THURLOW,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
dated
September
28,
1955,
dismissing
an
appeal
by
the
appellant
against
an
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
year
1955.
In
making
the
assessment,
the
Minister
added
to
the
income
of
the
appellant
an
amount
of
$233.33,
representing
the
appellant’s
share
of
a
sum
of
$700
which
had
been
deducted
by
the
appellant
in
his
computation
of
the
profit
of
a
partnership
known
as
Pearl
Realty,
in
which
he
had
a
one-third
interest,
and
the
issue
in
the
appeal
is
whether
the
appellant
is
liable
to
tax
in
respect
of
this
amount.
The
partnership
was
formed
in
November,
1954
and
carried
on
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
real
estate
in
Toronto
until
March
31,
1955,
when
it
was
dissolved.
In
that
period,
three
properties
were
bought
and
sold,
the
transactions
pertaining
to
two
such
properties,
namely
23
Cowan
Avenue
and
61
Beatrice
Street,
being
in
question
in
these
proceedings.
Twenty-three
Cowan
Avenue
was
purchased
for
$9,000
on
December
20,
1954,
the
date
set
for
completion
of
the
purchase
being
December
31,
1954.
The
property
was
sold
on
or
about
February
21,
1955
for
$12,500.
In
the
meantime,
on
or
about
January
30,
it
had
been
mortgaged
by
the
partners
to
secure
repayment
in
five
years
of
$4,200
and
interest
at
614
per
cent,
and
it
was
a
term
of
the
agreement
of
sale
that
the
purchaser,
in
payment
of
$4,200
of
the
selling
price,
should
assume
the
mortgage.
Of
the
$4,200
so
secured,
the
partners
had
received
$4,000,
the
remaining
$200
being
a
bonus
exacted
by
the
mortgagee.
As
to
this
transaction,
the
evidence
shows
that
on
February
2,
1955
the
solicitor
for
the
partnership
sent
to
it
a
cheque
for
$3,941.50,
representing
the
proceeds
of
the
loan,
but
there
is
no
satisfactory
evidence
as
to
what
this
money
was
used
for
or
why
it
was
borrowed.
In
particular,
the
evidence
leaves
me
unsatisfied
that
the
money
was
used
to
pay
for
the
property.
The
property
known
as
61
Beatrice
Street
was
purchased
on
November
22,
1954
for
$12,200
and
was
sold
on
February
26,
1955
for
$15,
000.
In
the
meantime,
it,
too,
had
been
mortgaged
to
secure
repayment
in
five
years
of
$6,500
and
interest
at
61%
per
cent,
and
the
assumption
of
the
mortgage
by
the
purchaser
represented
$6,500
of
the
selling
price.
The
proceeds
of
the
loan
were
$6,000,
the
remaining
$500
being
a
bonus
exacted
by
the
mortgagee.
In
this
case
the
evidence
shows
that
the
moneys
received,
less
some
legal
fees,
were
applied
in
part
payment
of
the
balance
of
the
purchase
price
payable
by
Pearl
Realty
when
the
purchase
was
completed
on
or
about
February
7,
1955.
The
evidence
also
shows
that
the
appellant
put
$6,000
or
$7,000
into
the
partnership
as
his
share
of
its
capital
and
that
the
other
partner
was
expected
to
put
in
somewhat
more,
but
it
is
not
clear
how
much
he
did
in
fact
contribute.
In
the
trading
account
of
the
partnership
for
the
period
from
January
1,
1955
to
March
31,
1955,
which
accompanied
the
appellant’s
income
tax
return
for
1955,
the
receipts
from
sales
of
the
three
properties
were
shown
at
$42,300,
which
included
the
$12,500
and
the
$15,000
for
which
23
Cowan
Avenue
and
61
Beatrice
Street,
respectively,
were
sold,
and
from
the
gross
profit
calculated
after
deducting
the
cost
of
purchasing
the
properties
and
a
sum
for
improvements
and
repairs,
there
was
deducted
under
the
heading
Expenses”
an
amount
of
$700
entitled
“Bonus
on
arranging
of
First
Mortgages’’.
