Stone
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
respondent
dated
October
23,
1986
rejecting
an
application
by
the
appellant
for
registration
as
a
“charitable
organization”
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
as
amended
by
S.C.
1970-71-72
c.
63,
and
as
further
amended
(the
"Act").
The
appellant
is
an
unincorporated
voluntary
association
formed
in
October
1983.
At
its
organizational
meeting
held
that
month,
it
adopted
a
constitution
which
sets
out
its
objects
in
the
following
context:
WHEREAS
we
are
deeply
concerned
about
world
tensions,
including
the
increasing
threat
of
a
nuclear
holocaust;
AND
WHEREAS
we
are
worried
about
the
stereotyping
of
peoples
and
societies
that
fed
this
tension:
and
whereas
we
believe
it
is
important
to
break
down
these
barriers
and
to
increase
understanding;
THEREFORE
BE
IT
RESOLVED
that
the
objects
of
the
committee
are
to:
(i)
re-create
the
link
between
residents
of
Toronto
and
Volgograd,
a
link
first
officially
made
during
the
Nazi
siege
in
1942-43;
(ii)
create
a
people-to-people
relationship
touching
on
issues
that
we
as
city
people
have
in
common,
including
the
risk
of
nuclear
war;
(iii)
enhance
this
relationship
through
exchanges
to
promote
understanding,
reduce
tensions
and
help
our
societies
find
peaceful
ways
of
living
together.
The
organization
does
not
intend
to
acquire
real
property.
The
organization
will
be
carried
on
without
purpose
of
gain
for
its
members,
and
any
profits
or
other
accretions
shall
be
used
to
promote
the
objects
of
the
organization.
The
appellant’s
application
for
registration
was
submitted
in
November
1985.
It
was
accompanied
by
required
supporting
material
including
a
statement
outlining
its
activities.
In
addition,
letters
urging
favourable
consideration
were
received
from
a
number
of
leading
residents
of
Toronto,
their
authors
expressing
the
view
that
the
applicant's
activities
are
"educational"
in
nature
and
therefore
charitable.
The
statement
of
activities
merits
careful
consideration.
It
describes
in
somewhat
greater
detail
what
the
appellant
regards
as
activities
entitling
it
to
recognition
as
a
“charitable
organization”
under
the
Act.
Thus,
we
find
statements
of
the
appellant's
purposes
and
activities.
The
Toronto
Volgograd
Committee
was
formed
with
a
view
to
benefiting
the
community
by
providing
the
public
at
large
with
an
opportunity
to
understand
and
experience
the
lifestyle
and
concerns
of
the
people
of
Volgograd
(formerly
Stalingrad).
As
the
Committee
is
deeply
concerned
about
world
tensions
and
the
stereotyping
of
peoples
and
societies
that
feed
this
tension,
it
is
felt
that
it
is
important
to
break
down
these
barriers
and
to
increase
understanding.
Therefore,
the
three
main
objectives
of
the
Committee
are
as
follows:
1.
To
benefit
the
community
as
a
whole
by
educating
the
Canadian
people
and
increasing
the
understanding
with
respect
to
the
concerns
and
the
lifestyle
of
the
people
of
Volgograd.
In
order
to
do
so,
the
Committee
will
try
to
re-create
the
link
between
the
residents
of
Toronto
and
Volgograd,
a
link
first
officially
made
during
the
Nazi
siege
in
1943-44.
2.
To
increase
public
awareness
by
creating
a
people-to-people
relationship
touching
on
issues
that
we
as
city
people
have
in
common,
including
the
risk
of
nuclear
war;
and
3.
To
educate
people
by
sponsoring
exchanges
and
meetings
between
the
residents
of
Toronto
and
Volgograd.
(Case
Material,
page
64)
One
method
used
by
the
Committee
to
further
the
education
of
people
with
regards
to
the
concerns
and
lifestyle
of
the
citizens
of
Volgograd
is
by
sponsoring
exchanges
and
meetings
between
the
residents
of
Toronto
and
Volgograd.
To
date
there
have
been
four
exchanges.
In
February,
1984
(the
40th
anniversary
of
Toronto's
first
twinning
with
Volgograd,
then
Stalingrad),
two
people
from
Volgograd
came
to
Toronto
for
a
week.
In
October,
1984,
13
delegates
from
Toronto
spent
a
week
in
Volgograd,
first
visiting
Moscow
and
later
Leningrad.
In
May,
1985,
four
people
from
Volgograd
came
to
Toronto
for
a
week.
This
was
followed
by
a
visit
by
twelve
delegates
from
Toronto
to
Volgograd
in
April,
1986.
Currently
planned
is
a
visit
by
eight
people
from
Volgograd
in
mid
October,
1986.
Visits
are
arranged
directly
between
the
Toronto
Volgograd
committee
and
the
Mayor's
office
in
Volgograd.
Volgograd
City
Hall
chooses
the
delegates
who
will
come
to
Canada.
The
offices
of
the
Canadian
Ambassador
to
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Russian
embassy
in
Ottawa
are
contacted
for
help
in
various
arrangements.
Itineraries
are
arranged
as
much
as
possible
in
advance,
and
include
both
formal
and
informal
functions.
All
four
exchanges
have
included
meetings
with
and
receptions
held
by
mayors
in
both
cities
and
a
chance
to
meet
leading
local
figures
in
each
city.
Members
of
each
group
indicate
areas
of
interest
and
the
itinerary
attempts
to
include
appropriate
visits
and
meetings
in
these
areas.
A
considerable
amount
of
time
is
set
aside
for
informal
discussions,
visiting
in
homes,
and
generally
getting
to
know
each
other
on
a
personal
level.
Attached
are
copies
of
the
itineraries
for
the
Fall
1984
trip
to
Volgograd
and
the
May
1985
visit
to
Toronto.
Media
Coverage
Significant
use
of
the
media
has
been
made
to
help
educate
those
not
otherwise
familiar
with
the
Committee's
work.
There
have
been
several
newspaper
articles
about
both
visits
and
impressions
by
return
delegates
and
appearances
on
both
radio
and
television.
The
following
is
a
partial
list
of
radio
and
television
stations
on
which
Toronto
Volgograd
Committee
members
have
had
an
opportunity
to
talk
about
the
Committee's
work:
Speaking
Engagements
Another
method
of
promoting
understanding
is
to
have
members
give
speeches
to
interested
groups
about
their
visits
to
the
Soviet
Union
and
to
have
visitors
from
the
Soviet
Union
speak
to
groups
in
Toronto.
Members
who
have
visited
Volgograd
are
expected
to
arrange
lectures
or
speaking
engagements
to
share
their
experience
with
as
many
people
as
possible.
In
1985
speeches
were
made
to
a
wide
range
of
groups
including
Management
Accountants
of
Canada,
criminologists
and
social
workers,
St.
