;
there
is
no
evidence
of
that.
Mr.
McCrodan
testified
that
each
of
the
Nesbitt
accounts
was
in
Mr.
Maguire's
name
with
a
different
account
number
referenced
back
to
his
original
opening
account.
He
stated
that
he
had
an
idea
that
these
accounts
were
conducted
by
Mr.
Maguire
for
clients.
The
form
of
Exhibit
A-1
refers
to
a
partnership,
whereas
the
appellants’
positions
are
that
each
club
was
a
joint
venture.
The
members
of
the
clubs
the
appellants
are
alleged
to
have
been
in
never
met,
and
the
Schultzes
never
knew
who
was
in
their
clubs
until
they
got
their
statements
in
1984.
These
statements
are
identical
to
the
"Harvey"
statements
(Exhibits
R-3
and
R-4),
except
that
the
Schultzes
names
are
situated
where
the
Harvey
names
were.
Mr.
Maguire
testified
that
in
his
mind
he
planned
to
put
Dr.
Schultz
in
a
different
club
in
1983
than
the
one
in
which
Dr.
Schultz
was
eventually
placed.
He
stated
that
the
placement
of
Dr.
Schultz
in
Investment
Club
0352
was
actually
done
in
1984.
Moreover,
the
cheque
that
paid
the
losses
on
Dr.
Schultz’s
1983
club
was
taken
from
another
club
account
which
was
not
Mrs.
Schultz’s
club.
Nothing
ever
authorized
this
procedure.
The
only
evidence
of
payment
of
Dr.
Schultz's
losses
is
the
endorsement
by
Mr.
Maguire
on
the
back
of
the
other
club’s
cheque.
The
cheques
did
not
clear.
Rather
the
cheque
was
issued
by
Nesbitt
with
signatures
deleted
and
then
cancelled
by
Nesbitt.
Thus,
the
evidence
is
that
Dr.
Schultz
did
not
pay
the
shortfall
in
his
account
in
1983
and
Mrs.
Schultz
did
not
receive
the
profit
in
her
account.
In
addition
to
the
shortfall,
there
was
a"
rental
fee”
on
a
short
transaction
of
$432.44
that
was
paid
by
JKM
&
A.
Mr.
Maguire's
allegation
is
that
Dr.
Schultz
was
one
of
29
members
of
the
club
and
therefore
Dr.
Schultz
was
billed
/29th
of
the
total
fees
attributable
to
that
club.
The
broker
fees
and
JKM
&
A's
fees
were
the
only
money
that
Dr.
Schultz
paid.
Mr.
Salutin,
Revenue
Canada's
auditor
of
the
"investment
clubs”,
stated
that
as
far
as
he
was
concerned
respecting
the
investment
clubs,
nothing
ever
happened.
Revenue
Canada
found
a
total
of
68
accounts.
Most
were
in
Mr.
Maguire's
name
and
some
were
in
Mr.
Benyi's
name;
there
was
no
documentation
respecting
these
accounts
with
anyone
else's
name
and
signatures
on
them
in
respect
to
any
of
the
alleged
investment
clubs
or
clients.
To
this
date
none
has
been
discovered
except
the
reports
issued
by
JKM
&
A
and
filed
with
its
clients’
income
tax
returns.
The
brokerage
houses
treated
each
of
Mr.
Maguire's
and
Mr.
Benyi's
accounts
as
personal
to
that
individual.
The
Schultz-
es'
investment
club
"trades"
were
conducted
within
the
brokerage
house
itself.
The
result
was
that
Revenue
Canada
saw
Mr.
Maguire
dealing
with
himself
in
respect
to
the
alleged
gains
or
losses
in
those
1983
accounts.
In
these
circumstances
he
had
no
gains
or
losses.
He
merely
incurred
some
fees
and
charges
by
the
brokerage
houses.
Because
he
was
merely
dealing
with
himself,
there
was
no
prospect
of
gaining
income
and
thus
the
brokerage
fees
and
charges
were
not
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
income
and
were
not
deductible.
Furthermore,
in
these
circumstances,
the
Schultzes
had
no
legal
interest
or
entitlement
in
or
to
the
alleged
transactions
which
were
entirely
Mr.
Maguire's.
In
1984
JKM
&
A
forwarded
a
report
and
T-5
slips
under
Nesbitt's
name,
without
any
authority
from
Nesbitt,
to
each
of
the
Schultzes
and
to
other
“club”
members
respecting
their
investment
clubs’
1983
activities.
These
documents
which
were
falsely
prepared
by
JKM
&
A
under
Nesbitt's
name
after
December
31,
1983
are
the
only
documents
evidencing
any"
investment
club”
or
any
interest
whatsoever
by
the
appellants
in
an“
investment
club”
in
1983.
JKM
&
A
is
in
the
tax
advising
business.
Dr.
Schultz
had
been
in
practice
for
approximately
ten
years
when
these
events
occurred.
