Gibson,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
from
assessments
of
tax
of
its
1972
and
1973
taxation
years,
notices
of
which
are
dated
February
9,
1978.
This
appeal
is
premised
on
the
factual
basis
set
out
in
the
pleadings
among
which
is
that
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
is
a
private
corporation
for
the
purpose
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
in
force
in
1972
and
1973,
so
that
the
special
provisions
in
section
129
of
the
Act
in
respect
to
what
is
or
is
not
“Canadian
investment
income”
are
relevant.
The
determination
on
this
appeal
is
confined
to
the
meaning
and
application
in
sections
125
and
129
of
the
Act
of
the
words
“active
business
income”,
“income
from
a
property”
and
“income
from
a
source
that
is
business
other
than
an
active
business.”
Private
corporations
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act
are
entitled
to
certain
rate
reductions
through
the
mechanism
of
the
small
business
deduction
under
section
125
of
the
Act
and
through
the
mechanism
of
“refundable
dividend
tax”
under
section
129
of
the
Act.
This
appeal
is
not
concerned
with
any
rate
reduction
through
the
mechanism
under
section
125,
although
section
125
in
respect
to
the
meaning
of
the
concept
“active
business
income’’
is
relevant.
Instead
this
appeal
is
concerned
solely
with
whether
or
not
certain
amounts
of
income
from
six
sources
constitute
“Canadian
investment
income”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
129(4)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
Income
Tax
Act
in
1972
and
1973
contemplated
that
the
sources
of
income
of
a
private
corporation
could
be
of
four
types:
1.
active
business
income.
2.
income
from
a
property.
3.
income
from
a
source
that
is
business
other
than
an
active
business.
4.
capital
gains.
The
issue
on
this
appeal
is
whether
or
not
these
certain
amounts
of
income
from
six
sources
or
any
of
them
are
(1)
“income
from
a
property”
or
“income
from
a
source
that
is
business
other
than
an
active
business”,
or
(2)
“active
business
income”.
If
they
or
any
of
them
are
active
business
income
and
not
income
from
a
property
or
income
from
a
source
that
is
business
other
than
an
active
business,
then
the
appeal
pro
tanto
fails;
and
the
converse
applies.
(None
of
the
sources
of
income
are
from
capital
gains.)
Paragraph
129(4)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
at
the
relevant
times
read
as
follows:
(a)
“Canadian
investment
income”
of
a
corporation
for
a
taxation
year
means
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
aggregate
of
(i)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
aggregate
of
such
of
the
corporation’s
taxable
capital
gains
for
the
year
from
dispositions
of
property
as
may
reasonably
be
considered
to
be
income
from
sources
in
Canada
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
such
of
the
corporation’s
allowable
capital
losses
for
the
year
from
dispositions
of
property
as
may
reasonably
be
considered
to
be
losses
from
sources
in
Canada,
(ii)
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
the
corporation’s
income
for
the
year
(other
than
exempt
income
or
any
dividend
the
amount
of
which
was
deductible
under
section
112
from
its
income
for
the
year)
from
a
source
in
Canada
that
is
a
property,
determined,
for
greater
certainty,
after
deducting
all
outlays
and
expenses
deductible
in
computing
the
corporation’s
income
for
the
year
to
the
extent
that
they
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
having
been
made
or
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
income
from
that
property,
(iii)
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
the
corporation’s
income
for
the
year
(other
than
exempt
income)
from
a
source
in
Canada
that
is
a
business
other
than
an
active
business,
determined,
for
greater
certainty,
after
deducting
all
outlays
and
expenses
deductible
in
computing
the
corporation’s
income
for
the
year
to
the
extent
that
they
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
having
been
made
or
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
income
from
that
business,
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
amounts
each
of
which
is
a
loss
of
the
corporation
for
the
year
from
a
source
in
Canada
that
is
a
property
or
business
other
than
an
active
business;
and
The
six
items
or
sources
of
income
in
issue
here
which
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
submit
qualify
as
“Canadian
investment
income”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
129(4)(a)
of
the
Act
are:
|
1972
|
1973
|
1.