Philip
the
Apostle
Anglican
Church,
teachers
and
students
at
Jarvis
Collegiate,
Canadian
Institute
of
International
Affairs.
Approximately
5,000
people
heard
members
speak
in
1985.
(Case
Material,
pages
65-66)
The
record
before
us
contains
copies
of
several
of
the
appellant's
newsletters,
one
of
which
includes
an
account
of
a
visit
of
four
Soviet
citizens
to
Toronto
in
May
1985.
It
reads
in
part:
Our
four
visitors,
Mikhail
Babushkin,
Gen.
Theodor
Pekarsky,
Larissa
Mitina
and
Victor
Shourubov
had
a
very
busy
week
here
from
May
23-29th.
We
tried
to
make
sure
they
saw
a
lot
of
Toronto,
including
St.
Lawrence
Market
on
a
Saturday
morning,
some
historic
sites
—
Old
Fort
York
and
the
Marine
Museum,
as
well
as
visiting
in
homes
all
over
the
city
and
area.
We
also
arranged
for
them
to
meet
many
Torontonians
during
their
stay.
In
addition
to
the
Steering
Committee
and
the
membership
—
who
joined
them
at
a
reception
one
evening
at
the
Heliconian
Club
—
they
met
Rotarians,
members
of
the
Canada/USSR
Association,
city
administrators,
teachers
and
students
at
Jarvis
Collegiate,
our
Mayor
and
some
members
of
Council
and
representatives
of
a
number
of
Toronto
peace
groups.
They
had
"time
off"at
Niagara
Falls,
including
a
gourmet
picnic
in
the
rain,
on
shopping
sprees,
and
at
a
performance
of
CATS.
They
were
well
received
by
the
media
on
the
whole,
with
the
exception
of
one
hostile
session
with
three
aldermen,
invited
guests
and
media
in
a
committee
room
at
City
Hall.
Our
visitors
endured
rude
and
angry
questions
from
a
number
of
people
who
relished
the
opportunity
to
vent
their
frustrations
on
real
live
Russians.
We
and
our
guests
survived
the
ordeal,
the
latter
retaining
their
composure
and
good
humour
under
considerable
pressure.
Perhaps
it
helped
them
towards
a
larger
perspective
of
the
wide-ranging
viewpoints
of
Toronto
citizenry,
and
to
understand
the
need
for
the
existence
of
our
project
—
an
unpleasant
if
necessary
exercise.
(Case
Material,
page
91)
An
undated
newsletter
(apparently
circulated
in
late
1985)
contains
a
report
on
a
return
visit
of
members
of
the
appellant
to
the
Soviet
Union.
It
is
worthwhile
to
recite
a
portion
of
that
report:
By
now
many
of
you
will
have
heard
that
the
Volgograd
trip
was
a
great
success.
Although
it
was
known
that
we
were
not
an
official
delegation
we
were
well
received
both
formally
and
informally
in
Moscow
and
Volgograd.
The
Canadian
ambassador,
Peter
Roberts
and
wife
Glenna
held
a
large
reception
for
us,
enabling
us
to
meet
with
a
range
of
Canadian
and
Soviet
officials
and
journalists.
Arriving
in
Volgograd
on
a
gloriously
sunny
day,
we
were
greeted
at
the
airport
by
Loudmila,
bearing
bouquets
of
red
roses,
her
boss,
Mr.
Shustov,
and
Mr.
Star-
ovatykh,
the
first
Deputy
Mayor.
Alexandre
was
visibly
delighted
to
see
us
again,
and
joined
us
for
many
of
the
functions
to
follow.
The
official
events
included
a
meeting
with
Mayor
Atopov
in
his
office
at
City
Council,
laying
flowers
at
two
war
memorials,
formal
presentation
of
our
group
at
a
meeting
of
the
Volgograd
Council
of
Deputies
in
the
Gorky
Theatre,
and
a
splendid
boat
tour
and
banquet
on
the
Volga
River
as
guests
of
Mayor
Atopov.
(Case
Material,
page
90)
The
report
goes
on
to
relate
how
the
individual
interests
and
requests
of
the
members
were
met
by
their
Soviet
hosts.
There
were,
for
example,
visits
to
a
school,
a
factory,
a
day
care
centre,
a
polyclinic
and
activity
centre
for
youth
and
a
discussion
with
a
group
of
Soviet
citizens
with
professional
backgrounds
who
had
studied
and
spoke
English.
Some
time
was
also
spent
with
the
local
Peace
Committee
where
the
delegation
referred
to
concerns
over
human
rights
and
disarmament.
In
his
letter
of
October
23,
1986
(Case
Material,
pages
94-96),
the
respondent
observed
that
to
qualify
for
registration
under
the
Act,
an
organization
“must
be
constituted
and
operated
for
exclusively
charitable
purposes"
in
the
common
law
sense.
It
was
his
view
that
the
appellant
could
not
qualify
"under
the
advancement
of
education
or
as
a
purpose
beneficial
to
the
community
as
a
whole
in
a
way
which
the
law
regards
as
charitable".
He
continued:
In
the
context
of
charity,
the
advancement
of
education
has
been
defined
by
the
courts
to
mean
the
advancement
of
education
for
its
own
sake
in
order
that
the
mind
may
be
trained.
This
does
not
include
the
provision
of
information
as
a
means
of
advocating
or
promoting
a
particular
viewpoint
with
respect
to
an
issue
or
cause.
Under
the
fourth
head,
other
purposes
beneficial
to
the
community
as
a
whole
in
a
way
which
the
law
regards
as
charitable,
common
law
has
determined
that
an
ultimate
intent
to
educate
people
and
foster
better
understanding
between
residents
of
two
communities
would
not
be
charitable.
Specifically,
in
Anglo-Swedish
Society
v.
C.L.R.
(1931)
T.C.
34
(K.B.D.),
an
organization
whose
dominant
object
was
"promoting
a
closer
and
more
sympathetic
understanding
between
English
and
Swedish
people"
was
held
not
to
be
charitable.
It
is
our
understanding
that
the
Committee's
activities
are
directed
toward
educating
Canadian
people
with
regard
to
the
concerns
and
lifestyle
of
the
citizens
of
Volgograd
in
an
attempt
to
foster
better
understanding
between
residents
of
Toronto
and
Volgograd,
to
reduce
tensions
including
the
increasing
threat
of
a
nuclear
holocaust,
and
to
help
the
societies
find
peaceful
ways
of
living
together.
In
our
view,
this
purpose
is
analogous
to
what
the
courts
have
determined
is
not
charitable.
Therefore.
while
doubtlessly
laudable,
we
cannot
conclude
that
the
Committee's
activities
are
charitable
in
the
common
law
sense
of
the
term.
(Case
Material,
page
95)
Three
errors
are
alleged
by
the
appellant
against
this
decision.