Nesbitt
is
a
nationally
known
brokerage
house.
Yet
no
copy
of
what
the
Schultzes
purported
to
sign
respecting
the
alleged
clubs
has
been
presented
to
the
Court.
The
Court
is
prepared
to
believe
that
the
appellants
each
signed
something
and
that
Mrs.
Schultz
mailed
those
two
signed
documents.
But
the
Court
does
not
believe
that
they
signed
documents
relating
to
the
two
investment
clubs
in
which
they
are
alleged
to
have
been
members
in
1983.
Nor
does
the
Court
believe
that
such
clubs
ever
in
fact
existed
in
any
form.
The
fact
that
some
of
the
issued
reports
in
question
have
the
Harvey
names
rather
than
the
Schultzes’
names,
the
fact
that
such
documents
as
exist
were
prepared
after
the
calendar
year
end,
the
fact
that
they
were
prepared
under
the
Nesbitt
name,
and
the
fact
that
Mr.
Maguire
admits
that
he
had
a
different
club
in
mind
for
Dr.
Schultz
all
create
serious
credibility
problems.
Mrs.
Schultz
never
received
any
of
her
"profits".
Dr.
Schultz
never
paid
any
part
of
his"
losses"
in
1983
except
the
fees
billed
by
JKM
&
A
and
Mrs.
Schultz's
alleged
profits
were
not
used
to
pay
his
alleged
losses.
It
is
the
Court's
view
that
both
form
and
substance
are
missing.
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
were
not
in
business
in
any
so-called
“investment
clubs”
in
1983.
Furthermore,
on
the
evidence
before
the
Court,
there
were
no
investment
clubs
in
1983.
There
was
just
Mr.
Maguire
trading
with
himself
and
making
up
lists
in
1984.
Dr.
Schultz’s
1983
notice
of
reassessment
(Exhibit
AR-III-6)
dated
July
28,
1987
States:
Disallowed
Business
Loss,
Re:
Investment
Club
0288352
$36,954.31
The
proposed
letter
(Exhibit
ARV-48)
dated
June
16,1987
corrects
the
numeric
name
of
the
club
and
states:
It
is
our
view
that
you
were
not
engaged
in
a
bona
fide
business
nor
was
there
any
expectation
of
profit
therefrom.
The
notice
of
confirmation
dated
October
16,
1991
(Exhibit
AR-111-16)
confirms
the
reassessment
and
also
refers
to
paragraph
18(1)(a)
and
subsection
245(1).
Mrs.
Schultz's
taxation
year
1983
is
affected
by
revision
of
her
child
tax
credit.
She
purports
to
have
interest
income
and
a
capital
gain
from
her
alleged
dealings
in
"investment
club
02-770345"
in
respect
to
which
her
business
year
ended
in
calendar
1984.
Both
appellants’
appeals
respecting
their
1983
taxation
years
are
dismissed.
Any
consequence
or
the
so-called
"investment
clubs”
that
Mrs.
Schultz
reported
in
her
1984
income
tax
return
and
in
respect
of
which
she
appealed
is
a
nullity
and
is
also
disallowed.
Mrs.
Schultz's
1984
assessment
is
referred
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
reasons
contained
herein.
Mr.
Maguire
described
the
Schultzes'
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
hedging
transactions
during
examination-in-chief
in
the
following
words:
MR.
ZALDIN:
Q.
Mr.
Maguire,
regarding
the
transaction
of
Thomas
Schultz
which
are
detailed
in
the
four-page
Schedule
A
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
were
you
personally
involved
in
the
why
of
those
transactions
being
done
when
they
were
done?
MR.
MAGUIRE:
A.
Yes,
I
was.
Some
of
the
hedging
ideas
were
my
own,
some
of
them
were
the
broker's.
Even
if
they
were
the
broker’s,
I
would
normally
be
apprised
of
the
investment
merits
of
the
particular
hedge.
I
did
indicate
that
we
also
got
duplicates
of
all
these
transactions
so
that
we
would
always
be
fully
cognizant
of
any
hedge
that
was
being
executed.
Moreover,
I
would
certainly
be
consulted
for
the
tax
end
of
the
hedges.
There
is
a
tax
side
to
—
or
there
can
be
a
tax
side
to
hedges
as
well
as
the
investment
side
and
I
would
be
consulted
in
that
Capacity
as
well.
Q.
Consulted
when?
A.
When
the
hedge
is
entered
into.
Often
towards
year-end
a
client,
specifically
in
this
case
Dr.
Schultz,
would
want
someone
like
myself
to
review
their
investments
and
to
extract
any
appropriate
tax
advantage
that
might
be
extracted.
There
was
a
plethora
of
tax
loss
selling
articles
in
the
paper
around
this
time
of
year
normally
in
the
Post
and
the
Times
and
the
Globe.
It
normally
advises
people
to
look
at
their
portfolios,
take
a
look
at
what
might
be
available
in
it
for
tax
purposes.
