Taylor,
T.C.J.:—These
are
appeals
heard
in
Winnipeg,
Manitoba,
on
September
14,
1990,
against
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1983,
1984
and
1985
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
imputed
interest
income
to
the
appellant
under
section
17
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the"Act").
The
notice
of
appeal
reads
in
part
as
follows:
The
Taxpayer
formed
an
affiliated
company,
which
ended
up
as
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
(“Brickell”),
in
Hong
Kong
in
association
with
Dunn
Air
Conditioning
of
Australia
("Dacal"
or
"Dunn")
in
1982.
Each
participant
invested
capital
money
in
such
entity
to
start
up
and
fund
its
business
operations
(copy
of
Agreement
of
Intent
dated
February
7,
1983
attached).*
The
first
use
of
these
funds
was
to
purchase
all
shares
of
an
existing
business
in
Hong
Kong,
Dunn
Air
Conditioning
Asia
Ltd.,
which
was
a
sales
organization.
Price
had
day
to
day
operational
and
management
control
of
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
and
initially
provided
all
product
sold
by
that
Company
and
its
subsidiaries
in
South
East
Asia.
Hong
Kong
law
not
permitting
a
Hong
Kong
company
to
buy
back
its
own
shares
and
the
participants
wishing
to
keep
their
options
open,
as
to
eventual
return
of
capital
and
not
wishing
the
permanent
locking-in
of
the
capital
advanced,
such
advances
were
set
up
by
way
of
shareholders
advances.
The
Taxpayer
made
various
remittances
of
investment
money
to
this
affiliated
company
in
Hong
Kong
in
1983
(Paragraph
3
of
Agreement)*
and
these
sums
were
reflected
on
the
books
of
the
Taxpayer
as
an
investment.
*Exhibit
A-2—referenced
later—significant
parts
quoted.
At
the
time
the
moneys
were
remitted,
the
Hong
Kong
company
was
a
noncontrolled
foreign
affiliate
of
the
Taxpayer.
The
Hong
Kong
company
remitted
the
funds
to
Price
Asia
Manufacturing
(Pamco"),
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary
Singapore
company
which
eventually
commenced
manufacturing,
with
sole
E.H.
Price
Limited
know-how
and
expertise,
for
South
East
Asia
the
same
Titus
products
manufactured
and
sold
by
the
Taxpayer
in
North
America.
The
Minister
has
added
to
the
Taxpayer's
income
pursuant
to
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
deemed
interest
of
$36,205
in
1983,
$55,523
in
1984
and
$52,793
in
1985.
For
the
respondent,
the
assumptions
of
fact
were:
—
at
all
material
times,
the
appellant
was
a
duly
incorporated
corporation
resident
in
Canada;
—
at
all
material
times,
Brickell
Investments
Ltd.
(Brickell")
was
a
non-resident
person;
—
in
the
1983
taxation
year
the
appellant
loaned
Brickell
the
amount
of
$503,123.27
in
total;
—
as
at
the
end
of
the
1985
taxation
year,
the
full
amount
of
the
loan
of
$503,123.27
remained
outstanding
and
unpaid;
—
no
interest
on
the
loan
was
included
by
the
appellant
in
computing
its
income
for
the
1983,
1984
or
1985
taxation
years;
—
the
appellant
was
deemed
to
have
received
the
amounts
of
$36,205
in
1983,
$55,523
in
1984
and
$52,793.00
in
1985
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act;
—
Brickell
was
at
no
material
time
a
subsidiary
controlled
corporation
of
the
appellant.
The
essentials
of
the
position
put
forward
by
the
appellant
were:
—
The
object
and
spirit
of
Section
17
is
to
prevent
a
corporation
that
is
resident
in
Canada
from
employing
capital
abroad
by
way
of
a
non-interest
bearing
loan
so
as
to
avoid
Canadian
Income
Tax
on
profits
derived
therefrom
but
accruing
to
the
benefit
of
non-resident
purposes.
Section
17
is
aimed
at
transactions
that
are
not
at
arm's
length
such
as
those
between
a
Canadian
subsidiary
and
a
noncontrolled
foreign
parent
contrived
for
purpose
of
applying
the
income
to
the
non-resident
rather
than
to
the
Canadian
Corporation.
—
The
advances
were
not
set
up
as
loans
in
the
books
of
E.H.
