Reed,
J.:—The
applicant
brings
a
motion
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
as
amended.
This
provision
was
added
to
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
1985
along
with
other
provisions
to
limit
the
ability
of
the
Minister
to
collect
taxes
which
he
asserts
are
owing
when
the
taxpayer
is
actively
disputing
that
claim.
Section
225.1
of
the
Act
prohibits
the
Minister
instituting
collection
proceedings
in
these
circumstances.
225.1
(1)
Where
a
taxpayer
is
liable
for
the
payment
of
an
amount
assessed
under
this
Act
(in
this
subsection
referred
to
as
the
“unpaid
amount"),
other
than
an
amount
payable
under
Part
VIII
or
subsection
227(9),
the
Minister
shall
not,
for
the
purpose
of
collecting
the
unpaid
amount,
(a)
commence
legal
proceedings
in
a
court,
(b)
certify
the
unpaid
amount
under
subsection
223(1),
(c)
require
a
person
to
make
a
payment
under
subsection
224(1.1),
(d)
require
an
institution
or
person
to
make
a
payment
under
subsection
224(1.1),
(e)
require
the
retention
of
the
unpaid
amount
by
way
of
deduction
or
set-off
under
section
224.1,
(f)
require
a
person
to
turn
over
moneys
under
subsection
224.3(1),
or
(g)
give
a
notice,
issue
a
certificate
or
make
a
direction
under
subsection
225(1)
before
the
day
that
is
90
days
after
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
of
assessment.
(2)
Where
a
taxpayer
has
served
a
notice
of
objection
under
this
Act
to
an
assessment
of
an
amount
payable
under
this
Act,
other
than
an
amount
payable
under
Part
VII
or
subsection
227(9),
the
Minister
shall
not,
for
the
purpose
of
collecting
the
amount
in
controversy,
taken
any
of
the
actions
described
in
paragraphs
(1)(a)
to
(g)
before
the
day
that
is
90
days
after
the
day
on
which
notice
is
mailed
to
the
taxpayer
that
the
Minister
has
confirmed
or
varied
the
assessment.
(3)
Where
a
taxpayer
has
appealed
from
an
assessment
of
an
amount
payable
under
this
Act,
other
than
an
amount
payable
under
Part
VIII
or
subsection
227(9),
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
or
to
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division
(otherwise
than
pursuant
to
subsection
172(1)),
the
Minister
shall
not,
for
the
purpose
of
collecting
the
amount
in
controversy,
take
any
of
the
actions
described
in
paragraphs
(1)(a)
to
(g).
(a)
where
the
appeal
is
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
before
the
day
of
mailing
of
a
copy
of
the
decision
of
the
Court
to
the
taxpayer;
and
(b)
where
the
appeal
is
to
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division,
before
the
day
on
which
the
judgment
of
the
Court
is
pronounced
or
the
day
on
which
the
taxpayer
discontinues
the
appeal,
whichever
is
the
earlier.
Section
225.2
provides,
however,
that
in
certain
circumstances
collection
can
be
proceeded
with
immediately:
(1)
Notwithstanding
section
225.1
where
it
may
reasonably
be
considered
that
collection
of
an
amount
assessed
in
respect
of
a
taxpayer
would
be
jeopardized
by
a
delay
in
the
collection
thereof,
and
the
Minister
has,
by
notice
served
personally
or
by
registered
letter
addressed
to
the
taxpayer
at
his
latest
known
address,
so
advised
the
taxpayer
and
directed
the
taxpayer
to
pay
forthwith
the
amount
assessed
or
any
part
thereof,
the
Minister
may
forthwith
take
any
of
the
actions
described
in
paragraphs
225.1(1)(a)
to
(g)
with
respect
to
that
amount
or
that
part
thereof.
(2)
Where
the
Minister
has
under
subsection
(1)
directed
a
taxpayer
to
pay
an
amount
forthwith,
the
taxpayer
may
(a)
upon
3
days
notice
of
motion
to
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada,
apply
to
a
judge
of
a
superior
court
having
jurisdiction
in
the
province
in
which
the
taxpayer
resides
or
to
a
judge
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
for
an
order
fixing
a
day
(not
earlier
than
14
days
nor
later
than
28
days
after
the
date
of
the
order)
and
place
for
the
determination
of
the
question
whether
the
direction
was
justified
in
the
circumstances;
(b)
serve
a
copy
of
the
order
on
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
within
6
days
after
the
day
on
which
it
was
made;
and
(c)
if
he
has
proceeded
as
authorized
by
paragraph
(b),
apply
at
the
appointed
time
and
place
for
an
order
determining
the
question.
Subsections
225.2(1)
and
(2)
were
added
to
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
Stats.
Can.
1985,
c.
45,
s.
116(1)
and
became
effective
on
October
29,
1985.
The
facts
to
which
this
application
relates
are
not
in
dispute.
