Joyal,
J.:—This
is
a
trial
pursuant
to
Rule
475
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
on
a
case
stated
by
the
parties
with
respect
to
the
imposition
of
an
excise
tax
on
certain
transactions
involving
cost-sharing
programs
undertaken
between
the
Federal
Government
and
the
Government
of
Manitoba.
The
material
facts
on
which
the
parties
have
agreed
to
state
their
case
are
briefly
but
clearly
set
out
in
paragraphs
1
to
5
of
the
stated
case
as
follows:
1.
Under
The
Agricultural
and
Rural
Development
Act
(A.R.D.A.)
R.S.C.
Chap.
A-4,
a
Federal
Provincial
Cost-Sharing
Agreement
(referred
to
as
the
Special
Arda
Program)
was
devised
to
promote
economic
development
in
Northern
Manitoba,
and
specifically
to
aid
native
persons
in
the
harvesting
of
natural
resources,
including
fishing
and
trapping.
Pursuant
to
the
Program
grants
were
allotted
to
individuals.
Grants
allotted
were
not
paid
directly
to
the
designated
recipients
but
instead
were
applied
towards
the
purchase
price
of
equipment
required
by
the
individual
in
the
plying
of
his
trade.
2.
During
the
period
commencing
the
1st
day
of
July,
1974
to
and
inclusive
of
the
31st
day
of
July,
1978,
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
in
Right
of
the
Province
of
Manitoba
purchased
certain
sleds
and
canoes
from
Lake
Winnipeg
Boat
Works
Ltd.
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
in
Right
of
the
Provnce
of
Manitoba
under
the
Special
A.R.D.A.
Program
through
the
Department
of
Northern
Affairs
then
provided
the
said
goods
to
Manitoba
fishermen
who
were
not
at
any
time
for
the
purpose
hereunder
either
an
agent
or
servant
of
Her
Majesty.
3.
The
Federal
Government
has
assessed
Federal
Sales
Tax
under
Section
27
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
R.S.C.
1970
Chap,
c-10
(sic*)
against
Lake
Winnipeg
Boat
Works
on
the
above
noted
goods.
The
goods
sold
to
the
Province
are
taxable
under
Section
27
of
the
said
Act
subject
to
any
exemption
under
the
Act.
4.
The
goods
have
been
assessed
in
the
sum
of
$2,358.11
exclusive
of
penalty,
the
Province
of
Manitoba
not
having
paid
the
tax
at
the
time
of
purchase.
Penalty
has
been
added
to
the
aforesaid
sum
pursuant
to
the
Excise
Tax
Act
on
a
monthly
basis
and
therefore
the
amount
now
claimed
by
the
Federal
Government
as
owing
stands
at
$6,091.05.
5.
The
Federal
Government
is
not
proceeding
on
its
claim
for
tax
against
Lake
Winnipeg
Boat
Works
by
virtue
of
an
agreement
reached
between
the
Federal
Government
and
the
Provincial
Government
whereby
the
claim
is
only
being
advanced
as
against
the
Government
of
Manitoba.
The
facts
make
it
clear
that
what
is
involved
in
the
A.R.D.A.
program
is
an
economic
development
scheme
to
assist
native
persons
in
the
carrying
out
of
their
traditional
occupations
including
fishing
and
trapping.
Under
the
program,
certain
amounts
of
money
which
might
have
otherwise
been
paid
to
recipients
to
enable
them
to
buy
needed
equipment
were
used
instead
to
buy
the
sleds
and
canoes
from
Lake
Winnipeg
Boat
Works
Ltd.
This
equipment
was
then
turned
over
to
the
recipients
free
and
clear.
On
the
sale
of
this
equipment
by
the
manufacturer
to
the
Government
of
Manitoba,
federal
sales
tax
under
section
27
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1970,
c.
E-13,
was
assessed.
The
question
before
the
Court
is
whether
the
Government
of
Manitoba
could
qualify
for
a
refund
under
the
provisions
of
subsection
44(2).
The
charging
provision
in
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
as
contained
in
section
27,
is
too
lengthy
to
be
recited
here
in
full.
