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Regarding the failure to satisfy the first test, Locke JA noted that the Crown did not become aware of the relevance of the additional evidence until six days before the hearing of the Tax Court motion, at which point there was no established procedure for introducing such evidence – but nonetheless found (at para. 14) that he was “not convinced that the appellant could not have sought, and possibly obtained, leave to put the evidence before the Tax Court.” In nonetheless allowing the new evidence, he stated (at paras. 21, 24): … I am conscious that the motion before the Tax Court was an interlocutory matter, and the respondent’s opportunity to adduce this evidence was limited because of the absence of a clear procedural mechanism for doing so. ...

In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that “in the settlement agreement, the reference to ‘consequential adjustments’ should be interpreted as only those adjustments that could be made under subsection 152(4.3) …, which would not include the restoration of income for his 1998 taxation year, as was done by the Minister” (para. 26), and that the Tax Court had not made reviewable error in finding that the settlement agreement allowed the Minister to make the implementing reassessment, Webb JA stated (at paras 25, 27): When the settlement was reached and the losses were recognized (subject to certain adjustments) and the carrying charges were allowed, this was, in effect, a recognition that the partnerships were valid partnerships. A further consequence of recognizing the partnerships as valid partnerships is that the amount of income that had been removed should be restored. … [T]he expression "consequential adjustment" does not appear anywhere in the text of subsection 152(4.3) of the Act, nor for that matter anywhere in the Act. ...

…I agree with the Respondent that the language of subsection 185(1) does preclude or exclude the possibility that the Minister may review more than one election or issue only one assessment dealing with multiple elections – particularly when those elections relate to dividends that have been declared and paid by the corporation in the same taxation year. … I find that the Court is bound by the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal in Carter, and Ginsberg, supra and that even if the Court was of the view that the assessment process involved an “inordinate” amount of time, as suggested by the Appellants, “there is no power in the court to vacate an assessment on the grounds that the Minister did not act with due dispatch.” ...

These transactions depended in part on the appellants being considered to have acquired units of an income fund ("FMO") from another income fund ("TOM") (which in turn had purportedly acquired the FMO units from an RRSP in consideration for issuing TOM units to it) at a cost equaling the units’ FMV, followed immediately by a distribution to them of capital gains that had been realized by FMO – with that distribution not reducing the ACB of their units by virtue of s. 53(2)(h)(i.1)(A) and (B)((I). ... The payment of a capital dividend by a corporation that has realized capital gains and capital losses in an equal amount, more or less, on the same day and before the capital dividends are declared, would defeat the “underlying rational of the provisions (…) in a manner that frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions”.... ...

Whether it was denied input tax refunds under the Quebec Sales Tax Act for the QST on its electricity purchases turned on whether it used the electricity “to produce movable property … intended for sale” within the meaning of s. 17(aa) of the Quebec Retail Sales Tax Act (“RSTA”) The Court of Quebec had followed C.R.I. ... In my view, this relief conferred a benefit on the Appellant and … constituted valuable consideration that may be characterized as "any other consideration" within the meaning of section 2(9) of the RSTA. ...

After having indicated (at para. 23) that the reasonableness of the letters turned on a test of whether there may be considered to be “a rational connection … between the information sought and the administration and enforcement of the ITA,” Fothergill J rejected a submission that the request letters sought foreign-based information and that they should have been issued under s. 231.6, stating (at paras. 37, 43): I am satisfied that Dr. ... Smith personally.... … I am not persuaded that the evidence in this case is so compelling that it was unreasonable for the Minister to proceed otherwise than under s. 231.6 of the ITA. ...

. … The fact that the agent and the principal are related companies does not change this principle. This was the case in Stubart …. As the trial judge concluded, we are dealing with clear contracts and uncontradicted evidence that confirm that the designation of the transactions as services agreements does reflect their true legal effects. ...

In rejecting this position, Monaghan JA stated (at para. 21) that the taxpayer “places far too much emphasis on the word ‘exact’ and gives insufficient weight to the word ‘demolish’ in … Hickman.” ... She went on to state (at para. 25): The purpose of pleading the assumption is to provide the appellant with notice of the case the appellant has to meet …. ...

However, effective January 1, 2019, the French tax on such income commenced to be imposed on a periodic basis during the year as it was earned, rather than being payable in the year following that in which it was earned – and as a result of a transitional relief measure, in 2019 the taxpayer received a credit to offset the French tax otherwise payable in arrears in 2019 on his 2018 rental income. ... Regarding “context” and “purpose” she stated (at paras. 63, 67): [T]he taxation year covered by the foreign tax credit provisions must be the same taxation year for which the taxable income and taxes payable in Canada are determined and computed. … The purpose of section 126 is to avoid double taxation where foreign source income is taxed both in Canada and abroad. ...

“[T]he objective pursued by Parliament in enacting Part II of Schedule VI … appears to have been to alleviate the economic burden on persons with disabilities or impairments for whom such devices are a necessity, a social objective which argues for a generous interpretation of Section 9.” ... (para. 49) He noted that the appellant after the reporting periods in issue had commenced requiring customers to certify that they had the prescription in their possession – and, regarding this customer attestation requirement, stated (at para. 85) that: [I]t is not for this Court, in this context, to measure its impact on the burden imposed on the appellant. ...