Price
Ltd.,
the
Taxpayer.
—
It
is
the
Taxpayer's
view
that
this
deemed
interest
should
not
be
imputed
for
the
years
being
reviewed.
—
The
advances
were
not
loans
in
the
ordinary
sense
in
that
the
recipient
never
signed
any
loan
agreements
nor
did
it
provide
any
signed
promissory
notes.
—
The
amounts
invested
have
always
represented
a
long
term
investment
by
the
Taxpayer
and
the
funds
used
for
the
manufacturing
and
sales
business
of
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
As
a
result
these
funds
have
been
set
up
as
a
type
of
equity
investment
as
opposed
to
a
loan
receivable.
The
Taxpayer's
position
has
been
one
of
an
investor
and
not
a
creditor.
—
If
the
amounts
advanced
were
a
loan,
they
would
have
been
of
questionable
value
in
each,
of
the
years
under
review
and
generally
accepted
accounting
practices
would
have
required
write-offs
reducing
the
accrued
value
of
such
loans.
Further,
if
interest
had
been
charged
and
accrued
for
each
year,
same
would
have
been
written
off
as
uncollectible,
which
has
the
effect
of
reducing
the
return
to
zero.
—
In
the
alternative,
the
Taxpayer
submits
that
as
it
acquired
control
of
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
in
1985,
it
should
be
entitled
to
the
benefits
of
Section
17(3),
which
exempts
the
provisions
of
Section
17(1)
with
respect
to
the
imputing
of
interest.
The
respondent
noted:
The
Respondent
relies,
inter
alia,
upon
the
provisions
of
sections
3,
9,
17
and
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
as
amended
and
Regulation
XLIII
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations,
C.R.C.,
1978,
c.
945,
as
amended.
In
my
view,
the
evidence
failed
to
leave
available
to
the
appellant
the
alternative
argument
above—that
Brickell
had
been
acquired
in
1985
by
the
appellant,
and
accordingly
the
thrust
of
this
decision
will
deal
with
the
direct
issue
of
whether
the
interest
amounts
involved
were
properly
assessed
under
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act
as
it
read
for
the
years
1983,
1984
and
up
until
October
29,
1985
when
the
section
was
slightly
amended.
No
issue
was
raised
at
the
hearing
with
regard
to
the
1985
amendments,
and
accordingly
I
shall
deal
only
with
the
terminology
which
follows
from
the
1983
Act:
Where
a
corporation
resident
in
Canada
has
loaned
money
to
a
non-resident
person
and
the
loan
has
remained
outstanding
for
one
year
or
longer
without
interest
at
a
reasonable
rate
having
been
included
in
computing
the
lender's
income,
interest
thereon,
computed
at
a
prescribed
rate
per
annum
for
the
taxation
year
or
part
of
the
year
during
which
the
loan
was
outstanding,
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
computing
the
lender's
income,
be
deemed
to
have
been
received
by
the
lender
on
the
last
day
of
each
taxation
year
during
all
or
part
of
which
the
loan
has
been
outstanding.
The
point
in
dispute,
as
I
comprehend
it,
is
whether
it
can
be
said
that
“the
corporation
has
loaned
money
to
a
non-resident
person
.
.
.”
(see
subsection
17(1)
above).
In
evidence
and
testimony,
the
appellant
through
its
president,
Mr.
G.D.
Price,
provided
the
Court
with
details
regarding
the
efforts
to
establish
its
operations
in
Asia,
including
the
financing
arrangements
referenced
in
both
the
notice
of
appeal
and
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
supra.
An
agreement
had
been
reached
between
Price
(this
appellant)
and
a
Mr.
Robert
Riddell
Dunn
of
Australia
(representing
his
own
company
earlier
in
these
reasons
called
"Dacal",
or
"Dunn"),
and
a
Mr.
Robert
Ross
Scown
(Scown")
of
Hong
Kong
to
formalize
these
efforts
(Exhibit
A-2).
Scown
was
a
minor
shareholder
andparticipant,
in
fact
was
out
of
the
venture
at
a
fairly
early
stage.
The
real
actors
soon
became
Price
and
Dacal,
with
Price
for
all
intents
and
purposes
the
source
of
financing.
Price
rapidly
became
also
the
source
of
expertise,
not
only
in
the
manufacture
of
the
product
to
be
sold,
but
also
in
the
field
of
sales
and
representation,
an
area
originally
expected
to
be
filled
by
Dacal.