In
making
the
assess-
ment,
the
Minister
added
back
this
amount,
and
the
issue
is
whether
he
was
right
in
so
doing.
The
appellant
put
his
case
in
two
ways.
He
submitted
first
that
the
$700
was
never
received
by
the
partnership
and
would
never
be
received
and
that,
although
in
the
method
of
accounting
used
the
$700
had
been
included
in
the
receipts
and
then
deducted,
it
would
have
been
equally
accurate
and
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
not
to
include
it
in
the
receipts
and
not
deduct
it.
Secondly,
the
submitted
that,
if
it
was
necessary
in
computing
income
to
include
in
the
receipts
the
full
selling
price
of
the
properties,
the
$700
was
properly
deducted.
The
position
taken
by
the
Minister
was
that
the
full
selling
price
of
the
properties
must
be
brought
into
the
computation
and
accounted
for
and
that
the
bonuses
were
outlays
made
by
the
partners
to
secure
working
capital
for
their
business
and
were
thus
payments
or
outlays
on
account
of
capital,
the
deduction
of
which
in
computing
income
for
income
tax
purposes
18
prohibited
by
Section
12(1)
(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
By
Section
3
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148,
it
is
declared
that,
for
the
purposes
of
Part
I
of
the
Act,
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
is
his
income
from
all
sources
and
includes
income
for
the
year
from
all
businesses,
and
by
Section
4
it
is
provided
that,
subject
to
the
other
provisions
of
Part
I,
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
is
the
profit
therefrom
for
the
year.
Clauses
(a)
and
(b)
of
subsection
(1)
of
Section
12
are
as
follows:
12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
or
a
business
of
the
taxpayer,
(b)
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part,’’
In
Section
11(1)(c)
provision
is,
however,
made
that,
notwithstanding
paragraphs
(a),
(b)
and
(h)
of
Section
12(1),
interest
on
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
may
be
deducted,
and
by
Section
11(1)
(cb)
it
is
also
provided
that
a
taxpayer
may
deduct
an
expense
incurred
in
the
year
in
the
course
of
borrowing
money
used
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business,
but
not
including
any
amount
in
respect
of
a
bonus
paid
or
payable
to
a
person
from
whom
the
money
was
borrowed.
It
will
be
observed
that
the
statute
does
not
define
what
is
to
be
taken
as
the
profit
from
a
business,
nor
does
it
prescribe
how
or
by
what
method
such
profit
is
to
be
computed,
though
it
does
contain
provisions
to
which,
for
income
tax
purposes,
any
method
adopted
is
subject.
However,
since
what
is
declared
to
be
the
income
from
a
business
is
the
profit
therefrom
for
the
year,
the
method
adopted
must
be
one
which
accurately
reflects
the
result
of
the
year’s
operations,
and
where
two
different
methods,
either
of
which
may
be
acceptable
for
business
purposes,
differ
in
their
results,
for
income
tax
purposes
the
appropriate
method
is
that
which
most
accurately
shows
the
profit
from
the
year’s
operations.
Thus
in
Publishers
Guild
v.
M.N.R.,
[1957]
C.T.C.
1,
Thorson,
P.,
said
at
page
29
:
‘What
is
basically
to
be
determined
under
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
is
the
amount
of
net
profit
or
gain
.
.
.
received’
by
the
taxpayer
during
the
year.
It
was
established
by
the
House
of
Lords
in
Sun
Insurance
Office
v.
Clark,
[1912]
A.C.
448,
that
‘the
question
of
what
is
or
is
not
profit
or
gain
must
primarily
be
one
of
fact,
and
of
fact
to
be
ascertained
by
the
tests
applied
in
ordinary
business’.
Thus,
what
is
to
be
determined
here
is,
not
whether
the
Department
has
accepted
the
accrual
basis
system
of
accounting
and
rejected
the
instalment
system,
but
rather
which
system
more
nearly
accurately
refiects
the
taxpayer’s
income
position.”
