Addy,
J.:—The
defendant
applies,
pursuant
to
Rule
419(1)(a)
to
have
the
statement
of
claim
of
the
plaintiff
struck
out
and
the
action
dismissed
on
the
grounds
that
the
statement
of
claim
discloses
no
reasonable
cause
of
action.
In
an
application
of
this
kind,
the
Court
must
assume
that
all
of
the
allegations
of
fact
in
a
statement
of
claim
would
be
conclusively
established
at
trial.
In
addition
to
the
identification
of
the
plaintiff,
the
facts
as
pleaded
in
the
various
paragraphs
of
the
statement
of
claim
are
as
follows:
3.
The
Plaintiff
is
a
member
of
the
Society
of
Friends
of
Quakers.
It
is
a
matter
of
the
Plaintiff's
conscience
and
a
living
expression
of
her
religion
and
faith
that
she
refuse
to
participate
in
any
expenditures
for
military
or
war
purposes,
including
the
payment
of
tax
which
will
be
used
for
military
or
war
purposes
whether
for
defense
or
otherwise,
providing
such
defense
involves
the
intent
to
use
or
actual
use
of
violence
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“military
expenditures").
5.
At
all
material
times,
the
Defendant,
represented
by
the
Government
of
Canada,
was
engaged
in
military
expenditures,
particulars
of
which
are
known
to
the
Defendant.
6.
The
Peace
Tax
Fund
is
operated
by
Conscience
Canada
Inc.,
a
body
corporate,
incorporated
pursuant
to
the
laws
of
Canada.
All
tax
money
paid
into
the
fund
is
held
in
trust
for
the
payees
and
the
Defendant.
It
is
the
objective
of
the
fund,
subject
to
lawful
approval,
to
expend
money
for
peaceful
purposes,
including
inter
alia
financial
support
for
persons
or
organizations
engaged
in
the
promotion
of
peace
by
peace
research,
education
and
development
projects.
7.
The
Plaintiff
says
and
the
fact
is
that
the
payment
of
tax
to
the
Peace
Tax
Fund,
as
hereinbefore
pleaded
and
the
refusal
to
pay
tax
for
military
expenditures
is
an
exercise
of
her
conscience
and
religious
beliefs,
.
.
.
9.
Throughout
Canadian
history
and,
in
particular,
during
World
War
I
and
World
War
II,
conscientious
objection
to
military
service
has
been
permitted
by
Canadian
law,
and
Canadians
have
in
fact
exercised
their
freedom
of
conscience
not
to
engage
in
military
service.
10.
The
Plaintiff
says
and
the
fact
is
that
the
money
allocated
in
the
Canadian
budget
for
military
expenditures
could
be
allocated
in
the
development
of
strategies
for
peace
and
spent
in
alternate
ways
to
promote
peace
and
Canadian
security.
In
paragraph
4
the
plaintiff
states
that
the
entire
tax
has
been
paid
to
the
Receiver
General
except
the
percentage
of
her
net
federal
tax
which
would
be
approximately
equal
to
the
percentage
of
the
federal
budget
used
for
military
purposes,
this
last
mentioned
amount
having
been
paid
in
trust
to
the
above
mentioned
Peace
Tax
Fund
of
Conscience
Canada
Inc.
It
necessarily
follows
as
a
question
of
fact
from
the
above
that
the
plaintiff
is
not
in
any
way
seeking
to
avoid
the
payment
of
moneys,
since
she
has
divested
herself
of
the
full
amount
she
would
have
had
to
pay.
The
above
constitutes
all
of
the
facts
which
are
to
be
taken
into
account
on
this
application.
The
other
matters
mentioned
in
the
statement
of
claim
pertain
to
the
pleading
of
law
or
of
conclusions
which
it
is
claimed
should
be
drawn
from
certain
facts
in
the
light
of
common
law
principles
and
various
statutory
or
constitutional
provisions.