First,
it
is
said
that
the
respondent
erred
in
finding
that
in
order
to
qualify
for
registration
an
organization
must
be
constituted
and
operated
“for
exclusively
charitable
purposes".
Second,
that
a
further
error
was
made
in
deciding
that
the
appellant's
activities
were
not
charitable
as
being
for
the
“advancement
of
education"
or
for
"other
charitable
purposes".
Finally,
it
is
contended
that
in
refusing
registration
the
respondent
erred
by
his
apparent
decision
that
the
appellant
provides
information
"as
a
means
of
advocating
or
promoting
a
particular
viewpoint
with
respect
to
an
issue
or
cause".
These
issues
must,
of
course,
be
addressed
in
the
light
of
relevant
statutory
provisions
and
common
law
principles.
Paragraph
149.1(1)(b)
of
the
Act
reads:
149.1(1)
In
this
section,
section
172
and
Part
V,
(b)
“charitable
organization”
means
an
organization,
whether
or
not
incorporated,
(i)
all
the
resources
of
which
are
devoted
to
charitable
activities
carried
on
by
the
organization
itself,
(ii)
no
part
of
the
income
of
which
is
payable
to,
or
is
otherwise
available
for,
the
personal
benefit
of
any
proprietor,
member,
shareholder,
trustee
or
settlor
thereof,
The
common
law
principles
I
have
in
mind
are
those
found
in
the
judgment
of
Lord
Macnaghten
in
The
Commissioners
for
Special
Tax
Purposes
of
The
Income
Tax
v.
Pemsel,
[1891]
A.C.
531;
[1891-4]
All
E.R.
28
(H.L.).
They
were
the
subject
of
comment
by
this
Court
in
Native
Communications
Society
of
B.C.
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1986]
3
F.C.
471
at
478-79;
[1986]
2
C.T.C.
170
at
173-74:
The
starting
point
for
a
discussion
of
what
may
or
may
not
constitute
a
good
charitable
purpose
is
the
decision
of
the
House
of
Lords
in
the
case
of
Commissioners
of
Income
Tax
v.
Pemsel,
[1891]
A.C.
531
and,
in
particular,
the
legal
meaning
of
the
word
"charity"
given
by
Lord
Mcnaghten,
at
page
583
of
the
report:
How
far
then,
it
may
be
asked,
does
the
popular
meaning
of
the
word
“charity”
correspond
with
its
legal
meaning?
"Charity"
in
its
legal
sense
comprises
four
principal
divisions:
trusts
for
the
relief
of
poverty;
trusts
for
the
advancement
of
education;
trusts
for
the
advancement
of
religion;
and
trusts
for
other
purposes
beneficial
to
the
community,
not
falling
under
any
of
the
preceding
heads.
That
definition
has
been
applied
time
after
time
in
this
country
and
has
been
approved
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
(see
Guaranty
Trust
Company
of
Canada
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1967]
S.C.R.
133,
at
page
141).
A
purpose,
to
be
a
good
“charitable”
one,
must
possess
a
charitable
nature
within
"the
spirit
and
intendment”
of
the
preamble
to
the
Statute
of
Elizabeth
entitled
"An
Acte
to
redresse
the
Misemployment
of
Landes
Goodes
and
Stockes
of
Money
heretofore
given
to
Charitable
Uses".
That
statute
was
enacted
in
England
in
160!
during
the
reign
of
Elizabeth
I
as
43
Eliz.
I,
c.
4.
Nowadays,
it
is
generally
known
to
this
branch
of
the
law
simply
as
the
"Statute
of
Elizabeth”.
It
is
unnecessary
to
recite
the
whole
of
that
preamble
and
perhaps
also
undesirable
to
attempt
its
reproduction
in
the
original
form
and
style.
I
prefer
instead
to
do
as
Slade
J.
did
in
McGovern
v.
Attorney-General,
[1982]
Ch.
321,
at
page
332
where
he
put
the
statute's
list
of
charitable
objects
in
modern
English
as
follows:
.
.
.
the
relief
of
aged,
impotent,
and
poor
people
.
.
.
maintenance
of
sick
and
maimed
soldiers
and
mariners,
schools
of
learning,
free
schools,
and
scholars
in
universities
..
.
repair
of
bridges,
ports,
havens,
causeways,
churches,
seabanks
and
highways
.
.
.
education
and
preferment
of
orphans
.
.
.
relief,
stock
or
maintenance
for
houses
of
correction
.
.
.
marriages
of
poor
maids
.
.
.
supportation,
aid
and
help
of
young
tradesmen,
handicraftsmen
and
persons
decayed
.
.
.
relief
or
redemption
of
prisoners
or
captives,
and
for
aid
or
ease
of
any
poor
inhabitants
concerning
payments
of
fifteens,
setting
out
of
soldiers
and
other
taxes.
With
respect
to
the
first
ground
of
appeal,
it
is
said
that
the
respondent
misdirected
himself
in
deciding
that
the
appellant
was
not
constituted
and
operated
“for
exclusively
charitable
purposes",
stress
being
placed
on
the
word
"purposes".
According
to
the
appellant,
the
respondent
should
have
paid
more
attention
to
its
actual
"activities"
and
less
to
the
objects
or
purposes
for
which
it
was
formed.
This
proposition,
it
is
argued
,
becomes
clear
from
an
examination
of
the
very
language
of
subparagraph
149.1(1)(b)(i),
requiring
that
all
of
an
organization’s
resources
be
devoted
"to
charitable
activities’
carried
on
by
the
organization
itself.
The
appellant
contrasts
the
word
"activities"
with
the
word
“purposes”
appearing
in
paragraph
149.1(1)(a),
requiring
a
charitable
foundation
to
be
“constituted
and
operated
exclusively
for
charitable
purposes",
and
submits
that
in
this
latter
situation
regard
would
necessarily
have
to
be
paid
to
a
foundation's
purposes
while
in
the
former
only
the
“activities’
of
an
organization
are
of
concern.
I
agree
with
this
analysis
to
the
extent
that
subparagraph
149.1
(1)(b)(i)
does
not,
strictly
speaking,
expressly
address
itself
to
the
documented
purposes
of
a
“charitable
organization”
but
rather
to
ensuring
that
the
organization
maintains
“charitable
activities"
to
which
it
devotes
all
of
its
resources
if
it
is
to
enjoy
the
benefits
of
registration.
Conversely,
the
statute
does
not
expressly
bar
consideration
of
an
organization's
purposes
as
spelled
out
in
its
constituting
document,
for
that
document
must
obviously
represent
not
only
a
guide
or
blueprint
for
its
future
actions
but
also
a
definition
of
its
essential
nature
or
character.