In
essence,
the
section
imposes
a
tax
of
nine
per
cent
(now
ten
per
cent)
on
the
sale
price
of
all
goods
produced
or
manufactured
in
Canada
or
imported
into
Canada.
In
this
light,
the
sale
of
boats
and
sleds
by
the
Lake
Winnipeg
Boat
Works
to
the
Government
of
Manitoba
attracts
the
application
of
section
27
and
a
sales
tax
is
payable.
Under
subsection
44(2)
of
the
Act,
however,
a
refund
may
be
granted
under
certain
conditions
when
the
sale
of
goods
is
to
a
provincial
government.
When
the
conditions
outlined
in
that
section
are
met,
a
refund
of
taxes
may
be
granted
to
the
province
or
to
whoever
has
paid
or
absorbed
the
tax.
Subsection
44(2)
of
the
statute
appears
to
be
the
relevant
provision
before
me.
It
states:
44,
(2)
Where
goods
have
been
purchased
by
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
any
province
of
Canada
for
any
purpose
other
than
(a)
resale;
(b)
use
by
any
board,
commission,
railway,
public
utility,
university,
manufactory,
company
or
agency
owned,
controlled
or
operated
by
the
government
of
the
province
or
under
the
authority
of
the
legislature
or
the
lieutenant
governor
in
council;
or
(c)
use
by
Her
Majesty
or
by
Her
agents
or
servants
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods
or
use
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes;
a
refund
of
taxes
paid
under
Part
III,
IV
or
V
may
be
granted
to
Her
Majesty
or
to
the
manufacturer,
producer,
wholesaler,
jobber
or
other
dealer
as
the
case
may
require.
For
the
Government
of
Manitoba
to
succeed
on
the
facts
before
me,
it
is
then
necessary
for
the
following
conditions
to
be
met,
namely:
1.
that
the
goods
in
question
were
purchased
by
the
Government
of
Manitoba
(44(2)).
This
condition
is
not
in
dispute.
It
is
admitted
in
paragraph
2
of
the
stated
case;
2.
that
the
goods
were
not
purchased
for
resale
(44(2)(a)).
It
is
admitted
by
the
parties
that
the
goods
were
not
sold
to
fishermen
and
trappers
but
were
given
to
them
without
charge.
3.
that
the
goods
were
not
purchased
for
use
by
any
board,
commission,
railway,
public
utility,
university,
manufactory,
company
or
agency
owned,
controlled
or
operated
by
the
government
of
the
province
or
under
the
authority
of
the
legislature
or
the
lieutenant
governor
in
council
(44(2)(b)
).
Such,
by
common
agreement,
is
not
the
situation
here.
4.
that
the
goods
were
not
purchased
for
use
by
Her
Majesty
or
Her
agents
or
servants
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods
or
use
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes
(44(2)(c)
).
It
is
in
respect
of
the
interpretation
of
paragraph
44(2)(c)
of
the
statute
that
there
is
an
issue
between
the
parties.
A
preliminary
observation
which
might
be
made
here
is
that
subsection
44(2)
speaks
of
resale
and
use.
In
the
case
of
goods
purchased
for
resale,
the
refund
provisions
do
not
apply.
In
the
case
of
use,
however,
no
monetary
consideration
need
be
present.
I
conclude,
therefore,
that
the
free
grant
of
the
goods
by
the
Government
to
its
constituents
in
Northern
Manitoba
does
not
per
se
bring
the
transaction
within
the
allowable
exemption.
The
test
remains:
is
the
use
of
the
canoes
and
sleds
by
their
owners
the
kind
of
use
expressed
in
paragraph
44(2)(c)
of
the
statute?
Obviously
Parliament
did
not
contemplate
a
program
in
the
nature
of
the
one
before
me
where,
instead
of
providing
a
segment
of
its
population
with
funds
to
buy
equipment,
the
Government
of
Manitoba
provides
it
with
the
equipment
itself.
In
the
event,
absent
special
statutory
provisions
exempting
people
of
native
ancestry
from
the
imposition
of
sales
taxes,
such
taxes
would
have
been
payable
had
these
people
purchased
the
goods
themselves.