On
July
16,
1984,
the
Minister
reassessed
the
plaintiff
with
respect
to
the
taxes
payable
by
him
for
the
1979
taxation
year.
The
plaintiff
taxpayer
filed
a
notice
of
objection
on
September
28,
1984.
On
February
4,
1987
the
Minister
reassessed
and
sent
another
notice
of
reassessment
to
the
plaintiff.
The
plaintiff
contested
that
reassessment
by
filing
an
appeal
with
the
Tax
Court
on
May
4,
1987.
The
Minister
proposes
to
proceed
with
the
collection
of
the
taxes
alleged
owing
by
the
plaintiff
taxpayer.
The
plaintiff
has
brought
a
motion
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2)
for
a
determination
as
to
whether
or
not
the
Minister
may
proceed
with
the
collection
of
the
taxes
alleged
to
be
due
and
owing.
It
should
be
noted
that
there
has
been
no
jeopardy
determination
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(1)
and
indeed
the
Minister
does
not
suggest
that
this
would
be
an
appropriate
case
for
such
a
determination
to
be
made.
The
Minister
does
not
question
the
ability
of
the
taxpayer
to
pay
the
taxes
alleged
owing.
The
Minister
is
proceeding
on
the
basis
that
it
is
his
statutory
duty
to
collect
the
taxes
alleged
owing
because
the
taxpayer's
situation
is
governed
by
the
pre-1985
legislation
and
not
by
the
provisions
contained
in
sections
225.1
and
225.2.
The
Minister
argues
that
the
plaintiff
cannot
proceed
on
the
motion
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2)
for
two
reasons:
(1)
there
has
been
no
jeopardy
determination
made
by
the
Minister
pursuant
to
paragraph
225.2(1);
(2)
the
transitional
provisions
relating
to
section
225.1,
which
require
the
Minister
not
to
proceed
with
the
collection
of
taxes
alleged
owing,
when
the
taxpayer
actively
disputes
the
Minister's
claim,
make
that
section
applicable
only
with
respect
to
taxes
which
are
in
dispute
as
a
result
of
notice
of
objection
filed
after
1984.
The
defendant's
first
position
is
clearly
correct.
Subsection
(2)
of
section
225.2
states
that
its
provisions
are
applicable
"Where
the
Minister
has
under
subsection
(1)
directed
a
taxpayer
to
pay
an
amount
forthwith
.
.
.”.
That
is,
subsection
225.2(2)
only
applies
where
the
Minister
proceeds
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(1).
The
Minister
has
not
done
so
in
this
case.
He
is
proceeding
on
the
basis
of
the
pre-1985
statutory
requirements.
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
argues
that
it
is
inconsistent
to
provide
for
a
summary
procedural
route
for
the
determination
of
whether
or
not
collection
proceedings
may
be
proceeded
with,
when
a
Minister
has
first
made
a
jeopardy
determination
but
to
provide
no
such
summary
procedure
in
circumstances
in
which
the
Minister
simply
marches
in
and
seizes
a
taxpayer's
assets
without
a
jeopardy
determination
having
first
been
made.
I
should
note
that
the
Minister
in
this
case,
while
he
has
issued
a
collection
notice,
has
not
taken
action
to
enforce
the
collection.
Indeed,
he
has
indicated
to
the
taxpayer
on
several
occasions
that
he
would
consider
his
statutory
duty
to
have
been
complied
with
if
the
taxpayer
would
put
up
security
for
the
amount
alleged
to
be
owing.
The
Minister's
position,
that
collection
must
be
proceeded
with,
is
based
on
his
interpretation
of
the
applicable
coming
into
force
provisions
of
the
1985
legislation.
While
I
do
not
think
the
plaintiff
can
in
this
case
bring
a
motion
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2),
he
is
not
without
procedural
remedy.
The
validity
of
the
Minister's
proposed
collection
can
be
challenged
by
way
of
a
motion
for
an
interlocutory
injunction,
supported
by
a
statement
of
claim,
alleging
that
the
Minister
is
exceeding
his
statutory
authority
(or
perhaps
pursuant
to
rule
474)
for
the
determination
of
a
question
of
law
if
the
Minister
is
not
pressing
for
immediate
seizure
of
the
plaintiff's
assets).
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
asked
that
if
I
should
find
that
a
motion
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
not
the
appropriate
procedure,
grant
leave
to
allow
the
pleadings
to
be
appropriately
amended.
Such
leave
will
be
granted.
Having
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
motion,
pursuant
to
subsection
225.2(2)
is
not
the
proper
procedure
in
this
case,
I
do
not
think
it
is
appropriate
for
me
to
make
any
comments
on
the
defendant's
second
argument
concerning
the
appropriate
interpretation
of
the
coming
into
force
provisions
respecting
section
225.1
and
225.2,
in
the
1985
legislation.
An
order
shall
issue
in
accordance
with
these
reasons.
Order
accordingly.
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