In
addition
to
Price
(this
appellant)
Dacal
and
Brickell,
Price
did
establish
in
Asia
another
corporation
Price
Asia
Manufacturing
Company
C
Pamco")
which
was
intended
to
be
the
eastern
manufacturing
arm
of
the
appellant.
By
virtue
of
the
agreement
between
Price
and
Dacal,
both
Dacal
and
Pamco
became
one
hundred
per
cent
equity
owned
by
Brickell.
During
the
times
material,
however,
Price
did
not
have
control
of
Brickell—accordingly
it
was
not
a
subsidiary
corporation
to
Price
(see
earlier
comments).
From
Exhibit
A-2
(the
agreement
dated
February
7,
1983),
the
following
paragraphs
have
been
extracted:
—
Capitalization
It
is
contemplated
that
the
joint
enterprise
will
require
an
initial
investment
of
approximately
HK$6,000,000
Hong
Kong
Dollars,
which
amount
other
than
enterprise
borrowing,
will
be
put
up
by
the
Parties
hereto
as
set
out
on
Schedule
“A”
attached
hereto.*
If
guarantees
are
required
by
any
Lending
Institution,
such
Guarantees
will
be
on
the
basis
of
each
Party
guaranteeing
his
proportion
of
the
Total
in
the
same
percentage
as
the
equity
ownership
of
such
guaranteeing
Party,
with
a
maximum
limit
as
unanimously
agreed
upon
at
that
time.
Capital
shall
be
agreed
upon
from
time
to
time
as
required,
with
each
of
the
Parties
undertaking
to
be
responsible
to
raise,
either
by
direct
investment
or
by
guarantee
of
debt
financing
provided
to
the
Company
on
terms
approved
by
the
Board
of
Directors,
the
appropriate
percentage
of
the
capital
as
it
relates
to
the
equity
ownership
of
such
Party,
until
the
manufacturing
operation
is
underway.
—
Shareholder's
Loans
Price
and
Dunn
may
make
loans
to
the
joint
enterprise
over
and
above
their
proportionate
share
of
the
agreed
upon
investment.
In
the
event
such
advances
or
loans
are
made,
the
joint
enterprise
shall
pay
interest
to
the
Party
making
the
advance
in
such
amounts
as
agreed
upon
by
the
Board
of
Directors.
It
shall
also
be
agreed
upon
at
that
time
as
to
the
Security
for
the
protection
of
such
advance(s).
Schedule
“A”
Hong
Kong
Holding
Company
Initial
Capitalization
(H.K.
$)
|
E.H.
Price
|
|
|
Limited
|
R.R.
Dunn
|
R.R.
Scown
|
Total
|
Shares
|
|
Common
A—voting
|
225
|
|
225
|
Common
B—voting
|
|
225
|
|
225
|
Common
C—non-voting
|
|
50
|
50
|
Total
shares
|
225
|
225
|
50
|
500
|
Shareholder^
Loans
|
|
—
in
proportion
to
equity
|
337,275
|
337,275
|
74,950
|
749,500
|
—
additional
loans
by
|
2,625,000
|
2,625,000
|
—
|
5,250,000
|
Price
&
Dunn
|
|
Total
loans
|
2,962,275
|
2,962,275
|
74,950
|
5,999,500
|
Total
capitalization
|
2,962,500
|
2,962,500
|
75,000
|
6,000,000
|
Rob
Scown’s
total
agreed
contribution
is
$300,000
(HK)
with
an
initial
contribution
of
$75,000
(HK)
and
the
balance
is
to
be
paid
by
retention
of
up
to
50%
of
any
bonuses
payable
to
him.
The
financial
statements
of
the
appellant
at
December
31,
1983,
showed
the
following
under
Note
(3)—Investments:
(b)
Affiliated
companies:
Brickell
Enterprises
Limited,
foreign
affiliate:
The
company's
equity
in
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
as
reported
in
the
audited
financial
statements
of
the
affiliated
company
at
June
30,
1983
is
$32,042.
Manage-
ment
estimates
that
the
company's
share
of
the
operating
loss
for
the
six
months
ended
December
31,
1983
is
$130,000,
and
estimates
that
for
the
next
six
months
ended
June
30,
1984,
operations
will
show
a
small
profit.