If
devotion
of
its
resources
in
the
manner
prescribed
by
the
section
is
to
be
considered
the
only
test
to
which
a
charitable
organization
is
answerable,
the
statute
might
well
be
found
rather
difficult
if
not
impossible
to
administer.
Such
a
proposition
would
enable
an
organization
to
conduct
its
affairs
in
a
manner
necessary
to
satisfy
that
test
for
the
purposes
of
securing
registration
but
allow
it
to
pursue
other
activities
authorized
by
its
constituting
document
although
not
charitable
ones
in
the
legal
sense.
This
would
place
the
respondent
in
the
position
of
having
to
monitor
the
conduct
of
every
registered
organization
on
a
constant
basis.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
the
basic
charitable
nature
of
an
organization
is
to
be
determined
by
reference
to
its
constituting
document,
it
would
have
only
to
show,
as
and
when
required,
that
it
did,
as
well,
carry
on
charitable
activities
to
which
it
devoted
all
its
resources
in
order
to
enjoy
or
to
continue
to
enjoy
the
benefits
of
the
statute.
Put
another
way,
it
would
have
not
only
to
speak
charity,
it
would
have
to
do
charity.
Fortunately,
I
am
relieved
of
expressing
a
final
view
on
the
question
because
of
counsel's
concession
during
argument
that
we
should,
indeed,
look
at
both
purposes
and
activities
in
deciding
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
registration
as
a
"charitable
organization".
I
may
add
that
this
position
appears
to
accord
with
the
traditional
English
view
held
at
a
time
when
the
task
of
superintending
charities
was
left
to
the
equitable
jurisdiction
of
the
old
Court
of
Chancery,
for
that
Court
seems
to
have
taken
close
notice
of
the
express
purposes
of
a
particular
charity.
The
second
issue
in
fact
breaks
down
into
two
separate
questions.
In
the
first
place,
was
an
error
committed
in
ruling
that
the
appellant
has
no
educational
purpose
because
it
was
not
constituted
and
operated
for
"the
advancement
of
education”
under
the
second
head
of
charity
found
in
Lord
Macnaghten's
classification?
Secondly,
if
the
respondent
was
correct
in
so
ruling,
did
he
nevertheless
err
in
ruling
that
the
appellant
was
not
constituted
and
operated
for
"other
purposes
beneficial
to
the
community"
under
Lord
Macnaghten's
fourth
classification?
The
third
issue
may
itself
be
conveniently
addressed
in
conjunction
with
the
first
of
these
questions,
for
it
is
there
argued
that
the
appellant
cannot
qualify
under
the
second
head,
in
any
event,
because
the
information
it
puts
out
is
aimed
at
"advocating
or
promoting
a
particular
viewpoint
with
respect
to
an
issue
or
cause".
In
determining
whether
a
given
organization
qualifies
for
registration
in
accordance
with
Lord
Macnaghten's
classification
of
charities,
it
is
desirable
to
bear
in
mind
the
following
principles,
which
are
not
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
To
begin
with,
as
the
Act
does
not
provide
a
useful
definition
of
"charity",
“charitable
purpose"
or
“charitable
activity”,
a
court
is
left
to
supply
one.
That
may
be
contrasted,
for
example,
with
a
statute
that
actually
does
contain
a
definition
as,
for
instance,
the
Ontario
legislation
that
was
before
the
Divisional
Court
in
Re
Laidlaw
Foundation
(1985),
48
O.R.
(2d)
549;
13
D.L.R.
(4th)
491
(Div.
Ct.)
on
appeal
from
the
Surrogate
Court.
That
statute
had
adopted
Lord
Macnaghten's
definition
as
its
own,
leading
the
Court
to
interpret
its
language
as
Southey,
J.
did
at
page
586,
in
“a
more
liberal”
way
having
regard
to
its
statutory
setting.
Secondly,
as
was
pointed
out
by
Mr.
Justice
Marceau
in
Scarborough
Community
Legal
Services
v.
The
Queen,
[1985]
2
F.C.
555
(F.C.A.)
at
571;
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
98
at
99,
"charities"
to
which
the
Act
applies
enjoy
a
special
status
in
that
"not
only
are
they
exempted
from
tax
.
.
.
but
.
.
.
all
donations
made
to
them
are
deductible
by
donors
in
computing
their
own
taxable
incomes".
Finally,
the
result
is
not
to
place
the
Court
in
a
kind
of
judicial
strait
jacket,
prevented
from
making
a
determination
of
eligibility
under
the
Act
in
light
of
current
societal
conditions
bearing
on
the
case.
Pemsel's
case
makes
it
clear
that
we
ought
not
to
take
that
approach.
That,
instead,
we
are
to
have
regard
to
prevailing
circumstances
or
conditions,
was
most
recently
emphasized
in
the
Native
Communications
Society
case
where
a
number
of
the
modern
English
cases
were
discussed.
Those
cases
furnish
yet
another
example
of
the
inherent
ability
of
the
common
law
to
adapt
to
changing
conditions
in
society
to
the
extent
required
in
order
to
produce
a
just
result.
I
turn
first
to
consider
the
question
of
whether
the
appellant
may
be
regarded
as
for
the
"advancement
of
education”
and
the
related
third
issue.
In
doing
so,
I
must
resist
any
temptation
to
paint
with
a
brush
that
is
broader
than
necessary
to
dispose
of
the
point
raised
for
decision.
The
appellant
attacks
the
respondent's
suggestions
that
advancement
of
education
in
its
charitable
sense
has
been
defined
to
mean
"advancement
of
education
for
its
own
sake
in
order
that
the
mind
may
be
trained”
and
that
it
does
not
include
“provision
of
education
as
a
means
of
advocating
or
promoting
a
particular
viewpoint
with
respect
to
an
issue
or
a
cause”.
The
first
of
these
positions
appears
to
state
the
meaning
of
advancement
of
education
somewhat
too
narrowly
as,
indeed,
the
respondent
seems
to
concede
in
paragraph
15
of
his
written
argument
where
he
says
that
this
head
of
charity
should
disclose
activities
concerned
with
"teaching,
education,
or
training"
or
be
concerned
with
activities
that
are
directed
toward
"enhancing
particular
branches
of
human
knowledge
and
its
public
dissemination”.
A
number
of
authorities
are
there
relied
upon,
including
Re
Shaw,
[1957]
1
W.L.R.
729
(Ch.D.)
at
737-38;
Re
MacDuff,
[1896]
2
Ch.
451
(C.A.)
at
472-73;
Re
Hopkins'
Will
Trusts,
[1965]
Ch.
669
(Ch.
D.)
at
680
and
The
Incorporated
Council
of
Law
Reporting
v.
Attorney-General,
[1972]
Ch.
73
(C.A.)
at
92-3,
per
Sachs,
L.J.,
and,
at
100-101,
per
Buckley,
L.J.