So
normally
towards
year-end
someone
would
be
in
to
specifically
look
at
what
tax
advantage,
if
any,
might
be
able
to
be
extracted
for
a
particular
investment.
Q.
Was
that
the
situation
with
Dr.
Schultz?
A.
Yes,
it
was.
Q.
Was
that
the
situation
with
Lois
Schultz?
A.
Yes,
it
was.
Q.
Can
I
ask
you,
Mr.
Maguire,
when
you
are
referring
to
the
monthly
statements
to
firstly
state,
for
example,
the
McLeod
Young
Weir
November
1984
statement
at
page
4.
.
.
.
A.
Yes.
MR.
ZALDIN:
Lois
Schultz
is
Volume
II,
Your
Honour,
and
Thomas
Schultz
is
Volume
I,
and
each
of
the
monthly
statements
appear
in
those
volumes
at
tabs
3
and
4.
BY
MR.
ZALDIN:
Q.
Let's
start
with
1984
for
Dr.
Schultz
and
that
will
be
in
tab
3
of
Volume
I.
A.
We
had
two
investment
hedges
executed
in
1984.
They
were
both
initially
constructed
in
the
same
fashion
as
the
1983
investment
club.
The
income
side
of
the
hedge
was
in
Lois
Schultz’s
name
and
the
expense
side
of
the
hedge
was
in
Dr.
Thomas
Schultz’s
name,
specifically
the
two
hedges
because
there
are
numbers
relating
to
both
of
them.
There
was
a
short
sale
of.
.
.
.
HIS
HONOUR:
What
page
are
we
on
now?
THE
WITNESS:
Sorry,
Your
Honour.
We
are
at
page
2,
tab
3,
Volume
I.
This
is
the
November
McLeod
Young
Weir
statement
for
Dr.
Thomas
Schultz.
He
has
a
short
sale
of
5,000
shares
of
Allied
Stores
for
$267,525,
while
concurrently
Lois
purchased—
this
is
in
Volume
II,
tab
3,
page
2
—
on
the
same
date,
November
9,
Lois
purchased
$200,000
face
value
of
Allied
Stores
convertible
debentures
for
a
total
debit
of
$274,140
U.S.
These
are
all
U.S.
funds.
So,
you
had
a
net
difference
between
the
proceeds
generated
to
Dr.
Schultz
of
$267,000
and
the
cost
to
Lois
of
$274,000.
You
had
investment
of
approximately
$6,500
of
capital
requirement
in
that
the
brokers
allow
you
to
use
the
debit
to
cover
the
credit
or
the
credit
to
cover
the
debit
or
vice
versa.
The
funds
required
for
such
an
investment
would
only
be
the
difference,
so
you
would
have
an
investment
of
roughly
$6,500
U.S.
This
would
have
had
projected
cash
flow.
The
$200,000
face
value
debentures,
as
indicated
on
Lois’
November
statement,
had
a
coupon
rate
of
9.5
per
cent,
so
that
she
could
have
expected
a
$19,000
per
annum
interest
return
from
these
debentures
and
they
didn't
mature
until
the
year
2007.
So
there's
a
long
term
expected
cash
flow
which
met
with
the
Schultzs’
desire
for
income
splitting.
She
would
generate,
let's
say,
$19,000
U.S.
annual
interest
income
from
the
Allied
Stores
debentures.
Whereas
the
expenses
that
Dr.
Thomas
Schultz
would
incur,
if
we
look
at
Schedule
A,
if
I
may
simplify
things
a
bit,
we
will
see
that
there
was
a
dividend
on
December
21
of
$2,500
that
has
been
disallowed
and
we
would
have
expected
the
two
expenses
for
four
dividends
a
year.
So
four
times
$2,500
is
$10,000,
and
we
would
have
had
rentals
of
approximately
a
little
over
$400
a
month,
so
another
you
can
call
it
$5,000
a
year.
So
he
would
have
had
expenses
of
$15,000
U.S.
a
year
while
she
would
have
an
income
of
$19,000
a
year.
So
there
was
some
effective
income
splitting
where
she
would
receive
$19,000
of
income,
he
would
incur
$15,000
of
expenses,
so
there
was
a
very
high
cash
flow
at
the
outset
to
this
particular
trade.
Similar
with
the
other
hedge
.
.
.
.
Mark
Davis
is
a
broker
employed
by
McLeod,
now
known
as
Scotia
McLeod.
He
and
Mr.
Maguire
first
worked
together
at
Eaton
Bay
Financial.
He
commenced
working
for
McLeod
in
1981.
Mr.
Davis
acted
as
broker
for
the
Schultzes
and
other
JKM
&
A
clients
when
they
dealt
with
McLeod
in
1984
and
1985.
Mr.
Davis
testified
that
a
hedge
transaction
requires
a
short
and
long
position.
The
short
position
sells
short
the
common
stock
that
the
second
security
is
convertible
into.