225
Class
A
ordinary
shares
|
42
|
Loan
(Canadian
dollar
cost—$855,802)
|
784,818
|
The
corresponding
references
for
December
31,
1984
read:
|
1984
|
|
1983
|
|
Brickell
Enterprises
Limited,
foreign
affiliate:
|
|
225
Class
A
ordinary
shares
at
cost
|
|
42
|
|
42
|
Accumulated
equity
(deficiency)
in
undistributed
|
|
earnings
(losses)
|
C
|
|
(59,334)
|
32,000
|
|
(59,334)
|
32,042
|
Loan,
non-interest
bearing,
no
set
terms
of
|
|
repayment
(Canadian
dollar
cost—$976,331)
|
|
951,773
|
787,818
|
|
892,481
|
816,860
|
|
2,140,009
|
$1,934,047
|
And
for
1985:
|
|
Brickell
Enterprises
Limited,
foreign
subsidiary:
|
|
560
Class
"A"
ordinary
shares
at
cost
(1984—225)
|
|
42
|
42
|
Accumulated
equity
(deficiency)
in
undistributed
|
|
earnings
(losses)—
|
|
Balance,
beginning
of
year
|
|
(
|
57,493)
|
32,000
|
Add:
Share
of
current
year
net
losses
|
|
(
275,520)
|
(
91,334)
|
Current
year
foreign
currency
adjustment
|
(
|
5,480)
|
1,841
|
Balance,
end
of
year
|
|
(
338,493)
|
(
57,493)
|
Loan,
non-interest
bearing,
no
set
terms
of
|
|
repayment
(Canadian
dollar
cost—$976,331;
|
|
1984—$976,331)
|
|
1,040,481
|
949,932
|
Deferred
receivable
from
subsidiaries
of
Brickell
|
|
Enterprises
Ltd.
(Canadian
dollar
cost—
|
|
$1,045,591)
|
|
1,055,888
|
|
I
have
made
no
particular
attempt
to
reconcile
these
amounts
year
to
year—but
I
am
satisfied
from
the
evidence
provided
by
the
appellant
that
they
are
in
order.
The
important
part,
for
this
appeal,
is
the
reference
to
the
"ordinary
shares
.
.
.
$42.00”
and
the
various
amounts
shown
as
"loans".
The
particular
identification
given
to
these
amounts
in
the
financial
statements
is
certainly
not
the
deciding
factor—they
will
be
determined
to
be
what
they
are,
not
what
they
are
called—but
it
does
provide
the
basis
for
the
respondent's
computation
(above).
Another
critical
piece
of
evidence
was
entered
as
Exhibit
A-1,
and
detailed
the
build-up
of
the
amounts
at
issue
in
this
appeal,
totalling
$503,123.26*
as
follows:
E.H.
Price
Ltd.
Investment
in
Brickell
1983
to
1986
|
Amount
DNR
|
|
Amount
|
deems
loans
|
Date
|
Source
|
(at
cost)
|
for
interest
|
1983
|
|
|
(Cdn.
$)
|
(Cdn.
$)
|
Feb.
8/83
|
Funds
tsf
from
Canada
|
280,050.00
|
280,008.00
|
|
Portion
for
shares
|
(42.00)
|
|
Apr.
14/83
|
A/R
owed
Price
|
|
|
tsf
to
Brickell
|
57,364.84
|
57,364.84
|
"'
Shown
as
$503,123.27
in
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
supra.
|
|
Apr.
18/83
|
A/R
owed
Price
|
|
|
tsf
to
Bricked
|
75,075.66
|
75,076.66
|
May
5/83
|
Misc.
expenses
converted
|
5,473.22
|
5,473.22
|
May
13/83
|
Tooling
Charges
|
|
|
from
E.H.
Price
|
58,930.51
|
|
May
18/83
|
A/R
owed
Price
|
|
|
tsf
to
Bricked
|
17,551.41
|
17,551.41
|
June
1/83
|
A/R
owed
Price
|
|
|
tsf
to
Bricked
|
67,650.13
|
67,650.13
|
July
13/83
|
Tooling
costs
owed
Price
|
43,748.70
|
|
Dec.
31/83
|
A/R
Paid
converted
|
250,000.00
|
|
Balance
Dec.
31/83
|
855,802.48
|
503,123.26
|
1984
|
|
March
|
to
adjust
A/R
converted
|
(2,433.87)
|
|
Dec.
