Kelly,
DJ:—The
issue
in
this
action
is
whether
the
respondent
is
liable
for
the
amounts
required
to
be
deducted,
pursuant
to
section
153
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
for
income
tax,
from
the
wages
and
salaries
of
employees
of
Venus
Electric
Limited
(Venus)
for
the
pay
period
ended
September
24,1976
(the
final
pay
period).
The
trial
judge
negatived
such
liability
whereupon
the
Crown
appealed
to
this
Court.
There
is
no
significant
disagreement
concerning
the
facts
which
I
now
set
out
despite
vastly
varying
contentions
of
the
parties
as
to
their
respective
positions
at
law.
Venus,
a
company
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Ontario,
was
engaged
in
the
business
of
assembling
and
selling
electric
appliances,
employing
some
850
persons.
It
carried
on
business
in
four
locations,
two
in
the
Province
of
New
Brunswick
and
two
in
the
Province
of
Ontario.
The
principal
banker
of
Venus
was
the
Mercantile
Bank
of
Canada
(The
Bank)
to
which
Venus
was
heavily
indebted;
as
security
for
the
indebtedness
Venus
had:
(1)
given
the
Bank
security
under
Section
88
of
the
Bank
Act;
(2)
executed
a
debenture
in
favour
of
the
Bank
by
which
it
created
(a)
a
fixed
charge
on
its
real
property
and;
(b)
a
floating
charge
on
all
its
other
assets
including
its
undertaking,
such
floating
charge
to
become
crystallized
into
a
fixed
charge
on
the
occurrence
of
any
one
of
certain
events
in
the
debenture
specified;
paragraphs
4.03
and
4.04
of
the
debenture
as
set
out
in
the
appendix
hereto
describe
the
rights
and
remedies
of
the
Bank
if
and
when
any
event
of
default
triggered
the
fixation
of
the
floating
charge.
The
Province
of
New
Brunswick
was
financially
interested
in
Venus,
having
guaranteed
its
indebtedness
for
sums
other
than
the
indebtedness
to
the
Bank.
During
the
summer
of
1976
the
financial
condition
of
Venus
was
causing
concern
and
Coopers
&
Lybrand,
a
firm
of
chartered
accountants,
was
retained
by
the
Province
to
look
into
the
situation
of
Venus.
Its
findings
were
not
reassuring
and
meetings
were
held
at
which
were
present
representatives
of
the
Bank
and
Coopers
&
Lybrand.
From
then
on
Coopers
&
Lybrand
kept
closely
in
touch
with
the
progress
of
Venus
and
at
or
shortly
before
September
24,
1976
recommended
that
a
receiver
should
be
appointed.
On
September
24,
1976
the
bank
delivered
to
the
respondent,
a
company
performing
services
as
receiver
and
an
affiliate
of
the
accounting
firm
of
Coopers
&
Lybrand,
a
letter
of
appointment
in
the
following
terms:
“September
24,
1976’’
Coopers
&
Lybrand
Limited,
145
King
Street
West,
Toronto,
Ontario.
Dear
Sirs:
Venus
Electric
Limited
We
hereby
appoint
you
as
Receiver
and
Manager
of
Venus
Electric
Limited
under
and
pursuant
to
the
$10,000,000
debenture
dated
March
26,
1976
issued
by
Venus
Electric
Limited
to
The
Mercantile
Bank
of
Canada.
We
also
appoint
you
as
our
Agent
to
collect
all
receivables
of
Venus
Electric
Limited
assigned
to
us
pursuant
to
a
general
assignment
of
debts
from
the
above
Company
registered
in
New
Brunswick
on
February
27,
1976,
and
in
Ontario
on
March
11,
1976
and
to
realize
on
our
security
held
by
us
pursuant
to
Section
88
of
The
Bank
Act
given
to
us
by
the
above
company.
THE
MERCANTILE
BANK
OF
CANADA
“James
McCall
ion”
James
McCallion
Assistant
Manager
Saint
John
Branch
In
anticipation
of
this
appointment
the
respondent
had
one
of
its
employees
at
each
of
the
four
locations
at
which
Venus
carried
on
business
and
at
1:00
am
on
Saturday
September
25,
the
respondent,
through
its
employees,
went
into
possession
of
all
the
property
and
assets
of
Venus.
On
Monday,
September
27
or
as
soon
as
each
employee
came
in
contact
with
the
respondent’s
representative
a
letter
in
the
following
terms
was
delivered
to
him
or
her.
VENUS
ELECTRIC
LIMITED
September
25,
1976
To
the
employees,
We
have
been
appointed
Receiver
and
Manager
of
Venus
Electric
Limited
and
Agent
for
the
Mercantile
Bank
of
Canada.
As
a
result,
we
are
now
responsible
for
the
administration
of
the
Company’s
affairs.
It
is
our
present
intention
to
continue
the
company’s
operations.
Our
staff
will
be
involved
in
many
aspects
of
the
business
and
we
will
appreciate
your
cooperation
and
continuing
support.