Rent
from
the
Century
Theatre
basement
to
Amity
|
|
Rehabilitation
|
$
3,000
|
$
3,000
|
2.
Rent
from
the
vacant
land
in
Toronto
(part
used
as
park
|
|
ing
lot
for
Birchcliff
Theatre)
Unsuitable
part
leased
to
car
|
|
dealer
|
1,925
|
2,100
|
3.
Rent
from
the
lease
of
Birchcliff
Theatre
to
a
Lion’s
Club
|
2,875
|
|
4.
Rent
from
the
lease
of
land
and
drive-in
theatre
facilities
|
|
in
Orillia
|
3,115
|
4,200
|
5.
Rent
from
apartments
in
the
Cinema
Theatre
|
1,320
|
1,320
|
6.
Rent
from
the
lease
of
a
portion
of
the
Birchcliff
Theatre
|
|
parking
lot
to
a
Christmas
tree
vendor
|
|
250
|
|
$12,235
|
$10,870
|
Less
expenses
|
1,406
|
843
|
NET
TOTAL
(admitted)
|
$10,769
|
$10,027
|
Whether
or
not
these
certain
amounts
of
income
from
these
six
sources
or
from
any
of
them
are
in
any
of
the
categories
above
referred
to
are
now
considered.
Are
they
or
any
of
them
income
from
a
source
that
is
a
property?
There
is
a
presumption
that,
since
the
purpose
of
a
corporation
is
to
make
profits
from
carrying
out
its
business
objects,
the
income
received
by
a
corporation
is
business
income.
The
sole
raison
d’être
of
a
public
company
is
to
have
a
business
and
to
Carry
it
on.
If
the
transaction
in
question
belongs
to
a
class
of
profit-making
operations
contemplated
by
the
memorandum
of
association,
prima
facie,
at
all
events,
the
profit
derived
from
it
is
a
profit
derived
from
the
business
of
the
company.”
(Italics
added)
per
Duff,
J
in
Anderson
Logging
Co
v
The
King;
[1917-27]
CTC
198;
52
DTC
1209;
see
also
Queen
&
Metcalfe
Carpark
Limited
v
MNR
[1973]
CTC
810;
74
DTC
6007.
The
submission
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
is
that
the
transactions
giving
rise
to
the
above
amounts
of
income
do
not
belong
to
a
class
of
profitmaking
operations
contemplated
by
its
memorandum
of
association,
and
that
therefore
there
should
be
no
such
presumption
in
this
case.
As
to
this,
the
submission
is
that
none
of
the
above
amounts
of
income
from
these
sources
is
in
respect
to
objects
or
purposes
contemplated
by
the
letters
patent
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
and
accordingly
there
should
be
no
presumption
that
such
income
is
business
income,
namely:
(a)
rent
from
the
Amity
Rehabilitation
Association
for
the
basement
of
the
Century
Theatre
(see
amended
statement
of
claim,
paragraph
3);
(b)
rent
from
a
used-car
dealer
for
the
vacant
land
unsuitable
as
a
theatre
parking
lot
(see
amended
statement
of
claim,
paragraph
4);
(c)
rent
from
the
Scarborough
Lions
Club
for
the
Birchcliff
Theatre
(see
amended
statement
of
claim,
paragraph
5);
(d)
rent
from
Banner
Theatres
Ltd
for
the
drive-in
theatre
in
Orillia
(see
amended
statement
of
claim,
paragraph
6);
(e)
rent
from
tenants
of
two
apartments
in
the
Cinema
Theatre
building
(see
amended
statement
of
claim,
paragraph
7);
or
(f)
rent
from
a
Christmas
tree
vendor
for
a
portion
of
the
Birchcliff
Theatre
parking
lot
(see
amended
statement
of
claim,
paragraph
9).