Several
English
cases
are
also
cited
by
the
respondent
as
establishing
that
purposes
or
activities
aimed
at
creating
a
particular
climate
of
opinion
and
as
promoting
an
attitude
of
mind
fall
outside
the
ambit
of'advancement
of
education”
because
the
law
regards
them
as
political:
Anglo-Swedish
Society
v.
C.I.R.
(1931),
16
T.C.
34
(K.B.),
Buxton
v.
Public
Trustee
(1962),
41
T.C.
235
(Ch.
D.)
and
In
re
Strakosch
Deed.;
Ternperley
v.
Attorney
General,
[1949]
1
Ch.
529
(C.A.);
[1949]
2
All
E.R.
6.
In
the
first
of
these
cases,
the
court
had
to
decide
whether
a
trust
for
the
“promotion
of
a
closer
and
more
sympathetic
understanding
between
the
English
and
Swedish
peoples"
by
affording
“opportunities
for
Swedish
journalists
to
visit
the
United
Kingdom,
and
to
study
at
first
hand
British
modes
of
thought
and
British
National
Institutions"
was
a
good
charitable
trust.
In
deciding
that
it
was
not,
Rowlatt,
J.
said
at
page
38:
Now
what
is
this?
It
is
a
trust
really
to
promote
an
attitude
of
mind,
the
view
of
one
nation
by
another;
that
is
all
really
that
it
is.
There
may
be
many
trusts
to
influence
general
opinion
the
results
of
which
influence
may
be
very
good,
but
where
the
immediate
trust
is
only
to
influence
general
opinion
in
favour
of
some
theory
or
view
or
aspiration,
or
whatever
it
may
be,
I
cannot
myself
see
that
the
statute
of
Elizabeth
is
looking
to
that
sort
of
thing
at
all.
Education
and
relief
of
poverty
and
all
these
things
seem
to
me
to
materialise,
if
I
may
use
the
expression,
in
some
fairly
approximate
way.
Perhaps
the
least
one
says
about
it
the
better,
because,
as
I
said
this
morning,
as
Lord
Haldane
said,
it
is
much
easier
to
say
that
a
certain
case
does
not
come
within
the
doctrine
than
to
define
the
limits
of
a
doctrine
affirmatively.
The
objects
before
the
Court
in
the
Strakosch
case
i.e.
"to
strengthen
the
bonds
of
unity
between
the
Union
of
South
Africa
and
the
Mother
Country
and
which
incidentally
will
conduce
to
the
appeasement
of
racial
feeling
between
the
Dutch
and
English
speaking
sections
of
the
South
African
community”,
were
found
not
to
be
educational.
Lord
Greene,
M.R.
,
speaking
for
the
Court
of
Appeal
at
page
536,
had
this
to
say:
We
realize
the
truth
of
the
contention
that
the
objects
to
which
the
gift
is
to
be
devoted
are
matters
of
great
public
concern
both
in
the
Union
of
South
Africa
and
in
the
Mother
Country.
In
particular
the
appeasement
of
racial
feeling
in
the
Union
cannot
but
benefit
all
inhabitants
of
the
Union,
not
merely
the
members
of
the
two
sections
of
the
community
expressly
referred
to.
But
the
very
wide
and
vague
scope
of
the
gift
and
the
unrestricted
latitude
of
application
which
its
language
permits
make
it
impossible
in
our
opinion
to
find
that
it
falls
within
the
spirit
and
intendment
of
the
preamble
to
the
Statute
of
Elizabeth.
And,
later,
at
page
538
he
added:
It
is
unfortunate
if,
as
may
well
be,
these
methods
were
in
the
testator's
mind
that
he
did
not
seek
to
constitute
a
trust
which
might
well
have
been
valid
as
an
educational
trust
notwithstanding
that
the
education
had
the
ultimate
aim
as
set
out
in
the
will.
We,
however,
find
it
impossible
to
construe
this
trust
as
one
confined
to
educational
purposes.
These
may
be
the
best
methods
but
they
are
certainly
not
the
only
methods.
The
problem
of
appeasing
racial
feeling
within
the
community
is
a
political
problem,
perhaps
primarily
political.
One
method
conducive
to
its
solution
might
well
be
to
support
a
political
party
or
a
newspaper
which
had
such
appeasement
most
at
heart.
This
argument
gains
force
in
the
present
case
from
the
other
political
object,
namely,
the
strengthening
of
the
bonds
of
unity
between
the
Union
and
the
Mother
Country.
It
would
also
we
think
be
easy
to
think
of
arrangements
for
mutual
hospitality
which
would
be
conducive
to
the
purposes
set
out
but
would
not
be
charitable.
Finally,
in
the
Buxton
case
the
objects
claimed
to
be
for
the
advancement
of
education
but
judged
to
be
non-charitable
instead,
read:
To
promote
and
aid
the
improvement
of
international
relations
and
intercourse
by
(a)
Educating
or
informing
public
opinion
by
the
methods
(among
others)
of
periodical
magazines
and
papers,
books
and
pamphlets,
lectures,
prizes,
scholarships
and
research
work,
(b)
Encouraging
or
assisting
personal
intercourse
between
the
inhabitants
of
different
countries
including
the
payment
of
travelling
expenses
and
maintenance,
(c)
Assisting
any
other
persons
or
bodies
having
similar
objects
and
purposes
to
the
above.
(d)
Assisting
any
persons
by
paying
their
expenses
in
connection
with
their
standing
for
election
for
Parliament
or
other
public
Assemblies.
(e)
Employing
or
following
any
other
methods
which
in
the
opinion
of
the
Trustees
may
conduce
to
the
attainment
of
the
above-mentioned
objects
and
purposes.
Plowman,
J.,
alter
referring
to
both
the
Anglo-Swedish
and
the
Strakosch
cases,
said
this
at
page
240:
.
.
.
I
ask
myself
the
question
whether
a
charitable
education
purpose
clearly
comes
within
the
ambit
of
"the
improvement
of
international
relations
and
intercourse".
In
my
judgment
it
does
not.
I
think
that
Mr.
Stamp
was
right
in
his
submission
that
the
objects
of
this
trust
have
nothing
at
all
to
do
with
charity.
And,
again,
at
page
242
he
added:
So
here
it
seems
to
me
that
the
objects
of
this
trust
are
really
public
utility
or
political.
The
only
element
of
education
which
might
be
said
to
be
comprehended
in
those
objects
appears
to
me
to
be
education
for
a
political
cause,
by
the
creation
of
a
climate
of
opinion
and
that
is
not,
in
my
judgment,
education
of
a
kind
which
is
charitable.
As
Mr.
Stamp
said,
it
is
really
no
more
than
propaganda.
In
my
view,
the
reasoning
of
these
cases
is
germane.
It
demonstrates
that
a
trust
for
the
espousal
of
a
political
cause
or
aspiration
is
not
charitable.