COOPERS
&
LYBRAND
LIMITED
Receiver
and
Manager
John
R
Hadfield.
During
the
week-end
four
employees
of
the
respondent,
met
physically
to
formulate
plans
and
recorded
minutes
of
their
meeting
which
read
in
part
as
follows:
Decision
No
1
A
decision
was
reached
by
those
present
at
the
meeting,
that
since
it
was
in
the
company’s
interest
to
ship
product,
and
to
do
so
requires
the
services
of
present
employees,
we
will
make
a
payment
to
each
employee
by
the
amount
of
which
they
(the
employee)
are
‘‘out
of
pocket”
with
respect
to
work
done
for
the
company
as
a
result
of
the
company’s
failure
and
the
company
could
not
pay.
Collectively,
the
persons
who
benefitted
by
the
procedure
outlined
in
resolution
No
1
will
be
referred
to
as
the
employees.
At
this
stage
it
will
be
helpful
to
outline
the
procedure
which
Venus
had
adopted
with
respect
to
paying
its
employees.
Venus
had
contracted
with
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
for
the
use
of
the
sophisticated
facilities
the
Bank
had
developed
for
handling
payrolls.
For
each
pay
period,
Venus
furnished
the
Bank
with
the
number
of
hours
worked
by
each
employee;
using,
inter
alia,
information
it
already
had
with
respect
to
the
rates
of
pay
applicable
to
and
under
what
headings
deductions
were
to
be
made
from
each
employee,
the
Bank
calculated
for
each
employee,
the
amount
earned,
the
amount
of
each
deduction
for
income
tax,
Canada
Pension
Plan,
unemployment
insurance
or
other
authorized
deductions
and
the
net
amount
payable,
prepared
a
cheque
in
favour
of
each
employee
and
prepared
a
tabulation
of
the
amounts
earned,
the
deductions
and
amounts
payable
for
each
point
of
payment.
Accompanying
his
or
her
cheque
each
employee
received
a
slip
on
which
appeared
the
appropriate
amounts
with
respect
to
the
pay
period
and
a
cumulative
total
for
the
calendar
year
of
earnings
and
deductions.
In
the
case
of
the
Atholville
and
Saint
John
payrolls,
the
local
branch
of
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
debited
the
Mercantile
Bank,
in
the
case
of
other
payrolls,
Venus
issued
its
cheques
drawn
on
the
Mercantile
Bank
payable
to
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia,
for
the
aggregate
of
the
earnings.
With
funds
which
were
apparently
provided
to
it
by
the
Bank,
the
paying
branches
of
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
honoured
the
salary
cheques
which
had
been
issued
for
the
final
pay
period.
The
payments
to
each
employee
were
equal
to
his
or
her
“take
home
pay”,
ie,
his
or
her
gross
earnings
for
the
final
pay
period,
less
authorized
deductions,
one
of
which
deductions
was
on
account
of
Income
Tax.
With
regard
to
the
Toronto
payrolls,
cheques
were
drawn
in
favour
of
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
on
the
printed
form
of
the
cheque
previously
in
use
by
Venus
on
which
appeared,
in
the
space
in
which
a
signature
usually
appears,
the
words:
Venus
Electric
Limited
COOPERS
&
LYBRAND
LIMITED
Receiver
and
Manager
John
R
Hadfield
The
debit
notes
issued
by
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
with
respect
to
the
New
Brunswick
payrolls
were
in
due
course
honoured.
Although,
in
pursuance
of
this
procedure,
the
money
did
not
pass
through
the
hands
of
the
respondent
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
payments
by
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
to
the
employees
were
clerical
acts
by
which
the
respondent
caused
the
moneys
to
be
paid
to
the
employees.
In
February
1977
the
respondent
prepared
and
filed
T-4
and
T-4
Supplementary
Income
Tax
forms
covering
the
period
January
1,
1976
to
September
24,
1976
inclusive.
As
required,
to
each
employee
to
whom
wages
were
paid
during
that
period
there
was
sent
a
copy
of
the
T-4
Supplementary
slip
relating
to
him
or
her.
The
exhibits
before
this
Court
did
not
include
the
totality
of
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
payroll
calculations
and
the
T-4
Supplementary
forms
but
selected
samples
of
them
were
filed
as
exhibit
A-10
and
exhibit
A-16
respectively.
The
names
of
seven
employees
ap-
peared
on
both
exhibits.
A
comparison
of
the
figures
appearing
in
those
exhibits
relative
to
those
seven
employees
showed
that
the
figures
for
the
aggregate
deductions
for
income
tax
from
January
1,
to
September
24,
on
each
of
the
exhibits
were
identical
and
that
the
figures
for
gross
earnings
for
the
same
period
on
each
of
the
exhibits
were
either
identical
or
substantially
the
same.