The
long
position
buys
the
convertible
security
(e.g.,
a
warrant,
a
convertible
debenture
or
another
convertible
security).
With
cross
guarantees,
the
only
capital
necessary
is
the
amount
of
the
difference
between
the
two
positions,
which
are
matched
or
paired
as
closely
as
possible
as
to
the
amount
of
conversion
shares.
For
the
person
in
the
long
position
it
offers
good
income
flow
and
a
possible
capital
appreciation.
In
a
dramatically
falling
market,
the
short
position
may
obtain
large
gains
at
very
little
risk.
Mr.
Davis
testified
that
he
did
not
advise
on
the
tax
aspects
of
a
hedge.
Mr.
Maguire
did.
Mr.
Davis
said
that
Mr.
Maguire
thought
it
advantageous
if
the
short
hedge
account
was
an
income
account
and
the
long
account
was
a
capital
account.
The
Schultzes
conducted
hedging
transactions
with
Mr.
Davis.
Dr.
Schultz
sold
short
and
Mrs.
Schultz
purchased
long.
The
Schultzes
each
signed
a
guarantee
on
the
other's
account,
each
opened
a
margin
account
and
each
gave
the
other
a
trading
authorization
to
deal
on
the
other's
account.
Mr.
Davis
testified
that
Mr.
Maguire
would
indicate
to
Mr.
Davis
where
a
hedging
transaction
would
produce
a
positive
cash
flow
and
ask
Mr.
Davis
if
McLeod
could
borrow
enough
stock
to
do
the
hedge.
If
McLeod
could
acquire
the
stock
and
the
hedge
could
be
done
at
a
specified
amount,
Mr.
Davis
would
get
the
Schultzes’
authorization
and
execute
the
hedge.
Roderick
H.
Campbell
is
a
stock
broker
who
was
employed
by
Merrill
during
1986
and
1987.
JKM
&
A
referred
a
number
of
clients,
including
the
Schultzes,
to
him
and
he
and
other
employees
of
Merrill
were
a
team
who
conducted
hedging
transactions
for
them
in
1986
and
1987.
The
Schultzes
each
opened
a
margin
account
with
Merrill
and
each
signed
a
guarantee
on
the
other's
account.
He
stated
that
all
the
instructions
were
received
from
Mr.
Maguire
and
that
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
merely
confirmed
those
instructions.
Mr.
Campbell
testified
that
Merrill
had
a
deal
with
JKM
&
A
whereby
JKM
&
A
would
protect
Merrill
for
any
fees
or
losses
on
transactions
already
begun
by
Merrill
on
Mr.
Maguire's
instructions,
if
JKM
&
A
clients
did
not
confirm
Mr.
Maguire's
instructions.
In
each
of
the
years
under
appeal,
Dr.
Schultz
filed
a
claim
for
a
business
loss.
The
essence
of
the
testimony
of
Mr.
Maguire,
and
each
of
the
brokers
acting
for
the
Schultzes
in
the
years
in
question,
is
that
Mr.
Maguire
instructed
them
in
the
hedging
transactions
and
that
Mrs.
Schultz
was
on
the
long,
income
producing
side
and
Dr.
Schultz
was
on
the
short,
loss
producing
side
where
there
was
said
to
be
some
possibility
of
a
“capital
gain".
Most
the
transactions
were
done
at
the
end
of
Dr.
Schultz's
tax
year.
The
evidence
is
that
the
only
hedges
they
didn't
do
were
those
that
they
didn't
have
the
money
for.
Richard
Holt
was
the
auditor
in
charge
of
the
hedging
investigation
of
the
Schultzes
in
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987.
He
testified
that
Revenue
Canada
reassessed
the
hedging
transactions
on
the
basis
that
Mrs.
Schultz
was
the
agent
of
Dr.
Schultz.
He
pointed
out
that
each
set
of
hedging
transactions
in
the
years
in
question
began
with
Dr.
Schultz
taking
a
short
position.
The
funds
from
this
short
trade
coupled
with
Dr.
Schultz's
guarantee
of
his
wife's
account,
enabled
the
hedge
transactions
to
proceed
thereafter.
He
stated
that
if
the
hedging
transactions
are
regarded
as
joint
ventures
or
a
partnership
between
the
Schultzes,
Revenue
Canada
would
regard
that
joint
venture
or
partnership
as
trading
with
itself.
Mr.
Holt
was
cross-examined
extensively
concerning
the
possibility
of
any
settlement
between
the
Schultzes
and
Revenue
Canada
in
which
it
was
implied
that
offers
were
made
to
taxpayers
who
were
not
JKM
8:
A
clients
that
were
not
made
to
JKM
8:
A
clients.
It
is
the
Court's
view
of
this
testimony
that
certain
settlements
were
made
by
Revenue
Canada
with
taxpayers
reassessed
respecting
hedging
transactions
where
those
taxpayers
engaged
in
discussions
with
Revenue
Canada
to
attempt
a
settlement.