31/84
|
A/R
owed
Price
by
|
|
|
—converted
to
|
122,962.49
|
|
|
investment
|
|
Balance
Dec.
31/84
|
|
976,331.29
|
1985
|
|
Transactions
|
|
nil
|
|
Balance
Dec.
31/85
|
|
976,331.09
|
1986
|
|
Dec.
|
Funds
tsf
|
79,844.00
|
|
Balance
Dec.
31/86
|
1,056,175.09
|
|
Explanations
were
provided
regarding
the
amounts
which
constitute
the
first
column
(above)
called
"Amount—at
cost"
which
were
not
carried
over
to
the
second
column
entitled
“Amounts
D.N.R.
deems
loans
for
interest”
(D.N.R.
meaning
Department
of
National
Revenue).
The
explanations
can
be
summarized
as—
(1)
the
original
funds
advanced
of
$280,008
(not
counting
that
of
$42
for
which
shares
were
received)
were
regarded
by
D.N.R.
as
"investments"
subject
to
the
terms
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act;
(2)
the
balance
of
the
amounts—$57,364.89,
$75,075.66,
$5,473.22,
$7,551.41
and
$67,650.13
referenced
accounts
receivable
owing
from
Dacal
(the
company
originally
owned
by
Mr.
Dunn)
which
amounts
had
resulted
from
product
sales
by
Price
to
Dacal
for
the
purpose
of
resale
by
Dacal
in
Asia;
(3)
in
general,
the
other
amounts—not
regarded
as
falling
under
the
provisions
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act
by
D.N.R.—resulted
from
accounts
receivable
to
Pamco.
I
readily
admit
that
I
was
not
convinced
that
there
was
any
substantive
difference
between
the
amounts
receivable
for
Dacal
and
those
for
Pamco—
both
corporations
were
100
per
cent
subsidiaries
of
Bricked,
and
both
were
used
in
serving
the
Asian
market.
However,
this
case
deals
only
with
those
accounts
receivable
to
Dacal
which
amounts
were
transferred
to
Bricked
as
part
of
the
reorganization
of
the
Asian
operations,
and
by
which
eventually
Price
gained
majority
ownership
and
thereby
control
of
Bricked
from
Dacal.
According
to
the
evidence,
Mr.
Dunn
through
Dacal
had
not
been
able
to
provide
his
share
of
the
capital
contribution
as
per
the
schedule
forming
part
of
Exhibit
A-2
(above).
In
effect,
Price
by
transferring
the
Dacal
trade
amounts
to
Bricked
settled
these
outstanding
unpaid
capital
contributions
which
Mr.
Dunn
had
not
been
able
to
make.
This
understanding
between
Mr.
Dunn
(Dacal)
and
Price
was
finalized
by
an
agreement
dated
December
13,
1985
(Exhibit
R-2)
which
read
in
part:
—
And
Whereas
Price
and
Dunn
have
advanced
moneys
by
way
of
loans
to
Brickell
and/or
its
subsidiaries;
—
And
Whereas
it
has
been
agreed
between
the
Parties
that
payment
of
the
Price
trade
accounts
and
intercompany
accounts
will
have
to
be
deferred
for
some
time
and
that
Debenture
security
is
to
be
given
therefor;
—
And
Whereas
as
a
result
of
the
deferment
it
has
been
agreed
between
the
Parties
that
Price
will
become
the
registered
holder
of
70%
of
the
issued
shares
of
Brickell
with
Dunn
holding
the
other
30%
thereof.
—
This
Agreement
is
to
supercede
[sic]
the
Agreement
between
Price,
Dunn
and
Robin
Romer
Scown,
dated
the
7th
day
of
February,
1983
and
such
Agreement
and
the
terms
thereof
are
hereby
suspended
and
substituted
by
the
terms
of
the
within
Agreement.
—
The
Parties
agree
that
a
further
300
Class
"A"
Ordinary
Shares
of
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
shall
be
issued
to
Price
for
a
consideration
equivalent
to
par
value
following
which
the
issued
"A"
and"B"
shares
of
Brickell
Enterprises
Ltd.
will
be:
Price
525
Class
‘A’
Ordinary
Shares
Dunn
225
Class‘B‘
Ordinary
Shares
In
addition
to
a
detailed
argument
from
each
party
dealing
with
the
term
”
loan"—parts
of
which
will
be
noted
later,
another
argument
of
counsel
for
the
appellant
revolved
around
a
contention
that
since
the
respondent
had
not
included
in
the
amounts
subject
to
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act,
the
accounts
receivable
of
Pamco,
that
it
was
unreasonable
that
the
respondent
should
have
regarded
similar
amounts
arising
out
of
trade
amounts
receivable
with
Dacal
to
be
treated
differently
and
the
subject
of
deemed
interest
charges.