If
on
the
evidence,
therefore,
the
said
goods
are
used
by
their
recipients
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes,
they
are
in
the
nature
of
goods
which:
(1)
are
purchased
by
the
Government;
(2)
are
not
resold;
(3)
are
not
used
by
Crown
agencies,
etc.;
(4)
are
not
used
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods;
(5)
are
nevertheless
used
for
mercantile
or
commercial
purposes.
The
question
before
me
is
therefore
narrowed
down
to
an
analysis
of
the
intent
and
meaning
of
paragraph
44(2)(c)
of
the
statute.
This
paragraph
contains
two
provisions,
the
first
one
relating
to
“use
by
Her
Majesty
or
by
Her
agents
or
servants
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods
.
.
.”.
This
is
not
the
provision
with
which
we
are
concerned.
Even
if
it
might
be
argued
that
a
canoe
is
used
in
the
production
of
fish
or
a
sled
is
used
in
the
production
of
animal
skins,
the
goods
are
not
used
by
Her
Majesty
or
by
Her
agents
or
servants
and
therefore
do
not
fall
within
that
term.
We
are
thus
left
with
the
consideration
of
the
remaining
part
of
paragraph
44(2)(c)
namely
“.
.
.
or
use
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes”.
An
analysis
of
the
words
and
expressions
used
here
provides
us
with
alternative
interpretations:
1.
The
expression
“use
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes”
is
read
in
a
disjunctive
sense,
without
reference
to
the
provisions
of
the
text
preceding
it.
In
this
light,
any
use
of
the
goods
by
anyone
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes
would
fit
within
the
paragraph
and
the
goods
would
not
be
subject
to
the
refund
provision.
If
it
were
assumed
that
the
goods
are
used
by
their
recipients
for
purposes
of
commercial
fishing
or
commercial
trapping,
such
would
be
in
the
nature
of
a
commercial
use
and
no
refund
of
the
taxes
paid
would
be
available.
2.
The
alternative
interpretation
would
establish
a
conjunction
between
use
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
and
production
of
goods
and
use
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes.
This
conjunctive
interpretation
would
result
in
a
finding
that
whether
for
manufacturing
or
production
purposes
or
whether
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes,
the
use
must
be
by
Her
Majesty
or
Her
servants
or
agents.
Any
use
by
other
than
the
persons
so
specified
would
not
fall
within
the
ambit
of
the
paragraph.
I
will
readily
admit
that
the
choice
between
these
two
alternatives
is
not
without
difficulty
and
neither
can
be
preferred
without
some
challenge
to
its
validity.
Nevertheless,
I
find
myself
adopting
a
conjunctive
interpretation
and
I
will
state
my
reasons
therefor.
1.
Textual
approach
to
the
wording
of
the
paragraph:
(a)
The
paragraph
specifies
in
its
opening
words
“use
by
Her
Majesty
or
by
Her
agents
or
servants”.
The
rest
of
the
words
in
the
paragraph
form
one
sentence
without
any
qualifying
word
coming
in
between
to
invite
a
separation
between
the
specified
persons
in
the
opening
words
and
the
two-pronged
use
in
the
remainder
of
the
paragraph.
(b)
The
construction
of
the
paragraph
invites
the
two
types
of
uses
mentioned
therein
to
be
read
together.
If
so
read,
the
uses
mentioned
must
be
restricted
to
such
uses
by
Her
Majesty
or
Her
agents
or
servants.
(c)
There
is,
in
my
view,
a
conceptual
relationship
between
“manufacture
or
production”
on
the
one
hand
and
“‘commercial
or
mercantile”
purposes
on
the
other.
Indeed,
there
is
most
often
implied
in
the
processes
of
manufacturing
or
producing
goods
a
commercial
or
mercantile
element.
The
presence
of
the
word
“other”
in
the
expression
“for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes”
(my
emphasis)
suggests
to
me
that
the
manufacture
and
production
of
goods
have
commercial
connotations
but
the
paragraph
intends
to
cover
commercial
or
mercantile
uses
which
are
not
necessarily
related
to
or
covered
by
manufacturing
or
production
operations.