See
also
M.N.R.
v.
Anaconda
American
Brass
Ltd.,
[1955]
C.T.C.
311,
and
Ken
Steeves
Sales
Lid.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1955]
Ex.
C.R.
108;
[1955]
C.T.C.
47.
Turning
now
to
the
question
whether
the
$700
must,
in
the
first
instance,
be
included
in
the
computation
as
a
receipt
since
it
formed
part
of
the
nominal
selling
price
of
the
two
properties,
there
being
but
two
transactions
to
consider,
both
of
which
were
substantially
completed
in
the
accounting
period,
it
would
seem
that
the
result
ought
to
be
the
same
whether
the
method
of
computation
used
is
that
employed
in
the
appellant’s
income
tax
return
or
any
other
logical
method.
If,
however,
instead
of
the
nominal
selling
price
of
the
properties,
one
takes
as
the
starting
point
of
the
computation
what
was
actually
received,
it
becomes
necessary,
in
my
opinion,
to
examine
the
transactions
themselves,
in
which
the
properties
were
sold,
to
see
what
was
in
fact
realized
in
them.
It
should
here
be
noted
that
the
transactions
in
which
the
properties
were
mortgaged
do
not,
in
my
opinion,
enter
into
the
computation.
The
mortgaging.
of
the
properties
cannot
be
regarded
as
a
partial
disposal
of
them,
nor
do
the
sums
received
from
the
mortgagees
form
part
of
the
proceeds
of
their
disposal
or
become
revenue
receipts
of
the
partnership.
In
each
case,
however,
when
the
property
was
sold,
the
partners
were
liable
for
the
mortgage
debt,
which
included
the
bonus
granted
by
them
and,
when
selling
the
property,
the
partners
received
a
portion
of
the
purchase
price
in
cash
and
a
second
mortgage
for
another
portion
of
it.
There
is
no
doubt
that
both
the
amount
received
and
the
value
of
the
second
mortgage
must
be
brought
into
the
computation.
In
addition,
on
each
occasion
the
partners
obtained
the
purchasers’
undertaking
to
pay
to
the
mortgagee
the
sum
which
they
were
obligated
to
pay
to
him.
In
my
view,
this
undertaking
was
something
of
value
to
the
partners
since,
without
it,
they
would
have
been
obliged
sooner
or
later
to
find
the
money
to
discharge
their
obligation
and
the
purchasers’
undertaking
relieved
them
of
the
obligation
to
do
so.
It
seems
to
me,
therefore,
that
the
actual
receipts
at
the
time
of
sale
in
each
case
were
made
up
of
the
cash
and
second
mortgage
received
and
a
contractual
obligation
as
well,
which
prima
facie
was
worth
to
the
partnership
the
amount
outstanding
on
the
first
mortgage.
Moreover,
while
the
actual
payment
of
the
first
mortgage
by
the
purchaser
would
probably
not
be
completed
for
some
years,
so
far
as
the
partners
were
concerned
in
the
ordinary
course
of
events
there
would
be
nothing
more
to
be
done
by
them
in
any
subsequent
year
to
earn
or
obtain
this
portion
of
the
selling
price
of
the
property.
This
feature
distinguishes
the
case
on
its
facts
from
that
of
Publishers
Guild
v.
M.N.R.
(supra).
The
amount
of
the
bonuses
assumed
by
the
purchasers,
accordingly,
in
my
opinion,
forms
part
of
the
total
amount
to
be
accounted
for
by
the
partners
as
receipts
from
the
sales
of
the
properties,
and
it
thus
makes
no
difference
for
the
purposes
of
this
case
whether
what
is
taken
as
the
starting
point
of
the
computation
is
the
nominal
selling
price
of
the
properties
or
what
was
actually
received.
Having
reached
this
conclusion,
it
becomes
necessary
to
consider
whether
the
bonuses
or
either
of
them
may
properly
be
deducted
as
expenses.
In
Royal
Trust
Company
v.
M.N.R.,
[1957]
C.T.C.