Analysis
Despite
the
capable
analysis
and
argument
together
with
related
case
law
presented
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
I
have
no
difficulty
whatever
in
considering
the
amount
of
$280,008
above
as
a
simple
loan—caught
by
the
provisions
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act.
With
respect
to
that
amount,
"a
corporation
(the
appellant)
resident
in
Canada
has
loaned
money
to
a
non-resident
person.
.
.”.
While
I
do
agree
that
there
may
be
as
much
logic
to
include
in
the
calculations
of
the
deemed
interest,
the
amounts
relevant
to
Pamco,
as
there
is
to
deal
with
the
amount
relevant
to
Dacal,
it
is
not
my
view
that
the
exclusion
of
one
(Pamco)
should
result
in
the
necessary
exclusion
of
the
other
(Dacal).
The
amounts
at
issue
relevant
to
Dacal—a
balance
of
$213,115.26
($503,123.26—
$28,008)
must
be
subjected
to
the
same
review
under
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act
as
the
above
amount
of
$280,008.
On
that
score,
the
point
becomes
whether
it
can
be
said
that
Price.
.
.has
loaned
money,
when
the
transactions
at
issue
by
which
Brickell
became
indebted
to
Price
were
ones
whereby
the
trade
accounts
receivable
of
Dacal
were
taken
over
by
Brickell
as
a
result
of
intercorporate
arrangements
between
Price,
Dacal
and
Brickell
to
balance
up
the
"investment"
accounts
of
Price
and
Dunn
(HKD
5614,163.52
each
above),
while
giving
Price
70
per
cent
of
the
share
capital
as
opposed
to
30
per
cent
remaining
for
Dunn.
The
position
of
the
respondent
on
this
point
is
that
there
was
no
substantive
difference
in
Price
providing
$280,008
by
way
of
direct
cash
infusion
to
Brickell—determined
above
to
be
subject
to
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act—and
Price
providing
credit
by
way
of
trade
accounts
receivable
to
Dacal,
which
became
the
eventual
obligation
of
Brickell
in
the
amount
of
$213,115.26
above.
First,
it
should
be
noted
from
the
1985
notes
to
Price
financial
statements,
supra,
that
the
complex
intercorporate
arrangements
between
Price,
Dacal
and
Brickell,
noted
above,
did
not
result
in
any
increase
in
the
cost
of
the
shares
of
Brickell
held
by
Price.
Price
originally
held
225
Class
A
ordinary
shares,
at
a
cost
of
$42
(see
1983
Notes
to
financial
statement
above)
and
when
the
number
of
shares
reached
560
in
1985
(agreement
and
notes
above)
the
cost
was
still
shown
at
$42.
Therefore,
the
only
item
affected
was
the
so-called
“investment”
or
“loan”
amount,
which
went
from
$784,818
in
1983
to
$1,040,481
in
1985
shown
as
a
loan,
and
a
further"deferred
receivable”
of
$1,055,888.
In
addition
to
these
amounts,
the
trade
receivables
with
affiliated
companies
(including
Brickell)
went
from
$284,094
in
1983
to
$657,520
in
1984,
then
dropped
to
$92,909
in
1985
(again
from
the
relevant
financial
statements
of
Price).
It
cannot
be
said
that
during
the
period
Price
was
advancing
credit
to
Dacal,
that
it
was
doing
so
to
one
of
its
subsidiaries,
which
would
permit
the
use
of
subsection
17(3)
of
the
Act—referenced
earlier.
There
appear
to
be
two
words
which
must
be
met
for
the
respondent
to
invoke
the
provisions
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act—"loaned"
and
"money".
I
say
"invoke"
because
the
interest
under
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act
is
not
interest
declared
by
the
taxpayer,
it
is
certainly
not
interest
received
by
the
taxpayer.
