Heald,
J
(per
curiam):—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
Crown
from
a
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
in
which
the
learned
trial
judge
allowed
the
respondents’
appeal
from
the
reassessment
for
income
tax
for
the
1973
taxation
year
in
the
estate
of
Umberto
Mastronardi,
deceased.
The
respondents
are
the
executors
and
trustees
of
that
estate.
At
the
time
of
his
death,
the
deceased
was
the
owner
of
the
majority
common
shares
of
Mastronardi
Products
Ltd
(an
Ontario
corporation),
and
by
virtue
of
subsection
70(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148
(as
amended
by
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
section
1
and
by
SC
1973-74,
c
14,
subsection
19(1)),
he
was
deemed
to
have
disposed
of
those
shares
immediately
prior
to
his
death
and
to
have
received
as
proceeds
of
disposition
an
amount
equal
to
their
fair
market
value.*
At
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
deceased,
Mastronardi
Products
Ltd
was
the
owner
of
a
term
life
insurance
policy
which
provided
for
the
payment
to
the
company
of
the
sum
of
$500,000
on
the
death
of
the
deceased.
This
policy
was
dated
September
25,
1972
and
was
for
a
term
of
five
years,
with
the
face
amount
reducing
by
$100,000
on
each
anniversary
date.
The
policy
was
non-convertible
and
non-participating.
The
policy
had
no
cash
surrender
or
other
value
prior
to
death.
The
deceased
was
required
by
the
insurance
company
to
have
two
independent
physical
examinations
which
he
had
on
August
28,
1972.
The
deceased
died
suddenly
and
without
warning
of
cardiac
arrest
on
February
20,
1973
at
the
age
of
51
years.
Neither
the
deceased
nor
his
immediate
family
were
aware
prior
to
his
death
that
he
was
a
likely
or
suspected
candidate
for
the
heart
attack
brought
on
by
arteriosclerotic
cardiovascular
disease
and
from
which
he
died.
The
parties
agree
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
shares
of
Mastronardi
Products
Ltd
would
be
$323.58
per
share,
if
no
account
was
taken
of
the
insurance
policy,
which
is
the
value
used
by
the
respondents
in
calculating
the
taxable
capital
gain
arising
on
the
deemed
disposition
of
the
shares
of
Mastronardi
Products
Ltd.
The
parties
also
agree
that,
if
the
shares
were
to
be
valued
on
the
basis
of
taking
into
account
the
policy
at
the
instant
of
death,
the
value
would
be
$778.59
per
share
which
is
the
figure
used
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
calculating
the
deceased’s
income
for
his
1973
taxation
year.
In
my
view,
the
learned
trial
judge
correctly
stated
the
problem
facing
him
in
interpreting
subsection
70(5)
(supra)
when
he
said
[p
575]:
.
.
.
it
is
apparent
that
there
is
a
two
step
fiction
enacted
by
section
70,
subsection
(5)
of
the
Act.
The
first
fiction
is
that
the
taxpayer
after
he
dies
is
deemed
to
have
disposed
of
the
subject
property
“immediately
before
his
death”.
The
second
fiction
is
that
he
is
deemed
‘to
have
received
proceeds
of
disposition
therefor
equal
to
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
at
that
time”.
The
problem
is
to
determine
what
was
the
legislative
concept
of
section
70,
subsection
(5)
of
the
Act
and
apply
such
to
the
facts
of
this
case.
After
summarizing
the
submissions
of
the
parties,
the
trial
judge
then
reached
the
following
conclusions
[p
576]:
The
words
“immediately
before
his
death”
in
section
70,
subsection
(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
should
not
be
construed
as
meaning
the
equivalent
of
the
instant
of
death;
and
also
those
words
do
not
import
a
necessity
of
valuing
capital
property
taking
into
account
the
imminence
of
death.
And,
in
conclusion,
he
stated
[p
576]:
In
my
view.
therefore,
in
this
case.
both
such
valuations*
must
be
considered
as
having
taken
place
at
some
other
time
rather
than
at
the
instant
of
death
of
the
deceased
and
no
premise
of
imminence
of
death
of
the
deceased
should
form
any
part
of
such
valuations.
We
have
carefully
reviewed
all
of
the
authorities
to
which
reference
was
made
by
counsel
during
the
course
of
argument
and
can
find
nothing
therein
which
has
persuaded
us
that
the
learned
trial
judge
erred
either
in
the
conclusions
which
he
reached
or
the
reasoning
which
he
followed
in
arriving
at
those
conclusions.
To
ignore
the
plain
meaning
of
a
statute
in
the
context
of
a
given
set
of
facts
and
to
Substitute
therefor
a
strained
and
unnatural
interpretation,
to
prevent
an
apprehended
injustice
in
the
future
on
an
entirely
different
set
of
facts,
as
counsel
for
the
appellant
most
eloquently
urged
us
to
do,
does
not
accord
with
the
principles
of
good
statutory
interpretation.
Speculation
as
to
the
possible
results
in
a
future
case
assists
not
at
all
in
deciding
what
the
result
should
be
in
a
case
such
as
this
which,
on
its
facts,
is
so
easily
capable
of
rational
resolution
by
simply
interpreting
the
plain
words
as
they
appear
in
the
statute
without
indulging
in
such
speculation.
Accordingly,
the
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
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