The
claim
of
the
plaintiff
is
for
declaratory
relief
to
the
effect
firstly
that
to
require
her
to
pay
the
full
amount
of
her
income
tax
to
the
Federal
Government
infringes
her
rights
guaranteed
by
sections
2(a)
and
15(1)
of
the
Charter
and
secondly,
that
she
is
not
required
to
pay
that
part
of
her
income
tax
which
is
proportional
to
the
part
of
the
federal
budget
allocated
to
military
expenditures,
but
that
she
may
pay
it
instead
to
the
Peace
Tax
Fund
or
for
such
other
peaceful
purpose
as
the
Honourable
Court
may
deem
fit.
The
defendant
cannot
succeed
on
this
present
application
unless
it
is
clear
that
there
can
be
no
arguable
case
in
favour
of
the
plaintiff.
Otherwise
the
motion
will
have
to
be
dismissed
and
the
matter
will
have
to
proceed
to
trial.
The
first
point
raised
by
the
defendant
is
that
there
is
no
nexus
of
any
kind
between
the
amount
of
taxes
payable
by
the
plaintiff
and
the
expenditures
made
by
the
Federal
Authority.
The
following
provisions
of
the
Financial
Administration
Act,
R.S.C.
1970,
c.
F-10
are
applicable
to
this
issue.
In
section
2
“appropriation”
is
defined
as:
any
authority
of
Parliament
to
pay
money
out
of
the
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund;
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund
is
defined
as:
the
aggregate
of
all
public
moneys
that
are
on
deposit
at
the
credit
of
the
Receiver
General;
The
term
“public
money"
is
defined
as:
public
money
means
all
money
belonging
to
Canada
received
or
collected
by
the
Receiver
General
or
any
other
public
officer
in
his
official
capacity
or
any
person
authorized
to
receive
or
collect
any
such
money
and
includes
(a)
duties
and
revenues
of
Canada,
(b)
money
borrowed
by
Canada
or
received
through
the
issue
or
sale
of
securities,
(c)
money
received
or
collected
for
or
on
behalf
of
Canada,
and
(d)
money
paid
to
Canada
for
a
special
purpose.
Section
11.1
provides
that:
.
.
all
public
money
shall
be
deposited
to
the
credit
of
the
Receiver
General.
Finally,
section
24.1
provides,
and
I
quote:
At
the
commencement
of
each
fiscal
year
or
at
such
other
times
as
the
Treasury
Board
may
direct,
the
deputy
head
or
other
person
charged
with
the
administration
of
a
service
for
which
there
is
an
appropriation
by
Parliament
or
an
item
included
in
estimates
then
before
the
House
of
Commons
shall,
unless
otherwise
directed
by
the
Board,
prepare
a
division
of
such
appropriation
of
item
into
allotments
in
the
form
detailed
in
the
estimates
submitted
to
Parliament
for
such
appropriation
or
item,
or
in
such
other
form
as
the
Board
may
prescribe.
It
seems
clear,
on
a
fair
reading
of
those
provisions,
that
not
only
moneys
received
from
income
tax
assessments
but
all
moneys
collected
by
the
Federal
Government
on
its
own
account
are
paid
into
and
form
part
of
the
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund
which
Parliament
appropriates
to
various
proposed
items
of
expenditure.
It
seems
equally
clear
that
the
expenditures
authorized
under
section
24
are
quite
unconnected
with
the
source.
As
Twaddle,
J.A.
stated
when
expressing
the
judgment
for
the
majority
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Manitoba
in
the
case
of
re
McKay
et
al
and
Government
of
Manitoba,
23
C.R.R.
8
at
12
:
The
citizen
pays
a
tax:
the
state
uses
it
not
as
the
citizen’s
money,
but
as
part
of
a
general
public
fund.
As
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States
pointed
out
in
Buckley
v.
Valeo,
supra,
at
p.
669
”.
.
.
every
appropriation
made
by
Congress
uses
public
money
in
a
manner
to
which
some
taxpayers
object”.
The
notion
of
a
taxpayer
"paying
for"
government
programmes
is
not
strictly
in
accord
with
the
fact
that,
whilst
the
taxpayer
pays
some
of
the
money
that
enables
the
government
to
embark
on
programmes,
the
government
alone
is
responsible
for
the
programmes
on
which
the
money
is
spent.