The
conclusion
I
arrive
at
from
this
similarity
is
that
the
aggregate
earnings
shown
on
the
T-4
Supplementary
included
earnings
for
the
final
pay
period
amounting
to
$231,904.48
and
that
the
amount
shown
as
the
aggregate
of
deductions
for
income
tax
included
the
deductions
for
income
tax
made
for
that
period,
viz,
the
amount
set
out
for
that
pay
period
in
the
payroll
calculations
made
by
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia,
namely
$28,499.78.
No
part
of
the
amount
which
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
had
calculated
to
be
deductible
from
the
pay
of
each
employee
for
income
tax
for
the
final
pay
period
was
ever
segregated
and
no
one
holds
any
funds
which
it
is
admittedly
payable
or
alleged
to
be
payable.
In
May
1978
the
respondent
presented
to
all
or
a
large
number
of
the
employees
who
had
received
payments
pursuant
to
the
resolutions
of
September
26
a
document
in
the
following
form,
save
as
to
the
name
of
the
addressee
and
the
dollar
amount.
May
9,
1978
J
Cusack,
19
Porterfield
Crescent,
THORNHILL,
Ontario.
L5T
4T1
Dear
J
Cusack:
VENUS
ELECTRIC
LIMITED
You
were
an
employee
of
the
above
company
on
September
24,
1976
at
which
time
we
were
appointed
Receiver
and
Manager
of
the
company.
At
that
time
the
company
owed
you
unpaid
wages.
We
arranged
financing
for
the
payment
to
you
of
the
following
amounts
in
order
that
you
would
not
be
out
of
pocket
as
a
result
of
the
receivership
of
the
company,
and
at
that
time
your
claim
against
the
company
for
the
monies
owing
to
you
was
assigned
to
us.
As
requested
by
the
respondent,
a
considerable
number
of
employees
Signed
the
form
submitted.
The
significance
of
these
signed
forms
will
be
referred
to
later
but
at
this
stage
it
should
be
remarked
that,
under
questioning
from
this
Court,
counsel
for
the
respondent
conceded
that
the
words
“at
that
time
your
claim
against
the
company
for
monies
owing
to
you
was
assigned
to
us’’
were
a
misstatement
of
the
facts
as
no
written
or
oral
assignment
had
been
made
by
or
asked
of
any
of
the
employees
who
had
received
the
payments
referred
to.
Date
|
Amount
|
$
|
|
September
24,
1976
|
508.48
|
We
are
now
engaged
in
a
dispute
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
con
|
cerning
responsibility
for
Source
Deductions
owing
by
the
company
to
the
Depart
|
ment
of
National
Revenue
and
it
would
assist
us
if
you
would
confirm
the
forego
|
ing
facts
by
signing
and
returning
one
copy
of
this
letter
to
us.
|
Thank
you
for
your
assistance.
|
|
|
Yours
very
truly,
|
|
COOPERS
&
LYBRAND
LIMITED
|
|
Receiver
and
Manager
|
|
Robert
E
Lowe,
|
|
President.
|
I
confirm
the
above
mentioned
facts.
|
|
As
previously
noted,
the
question
in
issue
is
whether
the
respondent
is
liable
for
the
aggregate
of
the
amounts
allegedly
withheld
on
account
of
income
tax.
If
the
respondent
has
any
liability
to
the
Crown
for
the
amount
it
failed
to
deduct
and
remit,
it
must
be
because
that
liability
is
imposed
on
the
respondent
by
subsection
153(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
the
relevant
portions
of
which
read
as
follows:
(1)
every
person
paying
(a)
salary
or
wages
or
other
remuneration
to
an
officer
or
an
employee
at
any
time
in
a
taxation
year
shall
deduct
and
withhold
therefrom
such
amount
as
may
be
prescribed
and
shall
at
such
time
as
may
be
prescribed
remit
that
amount
to
the
Receiver
General
of
Canada
on
account
of
the
payees
tax
for
the
year
under
this
part.
Three
requirements
must
be
met
in
order
that
liability
may
exist
under
that
section.
(1)
payments
to
employees
must
have
been
made
(2)
such
payments
must
have
been
with
respect
to
wages
or
salaries
due
to
the
employees
(3)
the
person
sought
to
be
held
liable
must
have
made
such
payments.
Each
of
these
requirements
will
be
dealt
with
in
the
order
in
which
they
are
stated:
(1)
Were
the
payees
employees?
It
is
not
denied
by
the
respondent
that
the
persons
to
whom
payments
were
made
were
employees
although
the
appellant
does
not
allege
that
the
respondent
was
at
any
time
prior
to
September
25,1976
the
employer
of
the
employees.
The
appellant
submits
that
to
meet
the
requirements
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
it
is
not
necessary
that
there
exist
between
the
recipient
of
the
payments
and
the
payor
an
employee/employer
relationship.
I
agree
with
this
submission.
Under
all
the
circumstances
the
persons
who
were
employees
of
Venus
on
September
24,
1976
were
employees
within
the
meaning
of
section
153
and
they
are
recognized
as
employees
by
the
text
of
the
resolution
adopted
on
September
26;
in
fact
the
respondent
has
not
seriously
alleged
otherwise.