There
is
no
definition
of
income
from
property
in
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Property
per
se
is
defined
broadly
in
section
248
to
mean:
property
of
any
kind
whatever
whether
real
or
personal
or
corporeal
or
incorporeal
and,
without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
includes
(a)
a
right
of
any
kind
whatever,
a
share
or
a
chose
in
action,
and
(b)
unless
a
contrary
intention
is
evident,
money;
In
view
of
the
jurisprudence
that
generally
and
normally
a
corporation
cannot
have
income
from
property
but
only
income
from
the
business
and
because
of
the
incidental
and
ancillary
powers
of
corporations
under
the
relevant
Act
of
incorporation,
and
because
in
any
event,
according
to
the
evidence
there
is
nothing
extraordinary
or
not
normal
about
these
particular
sources
of
income
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited,
it
is
difficult
to
accept
this
Submission
that
any
of
the
six
items
of
income
are
income
from
a
source
that
is
property.
Accordingly,
this
submission
is
not
accepted.
Are
they
or
any
of
them
income
from
a
source
that
is
a
business
other
than
an
active
business?
The
Act
does
not
definte
“income
from
.
.
.
a
business
other
than
an
active
business”
or
“active
business”
income.
As
a
consequence,
it
is
necessary
to
employ
some
traditional
and
accepted
methods
to
resolve
the
difficulties
that
arise
in
cases
such
as
this,
and
to
provide
some
certainty
in
the
matter
of
assessment
of
income
tax.
In
the
amended
statement
of
defence,
the
Minister
has
taken
the
position
that
these
items
of
revenue
were
“incidental
and
ancillary
to
the
plaintiff’s
business
activity,
and
as
such
is
active
business
income”.
(See
amended
statement
of
defence,
paragraph
6.)
section
125
of
the
Act
does
not
define
income
from
an
active
business
to
include
income
that
is
“incidental”
or
“ancillary”
to
a
taxpayer’s
principal
business
activity.
And
although
income
from
certain
sources
has
been
described
in
other
cases,
speaking
generally,
as
“subsidiary”,
“ancillary”,
“windfall”,
“casual”,
and
“incidental”
income,
and
by
other
words
to
the
normal
business
of
a
particular
taxpayer
there
is
no
reference
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
the
concept
of
“ancillary”
income
or
to
the
concepts
of
any
of
the
other
words
used
except
as
to
the
concept
of
“incidental”
income.
And
the
only
reference
in
the
Act
to
“incidental”
income
is
subparagraph
95(2)(a)(i),
which
provision
is
unrelated
to
the
issues
or
provisions
of
the
Act
respecting
this
case.
Section
95
deals
with
the
active
business
income
of
a
foreign
affiliate:
(2)
For
the
purposes
of
this
subdivision,
(a)
in
computing
the
income
from
an
active
business
of
a
foreign
affiliate
of
a
taxpayer
there
shall
be
included
(i)
any
income
from
sources
in
a
country
other
than
Canada
that
would
otherwise
be
income
from
property
or
a
business
other
than
an
active
business,
to
the
extent
that
it
pertains
to
or
is
incident
to
an
active
business
carried
on
in
a
country
other
than
Canada
by
the
affiliate
or
any
other
nonresident
corporation
with
which
the
taxpayer
does
not
deal
at
arm’s
length
.
.
.
(Italics
added)
(This
provision
was
made
“applicable
to
the
1972
and
subsequent
taxation
years”.)
In
dictionary
definitions
of
“incident”,
incidents
are
divided
into
separable
and
inseparable.
Jowitt
gives
an
example
of
one
that
is
separable
in
his
definition:
Thus,
fealty
was
incident
to
every
tenure,
and
could
not
be
separated
from
it;
so
a
rent
may
be
incident
to
a
reversion
though
it
may
be
separated
from
it,
that
is,
the
one
may
be
conveyed
without
the
other.
Hence
incidents
are
divisible
into
separable
inseparable.
The
meaning
and
employment
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
of
the
word
“incident”
probably
is
in
its
“separable
sense”.
This
seems
to
follow
from
two
examples
in
the
Act.