Were
it
otherwise,
the
word
“other”
would
have
been
redundant.
(d)
I
would
submit
that
a
disjunctive
approach
would
lead
to
an
anomaly
whereby
a
particular
statutory
provision
directed
particularly
to
use
by
Her
Majesty
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
and
production
of
goods
would,
when
applied
to
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes,
be
directed
generally
to
everyone.
A
more
proper
construction
would
indicate
that
for
use
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes
as
well
as
for
use
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods,
the
paragraph
refers
exclusively
to
Her
Majesty
or
to
Her
agents
or
servants.
2.
The
Structure
of
the
Statute
I
have
already
admitted
that
the
choice
between
the
alternative
interpretations
of
paragraph
44(2)(c)
is
a
difficult
one
to
make.
This
is
all
the
more
so
when
the
enquiry
is
limited
to
the
narrow
context
of
the
paragraph
itself.
It
will
be
found
helpful,
therefore,
to
take
a
view
of
the
statute
generally
and
see
if
the
interpretation
to
which
I
subscribe
is
consonant
with
the
substance
of
the
Act
as
a
whole
or
of
the
ideas
expressed
in
it.
(a)
The
statute
is
a
taxing
statute
and
the
tax
imposed
applies
to
all
goods
produced
and
sold
in
Canada
or
imported
into
Canada.
Subsection
43(b)
provides
that
with
respect
to
goods
imported
into
Canada
by
any
provincial
government,
the
tax
is
applicable
when
such
goods
are
for
purposes
of:
(i)
resale,
(ii)
use
by
any
board,
commission,
railway,
public
utility,
university,
manufactory,
company
or
agency
owned,
controlled
or
operated
by
the
government
of
the
province
or
under
the
authority
of
the
legislature
or
the
lieutenant
governor
in
council,
or
(iii)
use
by
Her
Majesty
or
by
Her
agents
or
servants
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
goods
or
use
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes.
(b)
It
is
noted
that
the
wording
in
the
three
paragraphs
of
subsection
43(b)
corresponds
exactly
to
the
wording
found
in
the
three
paragraphs
of
subsection
44(2).
Contrary
to
section
44,
however,
section
43
is
drafted
in
positive
language.
Therefore,
instead
of
deciphering
what
section
44
excludes,
we
are
faced
with
the
concurrent
and
perhaps
easier
task
of
determining
what
section
43
includes.
In
that
respect,
it
must
necessarily
have
been
the
intention
of
Parliament
to
impose
the
tax
on
provincial
government
purchases
whenever
the
goods
are
used
by
a
provincial
government
in
connection
with
the
manufacture
or
production
of
other
goods
or
used
by
such
government
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes.
It
could
not
have
been
Parliament’s
intention
to
bring
into
this
section
a
charging
provision
on
goods
used
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes
by
anyone.
Section
27
already
provides
for
a
tax
payable
on
all
such
goods
purchased.
(c)
Similarly,
the
legislative
intent
could
not
have
been
to
permit
a
provincial
government
to
traffic
in
goods
by
reselling
them
or
using
them
for
manufacturing
or
production
or
for
other
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes.
Section
43
is
clear
that
in
such
circumstances,
the
tax
is
payable
on
government
purchases
and
that
tax
is
not
refundable.
(4)
Finally,
if
section
43
can
be
construed
as
a
charging
provision,
perhaps
a
stricter
interpretation
of
its
meaning
may
be
applied.
I
am
not
suggesting
here
that
taxing
statutes
in
particular
invite
different
interpretation
techniques
than
those
applicable
to
other
legislative
enactments.
E
A
Driedger
in
Construction
of
Statutes,
(2nd
ed.
Toronto:
Butterworths,
1983)
at
page
204
makes
the
point
that
taxation
statutes
are
not
in
a
special
position
and
that
whatever
comment
might
have
been
made
from
time
to
time
by
the
courts
with
respect
to
such
statutes
apply
to
any
statute.
Lord
Russell
stated
as
much
in
A.-G.
v.
Carlton
Bank,
[1899]
2
Q.B.
158
at
164
when
he
said:
.
.
.