Monetary
support
by
the
state
for
the
expression
of
minority
views,
however
distasteful
to
the
majority
or
to
another
minority
group,
cannot
offend
the
conscience
of
those
opposed
to
the
viewpoint.
No
one
is
compelled
to
agree
with
the
minority
view
nor
forbidden
to
espouse
or
express
a
contrary
one.
To
borrow
the
words
of
Dickson
C.J.C.
in
R.
v.
Big
M
Drug
Mart,
supra,
"No
one
is
.
.
.
forced
[by
the
impugned
sections
of
the
Elections
Finances
Act]
to
act
in
a
way
contrary
to
his
beliefs
or
his
conscience.
The
Constitution
does
not
guarantee
that
the
state
will
not
act
inimically
to
a
citizen's
standards
of
proper
conduct:
it
merely
guarantees
that
a
citizen
will
not
be
required
to
do,
or
refrain
from
doing,
something
contrary
to
those
standards
(subject
always,
of
course,
to
the
reasonable
limitations
recognized
by
s.
1
of
the
Charter).
Two
other
American
cases
were
decided
on
the
same
principle,
namely:
Autenrieth
et
al
v.
Cullen,
418
F.
2d
586
(1969)
and
Barton
v.
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue,
737
F.
2d
822
(1984).
Notwithstanding
the
obvious
differences
in
our
systems
of
government
and
in
the
statutes
which
govern
appropriations,
I
find
that
the
views
expressed
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States
in
the
Buckley
case,
supra,
and
by
the
Ninth
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
in
the
other
two
American
cases,
are
fully
applicable
and
quite
persuasive.
Medhurst,
J.
of
the
Alberta
Court
of
Queen's
Bench
also
came
to
the
same
decision
in
Winterhaven
Stables
Ltd.
v.
Attorney
General
of
Canada
(1986),
29
D.L.R.
(4th)
394.
The
argument
whether
moneys
expended
for
military
purposes
are
quite
unconnected
with
the
source
is
really
one
of
law
and
must,
for
the
above
reasons,
be
decided
against
the
plaintiff.
Any
money
withheld
by
the
plaintiff
is
not
withheld
from
military
expenditures
but
from
the
sum
of
all
of
the
moneys
in
the
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund,
from
which
all
Government
expenditures
are
financed
by
reason
of
the
operation
of
the
Financial
Administration
Act
and
of
our
very
system
of
government.
The
plaintiff's
case
of
necessity,
because
of
the
relief
claimed,
centres
on
subsections
2(a)
and
15(1)
of
the
Charter.
They
are
reproduced
hereunder
for
the
sake
of
convenience:
2.
Everyone
has
the
following
fundamental
freedoms:
(a)
freedom
of
conscience
and
religion;
15.
(1)
Every
individual
is
equal
before
and
under
the
law
and
has
the
right
to
the
equal
protection
and
equal
benefit
of
the
law
without
discrimination
and,
in
particular,
without
discrimination
based
on
race,
national
or
ethnic
origin,
colour,
religion,
sex,
age
or
mental
or
physical
disability.
With
regard
to
the
application
of
the
Charter
of
Rights,
counsel
for
the
defendant
argues
in
the
first
instance
that
no
part
of
the
constitution
can
be
prohibited
or
prevented
from
operating
by
any
other
section.
He
also
states
that
the
Charter
of
Rights,
as
part
and
parcel
of
the
constitution,
does
not
enjoy,
over
the
other
provisions
of
the
constitution,
the
overriding
priority
which
it
does
over
each
and
every
one
of
the
other
laws
of
Canada.
One
cannot
say
that
by
reason
of
the
Charter
any
other
section
of
the
constitution
becomes
unconstitutional
or
inoperative.
I
find
that
these
assertions
by
counsel
for
the
defendant
constitute
valid
statements
of
the
law.
The
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
is
found
in
the
Constitution
Act,
1982.
Section
52
under
"Part
VII,
General"
provides
that
"The
Constitution
is
the
supreme
law
of
Canada
and
any
law
that
is
inconsistent
with
the
provisions
of
the
Constitution
is,
to
the
extent
of
the
inconsistency,
of
no
force
or
effect.”