(2)
Were
the
payments
to
the
employees
wages
or
salary?
The
submission
of
the
respondent
was
that
the
questioned
payments
to
the
employees
were
not
wages
but
were
gratuitous
benefactions
made
in
order
to
earn
and
preserve
the
good-will
of
the
persons
who
had
been
employees
of
Venus,
by
providing
that
the
employees
should
not
be
out
of
pocket
with
respect
to
work
done
for
that
company.
In
support
of
this
position,
reference
is
made
to
the
resolution
of
September
26,
1976
supra,
and
the
alleged
assignments
made
in
1978
by
the
employees
of
the
amounts
received.
In
this
latter
connection,
counsel
for
the
respondent
submitted
that
by
virtue
of
the
payments
the
respondent
was
ipso
facto
subrogated
to
the
employee’s
claim
for
wages.
This
latter
submission
was
not
pressed,
upon
the
Court
pointing
out
to
counsel
the
total
absence
of
any
legal
foundation
for
subrogation
under
the
circumstances.
Other
circumstances
which
I
consider
to
be
relevant
to
the
determination
of
this
issue
are
the
following:
(a)
by
virtue
of
procedures
carried
on
by
Venus’
agent
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
in
anticipation
of
the
expected
wage
distribution
on
the
24th
September
a
determination
had
been
made
with
respect
thereto
of
(1)
the
gross
amount
earned
by
each
employee;
(2)
the
appropriate
deductions
from
such
gross
earnings
for
income
tax,
Unemployment
Insurance,
Canada
Pension
Plan
and
any
other
authorized
direction;
(3)
the
net
amount
which
the
employee
was
entitled
to
receive
in
cash
or
in
such
other
form
as
was
agreeable
to
him.
The
aggregate
of
the
amounts
for
net
payments
to
employees
and
deductions
from
gross
earnings
were
respectively
$190,270.01,
$28,449.78.
The
Receiver
and
Manager
on
appointment,
being
bound
to
act
in
the
interest
of
the
debenture-holders,
not
in
the
interest
of
Venus,
decided
that
it
would
be
in
the
interest
of
the
debenture-holder
that
the
operation
of
property
in
its
possession
should
continue
and
that,
for,
this
purpose
the
good-will
and
cooperation
of
the
employees
was
essential;
to
this
end,
in
making
payments
to
the
employees,
it
elected
to
make
use
of
the
payroll
procedure
already
set
in
motion
by
Venus
and
instructed
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
to
honour
cheques
aggregating
a
sum
of
$190,270.01.
The
cheques
so
honoured
were
either
the
identical
cheques
which
the
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
prepared
prior
to
the
Receiver
and
Manager
going
into
possession
or
cheques
in
all
respects
similar
to
such
cheques;
the
evidence
is
Silent
in
this
respect.
(b)
the
respondent
did
not
draw
to
the
attention
of
the
employees
that
the
amounts
received
by
them
were
gratuitous
good-will
gestures
which
did
not
adversely
affect
their
rights
to
prove
claims
against
Venus
for
wages.
The
information
slips
which
accompanied
each
payment,
showing
the
amount
of
gross
earnings,
and
the
authorized
deductions,
set
out
a
net
amount
which
was
the
same
amount
that
would
have
been
paid
on
the
payroll
distribution
had
it
been
made
in
the
usual
course;
the
employees
were
left
with
the
impression
that
they
were
receiving
wages
for
which
they
would
have
to
account
on
their
individual
T
1
income
tax
returns.
(c)
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
no
part
of
the
amounts
purported
to
have
been
deducted
for
the
final
pay
period,
according
to
the
T4
and
T4
Supplementary
tax
returns
filed
in
February
1977,
had
ever
been
remitted,
or
could
be
identified
as
having
been
segregated,
on
the
strength
of
the
information
furnished
to
each
employee
on
the
slip
accompanying
the
payment
made
to
him
for
the
final
pay
period
and
on
the
T4
Supplementary
supplied
to
him,
it
was
reasonable
for
the
employee
to
assume
the
amount
received
with
respect
to
the
final
pay
period
was
wages
upon
which
he
or
she
would
be
taxable
and
that
he
or
she
was
deemed
to
have
received
as
wages
the
amount
purported
and
have
been
deducted
on
account
of
income
tax.
No
steps
were
taken
by
the
respondent
to
inform
the
employees
otherwise
until
the
letter
of
9th
May
1978
already
quoted.
In
light
of
the
decision
of
the
learned
trial
judge
that
the
respondent
was
not
a
person
paying
wages
it
was
not
necessary
for
him
to
decide
and
he
did
not
decide
whether
or
not
the
payments
to
the
employees
were
wages.