32,
Thorson,
P.,
in
discussing
the
approach
to
the
question
of
allowance
of
deductions
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
said
at
page
42
:
Consequently,
if
the
correct
approach
to
the
question
of
whether
a
disbursement
or
expense
was
properly
deductible
in
a
case
under
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
was
the
one
which
I
have
outlined,
it
follows,
a
fortiori,
that
it
is
the
correct
approach
to
the
question
of
whether
an
outlay
or
expense
is
properly
deductible
in
a
case
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Thus,
it
may
be
stated
categorically
that
in
a
case
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
the
first
matter
to
be
determined
in
deciding
whether
an
outlay
or
expense
is
outside
the
prohibition
of
Section
12(1)
(a)
of
the
Act
is
whether
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
in
accordance
with
the
ordinary
prniciples
of
commercial
trading
or
well
accepted
principles
of
business
practice.
If
it
was
not,
that
is
the
end
of
the
matter.
But
if
it
was,
then
the
outlay
or
expense
is
properly
deductible
unless
it
falls
outside
the
expressed
exception
of
Section
12(1)
(a)
and,
therefore,
within
its
prohibition.”
In
B.C.
Electric
Railway
Co.
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1958]
S.C.R,
133;
[1958]
C.T.C.
21,
Abbott,
J.,
with
whom
the
Chief
Justice
and
Fauteux,
J.,
concurred,
said
at
page
187
[
[1958]
C.T.C.
31]
:
“Since
the
main
purpose
of
every
business
undertaking
is
presumably
to
make
a
profit,
any
expenditure
made
‘for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income’
comes
within
the
terms
of
Section
12(1)
(a)
whether
it
be
classified
as
an
income
expense
or
as
a
capital
outlay.
Once
it
is
determined
that
a
particular
expenditure
is
one
made
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income,
in
order
to
compute
income
tax
liability
it
must
next
be
ascertained
whether
such
disbursement
is
an
income
expense
or
a
capital
outlay.
The
principle
underlying
such
a
distinction
is,
of
course,
that
since
for
tax
purposes
income
is
determined
on
an
annual
basis,
an
income
expense
is
one
incurred
to
earn
the
income
of
the
particular
year
in
which
it
is
made
and
should
be
allowed
as
a
deduction
from
gross
income
in
that
year.
Most
capital
outlays
on
the
other
hand
may
be
amortized
or
written
off
over
a
period
of
years
depending
upon
whether
or
not
the
asset
in
respect
of
which
the
outlay
is
made
is
one
coming
within
the
capital
cost
allowance
regulations
made
under
Section
11(1)
(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.”
In
W.
E.
Bannerman
v.
M.N.R.,
[1959]
S.C.R.
562;
[1959]
C.T.C.
214,
Kerwin,
C.J.,
in
delivering
the
unanimous
judgment
of
the
Court,
said
at
page
564
[[1959]
C.T.C.
217]
:
‘*,..
Under
Section
12(1)
(a)
of
the
present
Act
it
is
sufficient
that
an
outlay
be
made
or
expense
incurred
with
the
object
or
intention
that
it
should
earn
income,
but
since
in
one
sense
it
might
be
said
that
almost
every
outlay
or
expense
was
made
or
incurred
for
that
purpose,
a
line
must
be
drawn
in
the
indi-
vidual
case
depending
upon
the
circumstances
and
bearing
in
mind
the
provisions
of
Section
12(1)
(b).”
See
also
Evans
v.
M.N.R.,
[1960]
S.C.R.
391;
[1960]
C.T.C.
69.
In
the
present
case,
it
was
not
contended
that
the
deduction
of
the
expense
attending
either
of
the
two
mortgages
was
prohibited
by
Section
12(1)
(a),
and
the
matter
falls
to
be
determined
on
whether
the
bonuses
were
outlays
on
account
of
capital
the
deduction
of
which
is
prohibited
by
Section
12(1)
(b).