Section
52(1)
does
not
state
that
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
is
the
only
part
of
the
Constitution
which
enjoys
that
overriding
power.
Subsection
(2)
of
Section
52
clearly
states
that
all
of
the
Constitutional
Acts
and
amendments
as
well
as
the
Constitution
Act,
1982,
which
includes
the
Charter,
form
the
constitution
of
Canada.
Heads
3
and
7
of
Section
91
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867
provide
that
the
Parliament
of
Canada
has
exclusive
authority
over:
3.
The
raising
of
money
by
any
mode
or
system
of
taxation.
7.
Militia,
Military
and
Naval
Service
and
Defence.
In
the
case
entitled
Reference
Re:
Bill
30
(Separate
School
Funding
Reference),
[1987]
1
S.C.R.
1148,
Madam
Justice
Wilson
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
had
this
to
say
(refer
page
1197):
This
does
not
mean,
however,
that
such
rights
or
privileges
are
vulnerable
to
attack
under
ss.
2(a)
and
15
of
the
Charter.
I
have
indicated
that
the
rights
or
privileges
protected
by
s.
93(1)
are
immune
from
Charter
review
under
s.
29
of
the
Charter.
I
think
this
is
clear.
What
is
less
clear
is
whether
s.
29
of
the
Charter
was
required
in
order
to
achieve
that
result.
In
my
view,
it
was
not.
I
believe
it
was
put
there
simply
to
emphasize
that
the
special
treatment
guaranteed
by
the
constitution
to
denominational,
separate
or
dissentient
schools,
even
if
it
sits
uncomfortably
with
the
concept
of
equality
embodied
in
the
Charter
because
not
available
to
other
schools,
is
nevertheless
not
impaired
by
the
Charter.
It
was
never
intended,
in
my
opinion,
that
the
Charter
could
be
used
to
invalidate
other
provisions
of
the
Constitution,
particularly
a
provision
such
as
s.
93
which
represented
a
fundamental
part
of
the
Confederation
compromise.
Section
29,
in
my
view,
is
present
in
the
Charter
only
for
greater
certainty,
at
least
in
so
far
as
the
Province
of
Ontario
is
concerned.
[Emphasis
added]
In
the
unreported
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
the
Yukon
in
the
case
of
The
Honourable
Tony
Penikett,
et
al
v.
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
et
al.
dated
December
23,
1987,
Yukon
Court
of
Appeal,
the
Court
had
this
to
say
at
page
7:
We
agree
with
the
view
adopted
by
the
majority
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Ontario
where,
in
another
context,
they
observed
that
no
part
of
the
Constitution
is
made
by
virtue
of
s.
52,
paramount
over
another.
Each
provision
they
noted
must
be
read
in
light
of
the
other
provisions,
unless
otherwise
specified.
(Reference
Re:
Bill
30
(Separate
School
Funding
Reference)
(1986),
25
D.L.R.
(4th)
1
at
54,
appeal
dismissed
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
unreported,
June
25,
1987).
This
important
factual
distinction
applies
even
more
emphatically
to
counter
another
of
the
arguments
of
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
to
the
effect
that
the
relief
sought
should
be
granted
because
in
World
War
I
and
World
War
II
the
Canadian
Government
recognized
the
status
of
conscientious
objectors
by
exempting
them
from
actual
military
service.
The
conscription
laws
from
which
these
people
were
being
exempted
would
have
forced
them
to
actually
participate
in
the
violent
acts
of
war
and
in
the
killing
of
other
human
beings.
Needless
to
say
the
situation
before
me
is
an
entirely
different
one.
I
simply
cannot
accept
the
argument
of
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
that,
because
the
constitution
is
to
be
considered
as
a
living,
breathing
instrument
subject
to
variations
in
interpretation
as
the
nation
progresses
and
attitudes
change,
Head
7
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867
above
cited
should
now
be
interpreted
somehow
to
mean
defence
by
strictly
non-violent
means.
The
proposition
is
absurd,
not
only
because
of
the
clear
and
unambiguous
meaning
of
the
words
themselves
but
also
because
the
great
majority
of
Canadans
as
well
as
the
three
major
political
parties
obviously
still
consider
the
military
defence
of
Canada
by
force
of
arms
to
be
one
of
the
very
important
roles
of
the
Federal
Government
as
mentioned
in
the
constitution.