I
know
of
no
authority
for
saying
that
a
taxing
Act
is
to
be
construed
differently
from
any
other
Act.
The
duty
of
the
court
is
.
.
.
to
give
effect
to
the
intention
of
the
Legislature
as
that
intention
is
to
be
gathered
from
the
language
employed
having
regard
to
the
context
in
connection
with
which
it
is
employed.
I
am
nevertheless
able
to
rely
on
the
principles
enunciated
in
many
decisions
involving
taxing
statutes
that
unless
the
burden
of
tax
can
be
supported
four-square
on
the
wording
of
the
statute,
the
tax
cannot
be
imposed,
e.g.
Partington
v.
A.-G.
(1869),
L.R.
4
H.L.
100
at
122
reviewed
in
The
King
v.
Crabbs,
[1934]
S.C.R.
523.
An
adoption
of
this
view
leads
one
to
conclude
that
as
section
43
as
a
whole
imposes
a
tax
on
goods
imported
by
the
Crown
and,
specifically
in
paragraph
(iii)
thereof,
when
such
goods
are
for
purposes
or
uses
by
the
Crown,
it
should
not
be
interpreted
so
as
to
impose
the
tax
when
such
use
is
by
other
than
Her
Majesty,
Her
servants
and
agents.
3.
The
French
Version
of
the
Statute
By
virtue
of
subsection
8(1)
of
the
Official
Languages
Act,
R.S.C.
1970,
Chap.
0-2,
the
French
text
of
the
statute
is
as
authentic
and
authoritative
as
the
English
text.
In
this
instance,
unfortunately,
the
French
version
of
both
subparagraph
43(b)(iii)
and
paragraph
44(2)(c)
is
not
helpful.
There
is,
at
least
at
first
blush,
an
inconsistency
between
the
two
versions.
The
French
version
of
these
two
paragraphs
reads
as
follows:
43.
Les
taxes
imposées
par
les
Parties
III,
IV
et
V
s’appliquent
b)
aux
marchandises
importées
par
Sa
Majesté
du
chef
d’une
province
du
Canada,
pour
l’une
des
fins
suivantes:
(iii)
l’utilisation
par
Sa
Majesté
ou
par
ses
mandataires
ou
préposés
relativement
à
la
fabrication
ou
production
de
marchandises,
ou
pour
d’autres
fins
commerciales
ou
mercantiles.
and:
44.
(2)
Lorsque
des
marchandises
ont
été
achetées
par
Sa
Majesté
du
chef
de
quelque
province
du
Canada
pour
toute
fin
autre
que
c)
l’utilisation
par
Sa
Majesté
ou
par
ses
mandataires
ou
préposés
relativement
à
la
fabrication
ou
production
de
marchandises,
ou
pour
d’autres
fins
commerciales
ou
mercantiles;
un
remboursement
de
taxes
payées
en
vertu
de
la
Partie
III,
IV
ou
V
peut
être
accordé
à
Sa
Majesté
ou
au
fabricant,
producteur,
marchand
en
gros,
intermédiaire
ou
autre
commerçant,
selon
le
cas.
It
will
be
noted
that
a
comma
appears
after
the
word
"marchandises”
and
preceding
"ou
pour
d’autres
fins
commerciales
ou
mercantiles”
in
paragraph
(c).
According
to
general
rules
of
grammar
and
syntax,
such
a
comma
would
have
the
effect
of
separating
the
two
uses
mentioned
in
the
statute,
making
of
each
of
them
a
separate
category
unrelated
the
one
from
the
other.
In
effect,
this
comma
opens
the
door
to
a
disjunctive
interpretation
of
the
paragraph
so
that
‘‘use
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes”
would
apply
whether
such
use
were
by
Her
Majesty
and
Her
agents
or
servants
or
by
anyone
else.
This
in
turn
would
provoke
an
inquiry
as
to
whether
the
use
of
the
specific
goods,
namely
canoes
and
sleds
by
fishermen
and
trappers
constituted
a
commercial
or
mercantile
use.
Although
a
good
argument
may
be
made
that
the
French
text
has
a
disjunctive
character,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
it
should
not
be
followed.