In
my
opinion
the
only
inference
that
can
be
drawn
from
the
undisputed
facts
is
that
the
payments
aggregating
$196,207.01
made
to
the
employees
were
wages
within
the
meaning
of
section
153.
3.
Was
the
respondent
a
person
paying
wages
or
salaries
to
employees?
The
position
taken
by
the
respondent
before
this
Court
was
that
it
was
not
personally
responsible
for
the
act
of
paying
the
wages
but
that,
being
a
receiver
and
manager
it
was
acting
on
behalf
of
others;
and
that,
under
the
debenture,
it
was
the
agent
of
Venus
and
incurred
no
personal
liability
in
result
of
its
activities
in
causing
to
be
made
the
payment
of
wages
to
employees.
In
considering
whether
the
capacity
of
receiver
and
manager,
in
which
it
was
acting,
exonerated
it
from
itself
being
subject
to
liability
under
section
153,
the
presence
of
certain
facts
must
be
recognized.
In
the
first
instance,
at
the
relevant
times
the
respondent
was
not
a
re-
ceiver/manager
appointed
by
the
Court
upon
whom
had
been
conferred
by
the
Court
extensive
powers
to
act.
At
a
later
date
in
November
such
an
appointment
was
made
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario,
a
copy
of
the
receiving
order
being
introduced
as
evidence;
perusal
of
that
order
indicates
the
breadth
of
the
powers
exercisable
by
virtue
of
that
order.
In
the
absence
of
any
appointment
by
the
Court,
the
powers
and
duties
of
one
purporting
to
act
as
a
receiver
or
a
receiver
and
manager
are
to
be
found
by
resorting
to
the
instrument
authorizing
the
appointment
of
such
a
person.*
Exhibit
“A-4”
is
a
letter
of
September
24,
1976
delivered
to
the
respondent
by
the
Bank
through
which
the
respondent
traces
its
authority.
This
letter,
the
text
of
which
has
already
been
set
out,
indicates
that
the
respondent
was
acting
in
two
capacities:
(1)
Receiver
and
manager
of
the
property
which
was
the
subject
of
the
charge
created
by
the
debenture
hereinbefore
referred
to:
(2)
Receiver
under
an
assignment
in
favour
of
the
bank
pursuant
to
section
88
of
the
Bank
Act.
No
evidence
was
adduced
to
distinguish
what
property
of
Venus
became
subject
to
the
charge
under
section
88
of
the
Bank
Act
and
what
property
of
Venus
became
subject
to
the
fixed
charge
of
the
debenture
upon
the
crystallization
of
the
floating
charge
created
by
it
or
as
to
the
priority
inter
se
of
the
two
securities
on
the
property
of
Venus.
Since
the
conduct
of
the
respondent
which
is
alleged
to
have
given
rise
to
the
liability
under
section
153
was
beyond
the
scope
of
its
office
as
receiver
and
fell
within
the
ambit
of
the
powers
of
a
manager
as
distinguished
from
receiver
simpliciter
no
further
reference
will
be
made
to
the
respondents’
Capacity
as
receiver
to
realize
the
security
under
section
88
of
the
Bank
Act.
Subsequent
comments
and
remarks
are
related
to
the
consequence
of
the
Acts
done
by
the
defendant
as
manager.t
The
significant
features
of
the
relevant
sections
of
the
debenture
are
as
follows:
the
debenture
confers
power
on
the
holder
to
enforce
its
rights
by
entry
upon
the
mortgage
property
and
by
taking
possession
of
property
charged
by
the
debenture:
the
debenture
holder
may
appoint
by
instrument
in
writing
a
receiver
(under
which
term
is
included
manager)
and
such
receiver
may
be
vested
with
any
or
all
of
the
powers
and
discretions
of
the
debenture
holder:
the
debenture
is
to
be
interpreted
according
to
the
laws
of
New
Brunswick:
the
receiver
and
manager
is
deemed
to
be
an
agent
of
Venus
and
not
of
the
bank.J
The
appointment
already
noted
(Exhibit
A-4)
is
a
bald
one
in
that
its
terms
do
not
purport
to
vest
in
the
respondent
any
of
the
power
set
out
in
paragraph
4.04
of
the
debenture.
I
therefore
consider
that
the
respondent,
before
its
appointment
by
the
Court,
enjoyed
only
the
powers
inherent
ina
receiver
and
manager
at
common-law.
One
exercising
the
office
of
receiver
and
manager
is
acting
for
the
benefit
of
the
debenture-holders.
He
is
not
appointed
to
carry
on
the
business
of
the
company
in
the
best
interest
of
the
company;
he
is
appointed
to
realize
the
security
of
the
debenture-holders.*
While
the
debenture
itself
states
that
the
receiver
and
manager
is
the
agent
of
the
debenture
debtor,
the
chief
purpose
of
this
provision
(which
is
a
contractual
one
between
Venus
and
the
bank)
is
to
confirm
the
title
that
the
receiver
and
manager
seeks
to
confer
on
any
third
party
dealing
with
it
and
to
exonerate
the
bank
from
any
responsibility
for
acts
of
the
receiver
and
manager.