A
recent
illustration
of
its
application
may
be
found
in
the
judgment
of
Slade,
L.J.
in
Re
Koeppler
Will
Trusts,
[1985]
3
W.L.R.
765
(C.A.),
where
he
said
at
page
771
:
Furthermore,
if
read
by
themselves,
they
would
cover
modes
of
expenditure
which
would
plainly
not
be
charitable,
simply,
for
example,
the
espousal
of
the
political
cause
of
the
Common
Market:
compare
In
re
Strakosch,
deed.,
[1949]
Ch
529,
particularly
at
pp.
538-539
per
Lord
Greene
M.R.,
Buxton
v.
Public
Trustee
(1962)
41
TC
235
and
Anglo-Swedish
Society
v.
Inland
Revenue
Commissioners
(1931)
16
TC
34.
To
my
mind,
the
appellant's
purposes
and
activities
are
non-charitable
in
the
sense
of
these
cases
and,
accordingly,
do
not
satisfy
the
test
of
"advancement
of
education"
as
understood
in
this
branch
of
the
law.
The
remaining
question
is
whether
by
its
purposes
and
activities
the
appellant
qualifies
for
registration
as
a
charitable
organization
on
the
basis
that
it
comes
under
Lord
Macnaghten's
fourth
head
of
charity,
i.e.
a
trust
for
purposes
beneficial
to
the
community
not
falling
within
his
first
three
heads.
As
I
think
the
trust
fails
because
of
its
essential
political
nature,
it
is
not
strictly
necessary
to
deal
with
this
issue
and
I
will
not
do
so
at
any
length
even
though
it
was
fully
argued
before
us.
At
the
outset,
I
remind
myself
of
what
was
said
about
this
head
of
charity
in
the
Native
Communications
Society
case,
at
page
479-480
(C.T.C.
174):
A
review
of
decided
cases
suggests
that
at
least
the
following
propositions
may
be
stated
as
necessary
preliminaries
to
a
determination
whether
a
particular
purpose
can
be
regarded
as
a
charitable
one
falling
under
the
fourth
head
found
in
Lord
Macnaghten's
classification:
(a)
the
purpose
must
be
beneficial
to
the
community
in
a
way
which
the
law
regards
as
charitable
by
coming
within
the
“spirit
and
intendment"
of
the
preamble
to
the
Statute
of
Elizabeth
if
not
within
its
letter.
(National
AntiVivisection
Society
v.
Inland
Revenue
Commissions,
[1948]
A.C.
31
(H.L.),
at
pages
63-64;
In
re
Strakosch,
deed.
Temperly
v.
Attorney-General,
[1949]
Ch.
529
(C.A.),
at
pages
537-538),
and
(b)
whether
a
purpose
would
or
may
operate
for
the
public
benefit
is
to
be
answered
by
the
court
on
the
basis
of
the
record
before
it
and
in
exercise
of
its
equitable
jurisdiction
in
matters
of
charity
(National
Anti-Vivisection
Society
v.
Inland
Revenue
Commissioners
(supra),
at
page
44-45,
63).
I
have
already
discussed
the
common
law
principles
which
appear
to
govern
this
aspect
of
the
appeal.
They
are
found
in
the
Anglo-Swedish,
Strakosch
and
Buxton
cases
which,
though
not
on
all
fours
factually,
establish
principles
which
I
think
apply.
The
appellant's
purposes
and
activities,
directed
as
they
are
by
a
group
in
Canada
toward
a
group
in
the
Soviet
Union,
are
international
in
their
aspect.
I
do
not
question
that
the
motives
which
lay
behind
them
are
entirely
altruistic.
The
very
strong
view
is
plainly
held
that
nothing
but
good
can
flow
to
the
wider
community
from
this
sort
of
people-to-people
contact,
especially
in
times
of
international
tensions
and
the
threat
of
nuclear
war,
because
it
serves
to
promote
mutual
understanding
and
friendship
between
groups
in
two
countries
professing
distinct
political
ideologies.
The
only
question
we
are
called
upon
to
decide,
however,
is
whether
these
activities,
though
laudable
and
worthwhile
in
themselves,
meet
the
test
of
“charity”
in
the
sense
that
they
are
beneficial
to
the
community
in
a
way
the
law
regards
as
charitable.
In
my
respectful
opinion
that
test
is
not
met.
The
cause
being
pursued
is
not
a
charitable
cause
but,
rather,
a
political
one
in
the
sense
already
discussed.
Two
of
the
decisions
I
have
mentioned,
Anglo-Swedish
and
Strakosch,
lay
down
the
principle
that
must
be
applied
and
also
illustrate
why
it
is
that
trusts
of
this
variety
do
not
come
under
the
fourth
head
of
charity.
I
shall
repeat
what
I
have
already
recited
from
the
judgment
of
Rowlatt,
J.
in
the
first
of
these
cases,
this
time
enlarging
on
it
so
as
to
give
the
full
context
in
which
those
views
are
found.
He
said
this,
at
page
38:
There
is
no
doubt
that
the
people
who
formed
the
Society
acted
with
perfectly
altruistic
motives
in
endeavouring
to
achieve
what
they
thought
would
be
a
very
useful
public
object;
and
I
dare
say
they
are
perfectly
right,
but
I
am
bound
to
say
in
this
difficult
matter
I
cannot
bring
myself
to
think
that
this
is
a
charitable
trust
within
the
analogy
of
the
statute
of
Elizabeth.
I
have
said
that
I
think
it
is
a
trust
of
public
utility,
whether
or
not
a
particular
person
might
agree
with
the
particular
application
of
it.
That
is
the
kind
of
trust
it
is;
it
is
a
trust
to
bring
about
what
the
people
who
founded
it
think
is
an
improvement
in
public
matters,
and
therefore
it
is
a
trust
for
matters
of
public
utility.
But
it
is,
of
course,
well
settled
that
it
is
not
every
trust
for
matters
of
public
utility
that
is
a
charity.
In
other
words,
it
would
not
be
a
true
definition
of
the
words
“charitable
trust"
to
say
that
it
was
a
trust
for
public
utility.
That
is
very
trite
law
now.
Now
what
is
this?
It
is
a
trust
really
to
promote
an
attitude
of
mind,
the
view
of
one
nation
by
another;
that
is
all
really
that
it
is.
There
may
be
many
trusts
to
influence
general
opinion
the
results
of
which
influence
may
be
very
good,
but
where
the
immediate
trust
is
only
to
influence
general
opinion
in
favour
of
some
theory
or
view
or
aspiration,
or
whatever
it
may
be,
I
cannot
myself
see
that
the
statute
of
Elizabeth
is
looking
to
that
sort
of
thing
at
all.