This
question,
in
my
opinion,
turns
on
whether
or
not
the
borrowed
moneys
in
respect
of
which
the
bonuses
were
incurred
were
in
fact
used
as
capital
in
the
partnership
business.
In
The
European
Trust
Co.
v.
Jackson,
18
T.C.
1,
Romer,
L.J.,
referring
to
the
judgment
of
the
House
of
Lords
in
Scottish
North
American
Trust
Ltd.
v.
Farmer,
5
T.C.
693,
said
at
page
16:
The
House
of
Lords,
affirming
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Session
in
Scotland,
held
that
the
moneys
so
borrowed
were
not
sums
employed
as
capital
in
the
trade,
within
the
meaning
of
what
then,
I
think,
corresponded
to
Rule
3,
sub-rule
(f).
In
point
of
fact,
the
money
which
was
held
not
to
be
capital—
although
it
was
capital,
as
I
say,
in
the
sense
that
it
was
not
income—was,
really,
what
is
frequently
referred
to
as
circulating
capital.
But,
again,
it
is
impossible,
I
think,
to
treat
the
decision
of
the
House
of
Lords
as
laying
down
that
capital,
which
is
used
as
circulating
capital,
is
not
capital
within
the
meaning
of
Sub-rule
(f).
To
start
with,
they
did
not,
in
terms,
draw
any
distinction
between
circulating
capital
and
fixed
capital
and,
in
the
next
place,
they
did
not
over-rule,
although
they
commented
upon,
the
decision
in
the
Anglo-Continental
Guano
Works
v.
Bell,
reported
in
3
T.C.
239,
where
money
that,
so
far
as
I
can
see,
was
borrowed
and
used
as
a
circulating
capital,
was
treated
as
capital
within
the
meaning
of
Subrule
(f).
The
only
conclusion
that
I
can
draw
from
those
cases,
therefore,
is
this,
that,
in
each
case,
it
is
a
question
of
fact
whether
the
capital
money
borrowed
is
or
is
not
capital
employed
in
the
trade
within
the
meaning
of
this
sub-paragraph,
and
if
the
Commissioners
have
decided,
as
a
question
of
fact,
that
it
is,
then
this
Court
cannot
interfère.”
In
the
same
case,
Finlay,
J.,
had
said
at
page
11
:
“Now,
here
it
seems
to
me
that
the
principle
may
be
stated
in
this
way
:
if
you
get
a
company
dealing
with
money,
buying
or
selling
stocks
or
shares,
Treasury
bills,
bonds,
all
sorts
of
things,
and
if
you
get
that
company
getting,
as
such
com-
panies
constantly
do
get,
temporary
loans
from
their
bank—
accommodation,
I
suppose,
for
sometimes
twenty-four
hours,
or
even
less,
sometimes
for
a
good
deal
longer—if
you
get
that
sort
of
thing,
then
the
interest
on
that
money,
the
hire,
so
to
speak,
paid
for
that
money,
may
properly
be
regarded
as
an
expenditure
of
the
business,
an
outgoing
to
earn
the
profits.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
truth
of
the
thing
is
that
by
the
payment
of
the
interest
the
company
does
not
obtain
mere
temporary
accommodation,
day
to
day
accommodation
of
that
sort,
but
does,
in
truth,
add
to
its
capital
and
get
sums
which
are
used
as
capital
and
nothing
else,
then
I
think
that
in
that
ease
all
the
authorities
show
that
that
deduction
cannot
properly
be
made.”
In
Ascot
Gas
Water
Heaters
Ltd.
v.
Duff,
24
T.C.
171,
Lawrence,
J.,
said
at
page
176:
“It
appears,
therefore,
from
those
observations
of
Romer,
L.J.,
that
the
matter
cannot
be
concluded
by
considering
simply
whether
the
sum
in
respect
of
which
the
sum
is
sought
to
be
deducted
is
fixed
capital
or
circulating
capital,
and
it
appears
to
me
that
the
only
true
principle
must
be
the
principle
which
is
laid
down
by
Finlay,
J.,
and
which
is
binding
upon
me,
no
other
decision
or
criticism
of
his
statement
of
the
principle
having
been
brought
to
my
notice.