The
powers
of
the
receiver
and
manager
are
really
ancillary
to
the
main
purpose
of
the
appointment
which
is
the
realization
for
the
debenture-holder
of
its
security.
The
receiver
and
manager
is
akin
to
a
mortgagee
in
possession.
The
receiver
and
manager
taking
possession
of
the
property
subject
to
the
charge
becomes
the
manager
of
that
property
of
the
debtor
but
not
the
manager
of
the
debtor
company.
Having
gone
into
possession
of
the
property
of
Venus
for
the
purpose
of
realizing
that
property
for
the
benefit
of
the
bank
and
being
of
the
opinion
it
would
be
in
the
interest
of
the
bank
to
use
that
property
in
its
unquestioned
possession
to
continue
the
manufacturing
and
merchandising
activities
for
which
the
property
was
suited,
the
respondent
was
faced
with
the
situation
where
there
was
reason
to
apprehend
that
the
unpaid
wages
of
the
employees
of
Venus
(whose
willingness
and
assistance
was
necessary
to
accomplish
the
desired
end)
would
jeopardize
the
operation
in
the
future.
Having
decided
to
circumvent
these
unwanted
consequences
of
leaving
the
employees
to
realize
their
wage
claims
as
best
they
could,
the
respondent
of
its
own
accord
and
solely
on
its
own
judgment
initiated
the
steps
which
resulted
in
making
payment
to
each
employee
of
an
amount
equal
to
the
amount
of
his
or
her
earnings
actually
due.
These
payments
would
not
have
been
made
if
it
were
not
for
the
decision
and
direction
of
the
respondent.
Even
if
it
be
assumed
that,
so
far
as
the
respondent’s
responsibilities
to
Venus
were
concerned,
the
relationship
between
the
respondent
and
Venus
was
that
of
agent
and
principal,
the
payment
to
the
employees
of
the
amount
equal
to
the
amount
indicated
to
be
due
and
payable
to
them
personally
according
to
the
payroll
calculations
for
the
final
pay
period
was
not
an
act
of
which
Venus
was
capable
at
that
time.
All
of
its
property
had
been
in
the
possession
of
the
defendant
from
1:00
a.m.,
September
25.
The
payment
of
the
amounts,
which
I
have
concluded
were
wages,
was
a
result
of
a
decision
taken
by
the
respondent
in
complete
awareness
of
all
the
circumstances
and
carried
out
under
its
express
directions.
Even
if
it
be
assumed
that
the
bank
concurred
in
the
payments
being
made
the
person
causing
them
to
be
made
was
the
respondent.
The
attendant
circumstances
lead
to
one
conclusion
only
that
the
respondent
was
the
person
paying
wages
to
employees
and
consequently
coming
within
the
ambit
of
section
153.
Considerable
time
was
engaged
in
the
discussion
of
the
application
of
a
recent
decision
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
“Dauphin
Plains
Credit
Union
Limited
and
Xyloid
Industries
Limited
and
Her
Majesty
the
Queen”
in
which
judgment
was
pronounced
on
March
18,1980,
[1980]
CTC
247;
80
DTC
6123.
While
many
of
the
statements
made
therein
are
relevant
to
the
respondent’s
conduct,
due
to
the
fact
that
the
issue
before
the
Court
in
that
case
was
the
priority
as
between
the
claims
of
the
Crown
and
the
debenture-holders
to
monies
which
had
been
deducted
from
wages
for
the
purpose
of
income
tax,
all
that
was
said
in
that
judgment
is
not
necessarily
applicable
to
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
With
respect
to
the
quantum
of
the
respondent’s
liability,
alternative
submissions
were
made
(1)
that
the
default
of
the
respondent
was
in
failing
to
make,
from
the
wages
paid
to
the
employees,
the
appropriate
deduction
on
account
of
income
tax;
as
a
result
the
liability
of
the
Defendant
was
limited
to
10%
of
the
amount
which
it
had
failed
to
deduct;
(2)
that
if
the
respondent
incurred
liability
on
account
of
failure
to
remit
the
deductions,
made
on
account
of
income
tax,
the
amount
it
failed
to
remit
should
be
the
aggregate
of
the
deductions
for
income
tax
appropriate
to
wages
equal
to
the
actual
cash
paid
to
each
employee.
Section
227
deals
with
two
distinctly
different
defaults
by
persons
paying
wages.
First,
the
failure
to
deduct
and,
second,
the
failure
to
remit
the
amount
deducted.
The
liability
imposed
in
each
of
these
instances
is
more
easily
understood
if
one
keeps
in
mind
that
when
a
deduction
for
income
tax
is
made
from
wages
the
employee
is
deemed
to
have
received,
as
wages,
the
amount
deducted
and
is
accorded
credit
for
the
amount
deducted
as
an
instalment
on
account
of
the
income
tax
to
become
due
with
respect
to
his
income.