It
follows
that,
if
one
attempts
to
attain
by
means
of
subsection
2(a)
or
of
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Charter
the
result
sought
by
the
plaintiff,
the
right
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada
to
tax
for
military
purposes,
as
clearly
provided
for
in
the
constitution,
would
be
frustrated,
at
least
in
so
far
as
any
conscientious
objectors
are
concerned.
I
fail
to
see
how
subsection
15(1)
could
apply
in
any
event:
requiring
the
plaintiff
to
pay
the
same
taxes
as
any
other
Canadian
resident
taxpayer
with
the
same
taxable
income
cannot
constitute
discrimination.
The
only
section
which
can
in
any
way
be
considered
relevant
to
the
issue
is
subsection
2(a).
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
relied
on
and
quoted
extensively
from
the
reported
case
of
The
Queen
v.
Big
M
Drug
Mart
Ltd.,
et
al.,
[1985]
1
1S.C.R.
295;
18
D.L.R.
(4th)
321,
and
from
Edwards
Books
and
Art
Limited
v.
The
Queen,
et
al.,
[1986]
2
S.C.R.
713.
I
have
carefully
read
the
cases
and
particularly
the
passages
on
which
the
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
relies.
I
shall
refrain
from
quoting
them
as
there
is
nothing
therein
which,
in
my
view,
in
any
way
binds
me
or
even
might
persuade
me
to
adopt
the
conclusion
which
he
urges
upon
me.
As
to
the
subject
matter
of
the
cases
both
were
concerned
with
the
constitutionality
of
ordinary
legislation
and
not
with
other
portions
of
the
constitution
itself.
The
Big
M
case
dealt
with
the
constitutionality
of
the
Lord's
Day
Act
which
was
judged
to
be
unconstitutional.
The
Edwards
Books
case
dealt
with
the
constitutionality
of
the
Retail
Business
Holidays
Act
of
the
Province
of
Ontario.
The
Act
was
held
to
be
constitutional
and
not
to
infringe
either
sections
2,
7
or
15
of
the
Charter.
In
neither
case
is
there
a
question
of
attempting
to
use
one
part
of
the
constitution
to
nullify
or
infirm
another
part.
What
is
really
important
however
is
that
in
both
cases
the
legislation
imposed
actual
restraints
on
the
normal
rights
of
individuals
in
a
free
society
to
do
business
or
to
carry
on
with
their
normal
legitimate
activities.
Such
is
certainly
not
the
case
here.
As
previously
stated,
the
plaintiff
is
merely
being
taxed
for
general
federal
purposes
and
the
expenditures
for
military
purposes
are
made
entirely
by
the
Federal
authority
without
any
personal
participation
by
the
plaintiff
in
any
way.
Her
freedom
to
practise
the
tenets
of
her
religion
cannot
reasonably
be
held
to
be
affected
since
she
neither
directly
nor
indirectly
participates
in
the
expending
for
military
purposes
the
moneys
collected
by
the
Receiver
General.
It
appears
also
that
none
of
the
remedies
requested
in
the
plaintiff's
prayer
for
relief
could
legally
be
granted.
The
request
for
a
declaration
to
the
effect
that
the
plaintiff
is
not
required
to
pay
the
percentage
of
our
net
federal
tax
owing
which
would
be
equal
to
the
percentage
of
the
federal
budget
allocated
to
military
expenditures
would
have
to
be
denied
because,
for
the
reasons
previously
stated,
there
exists
no
connection
whatsoever
between
the
payment
by
taxpayers
of
income
tax
to
the
Receiver
General
to
be
credited
to
the
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund
and
the
payment
from
such
fund
of
whatever
sums
Parliament
might
have
appropriated
for
military
purposes.
The
plaintiff
also
requests
an
order
to
the
effect
that
the
moneys
be
paid
to
the
Peace
Tax
Fund
or
for
such
other
peaceful
purposes
as
this
Honourable
Court
may
decide.