The
evidence
is
that
JKM
8:
A
did
not
enter
into
any
discussions
to
attempt
a
settlement
with
Revenue
Canada
on
behalf
of
its
clients.
Robert
Benyi,
an
employee
of
JKM
8:
A
testified
on
behalf
of
the
appellants
respecting
the
allegation
that
the
respondent
had
unduly
delayed
its
assessment
procedure,
and
other
matters.
Mr.
Benyi
stated
that
JKM
8:
A
had
over
200
clients
who
were
assessed
respecting
investment
club
or
hedging
transactions
conducted
in
a
manner
similar
to
the
transactions
of
the
Schultzes.
The
Schultzes
authorized
JKM
8:
A
to
deal
with
Revenue
Canada
respecting
the
assessments
before
the
Court.
The
evidence
and
exhibits
reviewed
by
the
Court
in
this
matter
indicate
that
Revenue
Canada
requested
clients
of
JKM
&
A,
including
the
Schultzes,
or
JKM
&
A
to
supply
information,
documents,
replies
to
proposals,
waivers,
or
counter
proposals
respecting
the
assessments
in
question.
Almost
without
exception
JKM
&
A
did
not
do
so
and
advised
its
clients
not
to
do
so.
On
occasion
some
JKM
8:
A
clients
did
respond
to
Revenue
Canada,
apparently
independently
of
the
advice
of
JKM
8:
A.
An
example
reviewed
extensively
was
Revenue
Canada's
letter
of
proposal
to
Mrs.
Lois
Schultz
dated
May
8,
1987
(Exhibit
AR-V-47)
respecting
her
1983,
1984
and
1985
taxation
years.
Mr.
Benyi,
who
has
approximately
3
/2
years
experience
as
an
employee
of
Revenue
Canada,
stated
the
letter
was
confusing.
The
Court
finds
that
the
letter
was
clear
to
anyone
with
the
knowledge
of
the
Schultzes’
transactions
and
the
experience
of
Mr.
Benyi
and
the
lawyer
employed
by
JKM
&
A.
He
also
alleged
confusion
in
respect
to
a
similar
letter
to
Dr.
Schultz
dated
June
16,
1987
(Exhibit
AR-V-48)
respecting
his
1983,
1984
and
1985
taxation
years.
(In
Exhibit
AR-V-48
Revenue
Canada
stated
that
it
did
not
consider
Dr.
Schultz
was
in
a
bona
fide
business
in
1983
and
that
there
is
no
expectation
of
profit
therefrom.)
Mr.
Benyi
made
like
statements
concerning
the
taxpayers'
1986
and
1987
taxation
years.
Mr.
Benyi
complained
that
JKM
8:
A
was
"barraged"
by
Revenue
Canada
with
paper
in
respect
to
its
many
clients.
Given
the
complicated
transactions
in
which
some
of
the
brokers
themselves
had
never
before
participated
prior
to
receiving
instructions
from
JKM
8:
A
or
its
clients,
and
the
lack
of
responses,
Revenue
Canada
obviously
had
great
difficulty
in
preparing
its
reassessments
and
in
deciding
on
its
position
in
respect
to
these
reassessments.
In
the
1983
“investment
clubs”,
payments
of
accounts
were
made
from
other
alleged
accounts
with
no
apparent
authority
whatsoever.
Given
this
conduct
by
Mr.
Maguire,
and
allegedly
Nesbitt,
it
is
only
reasonable
for
Revenue
Canada
to
have
proceeded
slowly
and
cautiously
first
respecting
1983
and
thereafter
in
the
later
years
among
the
myriad
of
JKM
&
A
clients
and
clients’
brokerage
accounts
which
in
the
instant
case
involved
different
tax
years
for
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
and
different
and
varying
capital
and
income
positions.
In
the
Schultz
cases
before
the
Court,
the
appellants
did
not
file
statements
of
documents,
and
relied
entirely
on
documents
filed
by
the
respondent.
They
complained
about
alleged
missing
1983
Schultz
documents
which
they
implied
were
delivered
to
Revenue
Canada.
Both
Mr.
Benyi
and
Mr.
Salutin
testified
to
conduct
identical
to
that
already
described
by
both
Revenue
Canada
and
JKM
&
A
in
respect
to
all
of
JKM
&
A's
clients
for
all
the
years
in
question.
Mr.
Salutin
stated
that,
in
addition
to
the
"investment
clubs”,
there
are
more
than
1,000
hedging
account
investigations.
Mr.
Salutin
testified
that
the
Schultz
name
only
turned
up
towards
the
end
of
the
investment
club
investigation.
He
stated
that
at
least
one
other
taxpayer
filing
in
one
of
the
alleged
Schultz
investment
clubs
had
filed
the
annual
report
with
a
last
name
"Harvey"
listed
and
not
“Schultz”.
Thus
the
Schultz
name
was
missing
from
the
investment
club
lists
during
most
of
the
investment
club
investigation,
which
concluded
in
1986.
