Mahoney,
J:—While
I
have
no
wish
to
impede
the
parties
giving
effect
to
the
settlement
they
have
reached
in
this
matter,
the
procedural
deficiencies
are
such
that
I
should
not
want
the
record
of
this
action
to
stand
as
a.
precedent
for
those
taxpayers
wishing
to
avail
themselves
of
paragraph
165(3)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act."
By
three
notices
of
objection,
the
plaintiff
appealed
the
assessment
of
his
1971,
1972
and
1973
income
tax
returns
using
the
form
prescribed
by
subsection
165(1).
In
transmitting
the
notices
of
objection,
the
plaintiff’s
counsel,
in
a
covering
letter,
stated:
We
have
been
further
instructed
by
our
client
to
advise
you
that
he
wishes
(a)
to
appeal
immediately
to
the
Federal
Court
and
(b)
to
waive
reconsideration
by
the
Minister
of
the
three
above-mentioned
Reassessments.
For
the
purposes
of
section
165(3)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
please
consider
the
foregoing
provisions
of
this
paragraph
as
being
part
and
parcel
of
the
three
enclosed
Notices
of
Objection.
The
three
notices
of
objection
were
filed
in
the
Court’s
Registry
by
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
on
the
Minister’s
behalf.
They
were,
notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
section
175*
treated
as
a
single
originating
document.
The
letter
of
transmittal,
invoking
paragraph
165(3)(b)
was
not
filed.
The
Defendant
then
filed
three
separate
statements
of
defense.
To
his
credit,
a
Deputy
Clerk
of
Process
did
note
the
peculiarity
of
the
same
defendant
filing
three
statements
of
defense
in
the
same
action.
Unfortunately;
he
accepted
counsel’s
assurances
as
to
its
propriety.
Examinations
for
discovery
ensued
with
the
result
that
the
Defendant
now
accepts
the
plaintiff's
position.
The
Court
is
now
asked
to
grant
three
separate
consent
judgments
in
the
same
action
allowing
the
appeal
in
each
year
without
costs.
Plainly
each
of
the
notices
of
objections
ought
to
have
been
treated
as
originating
a
separate
action.
I
propose
to
so
order
nunc
pro
tunc.
Paragraph
165(3)(b)
clearly
requires
that
the
procedure
be
initiated
by
an
indication
“in
the
notice
of
objection’’.
Here
it
is
not
so
contained
although
counsel
obviously
appreciated
that
requirement.
While
I
am
not,
in
the
face
of
Minister’s
concurrence,
prepared
to
find
the
Plaintiff's
compliance
with
that
requirement
insufficient,
it
seems
that
it
would
be
most.
prudent
to
include
the
request
in
the
notice
of
ob-
jection,
signed
by
the
taxpayer,
rather
than
ask
that
something
contained
in
a
letter
of
transmittal,
signed
by
his
counsel,
be
deemed
to
be
so
included.
In
any
case,
that
request
is
an
essential
prerequisite
to
the
commencement
of
an
action
in
this
fashion
and
must
be
included
in
the
documentation
filed
for
that
purpose.
I
therefor
propose
to
order,
again
nunc
pro
tunc,
that
a
copy
of
counsel’s
letter
of
June
11,
1976,
be
filed
as
part
of
the
notice
of
objection
in
each
of
the
actions.
In
the
circumstances,
it
is
unnecessary
for
me
to
comment
on
the
content
of
the
particular
notices
of
objection.
I
do,
however,
feel
it
useful
to
point
out
that
subsection
175(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
imposes
on
an
appeal
commenced
in
this
fashion
the
same
requirements
of
the
Rules
of
Court
as
apply
when
it
is
commenced
by
statements
of
claim.
The
prescribed
form
of
notice
of
objection
is
not
particularly
apt
for
that
purpose.
It
contains
a
considerable
volume
of
immaterial
prescribed
verbage
with
which
the
Court
must
live
and
about
which
the
taxpayer
can
do
nothing.
The
contents
of
the
“Statement
of
Facts
and
Reasons’’
are,
however,
entirely
within
the
taxpayer’s
control.
If
he
wishes
to
adopt
this
procedure,
he
would
be
well
advised
to
have
regard
to
the
Rules
of
Court
in
setting
forth
his
facts
and
reasons.
The
content
should,
for
all
practical
purposes,
be
the
same
in
both
form
and
substance
as
if
that
portion
of
the
notice
of
objection
were
a
statement
of
claim.