Finally,
I
adopt
the
reasoning
of
Lord
Greene,
M.R.
at
page
537
of
the
Strakosch
case,
where
he
said:
As
Roxburgh
J.
read
them
the
terms
of
the
disposition
comprehend
any
application
which
in
the
opinion
of
the
testator's
trustees
is
calculated
to
promote
or
subserve
what
is
in
truth
a
political
cause
or
aspiration,
viz.,that
of
closer
collaboration
or
relations
between
two
national
groups,
those
of
the
United
Kingdom
and
the
Union
of
South
Africa,
and
at
the
same
time
closer
collaboration
or
relations
between
those
of
English
and
Dutch
descent
within
the
confines
of
one
of
those
national
groups,
viz.,
South
Africa.
We
do
not
think
the
case
is
altered
if
it
be
assumed
in
the
appellants’
favour
that
the
unlimited
discretion
given
to
the
trustees
extends
only
to
the
first
limb
of
the
objective
and
not
to
the
second.
For
in
that
case
the
result
is
that
(as
Sir
Cyril
Radcliffe
put
it)
the
drawing
together
of
the
two
divergent
races
in
South
Africa
(which
on
this
hypothesis
is
made
a
condition
of
any
application
of
the
fund)
is
a
part
or
incident
of
the
broader
aim
of
drawing
together
two
communities
which
form
part
of
the
political
organization
of
the
British
Commonwealth
of
Nations:
and
that
which
is
made
the
condition
is
still
what
we
have
called
a
political
cause
or
aspiration.
In
Williams'
Trustees
v.
Inland
Revenue
Commissioners
[1947]
A.C.
447,
the
House
of
Lords
has
laid
down
very
clearly
that
in
order
to
come
within
Lord
Macnaghten's
fourth
class,
the
gift
must
be
not
only
for
the
benefit
of
the
community
but
beneficial
in
a
way
which
the
law
regards
as
charitable.
In
order
to
satisfy
the
latter
it
must
be
within
the
“spirit
and
intendment"
of
the
preamble
of
the
Statute
of
Elizabeth.
I
would
dismiss
this
appeal
but,
in
the
circumstances,
without
costs,
there
appearing
no
“special
reasons"
required
by
Rule
1312
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
for
making
a
different
order.
Marceau,
J.:
—I
readily
agree
with
my
brother
Stone,
J.
that
the
application
of
the
appellant
for
registration
as
a
charity
under
paragraph
110(8)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
S.C.
1970-71-72
c.
63
as
amended
(the
"Act")
was
rightly
rejected.
However,
the
reasoning
which
led
me
to
my
conclusion
is
different
from
that
adopted
by
my
colleague
in
his
reasons
for
judgment,
and
in
view
of
the
importance
of
the
subject
involved,
which
surprisingly
enough
has
only
recently
and
on
a
few
rare
occasions
been
considered
by
this
Court,
I
think
I
ought
to
express
my
personal
view
of
the
matter.
I
will
start
with
two
observations
which,
in
my
understanding,
are
fundamental
and
ought
to
govern
the
whole
approach
to
be
adopted
to
resolve
the
issue.
The
first
observation
is
drawn
from
the
definition
of
"charity"
as
found
in
the
Act.
Since
1976,
when
Parliament
proceeded
to
a
major
overhaul
of
the
rules
governing
charities
for
income
tax
purposes,
an
overhaul
which
was
completed
later,
more
especially
in
1984,
two
types
of
"charity"
are
recognized:
the
charitable
foundation
(either
public
or
private)
and
the
charitable
organization.
They
are
defined
in
paragraphs
149.1(1)
(a)
and
149.1
(1)(b)
of
the
Act
as
follows:
149.1
(1)
In
this
section,
section
172
and
Part
V,
(a)
"Charitable
foundation
".
—
"charitable
foundation”
means
a
corporation
or
trust
constituted
and
operated
exclusively
for
charitable
purposes
,
no
part
of
the
income
of
which
is
payable
to,
or
is
otherwise
available
for,
the
the
personal
benefit
of
any
proprietor,
member,
shareholder,
trustee
or
settlor
thereof
and
that
is
not
a
charitable
organization;
(b)
“Charitable
organization”.
“Charitable
organization”
means
an
organization,
whether
or
not
incorporated,
(i)
all
the
resources
of
which
are
devoted
to
charitable
activities
carried
on
by
the
organization
itself,
(ii)
no
part
of
the
income
of
which
is
payable
to,
or
is
otherwise
available
for,
the
personal
benefit
of
any
proprietor,
member,
shareholder,
trustee
or
settlor
thereof,
Among
the
several
differentiating
elements
which
can
be
drawn
from
an
analysis
of
these
two
definitions,
there
is
one
which
is
immediately
striking.
A
"charitable
foundation”
is
established
and
organized
"for
charitable
purposes
only"
(the
corresponding
phrase
in
French
being
"à
des
fins
charitables"
)
while
a
“charitable
organization"
devotes
its
resources
“exclusively
to
charitable
activities"
(in
French:
"à
des
activités
de
bienfaisance”).
And
indeed,
in
each
and
every
subsequent
provision
establishing
the
rules
governing
each
type
of
charity,
when
dealing
with
a
“charitable
foundation",
the
Act
speaks
of
purposes;
and
when
dealing
with
a
charitable
organization,
it
speaks
of
activities
(see,
for
example,
subsections
149.1(2)
(3)
(6)
(6.1)
(6.2)).
That
this
differentiation
is
fundamental
in
the
legislative
scheme
is
not
to
be
doubted.
These
usual
and
ordinary
words,
which,
in
both
languages,
refer
to
completely
different
but
quite
simple
concepts,
were
certainly
used
for
what
they
really
mean
since
they
are
squarely
put
in
opposition
to
one
another,
it
being
provided
that
only
organizations
can
have
activities.
In
fact,
as
it
is
well
known,
Parliament
meant
to
distinguish
generally
between,
on
the
one
hand,
institutions
or
legal
entities
which
are
merely
repositories
of
funds
and
whose
income
is
distributed
periodically
with
a
view
to
helping
the
carrying
on
of
activities
by
others,
and,
on
the
other
hand,
institutions,
which
do
not
even
have
to
be
supported
by
a
corporate
entity,
but
join
together
people
who
intend
to
carry
by
themselves
some
specific
activities.
The
French
word
for
the
latter,
the
word
"oeuvre"
,
is
quite
revealing
in
this
respect,
its
meaning
being
"work",
“action”,
“task”.
So,
while
a
"foundation"
will
be
entitled
to
registration
as
a
"charity"
as
soon
as
the
purposes
for
the
pursuit
of
which
the
administrators
or
trustees
are
mandated
and
empowered
to
distribute
money
from
its
fund
are
"charitable"
—
a
fact
that
can
be
determined
only
by
considering
the
document
by
which
the
institution
was
set
up
—
an
"organization"
will
be
entitled
to
be
registered
as
a
charity
only
if
its
activities
are
and
remain
charitable
—
a
condition
which
requires
an
examination
of
what
its
members
actually
do.