The
principle,
therefore,
which
the
Commissioners
ought
to
have
applied
in
each
of
these
cases
was
whether
the
sums
in
respect
of
which
the
commission
dealt
with
in
these
two
cases
was
payable,
were
sums
which,
although
capital,
were
temporary
in
their
nature
and
might
be
regarded
as
an
ordinary
incident
of
carrying
on
the
business
of
the
Company.”
In
the
case
before
Lawrence,
J.,
two
sums
were
in
issue,
one
of
which
was
a
payment
made
by
the
taxpayer
to
obtain
a
guarantee
for
indebtedness
incurred
for
raw
materials
purchased
in
the
course
of
trading
and
the
cther
a
payment
made
for
a
guarantee
of
a
loan
raised
in
order
to
provide
credit
and
reserves
necessary
for
the
expansion
of
the
business
and
the
commissioners
had
held
the
first
sum
so
paid
to
be
a
proper
deduction
and
the
second
to
be
not
a
proper
deduction.
With
respect
to
the
latter,
Lawrence,
J.,
held
that
there
was
overwhelming
evidence
before
the
commissioners
on
which
they
might
find,
as
they
had,
that
the
latter
sum
was
not
deductible,
and
he
then
proceeded
as
follows
at
page
177
:
“In
the
other
case
there
is
much
more
difficulty,
but
the
Commissioners
have
in
that
case
expressed
their
finding
as
a
finding
of
fact
that
the
money
was
wholly
and
exclusively
laid
out
for
the
purposes
of
the
business,
and
was
a
proper
deduction.
Having
regard
to
the
fact
that
the
commission
was
payable
in
respect
of
a
sum
of
money
which
was
raised
in
respect
of
the
guarantee
of
the
amount
of
an
existing
trade
debt,
and
the
fact
that
that
trade
debt
was
very
largely
reduced
in
the
two
years
after
the
guarantee
had
been
given,
and
the
fact
that
the
parties
were,
according
to
the
evidence,
anxious
that
this
loan
should
be
repaid
as
quickly
as
possible,
I
feel
unable
to
say
that
there
was
no
evidence
upon
which
the
Commissioners
might
come
to
the
conclusion
of
fact
which
they
did.’’
In
Ward
v.
Anglo-American
Oil
Co.
Ltd.,
19
T.C.
94,
Single-
ton,
J.,
expressed
the
distinction
thus
at
page
108
:
“It
is
unnecessary
for
me
to
deal
further
with
the
matter
except
to
say
that
bearing
in
mind
the
words
of
Lord
Sumner
and
Lord
Parker
in
the
case
of
Usher’s
Wiltshire
Brewery,
Limited
v.
Bruce,
6
T.C.
399,
and
that
which
was
said
by
Lord
Justice
Warrington
in
Atherton
v.
British
Insulated
&
Helsby
Cables,
10
T.C.
at
page
182,
I
conceive
the
scheme
of
that
part
of
the
Act
and
of
Schedule
D,
which
deals
with
profits
or
gains
from
trade
and
deductions
which
can
be
made
therefrom,
to
be
this:
that
one
must
arrive
at
profits
or
gains
in
the
ordinary
commercial
or
business
sense.
Interest
on
ordinary
bankers’
overdrafts
which
has
arisen
for
ordinary
trading
purposes
is
a
legitimate
deduction,
because
it
is
money
wholly
and
exclusively
laid
out
or
expended
for
the
purpose
of
trade.
On
the
other
hand,
interest
on
an
issue
of
notes,
whether
for
one
year
or
for
a
longer
period,
may
fall,
and
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case
does
fall,
into
an
entirely
different
category.
It
seems
to
me
to
savour
much
more
of
a
capital
nature
or
of
some
fund
employed
or
intended
to
be
employed
as
capital,
and
I
do
not
think
the
issue
of
notes
on
which
interest
accrued
would
be
regarded
by
business
men
as
of
the
same
nature
as
facilities
obtained
for
ordinary
trading
purposes.”