It
is
a
calculation,
which
the
respondent
imposes
on
the
taxpayer,
in
a
situation
wherein
the
taxpayer
has
not
the
benefit
of
the
income
therefrom—"
interest
thereon
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
received.
.
.”.
To
do
so
in
my
opinion,
the
respondent
must
be
on
the
firmest
possible
grounds—
all
the
"‘i‘s"
dotted,
and
all
the
"t's"
crossed.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
made
reference
to
the
standard
definition
of
"loan"
from
the
texts—but
in
my
opinion
almost
all
the
situations
he
referenced
dealt
with
the
word
“loan”
as
a
noun,
whereas
in
the
context
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act
the
term”
has
loaned"
arises
out
of
the
transitive
form
of
the
verb
"to
lend”.
The
Living
Webster
definition
of
"to
lend”
is
as
follows:
“lend,
lend,
v.t.-lent,
lending.
[O.E.
laenan,
to
lend,
<
laen,
a
loan,
(<
lihan
=
G.
leihen,
to
lend);
cf.
D.
leenen,
Dan.
laane,
Icel.
lana,
to
lend.]
To
grant
to
another
for
temporary
use;
to
furnish
on
condition
of
the
thing
or
its
equivalent
in
kind
being
returned;
to
afford,
grant,
or
furnish
in
general,
as
assistance.
-refl.
to
accommodate;
to
adapt
so
as
to
be
assistance,
as:
He
lent
himself
to
the
scheme.-
v.i.
To
make
a
loan.-lend
a
hand,
to
assist,-lend-er,
n."
As
I
see
it
therefore
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
must
be
prepared
to
show
that
a
clear
action
can
be
attributed
to
the
appellant
which
can
accurately
be
described
as
"has
loaned",
in
the
sense
of
the
above
definition:
“.
.
.
To
grant
to
another
for
temporary
use;
to
furnish
on
condition
of
the
thing
or
its
equivalent
in
kind
being
returned;
to
afford,
grant,
or
furnish
in
general,
as
assistance
.
.
.”.
The
circumstances
of
this
part
of
the
amount
at
issue—trade
accounts
receivable
credit
provided
to
Dacal,
a
subsidiary
of
Brickell—do
not
fulfil
the
definition
of
“has
loaned"
as
between
Price
and
Brickell.
Even
using
the
basis
for
the
appellant’s
argument—the
noun
"loan"
which
I
have
questioned
above—the
amount
at
issue
does
not
constitute
a
"loan"
as
I
believe
that
term
should
be
understood
in
order
to
provide
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
the
authority
that
“interest
thereon
.
.
.
shall
.
.
.
be
deemed
to
have
been
received
.
.
.
(subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act),
from
Brickell,
since
it
is
from
Brickell
that
the
calculation
of
interest
to
Price
is
"deemed"
to
have
arisen.
"Trade
accounts
receivable"
even
to
a
subsidiary
might
form
the
basis
for
somewhat
similar
consideration
under
different
sections
of
the
Act
(i.e.
section
15—
“funds
or
property",
benefit
or
advantage",
loan
or
indebtedness”),
but
I
am
not
called
upon
to
consider
that
situation.
I
am
simply
satisfied
that
the
term
"has
loaned"
has
not
been
fulfilled,
and
if
indeed
something
was
“loaned”,
that
something
was
"trade
accounts
receivable”,
which
I
do
not
regard
as
“money”
in
the
context
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act.
I
understand
the
position
of
the
respondent
in
this
matter,
that
allowing
Dacal
to
have
''trade
accounts
receivable
credit"
which
amount
was
eventually
transferred
to
Brickell,
can
be
looked
at
as
merely
another
form
of
the
"investing"
which
was
set
up
and
intended
by
Exhibit
A-2
above.
But
I
do
not
agree
that
such
an
allocation
or
provision
of
capital
or
funds
in
these
circumstances
completes
the
terminology
"has
loaned
money",
as
that
is
necessary
to
support
the
respondent
invoking
the
"deeming"
provisions
of
the
Act.
The
appeals
are
allowed
in
order
that
the
amount
of
the
alleged
“loan”
of
$503,123.27
be
reduced
by
an
amount
of
$213,115.20,
so
that
only
the
remainder
of
$280,008
shall
be
subject
to
the
deeming
provisions
of
subsection
17(1)
of
the
Act.
In
all
other
respects
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
The
entire
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
party-and-party
costs.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.