If
the
person
paying
fails
to
deduct,
his
failure
has
no
effect
on
the
liability
of
the
employee
for
income
tax
it
being
assumed
that
the
taxing
authority
will
recover
from
the
employee
the
full
amount
of
the
income
tax;
the
only
liability
incurred
by
the
person
paying
the
salary
or
wage
is
a
penalty
calculated
as
a
percentage
of
the
amount
he
has
failed
to
deduct.
On
the
other
hand
if
a
deduction
is
actually
made
and
the
amount
deducted
not
fully
remitted
the
person
making
the
deduction
becomes
liable
to
the
collector
for
the
amount
the
employee
is
deemed
to
have
received
as
his
salary
and
credit
is
given
to
the
employee
on
account
of
income
tax
for
an
amount
equal
to
the
amount
deducted.
In
this
latter
event
the
liability
of
the
person
paying,
over
and
above
the
10%
penalty
which
may
be
assessed
on
account
of
his
default
in
remitting
is
an
amount
equal
to
the
deductions
he
had
failed
to
remit
together,
with
interest
thereon.
To
fix
the
quantum
of
the
liability
of
the
respondent,
it
is
necessary
to
settle
whether
its
conduct
amounted
to
failure
to
deduct
or
failure
to
remit
amounts
deducted.
The
T-4
and
T-4
Supplementary
tax
returns
for
the
period
up
to
and
including
the
final
pay
period,
prepared
by
the
respondent,
if
they
stood
alone
and
there
were
no
other
evidence
touching
upon
the
question,
would
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
income
tax
relevant
to
the
earnings
of
the
final
pay
period
had
been
physically
deducted
and
retained
for
transmission
to
the
Receiver
General.
In
fact
there
was
nothing
appearing
on
the
T-4
Supplementary
handed
to
each
employee
which
would
in
any
way
disclose
to
him
or
her
that
the
amount
indicated
as
having
been
deducted
for
income
tax
had
not
actually
been
dealt
with
as
the
income
tax
require
it
to
be,
segregated
and
remitted
to
Receiver
General.
Each
employee
was
entitled
to
assume
that
the
amount
appearing
on
the
T-4
Supplementary
form
as
the
aggregate
of
deductions
on
account
of
income
tax
was
that
for
which
he
was
entitled
to
claim
credit
against
the
amount
of
income
tax
payable
by
him
for
the
calendar
year.
However,
there
is
uncontradicted
evidence
to
the
effect
that
the
aggregate
amount
of
money
which
was
provided
by
the
debenture-holder
to
the
respondent
for
the
purpose
“making
a
payment
to
each
employee
by
the
amount
of
which
they
(the
employees)
are
out
of
pocket
with
respect
to
work
done
for
the
company
as
a
result
of
the
company’s
failure
and
the
company
could
not
pay’’
was
the
net
amount
after
deduction,
which
the
employees
together
would
have
received
for
the
final
pay
period.
In
the
light
of
the
evidence,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
respondents’
default
was
in
not
making
deductions
for
income
tax
rather
than
in
failing
to
remit
any
amount
actually
deducted.
Accordingly
its
liability
is
under
subsection
227(8)—that
is,
10%
of
the
amount
it
failed
to
deduct.
The
assessment
made
by
the
Minister
with
respect
to
liability
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
fixes
$28,449.78
as
the
amount
of
deductions
with
respect
to
which
the
respondent
is
liable
for
the
penalty
of
10%
provided
by
subsection
227(8).
The
aggregate
pay
roll
for
the
final
pay
period
was
$231,904.15
and
had
that
amount
actually
been
available
and
exhausted
on
payments
to
employees
and
segregation
of
amounts
authorized
to
be
deducted,
the
aggregate
of
the
deductions
for
income
tax
would
have
been
$28,449.78.
The
amount
which
the
respondent
had
available
to
pay
on
account
of
wages
was
however
$196,270.01
and
its
obligation
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
was
to
deduct
from
the
amount
thereof
apportioned
as
the
wages
of
each
employee,
the
appropriate
amount
for
income
tax
calculated
upon
the
portion
of
the
sum
of
$196,270.01
which
was
due
to
him
or
her.
In
the
absence
of
information
as
to
the
tax
status
or
entitlement
of
each
employee,
the
proper
amount
of
the
deductions
so
to
be
made
cannot
be
calculated
by
this
Court.
The
appeal
is
allowed,
the
judgment
below
set
aside
and
in
its
place
there
should
be
judgment
allowing
the
appeal
as
to
assessment
#389649
by
varying
the
amount
of
such
assessment
to
an
amount
calculated
as
above
described;
for
these
purposes
the
assessment
is
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
re-assessment
in
accordance
with
the
judgment
of
this
Court.
The
appellant
should
have
her
costs
both
here
and
below.