In
other
words,
if
the
goals,
the
objects,
the
intentions,
as
defined
in
its
constituting
document,
are
by
themselves
determinative
for
a
“foundation”,
it
is
not
so
for
an
“organization”.
It
is
true
that
the
classification
of
an
activity
requires
that
it
be
considered
in
relation
to
the
reason
for
which
it
is
carried
on,
but
nevertheless
it
is
not
to
be
confused
with
the
intention
of
the
actor;
the
activity
is
in
the
real
and
concrete
world,
not
merely
in
the
minds
of
the
individuals.
The
second
observation
is
suggested
by
the
first
one,
but
it
is
specifically
directed
to
the
meaning
of
the
word
“charitable”
in
the
definitions
of
the
two
types
of
“charity”.
As
it
is
well
known,
in
the
absence
of
any
statutory
indication
as
to
what
exactly
was
meant
by
that
word,
the
commentators
and
the
courts
have
turned
to
the
common
law
for
guidance.
The
well
known
judgment
of
Lord
Macnaghten
in
The
Commissioners
for
Special
Tax
Purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
v.
Pemsel
[1891]
A.C.
531
(H.L.)
has
become
the
leading
authority,
more
particularly
the
following
famous
passage
thereof:
How
far
then,
it
may
be
asked,
does
the
popular
meaning
of
the
word
"charity"
correspond
with
its
legal
meaning?
“Charity”
in
its
legal
sense
comprises
four
principal
divisions:
trusts
for
the
relief
of
poverty;
trusts
for
the
advancement
of
education;
trusts
for
the
advancement
of
religion;
and
trusts
for
other
purposes
beneficial
to
the
community,
not
falling
under
any
of
the
preceding
heads.
This
passage,
which
has
been
seen
in
England
as
embodying
the
common
law
test
to
identify
charitable
trusts,
was
in
effect
given
the
same
preeminence
in
this
country
following
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Guaranty
Trust
Company
of
Canada
v.
M.N.R.,
[1967]
S.C.R.
133;
[1966]
C.T.C.
755.
There
is
one
difficulty
however
with
Lord
Macnaghten's
judgment,
a
difficulty
which,
in
my
opinion,
is
too
often
overlooked:
it
was
a
judgment
strictly
concerned
with
charitable
trusts
and
was
elaborated
with
a
view
to
reaching
all
possible
objects
capable
of
giving
validity
to
institutions
set
up
in
an
altruistic
spirit
for
the
furtherance
of
some
beneficial
objective
(the
Guaranty
Trust
Company
case
was
similarly
concerned
with
the
validity
of
a
trust).
The
classification
adopted
therein
had
therefore
to
be
elaborated
liberally
and
with
"purposes"
and
not
"activities"
in
mind.
When
used
with
respect
to
activities
and
in
the
context
of
tax
law,
some
adaptation
will
undoubtedly
be
required
to
make
it
capable
of
identifying
those
activities
sufficiently
beneficial
to
be
entitled
to
the
very
special
tax
treatment
conferred
by
the
Act.
For
one
thing,
it
seems
to
me
obvious
that
the
vagueness
of
the
fourth
heading
is
particularly
troubling
when
applied
to
activities
as
it
appears
almost
totally
meaningless
if
not
somehow
reformulated
with
more
precise
language.
But
the
point
I
really
wish
to
make
here
is
that,
to
be
assigned
validly
and
usefully
to
one
of
the
four
headings
of
the
classification,
activities
must
necessarily,
it
seems
to
me,
be
considered
with
respect
to
their
immediate
result
and
effect,
not
their
possible
eventual
consequence.
In
other
words,
the
activity
will
draw
its
charitable
quality
from
what
it
itself
accomplishes
not
from
what
may
eventually
flow
from
it
or
be
somehow
indirectly
achieved
by
it.
If
these
basic
observations
I
have
just
made
are
correct,
the
issue
raised
by
the
appeal
is
quite
simple
and
can
be
dealt
with
quickly.
The
appellant
Committee,
an
unincorporated
organization,
had
the
right
to
be
registered
as
a
“charity”
,
contrary
to
the
decision
of
the
Minister,
if,
and
only
if,
its
activities
(and
that
is
to
say,
it
having
no
legal
entity,
the
activities
of
its
members)
have
the
immediate
effect
of
relieving
poverty,
advancing
education
or
religion
or,
possibly,
realizing
something
beneficial
to
the
community
as
a
whole.
The
first
step
is
therefore
to
inquire
as
to
what
exactly
the
members
of
the
committee
do
in
their
capacity
as
members.
The
evidence
on
this
point
is
clear:
put
simply,
the
activities
of
the
Committee
and
its
members
consist,
as
I
understand
it,
in
sponsoring
exchanges
and
meetings
between
residents
of
Toronto,
and
residents
of
Volgograd
in
Russia.
In
more
concrete
terms,
the
Committee
and
its
members
select
candidates
of
one
city
interested
in
visiting
the
other
city,
pay
for
all
travelling
expenses,
make
sure
that
the
visitors'
stay
is
organized
so
as
to
encourage
contacts
with
local
people,
and
finally
arrange
for
publicity,
by
way
of
media
coverage
and
speaking
engagements,
of
the
travellers’
experience
abroad
and
the
impressions
they
have
gathered
during
their
journey.
To
these
activities
would
have
to
be
added,
I
suppose,
when
members
are
themselves
chosen
as
candidates,
the
actual
travelling
abroad,
the
actual
meeting
of
people
and
the
actual
conveying
of
impressions.
So
these
are
all
the
activities
with
respect
to
which
we
have
to
ask
ourselves
whether
they
can
have,
as
their
immediate
effect,
the
relief
of
poverty,
the
advancement
of
education
and
religion,
or
the
realization
of
something
beneficial
to
the
community
as
a
whole.
In
my
judgment,
there
is
not
much
place
for
hesitation.
The
organization
or
the
making
of
trips
and
visits,
the
making
of
acquaintances
and
the
conveying
of
personal
impressions
and
experience
are
all
activities
which
may
be
very
good
and
instructive,
and
may
eventually
produce
worthwhile
results,
but
immediately
they
can
hardly
have
any
effect
beyond
the
satisfaction
of
intellectual
curiosity
and
the
acquisition
of
human
experiences
for
those
who
carry
them
on.
None,
it
seems
to
me,
can
be
said
to
be
charitable
within
the
spirit
and
intendment
of
the
Act.
It
is
on
the
basis
of
this
view
of
the
matter
that
I
would
dispose
of
this
appeal
as
suggested
by
my
brother
Stone,
J.
Appeal
dismissed.
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