The
plaintiff,
in
effect,
is
requesting
that
the
Court
usurp
the
powers
of
Parliament
and
actually
appropriate
moneys
destined
by
law
to
the
Consolidated
Revenue
Fund
for
appropriation
by
Parliament.
This
would
fly
directly
against
one
of
the
most
basic
tenets
of
our
constitution
namely,
the
division
of
powers.
It
seems
clear
that
the
issue
raised,
i.e.
that
the
statement
of
claim
discloses
no
reasonable
cause
of
action,
requires
for
its
disposition
neither
additional
pleadings
nor
any
evidence
and
may
be
disposed
of
at
this
stage
(refer
The
Attorney
General
of
Canada
v.
Inuit
Tapirisat
of
Canada
and
the
National
Anti-poverty
Organization,
[1980]
2
S.C.R.
735).
Where
it
is
patently
clear
to
the
judge
hearing
the
motion
that
the
claim
is
without
legal
justification
then
it
should
be
struck
out.
This
in
my
view
is
the
case
here
contrary
to
that
which
existed
in
the
case
of
Twinn,
et
al.
v.
The
Queen,
[1987]
2
F.C.
450,
on
which
the
plaintiff
relies.
In
that
case
Strayer,
J.
of
this
Court
stated
at
page
458:
With
respect
to
the
grounds
stated
in
Rule
419(1)(a),
it
is
important
to
note
that
it
requires
that
there
be
"no
reasonable
cause
of
action”.
The
significance
of
this
language
was
clearly
explained
by
Pratte
J.
in
Creaghan
Estate
v.
The
Queen,
[1972]
F.C.
732
(T.D.),
at
page
736
where
he
said
that
the
inclusion
of
the
word
"reasonable"
means
that
the
Court
need
not
decide
whether
the
suit
is
truly
founded
in
law
but
instead
whether,
assuming
all
the
facts
alleged
in
the
statement
of
claim
to
be
true,
the
plaintiff
has
an
“arguable
case”.
LeDain
J.
said
in
Dowson
v.
Government
of
Canada
(1981),
37
N.R.
127
(F.C.A.),
at
page
138
that
to
strike
out
on
these
grounds
it
must
be
“plain
and
obvious
that
the
action
cannot
succeed”.
This
statement
was
approved
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Operation
Dismantle
Inc.
et
al.
v.
The
Queen
et
al.,
[1985]
1
S.C.R.
441,
at
pages
450,
487.
I
understand
this
to
mean
that
a
judge
hearing
such
a
motion
should
not
strike
out
a
statement
of
claim
just
because
he
does
not
think
the
plaintiff's
case
is
sound
in
law,
if
it
is
possible
that
a
trial
judge
might
uphold
the
claim.
[Emphasis
added.]
I
fully
accept
those
statements
and
I
find
that
in
the
case
before
me
the
test
has
been
met
by
the
defendant.
There
are
also
very
practical
obstacles
to
the
remedies
requested
by
the
plaintiff
being
granted.
One
can
easily
envisage
government
actions
and
policies,
both
present
and
proposed,
to
which
certain
taxpayers
and
possibly
a
great
number
of
taxpayers
might
conscientiously
and
out
of
deep
and
sincere
moral
and
religious
convictions,
consider
to
be
totally
wrong,
reprehensible,
unjustified
and
even
evil.
One
such
issue
on
which
public
attention
is
being
focused
today
is
the
extremely
divisive
question
of
whether
public
moneys
should
be
expended
for
abortions.
If
each
of
those
taxpayers
who
might
be
conscientiously
objecting
to
this
policy
were
entitled
by
law
to
withhold
a
percentage
of
income
tax,
complete
chaos
would
result
and
orderly
government
would
break
down.
If
the
freedom
of
conscience
of
the
plaintiff
were
in
fact
being
infringed,
section
1
of
the
Charter
could
probably
be
successfully
invoked
since
it
would
appear
to
be
a
reasonable
limit
on
the
plaintiff's
freedom,
which
could
be
demonstrably
justified
in
a
free
and
democratic
society.
The
motion
will
accordingly
be
allowed,
the
plaintiff's
statement
of
claim
struck
out
and
the
action
dismissed
with
costs.
Motion
allowed.
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