APPENDIX
I
4.03
Whenever
the
security
hereby
constituted
shall
have
become
enforceable
and
so
long
as
it
shall
remain
enforceable,
the
Bank
may
proceed
to
realize
the
security
hereby
constituted
and
to
enforce
its
rights
by
entry
upon
the
mortgaged
property,
or
any
part
thereof,
without
the
consent
of
the
Company
or
any
legal
proceeding
and
may
use
force,
if
necessary,
to
obtain
entry
and
may
take
possession
and
get
in
the
property
charged
by
this
Debenture
and
for
that
purpose
take
any
proceedings
in
the
name
of
the
Company
or
otherwise
and
may
proceed
in
any
court
of
competent
jurisdiction
for
the
appointment
of
a
receiver
or
receiver
and
manager
or
by
public
or
private
sale
of
the
mortgaged
property,
or
any
part
thereof,
or
by
any
other
action,
Suit,
remedy
or
proceeding
authorized
or
permitted
hereby
or
by
law
or
by
equity;
and
the
Bank
may
file
such
proofs
of
claim
and
other
documents
as
may
be
necessary
or
advisable
in
order
to
have
its
claims
lodged
in
any
bankruptcy,
winding-up
or
other
judicial
proceedings
relative
to
the
Company.
No
such
remedy
for
the
realization
of
the
security
hereof
or
for
the
enforcement
of
the
rights
of
the
Bank
shall
be
exclusive
of
or
dependent
on
any
other
such
remedy
but
any
one
or
more
of
such
remedies
may
from
time
to
time
be
exercised
independently
or
in
combination.
Provided,
however,
that
in
the
event
of
a
sale,
the
Bank
shall
provide
the
Company
with
written
notice
thereof
not
less
than
thirty
(30)
days
in
advance
of
such
sale
and
shall
publish
such
notice
once
in
each
week
for
four
(4)
consecutive
weeks
in
a
daily
newspaper
of
general
circulation
published
in
each
of
the
Cities
of
Saint
John,
Fredericton,
Halifax,
Montreal
and
Toronto,
Canada.
Thereafter
it
shall
be
lawful
for
the
Bank
absolutely
to
sell
and
dispose
of
the
mortgaged
property
and
their
appurtenances
or
any
part
thereof
either
by
public
auction
or
private
contract
or
part
thereof
one
way
and
part
the
other
for
such
price
or
prices
as
to
the
Bank
shall
seem
reasonable.
All
contracts
which
shall
be
entered
into
and
all
conveyances
which
shall
be
executed
by
the
Bank
for
the
purpose
of
effecting
any
such
sale
shall
be
valid
and
effectual
notwithstanding
the
Company
shall
not
join
therein
or
assent
thereto
and
it
shall
not
be
incumbent
on
the
respective
purchasers
of
such
mortgaged
property
or
any
part
thereof
to
ascertain
or
enquire
whether
such
notice
of
sale
shall
have
been
given.
The
Bank
shall
be
at
liberty
to
bid
and
buy
at
any
sale
by
public
auction
only.
4.04
Whenever
the
security
hereby
constituted
shall
have
become
enforceable
and
so
long
as
it
shall
remain
enforceable
the
Bank
may
by
instrument
in
writing
appoint
any
person
or
persons,
whether
an
agent
or
employee
or
employees
of
the
Bank
or
not,
to
be
a
receiver
(which
term
shall
include
a
receiver
and
manager)
of
the
mortgaged
property,
or
any
part
thereof,
including
any
rents
and
profits
thereof
and
may
remove
any
receiver
and
appoint
another
in
his
stead.
Any
such
receiver
shall
for
all
purposes
be
deemed
to
be
the
agent
of
the
Company
and
not
the
agent
of
the
Bank.
The
Bank
may
from
time
to
time
fix
the
remuneration
of
such
receiver
and
direct
the
payment
thereof
put
of
the
mortgaged
property.
Any
such
receiver
may
be
vested
with
all
or
any
of
the
powers
and
discretions
of
the
Bank.
All
moneys
from
time
to
time,
received
by
such
receiver,
shall
be
paid
by
him—first,
in
discharge
of
all
rents,
taxes,
rates
and
outgoings,
affecting
the
mortgaged
property;
secondly,
in
payment
of
his
remuneration
and
cost
incurred
as
a
receiver,
including
all
legal
fees
incurred
by
solicitors
engaged
by
him
on
a
solicitor-and-client
basis
and
their
agents;
thirdly,
in
keeping
in
good
standing
all
liens
and
charges
on
the
charged
premises
prior
to
the
security
hereby
constituted
if
any;
fourthly,
in
payment
of
the
interest
accruing
due
on
this
Debenture
and/or
in
payment
of
any
principal
due
and
payable
upon
this
Debenture
as
the
Bank
see
fit;
and
other
sums
and
the
residue
of
any
moneys
so
received
shall
be
paid
to
the
Company.
The
Bank
in
appointing
or
refraining
from
appointing
such
receiver,
shall
not
incur
any
liability
to
the
receiver,
the
Company
or
otherwise.