In
Bennett
and
White
Construction
Co.
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1949]
C.T.C.
1,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
considered
a
case
under
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
wherein
the
taxpayer
had
incurred
expense
in
securing
the
guarantees
of
its
principal
shareholders
for
its
indebtedness
to
a
bank
and
held
that
the
expense
in
question
was
an
outlay
or
payment
on
account
of
capital.
Locke,
J.,
with
whom
Rinfret,
C.J.,
concurred,
said
at
page
6:
“I
am
of
the
opinion
that
expenditures
such
as
these
made
by
reason
of
the
necessity
of
obtaining
working
capital
are
payments
of
the
same
nature.’’
Rand,
J.,
said
at
pages
6-7
:
The
case
for
the
company
is
that
the
payments
were
‘wholly,
exclusively
and
necessarily’
paid
out
to
earn
the
income.
In
a
remote
sense
that
is
so
;
but
the
same
can
be
said
for
almost
every
outlay
in
the
organization
of
the
company.
The
conception
of
the
statute
however
is
an
earning
of
income
through
the
use
of
capital
funds
which
in
one
form
or
another
constitute
the
means
and
instruments
by
which
the
business
is
prosecuted;
but
that
providing
or
organizing
them
must
be
clearly
differentiated
from
the
activities
of
the
business
itself
has
been
lately
reaffirmed
by
the
Judicial
Committee
in
Montreal
Coke
and
Manufacturing
Company
v.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1944]
C.T.C.
94,
[1944]
A.C.
126.
The
acquisition
of
capital
may
be
by
various
methods
including
stock
subscriptions,
permanent
borrowings
through
issues
of
securities,
or
term
loans;
and
ordinarily
it
should
make
no
difference
in
taxation
whether
a
company
carried
on
financially
by
one
means
or
another.
In
the
absence
of
statute,
it
seems
to
be
settled
that
to
bring
interest
paid
on
temporary
financing
within
deductible
expenses
requires
that
the
financing
be
an
integral
part
of
the
business
carried
on.
That
is
clearly
exemplified
where
the
transactions
are
those
of
daily
buying
and
selling
of
securities:
Farmer
v.
Scottish
Trust,
[1912]
A.C.
118:
or
conversely
lending
money
as
part
of
a
brewery
business:
Reid’s
Brewery
v.
Mail,
[1891]
2
Q.B.
1.
Now
the
Crown
has
allowed
the
deduction
of
interest
paid
to
the
bank,
and
it
must
have
been
either
on
the
footing
that
the
day-to-day
use
of
the
funds
was
embraced
within
the
business
that
produced
the
profit,
or
that
the
interest
was
within
Section
5,
paragraph
(b).
But
setting
up
that
credit
right
or
providing
the
banking
facilities
is
quite
another
thing
from
paying
interest
;
it
is
preparatory
to
earning
the
income
and
is
no
more
part
of
the
business
carried
on
than
would
be
the
work
involved
in
a
bond
issue.
The
lender
might
insist
on
being
furnished
with
premises
near
the
scene
of
the
works;
it
might
exact
any
other
accommodation
as
the
price
of
its
willingness
to
provide
funds;
but
all
that
would
be
outside
the
circumference
of
the
transactions
from
which
the
income
arises.
Within
the
meaning
of
the
Act,
the
premiums
create
part
of
the
capital
structure
and
are
a
capital
payment:
Watney
v.
Musgrove,
5
Ex.
D.
241.
They
furnish
a
credit
apparatus
to
enable
the
business
to
be
carried
on,
and
although
they
affect
the
distributable
earnings
of
the
company,
they
do
not
affect
the
net
return
from
the
business.
That
was
the
view
of
O’Connor,
J.,
below
and
I
agree
with
it.’’
Estey,
J.,
said
at
pages
9-10
:
This
was
not
borrowing
of
money
on
a
temporary
or
shortterm
basis
such
as
is
necessary
and
incidental
to
the
ordinary
and
usual
transactions
in
the
course
of
the
appellant’s
business
.
