Hugessen,
J.:—The
respondent
(plaintiff)
moves
in
writing,
pursuant
to
rule
324,
for
special
directions
concerning
costs,
pursuant
to
rule
344.
The
Chief
Justice
has
nominated
me
to
hear
and
dispose
of
the
motion.
The
application
is
made
following
a
final
judgment
rendered
May
13,
1987
by
which
this
Court
dismissed
an
appeal
by
the
Crown
from
a
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
setting
aside
a
seizure
under
the
Income
Tax
Act;
a
crossappeal
seeking
the
return
of
all
copies
or
extracts
of
the
seized
documents
was
allowed.
In
his
written
submissions,
counsel
asks
that
I
direct
the
taxing
officer
to
allow
a
lump
sum
for
costs
in
the
amount
of
$10,000.
I
have
concluded
that
I
should
make
no
such
direction.
In
support
of
the
motion,
counsel
invokes
four
grounds:
(a)
importance
of
the
case
and
the
issues
involved;
(b)
complexity
of
issues;
(c)
volume
of
work;
and
(d)
conduct
of
the
parties.
These
are
all
matters
which,
in
accordance
with
the
various
paragraphs
of
sub-rule
344(3),
the
Court
may
properly
consider
on
an
application
such
as
the
present
one.
As
indicated,
however,
my
consideration
of
them
does
not
lead
me
to
the
conclusions
sought
by
counsel.
(a)
The
importance
of
the
issues.
Only
one
issue
was
argued
on
the
appeal.
Since
it
involved
a
question
of
the
application
of
the
Charter,
it
cannot
be
denied
that
it
was
important.
Importance
is,
however,
a
relative
matter.
The
point
upon
which
the
appeal
turned,
the
extent
of
the
remedies
available
to
the
victim
of
a
Charter-barred
seizure,
can
properly,
in
my
view,
be
described
as
incidental.
(b)
The
complexity
of
the
issues.
Quite
simply,
the
issues
were
not
complex
at
all.
In
its
reasons
for
judgment,
the
Court
described
them
"starkly"
in
a
single
sentence.
The
appeal
was
heard
jointly
with
another
(Skis
Rossignol
Canada
Ltée/Ltd.
and
Société
de
Distribution
Rossignol
du
Canada
Ltée,
Court
file
No.
A-245-85)
in
which
the
same
issue
was
raised.
The
hearing
of
both
appeals
and
of
the
cross-appeal
occupied
a
single
day;
judgment
was
given
from
the
bench
on
the
following
day.
The
reasons
for
judgment,
including
a
lengthy
style
of
cause,
barely
exceeded
five
pages
in
length.
(c)
The
volume
of
work.
No
material
has
been
filed
with
the
present
application
which
would
allow
the
Court
to
determine
whether
an
unusual
volume
of
work
was
involved.
In
fact,
no
affidavit
material
was
filed
at
all.
Nothing
that
I
have
been
directed
to
in
the
Court
record
indicates
a
volume
of
work
different
from
what
might
normally
be
expected
on
any
appeal
to
this
Court.
If,
as
seems
to
be
the
case,
counsel
wishes
me
to
award
a
lump
sum
on
a
purely
intuitive
or
impressionistic
basis,
I
decline
to
do
so.
Applications
under
rule
344
are
governed
by
sub-rule
319(2)
and
must
be
properly
supported.
It
certainly
cannot
be
assumed
that
the
Court
hearing
the
application
will
be
constituted,
in
whole
or
in
part,
the
same
as
the
Court
which
disposed
of
the
appeal
on
the
merits,
although
as
a
practical
matter
that
will
frequently
be
the
case.
In
any
event,
if
I
could
draw
on
my
personal
knowledge
as
a
member
of
the
panel
which
heard
the
appeal
I
would
conclude
that
there
was
nothing
unusual
or
out
of
the
ordinary
in
the
volume
of
work
which
was
required
of
counsel.
(d)
The
conduct
of
the
parties.
Counsel's
submission
under
this
heading
seems
to
amount
to
an
assertion
that
the
Crown's
appeal
was
frivolous
and
doomed
to
failure.
This
position
is,
of
course,
wholly
inconsistent
with
the
earlier
submissions
as
to
the
complexity
of
the
issues
and
the
volume
of
work.
In
any
event,
I
reject
it.
To
the
extent
that
any
extra
effort
was
required
of
counsel
by
the
Crown's
attitude
on
the
cross-appeal,
I
note
that
in
the
final
judgment
the
Court
granted
the
respondent
the
costs
of
the
crossappeal
as
well
as
of
the
appeal.
This
should
leave
ample
room
for
the
taxing
officer
to
exercise
his
discretion
within
the
confines
of
Tariff
B.
One
final
comment
in
closing.
On
an
application
such
as
this,
where
a
party
is
seeking
a
lump
sum
for
costs
in
lieu
of
the
amounts
provided
by
the
tariff,
it
would
seem
to
me
that
counsel
would
normally
have
the
obligation
of
showing
the
Court
what
such
latter
amounts
might
be
expected
to
be.
The
production
of
a
pro
forma
bill
of
costs
would
be
a
proper
way
of
doing
this.
In
the
absence
of
any
such
material,
the
Court
is
left
to
determine
as
best
it
can
and
on
its
own
the
amounts
which
could
be
claimed
under
the
tariff.
That
is
not
something
the
Court
should
have
to
do.
Order
The
application
is
dismissed
with
costs.
Application
dismissed.
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