Revenue
Canada
wrote
JKM
&
A
on
December
7,
1988
(Exhibit
R-5)
proposing
test
cases.
No
reply
was
ever
made
by
JKM
&
A.
Mr.
Benyi
stated
that
from
September
1988
until
March
1989
it
had
no
house
counsel
to
enable
JKM
&
A
to
reply.
In
approximately
November
1989
Revenue
Canada
confirmed
assessments
respecting
six
of
JKM
&
A's
clients.
In
a
letter
to
the
Tax
Court,
Revenue
Canada
stated
that
it
viewed
these
cases
as
representative.
At
no
time
did
house
counsel
for
JKM
&
A,
Mr.
Zaldin,
the
counsel
on
the
six
files
and
in
the
Schultz
matters
respond
to
the
view
of
Revenue
Canada
so
far
as
is
known
to
the
Court.
The
foregoing
matters
were
heard
as
it
was
obvious
that
the
appellants
felt
that
they
related
to
the
last
three
issues
raised
by
them
in
their
pleadings.
The
question
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue's
duty
pursuant
to
subsection
165(3)
was
raised
as
an
issue.
Subsection
165(3)
reads:
165(3).
Upon
receipt
of
a
notice
of
objection
under
this
section,
the
Minister
shall,
(a)
with
all
due
dispatch
reconsider
the
assessment
and
vacate,
confirm
or
vary
the
assessment
or
reassess,
or
(b)
where
the
taxpayer
indicates
in
the
notice
of
objection
that
the
taxpayer
wishes
to
appeal
immediately
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
and
that
the
taxpayer
waives
reconsideration
of
the
assessment
and
the
Minister
consents,
file
a
copy
of
the
notice
of
objection
with
the
Registrar
of
that
Court,
and
he
shall
thereupon
notify
the
taxpayer
of
his
action
by
registered
mail.
The
respondent
is
of
the
view
that
it
acted
with
due
dispatch.
If
it
did
not,
the
respondent
states
that
the
appellant
could
have
appealed
pursuant
to
subsection
169(1)
after
the
90
days
had
expired.
The
evidence
is
that
Mr.
Maguire
and
Dr.
Schultz
discussed
appealing
pursuant
to
subsection
169(1)
and
decided
not
to.
It
is
the
Court's
view
that,
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case,
the
actions
of
the
respondent
were
conducted
with
due
dispatch
given
the
conduct
of
JKM
&
A
and
the
multitude
of
cases
and
matters
for
review
respecting
the
transactions
which
are
the
subject
matter
of
this
case.
The
appellants
had
a
right
to
appeal
pursuant
to
section
169
once
they
had
filed
their
notices
of
objection
and
the
appropriate
time
had
lapsed.
This
right
of
appeal
was
reviewed
extensively
by
Associate
Chief
Judge
Christie
of
this
Court
in
Apfelbaum
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
1
C.T.C.
2599,
91
D.T.C.
800
(T.C.C.),
where
he
stated
that
the
right
to
appeal
pursuant
to
subsection
169(1)
is
the
appellant's
remedy
for
any
alleged
delay
by
the
respondent.
This
Court
agrees
with
that
determination.
The
appellants
raised
sections
7
and
12
and
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
The
facts
relating
to
this
proceeding
have
been
outlined.
There
is
no
evidence
that
either
of
the
appellants
suffered
any
violations
of
their
rights
as
contained
in
sections
7
and
12
or
as
contained
in
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Charter.
The
appellants
also
pleaded
that
subsection
245(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
it
read
at
the
time
of
the
assessments
in
question
was
void
for
vagueness.
In
particular
paragraph
48
of
the
notice
of
appeal
of
Dr.
Schultz
and
paragraph
46
of
the
notice
of
appeal
of
Mrs.
Schultz
describes
a
reliance
"on
a
finding
of
undue
or
artificial
reduction
of
income
as
too
vague
to
be
capable
of
clear
understanding".
The
concept
of
vagueness
was
reviewed
by
Gonthier,
J.
in
R.
v.
Nova
Scotia
Pharmaceutical
Society,
[1992]
2
S.C.R.
606,
93
D.L.R.
(4th)
36.
He
stated
at
page
638
(D.L.R.
56):
This
leads
me
to
synthesize
these
remarks
about
vagueness.
The
substantive
notice
and
limitation
of
enforcement
discretion
rationales
point
in
the
same
direction:
an
unintelligible
provision
gives
insufficient
guidance
for
legal
debate
and
is
therefore
unconstitutionally
vague.
He
stated
further
at
page
643
(D.L.R.
59-60):
The
doctrine
of
vagueness
can
therefore
be
summed
up
in
this
proposition:
a
law
will
be
found
unconstitutionally
vague
if
it
so
lacks
in
precision
as
not
to
give
sufficient
guidance
for
legal
debate.