.
.
The
learned
trial
Judge
held
that
the
sums
as
borrowed
were
capital
and
the
evidence
fully
supports
his
finding.’’
and
at
page
12:
“The
appellant
upon
obtaining
this
line
of
credit
was
enabled
to
complete
its
financial
arrangements
at
the
bank,
which
enabled
it
to
undertake
the
larger
volume
of
business.
Sums
borrowed
under
such
circumstances
are
capital
and
the
sums
paid
are
not
deductible
under
the
provisions
of
6(1)
(a).”
In
the
present
case,
while
the
loan
secured
by
the
partners
by
mortgaging
61
Beatrice
Street
was
on
its
face
not
of
a
temporary
nature
I
think
it
may
in
the
circumstances
be
inferred
that
the
partners
expected
to
dispose
quickly
of
the
property
in
just
such
a
transaction
as
subsequently
occurred.
From
their
point
of
view
the
borrowing
can,
I
think,
accordingly
be
regarded
as
temporary
since
they
did
not
expect
to
have
the
property
for
long
and
the
assumption
and
retirement
of
the
loan
were
in
fact
provided
for
in
the
transaction
in
which
the
property
was
sold.
Next
it
appears
that
the
borrowed
money
was
not
simply
deposited
in
the
partnership
bank
account
to
be
used
as
the
day-
to-day
exigencies
of
the
business
might
require
but
was
directly
used
to
pay
a
part
of
the
purchase
price
of
the
property
itself,
a
property
which
was
undoubtedly
acquired
as
a
revenue
asset
of
the
business,
And
in
the
ordinary
course
neither
this
money
nor
anything
representing
it
would
again
fall
into
the
hands
of
the
partners
or
be
capable
of
use
by
them
in
their
business.
Though
in
being
used
to
purchase
a
trading
asset
it
was
used
as
circulating
capital
is
used,
it
would
not
be
used
again
in
the
way
that
circulating
capital
is
ordinarily
used
over
and
over
again.
Nor
did
this
borrowing
expand
or
add
anything
of
a
permanent
nature
to
the
assets
employed
as
capital
in
the
business.
I
am
accordingly
of
the
opinion
that
the
money
so
borrowed
was
not
used
as
capital
in
the
business
in
the
sense
in
which
the
word
“capital”
is
used
in
Section
12(1)
(b)
and
that
the
bonus
of
$500
was
not
a
payment
or
outlay
on
account
of
capital
within
the
meaning
of
that
clause.
It
follows
that
the
bonus
was
properly
deductible
in
computing
the
profit
from
the
partnership
business.
Nor,
in
my
opinion,
is
this
conclusion
affected
by
Section
11(1)
(cb),
which
operates
to
permit
the
deduction
therein
mentioned,
whether
it
is
prohibited
or
not
by
Section
12(1)
(a),
(b),
and
(h),
but
does
not
itself
prohibit
deduction
of
an
amount
the
deduction
of
which
is
not
prohibited
by
Section
12.
On
the
other
hand,
with
respect
to
the
mortgage
on
23
Cowan
Avenue
the
situation
differs
in
that
the
evidence
does
not
show
why
the
money
was
borrowed
or
what
it
was
used
for,
and
the
burden
being
on
the
taxpayer
to
satify
the
Court
that
the
bonus
which
he
seeks
to
deduct
was
not
incurred
on
account
of
capital,
even
though
the
retirement
of
the
loan
was
provided
for
in
the
same
way
as
for
the
other
loan,
in
the
absence
of
satisfactory
evidence
that
the
borrowed
money
was
not
used
to
provide
fixed
or
working
capital
for
the
partnership,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
appellant
has
not
established
any
right
to
deduct
the
bonus.
The
appeal
will
be
allowed
with
respect
to
the
bonus
on
the
mortgage
on
61
Beatrice
Street
only,
and
the
assessment
will
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
to
be
revised
accordingly.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
the
costs
of
the
appeal.
Judgment
accordingly.