The
comma
appears
to
me
to
be
merely
a
desire
in
the
French
text
to
be
faithful
to
the
English
text,
a
text
which,
as
is
obvious,
is
not
representative
of
clear
and
lucid
draftmanship.
In
spite
of
this
comma,
it
is
my
view
that
a
conjunctive
interpretation
should
prevail.
As
a
conclusion,
the
use
of
goods
for
commercial
or
mercantile
purposes
in-
paragraph
44(2)(c)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
is
limited
to
such
use
by
Her
Majesty
or
Her
servants
or
agents.
4.
Prologue
Since
the
trial
of
this
action,
counsel
for
the
parties
have
agreed
upon
and
have
provided
me
with
additional
facts
relating
to
the
purposes
of
the
A.R.D.A.
program
in
the
scheme
to
provide
Northern
Manitoba
natives
with
canoes
and
sleds.
Textually,
the
agreed
facts
are
as
follows:
The
purpose
of
the
Program
was
to
provide
people
of
native
ancestry
who
were
not
either
agents
or
servants
of
the
Province
and
who
earned
less
than
$2,000.00
per
year,
with
trapping
and
fishing
equipment
to
be
used
for
the
harvesting
of
renewable
resources
for
commercial
purposes.
On
occasion
the
equipment
may
be
utilized
by
the
owners
for
other
non-commercial
purposes
such
as
emergency
transportation.
In
view
of
the
disposition
I
have
taken
of
the
interpretation
of
paragraph
44(2)(c)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
it
is
necessary
to
decide
this
subsidiary
issue.
In
any
event,
as
I
have
noted
before,
such
goods,
had
they
been
purchased
by
the
users
themselves,
would
have
been
subject
to
a
sales
tax
no
matter
what
use
to
which
they
might
have
been
put.
I
should
nevertheless
remark
that
in
the
matter
of
any
statute,
a
Court
must
be
wary
of
interpreting
it
in
a
manner
which
effectively
frustrates
its
object
and
purpose
or
the
legislator’s
intent.
By
the
scheme
instituted
with
respect
to
the
A.R.D.A.
program,
the
sales
tax
on
the
goods
becomes
refundable.
Conceivably,
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
the
Province
of
Manitoba
could
multiply
such
schemes
and
embark
upon
any
number
of
similar
programs
to
provide
tax-refundable
goods
to
any
number
of
selected
recipients.
I
am
far
from
suggesting
that
such
was
Her
Majesty's
motive
in
implementing
the
A.R.D.A.
program,
nevertheless
the
statutory
provision
is
there
for
the
taking.
It
must
be
remembered,
however,
that
qualifying
for
a
refund
under
paragraph
44(2)(c)
is
one
thing.
Obtaining
the
refund
is
another.
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
Canada
has
a
discretion
in
deciding
whether
or
not
in
a
particular
case
or
group
of
cases
a
refund
may
be
granted.
Indeed,
all
refund
provisions
in
the
Excise
Tax
Act
are
at
the
federal
government's
discretion,
including
tax
refunds
on
such
goods
as
are
used
for
sewerage
or
draining
systems
(subsection
44(3));
by
institutions
for
the
care
of
the
young,
the
elderly
and
the
handicapped
(section
45);
for
the
construction
of
educational
institutions,
public
libraries
and
provincially-owned
student
residences
(section
46)
and
other
public
or
non-profit
uses
as
well.
The
federal
Crown's
discretion
in
these
cases
has
been
affirmed
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
The
Queen
v.
Stevenson
Construction
Co.
Ltd.,
et
al.
(F.C.A.),
[1979]
C.T.C.
86;
79
D.T.C.
5044.
Federal
control
is
always
paramount.
In
the
circumstances,
the
consequences
of
the
interpretation
I
give
the
section
of
the
statute
before
me
should
not
be
any
cause
of
concern.
There
shall
therefore
be
judgment
dismissing
the
plaintiff’s
action
and
a
declaration
that
the
sales
taxes
paid
on
the
goods
in
question
qualify
for
an
application
for
a
refund
under
subsection
44(2)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act.
The
defendant
is
entitled
to
costs.
Plaintiffs
action
dismissed.
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