This
statement
of
the
doctrine
best
conforms
to
the
dictates
of
the
rule
of
law
in
the
modern
state,
and
it
reflects
the
prevailing
argumentative,
adversarial
framework
for
the
administration
of
justice.
Subsection
245(1)
is
not
void
for
vagueness.
If
necessary,
it
is
for
the
Court
to
determine
its
application.
The
Crown
argued
that
the
essence
of
the
convertible
hedging
transactions
was
that
Mrs.
Schultz
was
an
agent
or
partner
of
Dr.
Schultz.
The
law
is
that
partnership
or
agency
can
be
determined
from
the
activities
of
the
parties.
The
relationship
of
husband
and
wife
is
such
that
in
the
purchase
of
necessities
the
law
grants
a
wife
authority,
by
virtue
of
the
relationship,
to
pledge
her
husband's
credit
for
necessities.
The
Income
Tax
Act
itself
causes
attribution
to
spouses
in
many
situations.
The
agency
reasoning
by
the
Crown
is
set
out
clearly
in
paragraphs
69,
70,
71
and
72
of
the
reply
to
Dr.
Schultz's
appeal.
In
essence
the
Crown
argues
and
the
evidence
is
that
Dr.
Schultz
sold
short
as
the
first
step
in
every
set
of
hedging
transactions
before
the
Court.
As
a
result
of
the
short
sale
by
Dr.
Schultz,
there
were
substantial
funds
in
his
brokerage
account
which,
coupled
with
his
guarantee
of
Mrs.
Schultz,
enabled
her
to
buy
long.
The
Court
saw
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
give
evidence.
Mrs.
Schultz
was
strongly
of
the
view
that
she
wanted
money
and
property
of
her
own.
The
couple
married
while
Dr.
Schultz
was
in
university
and
started
off
with
little
or
no
income.
By
1983
Dr.
Schultz
was
earning
a
substantial
income.
In
that
year
he
was
paying
Mrs.
Schultz
approximately
$2,000
per
month
to
work
in
his
dental
practice.
It
is
clear
from
what
she
said
and
her
attitude
in
Court
that
Mrs.
Schultz
wanted
more
income
for
herself
and
in
the
later
years
under
appeal,
Dr.
Schultz
increased
her
salary
substantially.
Mrs.
Schultz
was
certainly
a
more
enthusiastic
participant
in
the
transactions
in
question
than
was
Dr.
Schultz
and
she
was
more
impressed
by
Mr.
Maguire
and
more
persuaded
by
him
than
was
Dr.
Schultz.
There
are
times
in
a
marriage
when
one
party
goes
along
with
the
wishes
of
the
other.
It
is
the
Court's
view
of
the
evidence
that
Dr.
Schultz
went
along
with
the
wishes
of
his
wife
in
respect
to
the
transactions
in
question.
Mrs.
Schultz
was
not
the
agent
of
her
husband.
However,
neither
of
the
Schultzes
exercised
the
control
of
a
principal
over
the
other.
What
they
did,
they
did
together.
The
Court
finds
that
Dr.
Schultz
did
not
enter
into
any
of
the
security
transactions
in
question
in
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
with
an
intention
to
make
a
personal
profit.
From
his
conduct
and
the
evidence
respecting
his
transactions
it
is
clear
that
he
had
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
from
his
own
transactions.
In
Moldowan
v.
The
Queen,
[1978]
1
S.C.R.
480,
[1977]
C.T.C.
310,
77
D.T.C.
5213
at
page
485
(C.T.C.
313,
D.T.C.
5215)
Chief
Justice
Dickson
stated
the
following:
Although
originally
disputed,
it
is
now
accepted
that
in
order
to
have
a
"source
of
income”
the
taxpayer
must
have
a
profit
or
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
Source
of
income,
thus,
is
an
equivalent
term
to
business.
.
.
The
principal
purpose
of
these
transactions
by
both
the
Schultzes
was
income
splitting,
i.e.,
to
reduce
Dr.
Schultz's
high
income
and
to
increase
Mrs.
Schultz's
low
income.
The
evidence
is
that
they
hedged
in
a
highly
coordinated
fashion.
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
also
had
the
joint
intention
to
make
a
profit
for
their
family
by
their
coordinated
transactions.
They
believed
this
was
possible
from
the
information
given
to
them
by
Mr.
Maguire.
The
Schultzes
also
believed
that
they
could
make
this
profit
before
taxes,
not
after
taxes.
Mr.
Maguire
neglected
to
include
his
advisory
fees
in
his
example
which
consisted
of
a
relatively
small
flat
fee
coupled
with
a
substantial
percentage
of“
"the
taxes
saved".
Nonetheless,
using
Mr.
Maguire's
hedging
example
with
a
profit
of
$4,000
and
including
his
fees,
the
Court
finds
that
it
was
reasonably
possible
for
the
Schultzes
to
earn
a
profit
both
before
and
after
taxes.
It
remains
to
be
seen
if
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
were
engaged
in
a
partnership.