First,
under
section
125
of
the
Act,
Parliament
intended
that
a
so-called
small
business
may
have
income
from
an
active
business
and
income
from
a
business
other
than
its
active
business
and
so
be
subject
to
the
two
different
rates
of
tax.
(As
to
the
approach
generally
in
characterizing
these
two
types
of
income
in
King
George
Hotels
Limited
v
the
Queen,
[1981]
CTC
87;
81
DTC
5082,
the
Court
said,
per
Urie,
J:
.
.
.
It
cannot
be
said,
therefore,
in
my
view,
that
income
from
“other
than
an
active
business”
necessarily
means
that
derived
from
a
business
that
“is
in
an
absolute
state
of
suspension”
or
one
“devoid
of
any
quantum
of
business
activity”
as
has
been
said
in
earlier
decisions
in
the
Trial
Division.
In
any
given
case,
the
business
may
not
be
of
that
kind
but
whether
or
not
it
is,
is
not
necessarily
determinative
of
the
issue,
the
resolution
of
which
depends
on
the
fact
finder’s
view
of
the
true
nature
of
the
business
based
on
the
facts
in
the
particular
case.
The
quantum
of
activity
may
well
vary
from
case
to
case
but
still
it
is
necessary
for
the
Court
to
weigh
all
of
the
evidence
to
characterize
the
quality
of
the
particular
business.)
Second,
under
subsection
95(2)
above
quoted,
there
is
a
specific
statutory
characterization
of
incident
income
and
direction
as
to
how
“incident”
income
should
be
treated
for
tax
purposes,
that
is
incident
income
to
the
income
of
an
active
business;
and
the
meaning
of
“incident”
employed
in
that
subsection
is
in
its
separable
sense,
because
if
“incident”
had
been
used
in
its
inseparable
sense,
such
statutory
characterization
and
direction
would
not
have
been
necessary.
Employing
this
approach,
therefore,
the
question
arises
as
to
whether
or
not
the
Minister’s
pleading
in
paragraph
6
is
correct.
And
this
question
may
be
resolved
as
follows:
Are
these
six
items
or
sources
of
income
incidental
to
the
main
source
of
income
from
the
plaintiff’s
business
activity,
that
is,
incidental
in
the
sense
that
these
sources
or
any
of
them
are
separable
from
the
sources
of
income
from
its
business
activity
if
it
has
an
active
business?
What
is
the
business
activity
of
the
plaintiff
and
does
it
earn
active
business
income?
According
to
the
documentary
evidence
such
as
the
letters
patent
and
certain
of
the
contracts
(see
for
example
Exhibit
3),
the
business
activity
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
is
and
was
at
all
material
times,
the
business
of
operating
motion
picture
theatres
in
Ontario,
and
income
from
such
activity
is
and
should
be
categorized
as
active
business
income.
Accordingly,
the
further
question
that
must
be
asked
is:
Are
all
or
any
of
these
six
items
or
sources
of
income
part
of
the
active
business
income
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
or
are
they
incidental
or
incident
to
such
active
business
income?
From
the
evidence
and
after
a
careful
consideration
of
the
submissions
of
counsel,
it
would
appear
that
items
3
and
4
above
referred
to,
namely:
|
1972
|
1973
|
3.
Rent
from
the
lease
of
|
|
Birchcliff
Theatre
to
a
|
|
Lion’s
Club
|
$2,875
|
|
4.
Rent
from
the
lease
of
|
|
land
and
drive-in
theatre
|
|
facilities
in
Orillia
|
3,115
|
$4,200
|
are
inseparable
from
the
income
and
are
part
of
the
income
from
the
normal
business
activity
of
Supreme
Theatres
Limited
and
therefore
part
of
its
active
business
income
and
that
the
other
items
are
not;
and,
accordingly,
items
3
and
4
do
not
qualify
as
“Canadian
investment
income”
while
the
other
items
do.
Therefore
the
Minister’s
pleading
in
paragraph
6
of
the
statement
of
claim
is
not
correct.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed
in
part
with
costs
and
the
matter
is
referred
back
for
reassessment
not
inconsistent
with
these
reasons.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.