A
partnership
is
a
relationship
between
persons
carrying
on
a
business
in
common
with
a
view
to
profit.
Lindley
on
the
Law
of
Partnership,
15th
edition,
beginning
at
page
79,
lists
eight
tests
of
a
partnership.
Applied
to
the
Schultzes,
the
tests
are
determined
as
follows:
1.
A
partnership
is
the
result
of
an
agreement.
The
Schultzes
agreed
to
consult
Mr.
Maguire
on
income
splitting.
They
agreed
to
enter
into
the
transactions
in
question
to
split
their
incomes
and,
together,
to
profit
from
the
transactions.
2.
Partnership
involves
community
of
profit
or
loss.
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
would
like
to
show
separate
profits
or
losses.
However,
in
fact
they
dealt
out
of
a
joint
account
in
all
their
funding
and
they
used
each
other's
accounts
to
guarantee
their
transactions.
Mrs.
Schultz
did
not
withdraw
her
profits.
They
were
used
to
pay
Dr.
Schultz's
losses.
In
fact
they
engaged
in
community
of
profit
and
loss.
Moreover
Mrs.
Schultz
testified
that
they
never
accounted
to
each
other
or
anyone
else
for
the
transfers
of
profit
or
loss.
They
were,
in
her
words,
not
like
that.
3.
A
partner
is
restricted
in
transferring
his
equitable
interest
in
the
partnership.
In
the
years
in
question
the
Schultzes
did
not
transfer
their
equitable
interests
in
the
hedging
enterprise.
The
only
property
they
transferred
was
that
of
their
various
short
and
long
positions.
These
were
paired
in
all
of
the
hedging
years
in
question
before
the
Court,
and
the
guarantees
to
the
brokerage
houses
tied
their
equity
together.
4.
A
partner
is
an
agent
of
the
partnership
so
far
as
concerns
activities
falling
within
the
scope
of
the
partnership.
In
1984
and
1985
they
appointed
each
other
agent
in
their
accounts.
In
1986
and
1987
they
did
not.
However
they
obviously
appointed
each
other
as
agent
to
write
cheques
on
their
joint
account
to
pay
any
charges
arising
from
the
hedge
transactions
or
to
receive
any
profits
which
would
be
deposited
into
the
joint
account.
5.
À
partner
has
a
lien
on
the
thing
owned
in
common
for
outlays
or
expenses.
In
fact
Mrs.
Schultz's
profits
in
her
hedging
accounts
were
used
to
pay
Dr.
Schultz's
outlays
or
expenses.
If
this
was
not
enough,
the
proceeds
of
the
joint
account
were
used.
Their
guarantees
of
each
other's
account
were
also
available
for
outlays
or
expenses.
In
fact
liens
existed
on
what
they
owned
in
common
for
outlays
or
expenses.
6.
A
partner
has
no
right
to
partition
in
specie
or
to
sell
partnership
property
but
does
have,
on
dissolution,
the
right
to
have
the
partnership
property
sold
and
the
proceeds
divided.
This
in
fact
is
what
the
Schultzes
did
in
their
brokerage
accounts
when
they
used
Mrs.
Schultz's
account
to
pay
Dr.
Schultz’s
losses
or
paid
any
additional
indebtedness
out
of
their
joint
account.
7.
The
partner's
equitable
interest
in
his
or
her
share
of
the
partnership
property
is
treated
as
personal
estate.
8.
Partnership
exists
only
for
the
purpose
of
gain.
The
Schultzes
entered
into
their
agreement
and
the
hedging
transactions
through
JKM
&
A
to
obtain
a
gain
in
their
assets
both
before
and
after
taxes.
Thus,
the
Court
finds
that
for
the
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
taxation
years
Dr.
and
Mrs.
Schultz
were
equal
business
partners
in
the
hedging
transactions
and
that
they
shared
equally
in,
and
were
legally
entitled
to
share
their
profits
and
their
losses
in
equal
shares.
The
Court
finds
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue's
calculations
on
the
basis
that
the
appellants’
transactions
concluded
when
both
positions
were
closed
are
valid
and
correct
and
the
calculations
for
the
years
in
question
are
to
proceed
on
that
basis.
The
election
by
Mrs.
Schultz
contained
in
Form
1123
is
to
be
applied
to
her
only
and
is
not
to
apply
to
Dr.
Schultz,
since
that
election
was
a
personal
election
by
Mrs.
Schultz.
The
appeals
are
referred
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
accordingly
in
respect
to
Dr.
Schultz's
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
taxation
years
and
in
respect
to
the
remaining
items
in
Mrs.
Schultz's
1984
taxation
year
and
all
of
her
1985,1986
and
1987
taxation
years.
The
respondent
is
awarded
its
costs
throughout
on
a
party-and-party
basis.
Because
the
appeals
were
combined
on
the
consent
of
the
parties,
the
respondent
is
awarded
only
one
set
of
costs
in
respect
to
the
two
appeals.
Appeals
allowed
in
part.